Activities of Clare DALY related to 2023/2072(INI)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union
Amendments (17)
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 9
Citation 9
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the European Union remains committed to the 'One-China' policy and recognises the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China;
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas in direct response to the coercive policies and theof the US there is a growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its aggressive stance towards Taiwan, as well as the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities and reaffirmed the need to ‘de-risk’ its relations vis-à-vis the PRC and other non-democratic third countriesresponse to aggressive provocations by the US in Taiwan;
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas China’s acquisition of criticalinvestment in infrastructure, especially in the EU’s neighbourhood, including the Western Balkans, poses an increasing risk to the trade-security nexusopportunites for incresed trade and development links between the EU and China;
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Underlines that China’s military- civil fusion (MCF) strategy is a state-led, state-directed programme and plan to instrumentalise all levers of state and commercial power to strengthen and support the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP);
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that China’s party-driven political system and planned economy often require private companies to align their commercial interests within the CCP’s military, repression and political interference activities; highlights that, consequentially, Chinese companiscope of China's economic reform programmes’ international activities help the CCP to expand its influence over foreign countries and undermine geopolitical rivals order to protect the national interest;
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger political and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road); believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to advance China’s long-term strategic goal to become the world’s leading powthe increasing threats and provocations, military and economic emanating from the United States; believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to ensure that China is capable of defending its soverignity and strategic interests in its immediate periphery;
Amendment 59 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2 a (new)
Subheading 2 a (new)
Notes that while China can already compete with the United States military across a range of military fields, a hegemonic military presence is dependant on the ability to project power across the world through military bases and military equipment, the United States, with its hundreds of bases and military equipment encircling the globe poses a far greater threat than any other military power on earth;
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors; and that in light of the severity of the climate crisis and the need for international cooperation at an unprecedented scale in order to tackle the crisis, China's advances in these areas of mining and processing present huge opportunities for collaboration on green infrstructure and that duplication of efforts and compitition in these areas of economic activity will be counterproductive, potentially having disasterous results for the economy of the EU and the future of life on earth;
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and reduce its dependencies on countries like the PRC that are systemic rivals, not strategic partners; stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items from being leaked to destinations of concern that pursue or collaborate in MCF strategies;
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to map, track and assess China’s access to critical infrastructure in the EU; stresses that the Member States are ultimately responsible for infrastructure protection, but have not consistently implemented current guidelines on foreign direct investment or set up national-level investment-screening mechanisms;
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission’s proposals and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF;
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Further welcomes the Commission’s proposal to prevent the leakage of sensitive emerging technologies by establishing a list of dual-use technologies, based on narrowly defined and forward-looking criteria, such as the potential enabling and transformative nature of a technology, the risk of MCF and the risk of the technology being misused to violate human rights; calls on the Commission and the Member States to identify and implement the relevant protection measures for these dual-use technologies as soon as possible;
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as China; calls for further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and material within the EU;
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Calls on the Commission to propose a new legislative framework to mitigate the security risks coming from the suppliers of undersea cable systems; stresses the need to prevent cable system suppliers, such as Chinese companies, from sharing data with intelligence services other than to protect the infrastructure from outside intrusions or malignant attacks;
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Recalls that in order to ensure climate and economic resiliance of all countries, the UN states that all countries and all sectors of society need to act now; empasises that increasing great power competition in the military and economic spheres is directly contrary to the interests of humanity at the present conjuncture, and that in the interests of stability and the sustainable survial of the human species we need increased international cooperation across all sectors; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that all measures are taken to advance international cooperation on climate action;