16 Amendments of Eero HEINÄLUOMA related to 2023/0111(COD)
Amendment 60 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect to some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to. Failures of certain smaller and medium- sized institutions and entities are instead mostly addressed through unharmonised national measures. Taxpayer money is used rather than resolution financing arrangements. That situation appears to arise from inadequate incentives. Those inadequate incentives result from the interplay of the Union resolution framework with national rules, whereby the broad discretion in the public interest assessment is not always exercised in a way that reflects how the Union resolution framework was intended to apply. At the same time, the Union resolution framework saw little use due to the risks for depositors of deposit-funded institutions to bear losses to ensure that those institutions can access external funding in resolution, in particular in the absence of other bail-inable liabilities. Finally, the fact that there are less stringent rules on access to funding outside resolution than in resolution has discouraged the application of the Union resolution framework in favour of other solutions, which often entail the use of taxpayers’ money instead of the own resources of the institution or entity or industry-funded safety nets. That situation in turn generates risks of fragmentation, risks of suboptimal outcomes in managing institutions and entities’ failures, in particular in the case of smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities, and opportunity costs from unused financial resources. It is therefore necessary to ensure a more effective and coherent application of the Union resolution framework and to ensure that it can be applied whenever that is in the public interest, including for smaller and medium- sized institutions primarily funded through deposits and without sufficient other bail-inable liabilities.
Amendment 69 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) The level of the MREL for resolution entities is the sum of the amount of the losses expected in resolution and the recapitalisation amount that enables the resolution entity to continue to comply with its conditions for authorisation and enabling it to pursue its activities for an appropriate period. Certain preferred resolution strategies entail the transfer of assets, rights and liabilities to a recipient and market exit, in particular the sale of business tool. In those cases, the objectives pursued by the recapitalisation component might not apply to the same extent as in the case of an open-bank bail-in strategy, because the Board will not be required to ensure that the resolution entity restores compliance with its own funds requirements after resolution action. Nevertheless, the losses in such cases are expected to exceed the resolution entity’s own funds requirements. It is therefore appropriate to lay down that the level of the MREL of those resolution entities continues to include a recapitalisation amount that is adjusted in a way which is proportionate tosupports the resolution strategy.
Amendment 87 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
Recital 19
Amendment 106 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31
Recital 31
(31) In certain circumstances, after the Single Resolution Fund has provided a contribution up to the maximum of 5 % of the institution or entity’s total liabilities including own funds, the Board may use additional sources of funding to further support their resolution action. It should be specified more clearly in which circumstances the Single Resolution Fund may provide further support where all liabilities with a priority ranking lower than deposits that are not mandatorily or discretionarily excluded from bail-in have been written down or converted in full.
Amendment 190 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 13c – paragraph 7
Article 13c – paragraph 7
7. The Board shall inform the Commission, the ECB, the relevant national competent authorities and the relevant national resolution authorities and the relevant national ministries of any action taken pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 without delay.
Amendment 191 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
The ECB, the national competent authorities, the Board and the relevant national resolution authorities and the relevant national ministries shall closely cooperate:
Amendment 193 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point c
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, in particular when provided from the budget of a Member State;
Amendment 199 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d
(d) to protect depositors while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemescovered by Directive 2014/49/EU, and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;
Amendment 224 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
When carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, shall consider and compare all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the entity, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.; If liquidation aid is expected to be granted in winding up the institution according to the national law, the resolution action shall be assessed to be in the public interest.
Amendment 231 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18a – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 18a – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Extraordinary public financial support outside of resolution action may be granted to an entity as referred to in Article 2 on an exceptional basis only in one of the following cases and provided that the extraordinary public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework and such support is implemented in the legislation of the Member State:
Amendment 235 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part
Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part
(a) where, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State orand to preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms:
Amendment 243 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d
(d) the measures are not used to offset losses that the entity has incurred or is likely to incur inover the near futurext 12 months.
Amendment 249 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (d), the relevant competent authority shall quantify the losses that the entity has incurred or is likely to incur. That quantification shall be based, as a minimum, on the institution’s balance sheet, provided that the balance sheet complies with the applicable accounting rules and standards, as confirmed by an independent external auditor, and, where available, on asset quality reviews conducted by the ECB, EBA or national authorities orasset quality reviews conducted by the ECB, the EBA or national authorities or, where appropriate, on on-site inspections conducted by the ECB or the relevant national competent authority. Where such exercises cannot be undertaken in due time, wthere appropriate, on on- sit competent authority can base its evaluation on the inspectitution’s conducted by the ECB or the relevant national competent authoritybalance sheet, provided that the balance sheet complies with the applicable accounting rules and standards, as confirmed by an independent external auditor.
Amendment 261 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 19 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 7
Article 19 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 7
The Commission mayshall issue a negative decision, addressed to the Board, where it decides that the proposed use of the Fund would be incompatible with the internal market and cannot be implemented in the form proposed by the Board. On receipt of such a decision the Board shall reconsider its resolution scheme and prepare a revised resolution scheme.;
Amendment 272 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 27 – paragraph 7 – point a
Article 27 – paragraph 7 – point a
(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 20(1) to (15), has been made by shareholders, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write-down, or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU and Article 21(10) of this Regulation, and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 79 of this Regulation and Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU where relevant;
Amendment 278 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 27 – paragraph 9 – point b
Article 27 – paragraph 9 – point b
(b) all liabilities ranking lower than deposits, and not excluded from bail-in pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5unsecured, non-preferred liabilities other than eligible deposits, have been written down or converted in full.