14 Amendments of Eero HEINÄLUOMA related to 2023/0112(COD)
Amendment 39 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect of some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to. Failures of certain smaller and medium- sized institutions and entities are instead mostly addressed through unharmonised national measures. Taxpayer money is used rather than resolution financing arrangements. That situation appears to arise from inadequate incentives. Those inadequate incentives result from the interplay of the Union resolution framework with national rules, whereby the broad discretion in the public interest assessment is not always exercised in a way that reflects how the Union resolution framework was intended to apply. At the same time, the Union resolution framework saw little use due to the risks for depositors of deposit-funded institutions to bear losses to ensure that those institutions can access external funding in resolution, in particular in the absence of other bail-inable liabilities. Finally, the fact that there are less stringent rules on access to funding outside resolution than in resolution has discouraged the application of the Union resolution framework in favour of other solutions, which often entail the use of taxpayers’ money instead of the own resources of the institution and entity or industry-funded safety nets. That situation, in turn, generates risks of fragmentation, risks of suboptimal outcomes in managing institutions and entities’ failures, in particular in the case of smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities, and opportunity costs from unused financial resources. It is therefore necessary to ensure a more effective and coherent application of the Union resolution framework and to ensure that it can be applied whenever that is in the public interest, including for certain smaller and medium-sized institutions primarily funded through deposits and without sufficient other bail-inable liabilities.
Amendment 53 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
Recital 10
Amendment 69 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
Recital 12
Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 26
Recital 26
(26) In certain circumstances, after the resolution financing arrangement has provided a contribution up to the maximum of 5 % of the institution or entity’s total liabilities including own funds, resolution authorities may use additional sources of funding to further support their resolution action. It should be specified more clearly in which circumstances the resolution financing arrangement may provide further support where all liabilities with a priority ranking lower than deposits that are not mandatorily or discretionarily excluded from bail-in have been written down or converted in full.
Amendment 92 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 29
Recital 29
(29) The level of the MREL for resolution entities is the sum of the amount of the losses expected in resolution and the recapitalisation amount that enable the resolution entity to continue to comply with its conditions for authorisation and enabling it to pursue its activities for the appropriate period. Certain preferred resolution strategies entail the transfer of assets, rights and liabilities to a recipient and market exit, in particular the sale of business tool. In those cases, the objectives pursued by the recapitalisation component might not apply to the same extent, because the resolution authority will not be required to ensure that the resolution entity restores compliance with its own funds requirements after resolution action. Nevertheless, the losses in such cases are expected to exceed the resolution entity’s own funds requirements. It is therefore appropriate to lay down that the level of the MREL of those resolution entities continues to include a recapitalisation amount that is adjusted in a way that is proportionate tosupports the resolution strategy.
Amendment 110 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 38
Recital 38
Amendment 129 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 41
Recital 41
Amendment 135 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 43
Recital 43
Amendment 238 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31– paragraph 2 – point c
Article 31– paragraph 2 – point c
(c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, in particular when provided from the budget of a Member State;
Amendment 273 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.; If liquidation aid is expected to be granted in winding up the institution according to the national law, the resolution action shall be assessed to be in the public interest.
Amendment 299 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part
(a) where, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State orand to preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms:
Amendment 325 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (d), the relevant competent authority shall quantify the losses that the institution or entity has incurred or is likely to incur. That quantification shall be based, as a minimum, on the institution or entity’s balance sheet, provided that the balance sheet complies with the applicable accounting rules and standards, aasset quality reviews conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities, or, where appropriate, on on-site inspections confirmducted by an independentthe competent authority. Where such external auditor, andcises cannot be undertaken in due time, wthere available, o competent authority can basset quality reviews conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities, or, where appropriate, on on- site inspectione its evaluation on the institution or entity’s balance sheet, provided that the balance sheet complies with the applicable accounting rules and standards, as conductfirmed by the competent authorityan independent external auditor.
Amendment 430 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:
Amendment 463 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109
Article 109