Activities of Rasa JUKNEVIČIENĖ
Plenary speeches (6)
Announcement by the President – Election of the European Ombudsman
Strengthening Moldova's resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration (debate)
The democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia (debate)
Situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia (debate)
Managing migration in an effective and holistic way through fostering returns (debate)
Georgia's worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud (debate)
Institutional motions (12)
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States
JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia
JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration
JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan
JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan
JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia
JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia
Written questions (1)
EU action in relation to migration pressure on the Canary Islands
Amendments (503)
Amendment 118 #
2024/2082(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Stresses the seriousness of the threats to the security of the European continent, which have reached a level unprecedented since the Second World War and deteriorated Euro-Atlantic security environment; expresses deep concern at the rise of geopolitical fractures, new imperialist ambitions for domination by authoritarian powers, in particular Russia’s war against Ukraine and massive war crimes committed against sovereign state and its people; systemic rivalry of great powers, nationalist unilateralism and the primary and growing use of force and violence by certain states and non-state actors to promote their political objectives and interests or to resolve disputes; believes that this trend amounts to a paradigm shift, as it reverses the logic of building international security on the basis of respect for international law, a rules- based international order and multilateralism;
Amendment 221 #
2024/2082(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Reaffirms its unwavering support for the EU and its Member States to stand in solidarity with Ukraine in the face of Russia’s war of aggression and to provide it with the necessary military means to defend itself, end the conflict and restoprotect its sovereignty and ensure its full territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; welcomes the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine, and the bilateral security agreements concluded by Ukraine with several Member States; reiterates its call for urgent need for Member States to accelerate their delivery of weapons, air defence systems and ammunition to Ukraine, including air- launched cruise missiles; calls for Member States to lift all restrictions hindering Ukraine from using Western weapons systems against military targets within Russia, as allowed by international law; underlines the importance to support the development of Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity; and reiterates the importance to integrate Ukraine into the EU EDTIB;
Amendment 248 #
2024/2082(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Calls for the EU and its Member States to support Ukraine in expanding the international coalition in support of its Victory Plan presented by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as the only viable route to restore Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on the basis of international law, thereby holding Russia to accountand its leadership fully accountable for waging the war of aggression against Ukraine, for its war crimes, including the crime of aggression and massive damage caused by its war, and ensuring Russian reparations and other payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine;
Amendment 262 #
2024/2082(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Strongly condemns North Korea and Iran for their reported provision of weapons and military support to Russia, with North Korea also supplying military personnel, thereby fuelling the illegal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine;
Amendment 281 #
2024/2082(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Stresses the importance of the European Peace Facility (EPF), which has been instrumental in supporting the provision of military capabilities and training to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, while providing coordination for all stakeholders through the clearing house mechanism hosted by the EU Military Staff ; welcomes the setting up of the dedicated Ukraine Assistance Fund under the EPF and calls for financial resources for military assistance to Ukraine to be increased through this instrument; urges Hungary to lift its veto on EPF military support to Ukraine, including the agreed reimbursements to Member States that delivered military aid to Ukraine; underlines the importance of the EUMAM Ukraine and the need to adjust its mandate according to Ukraine’s needs;
Amendment 315 #
2024/2082(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Welcomes the vision set out in the European Defence Industrial Strategy accompanied by the Commission’s proposal for establishing the European defence industry programme; supports the objective of strengthening EU defence industrial preparedness to further enable Member States to identify and discuss joint defence programming and, procurement and stockpiling, as well as European defence projects of common interest; calls for the swift adoption of EDIP;
Amendment 358 #
2024/2082(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Stresses the importance of ensuring a balanced effort between strengthening existing EU armament industrial capabilities in the short and medium-term, and supporting research and development for new and innovative military equipment and armament tailored to the needs of the armed forces of the Member States; underlines the importance of full complementarity and interoperability with NATO, also in line with NATO standards, as it remains the foundation of our collective defence;
Amendment 433 #
2024/2082(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Reiterates its call to strengthen the EU military planning and conduct capability and to achieve full operational capability, including through the provision of adequate premises, staff, enhanced command and control, and effective communication and information systems for all CSDP missions and operations; reiterates its full support for the Rapid Deployment Capacity to achieve full operational capability in 2025, with at least 5 000 troops available for rescue and evacuation tasks, initial entry and stabilisation operations or temporary reinforcement of missions; highlights the urgency to accelerate ongoing efforts to enhance military mobility of our armed forces;
Amendment 449 #
2024/2082(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Welcomes the increased budgets and investment in defence by Member States and the increase, albeit modest, in the EU budget for CSDP in 2024; underscores the significance of commitment for increased defence spending; calls on the Member States that have not yet reached the minimum threshold of 2 % of their GDP devoted to defence expenditure to resolutely commit to gradually increasing their military budgets; recommends that, on the basis of continuous analysis of capability needs, Member States further increase this threshold, in particular for continued investments in defence industry and joint procurement of defence capabilities;
