35 Amendments of Antonio Maria RINALDI related to 2023/0111(COD)
Amendment 64 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) The intensity, and level of detail, of the resolution planning work needed with respect to subsidiaries that have not been identified as resolution entities varies depending on the size and risk profile of the institutions and entities concerned, the presence of critical functions, and the group resolution strategy. The Single Resolution Board (the ‘Board’) should therefore be able to consider those factors when identifying the measures to be taken in respect of such subsidiaries and follow a simplified approach where appropriateit should be able to decide to follow a simplified approach, after consulting with the respective national authority, where appropriate, as long as the simplified approach does not, under any circumstances, result in a reduction of required standards.
Amendment 68 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) The level of the MREL for resolution entities is the sum of the amount of the losses expected in resolution and the recapitalisation amount that enables the resolution entity to continue to comply with its conditions for authorisation and enabling it to pursue its activities for an appropriate period. Certain preferred resolution strategies entail the transfer of assets, rights and liabilities to a recipient and market exit, in particular the sale of business tool. In those cases, the objectives pursued by the recapitalisation component might not apply to the same extent as in the case of an open-bank bail-in strategy, because the Board will not be required to ensure that the resolution entity restores compliance with its own funds requirements after resolution action. Nevertheless, the losses in such cases are expected to exceed the resolution entity’s own funds requirements. It is therefore appropriate to lay down that the level of the MREL of those resolution entities continues to include a recapitalisation amount that is adjusted in a way which is proportionate to the resolution strategy.
Amendment 71 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) Where the resolution strategy envisages the use of resolution tools other than bail-in, the recapitalisation needs of the entity concerned will generally be smaller after resolution than in case of open bank bail-in. The calibration of the MREL in such a case should take that aspect into account when estimating the recapitalisation requirement. Therefore, when adjusting the level of the MREL for resolution entities the resolution plan of which envisages the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and, optionally, its exit from the market, the Board should take into account the features of those tools, including the expected perimeter of the transfer to the private purchaser or to the bridge institution, the types of instruments to be transferred, the expected value and marketability of those instruments, and the design of the preferred resolution strategy, including the complementary use of the asset separation tool. Since the resolution authority has to decide on a case by case basis on any possible use in resolution of funds from the deposit guarantee scheme and since such decision cannot be assumed with certainty ex ante, the Board should not consider the potential contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme (in resolution when calibrating the level of the MREL.
Amendment 78 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
Recital 17
(17) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentiallymanage the failure of any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business mod that has a positive public interest assessment, namely, ifwhen the tools available under national law are not adequate to manage its failure. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to any failing institution or entity should be specified.
Amendment 83 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
Recital 18
(18) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect, among other factors, the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme funds are used more efficiently and the losses for those funds are minimised. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, the resolution objective of protecting depositors should be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more costly for the deposit guarantee schemefollowing a holistic evaluation.
Amendment 90 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
Recital 19
(19) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided throughprioritisation of using industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand,instead of funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money, except for extraordinary circumstances of a systemic nature or pertaining to very large economic turmoil. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline. Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, the Board should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the deposit guarantee scheme, preferable to funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States.
Amendment 94 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20
Recital 20
(20) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the outcome of the public interest assessment should be negative only whereconsider whether the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives more effectively and not only to the same extent as resolution.
Amendment 99 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
Recital 21
(21) In light of the experience acquired in the implementation of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/49/EU, it is necessary to specify further the conditions under which measures of a precautionary nature that qualify as extraordinary public financial support may exceptionally be granted. To minimise distortions of competition arising from differences in nature of deposit guarantee schemes in the Union, interventions of such schemes in the context of preventive measures complying with the requirements laid down in Directive 2014/49/EU that qualify as extraordinary public financial support should exceptionally be allowed where the beneficiary institution or entity does not meet any of the conditions for being deemed ashas been not declared failing or likely to fail. It should be ensured that precautionary measures are taken sufficiently early failing or likely to fail. It should be ensured that precautionary measures are taken sufficiently early. The ECB currently bases its consideration that an institution or entity is solvent, for the purposes of precautionary recapitalisation, on a forward-looking assessment for the following 12 months of whether the institution or entity can comply with the own funds requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, and the additional own funds requirement laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive (EU) 2019/2034. That practice should be laid downrevised in Regulation (EU) No 806/2014. Moreover, measures to provide relief for impaired assets, including asset management vehicles or asset guarantee schemes, can prove effective and efficient in addressing causes of possible financial distress faced by institutions and entities and preventing their failure and could therefore constitute relevant precautionary measures. It should therefore be specified that such precautionary measures can take the form of impaired asset measures.
