6 Amendments of Rob ROOKEN related to 2021/0214(COD)
Amendment 144 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
Recital 8
(8) As long as a significant number of the Union’s international partners have policy approaches that do not result in the same level of climate ambition, there is a risk of carbon leakage. Carbon leakage occurs if, for reasons of costs related to climate policies, businesses in certain industry sectors or subsectors were to transfer production to other countries or imports from those countries would replace equivalent but less GHG emissions intensive products. That could lead to an increase in their total emissions globally, thus jeopardising the reduction of GHG emissions that is urgently needed if the world is to keep the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre- industrial levels. There are concerns, however, that CBAM would promote the substitution of EU sales in third markets by non-EU output, thereby not only damaging Union's economy, but also fostering another form of “carbon leakage”, since European producers emit substantially less carbon per unit of production than producers elsewhere do, which in particular applies to commodities.
Amendment 152 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
Recital 9
(9) The initiative for a carbon border adjustment mechanism (‘CBAM’) is a part of the ‘Fit for 55 Package’. That mechanism is to serve as an essential element of the EU toolbox to meet the objective of a climate-neutral Union by 2050 in line with the Paris Agreement by addressing risks of carbon leakage resulting from the increased Union climate ambition. However, CBAM might be more costly for EU economies, which are more integrated with the rest of the world. In addition, there are concerns about the combination of ETS, including the gradual deletion of free allowances, and CBAM, which is likely to make EU businesses lose competitiveness and decrease global sales due to replacement by production elsewhere in the world. As a consequence, global production of CBAM goods might move to countries with lower carbon costs and where carbon intensity in production is higher.
Amendment 164 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9 a (new)
Recital 9 a (new)
(9a) There is a significant concern that the introduction of CBAM will lead to a Europe that increasingly produces for itself, thereby damaging its own economy without there being a positive impact on the net-effect for global carbon emissions.
Amendment 244 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
Recital 12
(12) While the objective of the CBAM is to prevent the risk of carbon leakage, this Regulation would also encourage the use of more GHG emissions-efficient technologies by producers from thirdCBAM is unlikely to provide a profound incentive for other countries to introduce their own systems of carbon pricing, once they realise that the global economy is gradually shifting away from the Union towards emerging and middle- income countries, so and that less emissions per unit of output are generatedsuch a system would damage their total export and domestic consumption.
Amendment 276 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 b (new)
Recital 13 b (new)
(13b) Trade retaliation can have the aim to hit the Union where it would hurt the most. The Union, due to its climate ambitions, will increasingly be dependent on raw materials such as rare earth, lithium, cobalt, graphite. There is a risk that CBAM might lead to expensive restrictions on these much needed commodities and to increasing the Union's geopolitical vulnerability.
Amendment 279 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 c (new)
Recital 13 c (new)
(13c) CBAM not only increases the possibility of international trade conflicts, but promotes indirectly market distorting subsidies in third countries, thereby further damaging global trade rules substantially.