Amendment 467 #
2024/2082(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to initiate an open discussion based on the recommendations presented in Mr Draghi’s report on the future of European competiveness, including increasing the resources allocated to security and defence in the next multiannual financial framework and exploring all funding options to this end; further calls on Member States to amend the EPF financing process to ensure adequate and sustainable support for partners and, in particular ensuring sustainable support for Ukraine’s defence needs, and for allies, while also aligning with CSDP missions and operations;
Amendment 721 #
2024/2082(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Regrets, during these unstable geopolitical times, the weakening of non- proliferation and arms control regimes, and calls for the redoubling of efforts to reverse this trend;
Amendment 774 #
2024/2082(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Stresses the importance of NATO and the EU playingclose cooperation, full complementarity, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international security and thus avoiding the duplication of defence efforts; welcomes the accession of Sweden to NATO in 2024, following Finland in 2023, representing a historic step forward in strengthening security in Europe;
Amendment 13 #
2024/2080(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 7 b (new)
Citation 7 b (new)
– having regard to its resolutions on historical remembrance, including its resolutions of 2 April 2009 on European conscience and totalitarianism, 19 September 2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe (2019/2819(RSP)), and 15 December 2022 on 90 years after the Holodomor: recognising the mass killing through starvation as genocide (2022/3001(RSP))[MBS1] [MBS1]from resolution on instrumentalisation of history,
Amendment 73 #
2024/2080(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
D a. whereas Russia has failed to acknowledge its role in starting World War II and to assume its responsibility for atrocities committed in territories occupied by the Soviet Union; whereas, contrary to the crimes committed by the Nazi regime, the crimes committed by communist dictatorships in Europe in the 20th century have not received a full international legal and political assessment and condemnation and this contributed to the instrumentalisation of history under the Putin’s rule in Russia; whereas the Kremlin has been using falsified history as a casus belli, systematically whitewashing Soviet crimes and spreading historical disinformation to justify Russia’s aggression against neighbouring states; whereas Putin’s regime has instrumentalised history in attempt to secure loyalty of the population by creating nostalgia for the supposed greatness of the Soviet empire, falsifying history of Russia and Ukraine, rejecting Khrushchev’s policy to acknowledge and condemn Stalinist crimes, reneging on Gorbachev’s recognition and condemnation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and declaring the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest tragedy of the previous century;
Amendment 500 #
2024/2080(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Reiterates that Ukraine, as a victim of aggression, has the legitimate right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls on the VP/HR, the Commission the Council and the Member States concerned to enable effective Ukrainian countermeasures against Russia; recalls that Russia has violated international law and that the full seizure of the frozen Russian assets is an appropriate step towards enforcing Russia’s obligation to abide by international law, and to compensate Ukraine and other injured parties for the losses caused by Russia’s war of aggression; underlines the need to include as Russian assets all movable or immovable assets not only of the Russian state, but also of Russian local authorities, Russian state-owned companies, Russian oligarchs and all those on the EU sanctions list and their families;
Amendment 533 #
2024/2080(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Denounces the systemic falsification and distortion of history perpetrated by the Kremlin and its proxies, which is aimed at justifying Russia’s crimes, promoting nostalgia- based loyalty among the Russian population, and promoting its imperial ambitions at home and among Russia’s supporters abroad; condemns the use of historical disinformation as a weapon in its war of aggression against Ukraine and its hybrid aggression against the Western Balkans and the EU; calls on the EU to unequivocally recognize and condemn Soviet crimes and denounce the legacy of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which divided Europe into influence zones; calls for awareness raising and systematic integration of history of Nazi and communist totalitarian crimes into school curricula in all EU Member States;
Amendment 121 #
2023/2729(RSP)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Amendment 16 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
Citation 8 a (new)
– having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, adopted in accordance with Rule 144 of its Rules of Procedure,
Amendment 18 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
Citation 8 a (new)
– having regard to its resolutions of 19 July 2020, 19 January 2022, and 13 June 2023 on fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong,
Amendment 24 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 b (new)
Citation 8 b (new)
– having regard to its resolution of 15 June 2023 on the deterioration of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong, notably the case of Jimmy Lai,
Amendment 26 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 c (new)
Citation 8 c (new)
– having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,
Amendment 28 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 d (new)
Citation 8 d (new)
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC,
Amendment 29 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 e (new)
Citation 8 e (new)
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union,
Amendment 30 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 f (new)
Citation 8 f (new)
– having regard to the Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on a Union-wide coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure,
Amendment 31 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 g (new)
Citation 8 g (new)
– having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/102,
Amendment 32 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 h (new)
Citation 8 h (new)
– having regard to the EU toolbox for 5G security of 29 January 2020,
Amendment 33 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 i (new)
Citation 8 i (new)
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN/2021/0030),
Amendment 34 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 j (new)
Citation 8 j (new)
– having regard to the Versailles Declaration, adopted at the informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government on 11 March 2022,