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
Recital 23
(23) Precautionary recapitalisation is aimed at supporting viable institutions and entities identified as likely to encounter temporary difficulties in the near future and to prevent their situation from deteriorating further. To avoid that public subsidies are granted to businesses that are already unprofitable when the support is granted, precautionary measures granted in the form of acquisition of own funds instruments or other capital instruments or through impaired asset measures should not exceed the amount necessary to cover capital shortfalls as identified in the adverse scenario of a stress test or equivalent exercise. To ensure that public financing is ultimately discontinued, those precautionary measures should also be limited in time and contain a clear timeline for their termination (exit strategy). Perpetual instruments, including Common Equity Tier 1 capital, should only be used in exceptional circumstances and be subject to certain quantitative limits because by their nature they are not well suited for compliance with the condition of temporariness.
Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24
Recital 24
(24) Precautionary measures should be limited to the amount that the institution or entity would need to maintain its solvency in case of an adverse scenario event as determined in a stress test or equivalent exercise. In the case of precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures, the receiving institution or entity should be able to use that amount to cover losses on the transferred assets or in combination with an acquisition of capital instruments, provided that the overall amount of the shortfall identified is not exceeded. It is also necessary to ensure that such precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures comply with existing State aid rules and best practices, that they restore the institution or entity's long-term viability, that State aid is limited to the minimum necessary and that distortions of competition are avoided. For those reasons, the authorities concerned should, in case of precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures, take into account the specific guidance, including the AMC Blueprint35 and the Communication on Tackling Non- Performing Loans36 . Those precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures should also always be subject to the overriding condition of temporariness. Public guarantees granted for a specified period in relation to the impaired assets of the institution or entity concerned are expected to ensure better compliance with the temporariness condition than transfers of such assets to a publicly supported entity. To ensure the market exit of institutions and entities that prove not to be viable, despite the support received, it is necessary to lay down that non- compliance by the institution or entity concerned with the terms of the support measures specified at the time such measures were granted is to result in the institution or entity concerned being considered failing or likely to fail. __________________ 35 COM(2018) 133 final. 36 COM(2020) 822 final.
Amendment 107 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 35
Recital 35
Amendment 113 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 40 a (new)
Recital 40 a (new)
(40a) Given the creditor hierarchy review, market conditions might not be as favourable to deposit guarantee schemes that seek such alternative funding arrangements. Therefore, to prevent temporary financing by the Member States, and to ensure that it remains a last resort, the Board should be able to provide either a credit line or a guarantee based on the Single Resolution Fund to a deposit guarantee scheme in order to facilitate its access to markets at favourable financing conditions. The Single Resolution Fund's support should be provided when the deposit guarantee scheme is required to intervene in resolution, yet available financial means are insufficient to satisfy the needs of such action.
Amendment 122 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point c a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point c a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 55 a (new)
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 55 a (new)
Amendment 131 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 8 – paragraph 10 – subparagraph 3
Article 8 – paragraph 10 – subparagraph 3
The identification of the measures to be taken in respect of the subsidiaries referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b), that are not resolution entities may be subject to a simplified approach by the Board, after consulting with the relevant national resolution authority, and if such approach would not negatively affect the resolvability of the group, taking into account the size of the subsidiary, its risk profile, the absence of critical functions and the group resolution strategy.;
Amendment 148 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operatability to access the capital markets for eligible liabilities;
Amendment 155 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
(ea) whether any contribution by a deposit guarantee scheme is expected to be made pursuant to Article 79.’
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12da – paragraph 2
Article 12da – paragraph 2
Amendment 186 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 13c – paragraph 4 – introductory part
Article 13c – paragraph 4 – introductory part
4. TAfter having received the notification referred to in paragraph 2, the Board shall have the power to market to potential purchasers, or make arrangements for such marketing, the entity referred to in Article 7(2), or the entity referred to in Article 7(4), point (b), and Article 7(5) where the conditions for the application of those provisions are met or require the entity to do so, for the following purposes:
Amendment 198 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d
(d) to protect depositors while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;
Amendment 203 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 14 – paragraph 2a (new)
Article 14 – paragraph 2a (new)
(17a) in Article 14, the following paragraph 2a is inserted: "2a. Subject to different provisions of this Regulation, the resolution objectives are of equal significance, and resolution authorities shall balance them as appropriate to the nature and circumstances of each case. For the purposes of Article 18(5), the objectives of preserving financial stability and protecting depositors pursuant to points (b) and (d) of paragraph 2, respectively, shall be deemed to be more significant than other resolution objectives.’;
Amendment 209 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 2
Article 18 – paragraph 2
2. Without prejudice to cases where the ECB has decided to exercise directly supervisory tasks relating to credit institutions pursuant to Article 6(5), point (b) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, in the event of receipt of a communication pursuant to paragraph 1 in relationPrior to determining an institution failing or likely to fail, the relevant authority referred to ain entity or group as referred to in Article 7(3), the Board shall communicate its assessment as referred to paragraph 1, fourth subparagraph, to the ECB or the relevant national competent authority withoutthe second subparagraph of Article 18(1) shall examine whether there exist measures, including alternative private sector measures, supervisory action or early intervention measures, which can avoid the failing or likely to fail declayration.
