20 Amendments of Anna-Michelle ASIMAKOPOULOU related to 2022/2040(INI)
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 a (new)
Citation 5 a (new)
— having regard to the Proposal for a Regulation establishing a Single Market Emergency Instrument and repealing Council Regulation (EC) 2679/98
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
E a. Whereas the EU is pursuing a number of legislative initiatives that seek to boost our supply chain resilience, such as the Battery Regulation, the Single Market Emergency Instrument, The Chips Act, the Critical Raw Materials Act, and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive;
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. Strongly believes that the anticipated Critical Raw Materials Act can contribute positively to the EU’s long- term commitment to foster more resilient supply chains;
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4 b. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Critical Raw Materials Act addresses key problems of access to funding and investment for extraction and processing projects; Strongly believes that the Critical Raw Materials legislation should include an associated EU Fund that can assist in leveraging finance for strategically important projects, both inside and outside of the EU; Believes that such funding should be made available as soon as possible;
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 c (new)
Paragraph 4 c (new)
4 c. Notes that China dominates the supply and processing of many strategically important critical raw materials, including rare earths; Notes that China is the largest supplier for nearly one third of the EU’s identified Critical Raw Materials; Expresses concern about previous attempts by China to weaponize these dependencies;
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 d (new)
Paragraph 4 d (new)
4 d. Reiterates that Critical Raw Materials are key to achieving the Green and Digital transitions and that demand for these materials is set to dramatically increase in the coming decades;
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 e (new)
Paragraph 4 e (new)
4 e. Believes that improved recycling rates, greater circularity in the economy, and further research into substitute materials can all play arole in meeting this rising demand; Reiterates, however, that this alone will not be sufficient, and that new primary production of critical raw materials will be necessary to keep pace with demand;
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 f (new)
Paragraph 4 f (new)
4 f. Notes that many materials, which are key to attaining the EU’s resilience in strategic sectors do not feature in the EU’s current Critical Raw Materials list; Calls on the Commission to address this as part of its upcoming Critical Raw Materials Act, particularly for strategic materials such as Aluminium, Cooper, and Nickel;
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 g (new)
Paragraph 4 g (new)
4 g. Calls on the Commission to prioritise policies aimed at retaining and developing our existing levels of primary production of strategic materials; Notes with concern the impact of the current energy crisis on primary production in the EU in these sectors; Notes that 50% of the EU’s aluminium and zinc capacity are already offline, while Silicon production is 30% offline; Highlights the importance of these materials to key strategic EU projects like the Solar Energy Strategy, the Chips Act, and the transition to Electric Vehicles.
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 h (new)
Paragraph 4 h (new)
4 h. Notes the need for the EU to develop a more cohesive strategy in its bid to achieve a degree of strategic autonomy in the field of Critical Raw Materials supply; Expresses concern that these ambitions are often siloed within individual units of the Commission or pursued via targeted, flagship projects; Believes that a dedicated EU agency on Critical Raw Materials and Resilient Supply Chains could overcome this challenge;
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Suggests that future investment and trade agreements of the EU with relevant third countries, shall make collaboration in the field of semiconductors and along the entire semiconductor supply chain a key priority; Calls on the Commission to launch a public consultation, impact assessment, and scoping exercise for a Bilateral Investment Agreement with Taiwan;
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5 b. Notes that the implementation of the proposed toolbox has to be guided by the principles of confidentiality and proportionality. Furthermore, it shall avoid any additional administrative burden for businesses, in particular SMEs, or protective measures that hamper trade relations more broadly;
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 c (new)
Paragraph 5 c (new)
5 c. Believes that in a globalised world characterized by complex international value chains, European resilience must be based on well-functioning multilateral and bilateral trade regimes.
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 d (new)
Paragraph 5 d (new)
5 d. Highlights that any new initiative to improve the salience of supply chains (such as the Chips Act or the Single Market Emergency Instrument) proposed by the European Commission must comply with Union law, the WTO Agreement and be consistent with commitments made under other trade and investment agreements to which the Union or the Member States are party;
Amendment 107 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 e (new)
Paragraph 5 e (new)
5 e. Recognizes that the EU needs to shorten supply chains and re-shore essential production procedures to increase resilience and its strategic autonomy; calls on the Commission and Member States to reinforce measures that have a rapid effect on the reindustrialisation of Europe and create future-proof jobs by working with international partners in order to remove existing barriers to global competition and revive free trade.
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. Calls on the Commission to review whether it can make greater use of its trade defence tools to target unfair, state- subsidies provided by non-market economies; Highlights the case of the Aluminium industry, where between 2013 and 2017, the OECD found that 85% of global subsidies in the sector were channelled to just five Chinese companies;
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)
Paragraph 8 b (new)
8 b. Calls on the Commission to examine innovative solutions that can increase electricity intensive industries’ access to renewable energy sources; Calls on the Commission to consider new approaches to Power Purchase Agreements, such as the “Green Pool” initiative being pioneered by Greece;
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13 a. Welcomes the EU’s first Strategic Partnerships for Critical Raw Materials as signed with Canada and Ukraine in 2021; Calls on the Commission to swiftly conclude similar agreements with other key partners; Welcomes existing commitments from the Commission to pursue such agreements with a number of partners, including Norway and Namibia; Recognises the strong role that they can play in diversifying supply chains and facilitating investment opportunities;
Amendment 162 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)
Paragraph 13 b (new)
13 b. Welcomes the commitment between the European Union and the United States to develop a Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium, aimed at addressing issues of subsidies and overcapacity from non- market actors; Calls on the Commission to intensify its engagement with the United States on this arrangement;
Amendment 194 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20 a. Believes that the Global Gateway can play a key role in contributing to the EU’s bid to diversify its supply chains, particularly in the area of critical raw material processing projects; Highlights the benefits that this can bring to the EU, but also to third countries looking to develop their own values chains;