Amendment 35 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 k (new)
Citation 8 k (new)
– having regard to the Vilnius Summit Communiqué, issued by the NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius on 11 July 2023,
Amendment 36 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 l (new)
Citation 8 l (new)
– having in regard to the Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market,
Amendment 37 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 m (new)
Citation 8 m (new)
– proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries COM/2021/775 final,
Amendment 38 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 n (new)
Citation 8 n (new)
– having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market COM(2022) 453 final 2022/0269(COD),
Amendment 39 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 o (new)
Citation 8 o (new)
– proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937COM/2022/71 final,
Amendment 48 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas China is simultaneously a partner and also increasingly a competitor and systemic rival to the EUa competitor and a systemic rival to the EU, increasingly undermining the EU's interests and posing a growing security threat;
Amendment 61 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas both the European Union and China have a shared interest inChina is not pursuing constructive and stable relations, which must be based on respect for the rules-based international order, international law, balanced engagement and reciprocity;
Amendment 72 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the Chinese Communist Party does not share the same values as European democracies, has become increasingly authoritarianis a totalitarian party-state and promotes governance models internationally that contradict and undermine the EU’s values;
Amendment 83 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas China is changing and moving into a new era of security and control characterised by an increasingly assertive economic and, foreign and military policy, attempts to change the international rules- based order and increasingly oppressive domestic policies;
Amendment 97 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the EU can only credibly defend its interests and values against an increasingly assertive China if it acts with a single, united approach and political will;
Amendment 102 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas in order to defend its core values and be treated as an equal partnerinterests, Europe needs a new approach towards China based on European strategic autonomyde- risking, reciprocity, cooperation with like- minded partners, and opposition tobacked by the necessary legislative and non-legislative instruments to defend itself against coercion;
Amendment 115 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas the EU must not accept critical, in coordination with like-minded partners, must clearly communicate to the PRC the consequences of its political or military support by China for Russia’s illegal war of aggression in Ukraine or for any circumvention of EU sanctions imposed followingrelated to Russia’s illegal invasion;
Amendment 120 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas China’s grey-zone activities, such as warplane incursions, missile drills, economic coercion, and cyberattacks, aim to pressure Taiwan into submission; whereas China’s expansionist policies and harassment behaviour in the South China Sea demonstrate a flagrant disregard for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the freedom of navigation;
Amendment 121 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas China’s grey-zone activities, such as warplane incursions, missile drills, economic coercion, and cyberattacks, aim to pressure Taiwan into submission; whereas China’s expansionist policies and harassment behaviour in the South China Sea demonstrate a flagrant disregard for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the freedom of navigation;
Amendment 131 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the EU must not accept any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by force, nor ongowork with its like-minded partners to hold the PRC accountable for the deteriorating human rights violsituations within China, in particular in Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Hong Ko across mainland China and Hong Kong, and perpetrated crimes against humanity in Xinjiang;
Amendment 135 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the EU must not accept anywork with its partners in strengthening deterrence capacities against any attempts by the PRC to unilaterally change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by force, nor ongoing human rights violations within China, in particular in Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Hong Kong;
Amendment 141 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas since the PRC imposed the National Security Law (NSL) on 30 June 2020, fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and the judiciary’s independence in Hong Kong have deteriorated alarmingly; whereas the PRC has fully breached the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations and the ICCPR;
Amendment 146 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H b (new)
Recital H b (new)
Hb. whereas freedom of religion and belief continues to deteriorate across mainland China, with the CCP carrying out an intense campaign of ‘sinicisation’ of religion, requiring all religions to adhere to the party's ideology, doctrine, and teachings;
Amendment 153 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 (new)
Paragraph -1 (new)
-1 Stresses the utmost importance of having a united and single EU policy strategy towards China, which would eliminate divisive initiatives such as 17+1; believes that visits to China of the leaders of the EU Member States and their main messages to China’s leadership should be coordinated at the EU level;
Amendment 156 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 a (new)
Paragraph -1 a (new)
-1a Calls for a development of a comprehensive transatlantic strategy towards China;
Amendment 157 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 b (new)
Paragraph -1 b (new)
-1b Calls for further development and strengthening of the EU Indo-Pacific strategy in order to counterbalance China in the region;
Amendment 158 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – subheading 1
Paragraph 1 – subheading 1
Amendment 161 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a
Paragraph 1 – point a
(a) continue engagingengage selectively with China to tackle global challenges such as climate change and biodiversity, health and pandemic preparedness, debt relief and humanitarian assistance, and increase dialogue with China on security issues in view of China’s increasingly critical role in global securityin those areas where China is willing to engage constructively. Notes with concern, however, that even in areas such as global security, climate change and biodiversity, health and pandemic preparedness, debt relief and humanitarian assistance, China does not play a constructive global role;
Amendment 174 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point b
Paragraph 1 – point b