Amendment 213 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 14(3), that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in that Article 14, and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectively. to the same extent.
Amendment 216 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1a (new)
Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1a (new)
When carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, pursuant to Articles 8(2), 9(2) and 12d(2), the Board, in order to assess the appropriateness of the resolution for the institution, considers the following elements: (a) the prevalence of deposits and the absence of debt instruments in the funding model; (b) the access to the capital markets for eligible liabilities; (c) the extent to which the institution relies on Common Equity Tier 1 capital to meet its capital requirements.
Amendment 222 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
When carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board, based on thepursuant to Articles 8(2), 9(2) and 12d(2), the Board, inf ormation available to it at the time of that assessment, shall consider and compare all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the entity, both in the event of resolution and inder to assess the appropriateness of the resolution for the institution, considers the following elements: (a) the prevalence of deposits and the absence of debt instruments in the funding model; (b) the access to the capital markets for eligible liabilities; (c) the evxtent of winding up in accordance with the applicable national lawto which the institution relies on Common Equity Tier 1 capital to meet its capital requirements.;
Amendment 242 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the measures are of a precautionary and temporary nature and are based on a pre-defined exit strategy approved by the ECB or the relevant national competent authority, including a clearly specified termination date, sale date or repayment schedule for any of the measures provided;
Amendment 246 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), an entity shall be deemed to be solvent where the ECB or the relevant national competent authority have concluded that no breach has occurred, or is likely to occur in the 12 following months, of any of the requirements referred to in Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, Article 40 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 or the relevant applicable requirements under national or Union law.
Amendment 247 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a (new)
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a (new)
The ECB or the relevant national competent authority may deem an entity to be solvent where they determine that a breach of the requirements referred to in the second subparagraph is temporary in nature, taking into account the specific circumstances of each case, and provided that the entity can demonstrate a reasonable plan for the remedy of the breach within an appropriate timeframe, as determined by the ECB or the relevant national competent authority.
Amendment 251 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5
Amendment 255 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6
In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the ECB or the relevant national competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 18(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures and shall communicate that assessment to the Commission and to the Board, in accordance with Article 18(1), third subparagraphrequest the institution or entity to submit a remediation plan describing the steps to be taken in order to ensure or restore compliance with supervisory requirements, its long-term viability and to repay the amount provided, as well as the associated timeframe.;
Amendment 256 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Where the ECB or the relevant national competent authority does not recognise the remediation plan as credible or feasible, or where the institution or entity fails to comply with the remediation plan, an assessment of whether the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail shall be conducted in accordance with Article 18.
Amendment 258 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18a – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 18a – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. The ECB or the relevant national competent authority shall inform the Board of its assessment whether the conditions referred to in paragraph 2, points (a), (b) and (d), with respect to the entities and groups referred to in Article 7(2), and to the entities and groups referred to in Article 7(4), point (b), and Article 7(5) are met.
Amendment 259 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 2 b (new)
Article 18 – paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, point (d), the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) can be used to offset losses that the institution or entity is likely to incur in the near future where an exception to the burden-sharing requirement is made under Union State aid framework.
Amendment 260 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Where resolution action involves the granting of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU or of Fund aid in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, the resolution scheme referred to in Article 18(6) of this Regulation shall not enter into force until such time when the Commission adopts a positive or conditional decision, or a decision not to raise objections, concerning the compatibility of the use of such aid with the internal market, while taking into consideration the need for timely execution of the resolution scheme by the Board. The Commission shall take the decision concerning the compatibility of the use of State aid or of Fund aid with the internal market at the latest when it endorses or objects to the resolution scheme pursuant to Article 18(7), second subparagraph, or when the period of 24 hours referred to in Article 18(7), fifth subparagraph, expires, whichever is earlier. In the absence of such decision within 24 hours from the transmission of the resolution scheme by the Board, the resolution scheme shall be deemed authorised by the Commission and shall enter into force in accordance with Article 18(7), fifth subparagraph.
Amendment 292 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 37 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 37 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 70 – paragraph 3
Article 70 – paragraph 3
3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 69 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low-risk assets unencumbered by any third- party rights, at the free disposal of and earmarked for the exclusive use by the Board for the purposes specified in Article 76(1). The share of those irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 530 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. Within that limit, the Board shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;
Amendment 325 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 2
Article 2 – paragraph 2
It shall apply from … [OP please insert the date = 1824 months from the date of entry into force of this amending Regulation].