Activities of Juozas OLEKAS related to 2023/2072(INI)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union
Amendments (17)
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the recent joint communication on a European economic security strategy focuses on managing and minimising the risks arising from certain economic flows in the context of increased geopolitical tensions and accelerated technological shifts, while preserving maximum economic openness and dynamism;
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas in 2021-22, China engaged in economic blockade against Lithuania in response to Lithuania's decision to withdraw from Belt and Road Initiative and to open Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania, resulting in the European Commission's request to establish a panel at the World Trade Organization to examine the legality of China's trade restrictions against Lithuanian and EU exports containing Lithuanian content; this demonstrates China's assertiveness in targeting specific EU countries, not only through direct economic coercion, but also through the threat of secondary sanctions;
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Underlines that China’s military- civil fusion (MCF) strategy is a state-led, state-directed programme and plan to instrumentalise all levers of state and commercial power to strengthen and support the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCPChinese Communist Party (CCP) and its armed wing People’s Liberation Army (PLA);
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that China’s party-driven political system and economy often require private companies to align their commercial interests with the CCP’, including in its military, repression, influence and political interference activities; highlights that, consequentially, Chinese companies’ international activities help the CCP to expand its influence over foreign countries and undermine geopolitical rivals;
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger geopolitical, economic and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road) and the Global Security Initiative; believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to advance China’s long-term strategic goal to become the world’s leading power; in terms of political influence, economic capacities, technological dominance and military might;
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors as well as its open strategic autonomy;
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Recalls that both diplomatic and military communication travels through privately owned undersea cables provided by Chinese companies, such as HMN Technologies, a PLA cyber intelligence– affiliated entity, facilitate diplomatic and military communication; expresses its grave concern over the undersea data cable systems operated by Chinese company HMN Technologies, which connect EU Member States’ territories and the Indo- Pacific region, including Member State and NATO military bases in the region, creating security vulnerabilities as regards underwater surveillance and the, data collection, and gathering of intelligence;
Amendment 85 #
7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s open strategic autonomy and reduce its dependencies on non-democratic countries like the PRC that are systemic rivals, not strategic partners; stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items especially those which are critical to the security and defence of the Union from being leaked to destinations of concern that pursue or collaborate in MCF strategies;
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Remains concerned that European critical infrastructure is becoming increasingly vulnerable to external influence; commends, in this respect, recent legislative steps to enhance the resilience of critical entities in the EU; notes with concern, however, that such initiatives are largely limited to screening procedures for foreign direct investment, leaving other channels open for the CCP to gain access and influence over critical assets, including through elite capture, technology and intellectual property transfers, supply chain and sales market dependencies, and therefore calls for the expansion of these legislative initiatives to address such risks;
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited only to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to map, track and assess China’s , and other third countries’access to critical infrastructure in the EU and to jointly proceed with mitigating measures where necessary; stresses that the Member States are ultimately responsible for infrastructure protection, but have not consistently implemented current guidelines on foreign direct investment or set up national-level investment-screening mechanisms; calls in this regard for the Commission and the Member States to conduct a process to increase the harmonization of the regulations on screening and control of foreign investments, and to fully implement the Foreign Direct Investment screening mechanism; further calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a response mechanism in case of detection of dual-use or misuse of critical infrastructure in the Union, which are under the property, participation or to the advantage of interests linked to the Chinese MCF strategy;
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to screen exports or outward investments in a narrow set ofand research collaboration in key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission’s proposals and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF;
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as China; calls for further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and material within the EU; further calls on the Commission and Member States to develop additional initiatives aimed at enabling closer coordination and collaboration with like- minded partners and allies to monitor and develop further, where possible and in line with the EU’s aim to reduce further dependencies, global production capacities and supply chains of critical infrastructure and materials which are crucial to the security and defence of the Union;
Amendment 130 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Calls on the Commission to propose a new legislative framework to mitigate the security risks coming from the suppliers of undersea cable systems, including through stricter monitoring and frequent review of the ownership structures of such suppliers, their previous investments in the undersea cable systems and the proximity of the undersea cable systems to European and allied military bases; stresses the need to prevent cable system suppliers, such as Chinese companies, from sharing data with intelligence services other than to protect the infrastructure from outside intrusions or malignant attacks; calls in this regards for initiatives aimed at the further development of European owned or based companies in the field of undersea cable systems;
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Recalls that the PRC’s naval forces have means and legal tools to ensure that China’s civilian ships and infrastructure can be used for military and security purposes; considers that China can use its civilian commercial infrastructure to support the PLA’s presence in third countries; warns that such MCF provides the PLA with access to foreign ports, enabling it to pre- position logistics support to sustain naval deployments as far afield as the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean; underlines that the risks of espionage are highest when Chinese civilian commercial assets are located in logistical hubs close to EU and NATO naval bases or port operators that have signed agreements to provide logistical support to European companies;
Amendment 147 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Notes that one third of all African infrastructure, including around 50 % of Africa’s 3G networks and 70 % of its 4G networks, built since 2010 has been financed and constructed by Chinese state- owned enterprises; underlines that, over the past 20 years, China has increased its trade, investment and loan commitments with few or opaque contractual obligations; expresses concern that thise Chinese model is clearly attractive to many countries that cannot satisfy EU requirements for accessing equivalent levels of finance, thereby expanding Chinese influence to the detriment of EU partnerships; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the EU’s high standards for investment with partners do not compromise it security relationships and engagement as a reliable and strategic partner and triggering risks of unsustainable debt for these countries, harming their long-term development to the detriment of their local population;
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Underlines with concern that the PRCR’s basing strategy to build a ‘blue economy cooperation base’ along the coast of Africa , including through the construction of fishing vessels and vessel repairs facilities, which can also be used for military purposes; stresses that there is a general lack of detail and transparency on these agreements and licences with African countries; outlines the potential geopolitical consequences for the EU, especially in third countries where the EU is engaged;
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Calls on the Commission to periodically report to the European Parliament on the detection of possible dual use of strategic infrastructures that provide logistical and intelligence support to China which poses a security concern to the Union;