(b) call on China to uphold the rules- based international order, especially the principles of the UN Charter, including respect for the territorial integrity or political independence of all states, and strengthen multilateral institutions in face of Chinese regime's malign influence and attempts to change international norms;
Amendment 184 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
(ba) prevent China from abusing the One China Policy to threaten Taiwan and attempts to isolate and exclude Taipei from multilateral fora;
Amendment 187 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c
Paragraph 1 – point c
(c) maintain diplomatic stability while increasing the EU’s assertiveness towards China in order to assume its responsibility as a member of the UN Security Council to pressure Russia into stopping its illegal war ofsupport the EU's diplomatic efforts through deterrence and by increasing the EU’s assertiveness towards China in order to hold it accountable for its terror and oppression across mainland China and Hong Kong, its military threats against Taiwan, assertiveness against neighbours, subversive activities against EU Member States, and its support for Russia's aggression against Ukraine;
Amendment 204 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e
Paragraph 1 – point e
(e) ensure that China plays a constructive role in multilateral organisations such as the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations and support steps towards allowing Taiwan’s participation in the meetings, mechanism and activities of relevant international institutions such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; strongly oppose China’s constant misinterpretation and distortion of the UN Resolution 2758(XXVI) which contains no mention of People’s Republic of China’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, nor does it authorize the PRC to represent Taiwan in the UN system; express grave concerns that Taiwanese passport holders, including journalists, NGO workers and political activists, continued to be barred from accessing tours and events in the UN;
Amendment 207 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e
Paragraph 1 – point e
(e) ensure that China plays a constructive role in multilateral organisations such as the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations and support steps towards allowing Taiwan’s participation in the meetings, mechanism and activities of relevant international institutions such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change;
Amendment 215 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
(ea) oppose China’s constant misinterpretation and distortion of the UN Resolution 2758(XXVI) which contains no mention of People’s Republic of China’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, nor does it authorise the PRC to represent Taiwan in the UN system; address grave concerns that Taiwanese passport holders, including journalists, NGO workers and political activists, continued to be barred from accessing tours and events in the UN;
Amendment 221 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f
Paragraph 1 – point f
(f) note that the Chinese government is strengthening its role and influence in international institutions, including in the United Nations and its Human Rights Council; respond adequately to China’s efforts to build alternative international organisations, including through the BRICS group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), by ensuring better coordination among the EU Member States and intensifying partnerships with like-minded partners around the world;
Amendment 230 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
(fa) conduct a comprehensive economic analysis of impact of the potential slowdown or even a deep crisis of the Chinese economy on the EU economies;
Amendment 233 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point f b (new)
(fb) further develop and strengthen EU’s relations with India, which is overtaking China in its demographic growth and has a strong potential to catch up with China in its economic growth;
Amendment 234 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – subheading 2
Paragraph 1 – subheading 2
Amendment 239 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g
Paragraph 1 – point g
(g) insist that China fulfils its responsibilities as a global power by upholding human rights and the rule of lawhold China accountable for its violations of human rights and the rule of law, including through multilateral fora such as the UN Human Rights Council;
Amendment 246 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
(ga) insist that China fulfils its responsibilities under international law and ceases considering North Korean escapees as “illegal economic migrants” and recognizes North Korean nationals fleeing persecution in their homeland as refugees, precisely because they face a credible risk of persecution upon return to North Korea;
Amendment 248 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
(ga) oppose China's membership of UN Human Rights Council and work with like-minded partners to support the reform of the UNHRC;
Amendment 252 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point h
Paragraph 1 – point h
(h) ensure a unified European approach when China uses its economic leverage to silence opposition against its human rights abuses; intensify and include Members of the European Parliament in the Human Rights Dialogue with China and work towards a united approach on cultural and academic cooperation with China while preventing undue influence from Chinese sources of finance; ensure that the Human Rights Dialogues aren’t misused for propaganda purposes by China but, instead, that the Union’s representatives fully utilise the dialogue by raising concrete cases;
Amendment 269 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i
Paragraph 1 – point i
(i) support an independent and impartial UN investigation into human rights violations in China, in particular in Xinjiang and, Tibet and Hong Kong, and urge the Chinese authorities to grant meaningful access to the regions concerned and immediately and unconditionally release the Uyghur scholar and 2019 Sakharov Prize Laureate Ilham Tohti; call for the immediate release of Chinese human rights defenders and lawyers, including Li Qiaochu, Xu Yan, Xie Yang, Li Yuhan, Yang Bin, Lin Shenliang, Sophia Huang Xueqin, Wang Jianbing, He Fangmei and Wu Yi;
Amendment 270 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i
Paragraph 1 – point i
(i) support an independent and impartial UN investigation into human rights violations in China, in particular in Xinjiang and Tibet, and urge the Chinese authorities to grant meaningful access to the regions concerned and immediately and unconditionally release the Uyghur scholar and 2019 Sakharov Prize Laureate Ilham Tohti; support the 2022 UN Human Right report on Xinjiang and call on China to cease its crimes against humanity in the region, which include arbitrary and discriminatory detention of members of Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim groups;
Amendment 274 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i
Paragraph 1 – point i
(i) support an independent and impartial UN investigation into human rights violations in China, in particular in Xinjiang and, Tibet, and Hong Kong, and urge the Chinese authorities to grant meaningful access to the regions concerned and immediately and unconditionally release the Uyghur scholar and 2019 Sakharov Prize Laureate Ilham Tohti;
Amendment 279 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
(ia) underline religious freedom and human rights have continued to deteriorate in China; condemn Chinese government measures aimed at suppressing believers who resist being controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and which force bishops to join the CCP-controlled Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association; highlight the need to protect religious freedom from authoritarianism like China;
Amendment 280 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
(ia) review and support China to follow up on the recommendations of the UN Human Rights Committee, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and UN Committee on Women’s Rights regarding violations of rights and freedoms and breaches of international legal obligations in China, in particular Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong;
Amendment 281 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
(ia) insist on China to follow up on the recommendations of the UN Human Rights Committee, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and UN Committee on Women’s Rights regarding violations of rights and freedoms and breaches of international legal obligations in China, in particular Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong;
Amendment 285 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point i b (new)
(ib) condemn Chinese authorities assimilationist policies in Tibet that violate the educational, religious, cultural and linguistic rights of the Tibetan people and threaten to ultimately eradicate Tibetan culture and identity, in particular, the compulsory boarding school and pre- school system which separates over 1 million Tibetan children from their families and enforces Chinese-language education; urge China to immediately abolish the boarding school and pre- school system imposed on Tibetan children, allow private Tibetan schools to be established and ensure that Mandarin is not the only language allowed as the language of instruction in Tibet; consider adopting sanctions on Chinese officials responsible for designing and implementing the boarding school and preschool system in Tibet;
Amendment 290 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point i c (new)
(ic) condemn the promulgation of the “Administrative Measures for Religious Activity Venues” - also known as "Order number 19” - that came into force on 1 September 2023 and will intensify the ongoing repression in Tibet and elsewhere across mainland China;
Amendment 292 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i d (new)
Paragraph 1 – point i d (new)
(id) adopt additional sanctions targeting high-ranking PRC officials, such as Chen Quanguo, Zhao Kezhi, Guo Shengkun and Hu Lianhe, as well as others identified in the Xinjiang police files, and other individuals and entities, who are involved in the systematic human rights violations and crimes against humanity in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;
Amendment 293 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i e (new)
Paragraph 1 – point i e (new)
(ie) address the systematic use of forced labour by China in Xinjiang and Tibet by working with the private sector to diversify supply chains and through implementation of the regulation prohibiting products made with forced labour;
Amendment 294 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i f (new)
Paragraph 1 – point i f (new)
(if) address the deteriorating situation of religious freedom in China; condemn the Chinese government measures aimed at suppressing believers who resist being controlled by the CCP, and which force bishops to join the CCP-controlled Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association;
Amendment 297 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j
Paragraph 1 – point j
(j) address individual cases of European citizens, including dual nationals, being held in ‘administrative detention’ in China, such as the Swedish bookseller Gui Minhai, and use all diplomatic channels to pressure for their release;
Amendment 299 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point j a (new)
(ja) ensure adequate resources for the European Union Office to Hong Kong (EU Office) so that it can continue conducting prison visits and human rights monitoring, by releasing public statements, appointing a human rights focal point among its staff for human rights defenders and raising their cases with the authorities at all levels; calls on the EEAS and the EU Office to report regularly on the most prominent trials, as well as on the evolution of the human rights situation in Hong Kong more generally;
Amendment 305 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point k
Paragraph 1 – point k
(k) show solidarity with civil society inacross mainland China and Hong Kong and speed up the implementation of the European human rights framework with Magnitsky-style sanctions in close collaboration with international partners, including the freezing of foreign assets and visa restrictions against those involved in human rights abuses, including and crimes against humanity, including John Lee and other Hong Kong and PRC political decision makers in Hong Kong;
Amendment 310 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point k a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point k a (new)
(ka) closely monitor the trials of political prisoners in Hong Kong and call for the release of such political prisoners, including the founder of Apple Daily Jimmy Lai, who is a British citizen and the focus of the European Parliament resolution of 14 June 2023, and the 47 pro-democracy activists, including former elected legislators, arrested and imprisoned for holding a primary election campaign in 2020;
Amendment 313 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point l
Paragraph 1 – point l
(l) identify and close down any avenues that currently facilitate transnational repression efforts by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including illegal Chinese 'police stations' in the European Union and in particular those targeting diaspora communities, in cooperation and coordination with like- minded partners; work with third countries to protect the targets of the PRC's transnational repression, such as Chinese and Hong Kong human rights lawyers and activists;
Amendment 319 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point m
Paragraph 1 – point m
(m) review the autonomous status of Hong Kong in the light of the National Security Law and the PRC’s violation of its international commitments, its breaches of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, and the crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy and opposition figures, including members of civil society, and erosion of the rule of law;
Amendment 324 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point m a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point m a (new)
(ma) review the agreement between the EU and Hong Kong/China on cooperation and mutual administrative assistance in customs matters, the status of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in Brussels, and Hong Kong’s seat in the World Trade Organization;
Amendment 327 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n
Paragraph 1 – point n
(n) condemn attempts by the Chinese authorities to target Hong Kong diaspora communities within the EU and call on Member States to suspend extradition treaties with the PRC, Macau, and Hong Kong; reiterate the call for EU Member states to consider lifeboat and other visa schemes for the Hong Kong diaspora;
Amendment 328 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n
Paragraph 1 – point n
(n) condemn attempts by the Chinese authorities to target Chinese and Hong Kong diaspora communities within the EU and call on those Member States who have not yet done so to suspend extradition treaties with the PRC and Hong Kong;
Amendment 331 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n
Paragraph 1 – point n
(n) condemn attempts by the Chinese authorities to target Hong Kong diaspora communities within the EU and call on Member States to suspend extradition treaties with the PRC and, Hong Kong and Macau;
Amendment 338 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point n a (new)
(na) organise annual 4 June Tiananmen Square vigils in commemoration of the victim of communist totalitarianism;
Amendment 340 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point n b (new)
(nb) closely monitor the trials of political prisoners in Hong Kong and call for the release of such political prisoners, including the founder of Apple Daily Jimmy Lai and the 47 pro-democracy activists, including former elected legislators, arrested and imprisoned for holding a primary election campaign in 2020;
Amendment 344 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point n c (new)
(nc) fully implement the Council conclusions on Hong Kong of 24 July 2020;
Amendment 351 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – subheading 3
Paragraph 1 – subheading 3
Amendment 358 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point o
Paragraph 1 – point o
(o) work closely towards fostering unity and political will among the Member States’ approach towards China and strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy to ensure that Europe is able to defend its values and economic interests vis-a-vis China, as well as the global rules-based order;
Amendment 364 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point p
Paragraph 1 – point p
(p) work towards a renewed, assertive and coherent EU approach towards China that shapes relations with the PRC in the interest of the EU as a whole and takes full account of the challenges stemming from the PRC’s rise as a disruptive global actor and, its increasingly oppressive domestic policies and assertive foreign policythe multi-dimensional security threat it poses to the EU and to democracies around the world;
Amendment 375 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point q
Paragraph 1 – point q
(q) strengthen the EU’s economic autonomy, and develop effective approaches to counter China’s targeted economic coercion towards Member States, such as Lithuania; ensure mutually beneficial economic relations and prevent sensitive technologies from being used for military purposes by de-risking trade flows and reducing critical dependencies on the PRC without aiming to decouple or turning inwards;
Amendment 376 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point q
Paragraph 1 – point q
(q) strengthen the EU’s economic autonomy, ensure mutually beneficialresilience and economic competitiveness, ensure more balanced economic relations and prevent sensitive technologies from being used for military purposes by de- risking trade flows and reducing critical dependencies on the PRC without aiming to decouple or turning inwards, and defend free market principles against Chinese market-distorting practices and economic coercion;
Amendment 387 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point r
Paragraph 1 – point r
(r) swiftly implement, in this context, the European Economic Security Strategy and, make better use of our existing trade instruments to minimise the detrimental effects of de-risking on , work closely withe European economympanies and to ensure close alignment with like-minded partners around the world, such as our transatlantic partners and partners in Southeast Asia to boost supply chain resilience and economic competitiveness;
Amendment 390 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point r a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point r a (new)
(ra) highlight that Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is vital for global economy and more than 50 percent of the world’s shipping containers pass through Taiwan Straits; urge the EU and its Member States to take a firm stand against China’s intimidation and coercion towards Taiwan; welcome Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing diversification in Europe and reiterate its longstanding support to a EU-Taiwan Bilateral Investment Agreement and any arrangements mutually beneficial to bilateral trade and investment;
Amendment 392 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point r a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point r a (new)
(ra) urgently conclude interinstitutional negotiations on the Critical Raw Materials Act and ensure the speedy implementation of its goals in order strengthen the Union’s supply chain resilience;
Amendment 394 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point r b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point r b (new)
(rb) conduct an audit of public funds invested in China through sovereign wealth funds, local government funds and public pension funds; establish common guidelines to minimise and phase out public funds invested in China, particularly those invested in state corporations or the military industrial complex;
Amendment 395 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point r c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point r c (new)
(rc) strengthen economic cooperation with Taiwan, including the semiconductor industry which is vital for global economy and continue supporting Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing diversification in Europe;
Amendment 396 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point s
Paragraph 1 – point s
(s) work towards a more coordinated approach towards the protection of critical infrastructure at EU level and strengthen cooperation with NATO and other like- minded partners; present an EU strategic policy framework to reduce and limit influence and operational control by China and other regimes that a security threat to the Union in the EU’s critical infrastructure;
Amendment 405 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point s a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point s a (new)
(sa) call on the Commission and the Member States to urgently address the need to reduce the risks of espionage and sabotage in critical infrastructure, in particular those with a military function, such as ports that are used by NATO;
Amendment 413 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point t
Paragraph 1 – point t
(t) ensure greater coordination and cooperation with like-minded partners to address the multi-dimensional threat posed by China, on issues of common concern, especially but not exclusively on issues such as strategic dependencies, economic coercion, political interference and disinformation, and to promote rules- based multilateralism and strategic solidarity between democracies;
Amendment 419 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point u
Paragraph 1 – point u
(u) highlight that the EU’s ‘One China policy’ remains the foundation of our engagement with both the PRC and Taiwan but also; maintain that whilst the EU’s relationship with Taiwan remains unofficial, it recognises Taiwan as a reliable and valued like-minded partner in Asia; underline the positive effects and strategic importance of deepening ties between the EU and Taiwan;
Amendment 423 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point u
Paragraph 1 – point u
(u) highlight that the EU’s ‘One China policy’ remains the foundation of our engagement with both the PRC and Taiwan but also underl, and that the Union will not tolerate its abuse by Beijing; continue strengthenineg the positive effectdynamic of deepening ties between the EU and Taiwan;
Amendment 428 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point v
Paragraph 1 – point v
(v) revisit the EU’s engagement policy with Taiwan and continue supporting democracy there together with like-minded partners; encourage further exchanges between Parliament and its Taiwanese counterparts in this context as well as people-to-people contact; strengthen cooperation with Taiwanese institutions in addressing China's hybrid threats;
Amendment 437 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point v a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point v a (new)
(va) conduct as soon as possible an impact assessment for an EU-Taiwan Bilateral Investment Agreement (BIA);
Amendment 441 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point w
Paragraph 1 – point w
(w) ensure that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is not changed by means of force or coercion by supporting initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue, cooperation and confidence-building between the two sides; take concrete steps, including increasing Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP) in the Taiwan Strait, facilitating Taiwan’s military capability- building, and considering economic sanction packages in the event of a Chinese invasion, to discourage China from escalating tensions in the region; prepare a scenario-based strategy for tackling potential security challenges in the Taiwan Strait;
Amendment 447 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point w
Paragraph 1 – point w
(w) contribute to allies' deterrence measures to ensure that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is not changed by means of force or coercion, and by supporting initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue, cooperation and confidence-building between the two sides; prepare a scenario- based strategy for tackling potential security challenges in the Taiwan Strait;
Amendment 455 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point x
Paragraph 1 – point x
(x) establish a ‘Far-East StratCom Task Force’ as part of the European External Action Service, to be tasked with identifying, monitoring and countering disinformation efforts and nation-specific actions by China; strengthen efforts to fight Chinese malign influence, including information operations, in third countries, including Latin America and Africa;
Amendment 459 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point x a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point x a (new)
(xa) strengthen cooperation between national intelligence agencies in identifying and addressing Chinese espionage and other subversive activities seeking to influence or undermine our democratic societies and institutions;
Amendment 460 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point x b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point x b (new)
(xb) fully implement the EU's “5G security toolbox” guidelines to mitigate security risks in networks, including by removing all equipment and services from Huawei, ZTE and other Chinese vendors in core network functions;
Amendment 461 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point x c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point x c (new)
(xc) implement the suspension of the TikTok application on corporate devices, as well as personal devices enrolled in institutional mobile device services across all EU and Member State institutions;
Amendment 466 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point y
Paragraph 1 – point y
(y) fully leverage the Global Gateway strategy as a tool to intensify the EU’s engagement and business relations with partners from developing countries and provide an alternative to Chinese-driven foreign investment strategies; intensify cooperation with international financial institutions and the private sector to mobilise the necessary funding;
Amendment 471 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point y a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point y a (new)
(ya) The European Parliament: commends achievements of the Taiwanese democracy and its capabilities of defending democracy against China’s hybrid attacks; stresses that these achievements should be promoted internationally as it brings understanding that all nations, including Chinese, are able to create a flourishing democracy;
Amendment 472 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point y a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point y a (new)
(ya) make clear to China the consequences of supporting Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and sanctions circumvention, including through the territory of Hong Kong;
Amendment 474 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point y b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point y b (new)
(yb) commits to establishing in the European Parliament a formal parliamentary delegation for bilateral cooperation with the Parliament of Taiwan;
Amendment 52 #
2023/2126(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas standing together against the brutality of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and helping Ukraine win this war will be even more crucial in the months to come;
Amendment 97 #
2023/2126(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point b
Paragraph 1 – point b
(b) foster the EU’s open strategic autonomy as a means to pursue the EU’s own legitimate interests while strengthening the transatlantic bond and increasing the joint leverage of the EU and the US on the world sceneglobal scene, while keeping possibilities to pursue the EU’s own legitimate interests;
Amendment 119 #
2023/2126(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e
Paragraph 1 – point e
(e) reinforce the accountability and resilience of our democratic systems in the run-up to the elections next year on both sides, as well as enhance transatlantic dialogue and cooperation on policies supporting democracy, human rights and the rule of law and combating disinformation and foreign interference from authoritarian regimes; encourage further cooperation and exchanges between like-minded partners, in particular those who stand on the frontline defending democracy and freedom against authoritarian expansion.
Amendment 134 #
2023/2126(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f
Paragraph 1 – point f
(f) continue the full EU-US coordination on effective international sanctions, especially on closing the remaining loopholes in the sanctions on energy resources, on Russia, Belarus and all those who facilitate Russia’s aggression in order to undermine Russia’s ability to continue the war and other aggressions against its neighbours and to prevent sanction circumvention;
Amendment 140 #
2023/2126(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
(fa) continue comprehensive EU-US- Ukraine coordination of efforts to achieve full confiscation of the frozen Russian assets and their use for reconstruction of Ukraine;
Amendment 142 #
2023/2126(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point f b (new)
(fb) continue close EU-US-Ukraine coordination to establish the International Special Tribunal for the crime of war aggression;
Amendment 151 #
2023/2126(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
(ga) continue EU-US cooperation in working with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to support them on their way to EU membership as well as to bring Ukraine and Georgia closer to their NATO membership goal;
Amendment 158 #
2023/2126(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point h a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point h a (new)
(ha) develop and implement a joint EU- US strategy on how to assist Russian and Belarusian people in transformation of their countries once a window of opportunity for such transformation will open after Russia’s defeat in its war of aggression against Ukraine;
Amendment 177 #
2023/2126(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j
Paragraph 1 – point j
(j) assess the importance of theseek strong convergence of transatlantic positions and develop a joint transatlantic strategy towards China, building more and more on the ‘de-risking’ strategy while looking for ways to cooperate with China on some global challenges;
Amendment 201 #
2023/2126(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point l
Paragraph 1 – point l
(l) explore ways to create synergies and possibilities of EU-US engagement with China in multilateral frameworks on common and global challenges, such as climate change, health-related risks, respect for human rights, cyberspace including religious freedom, foreign information manipulation and interference, cyberspace, freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait, arms control, non- proliferation and emerging disruptive technologies;
Amendment 226 #
2023/2126(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point q
Paragraph 1 – point q
(q) foster closer partnership with the US and other like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific region; , including Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Taiwan, in order to counter challenges that affect our shared values, interests, security and prosperity, in particular, any unilateral attempt to alter the status quo; note that China’s continued military provocations pose a threat not just to Taiwan, but to the wider Indo-Pacific, and ultimately, the established global order.
Amendment 328 #
2023/2126(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point ab
Paragraph 1 – point ab
(ab) continue the ongoing coordination of the military support provided to Ukraine within the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in order to help achieve Ukraine’s full military victory against Russia in the shortest possible time;
Amendment 58 #
2023/2119(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas Ukraine needs to be provided with the necessary military capabilities for as long as it takes until Ukraine’s decisive military victory against Russia to end Russia’s illegal war of aggression and to restore its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders;
Amendment 62 #
2023/2119(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the People’s Republic of China has for many years promoted an alternative narrative, challenging democratic values, open markets, and the rules-based international order; whereas China’s increasing influence in international organisations has impeded positive progress and further excluded Taiwan from meaningful participation;
Amendment 70 #
2023/2119(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the Strategic Compass aims to equip the EU with the necessary strategic guidance, realistic and operational tools to move towards a coherent and credible defence policy, and to make it an effective and capable security provider and an assertive global actor, that makes a positive contribution to global and transatlantic security and complements NATO, which continues to serve as the cornerstone of collective defense for its member states;
Amendment 159 #
2023/2119(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Confirms the EU will continue to support Ukraine for as long as it takes and until Ukraine’s decisive military victory against Russia to end Russia’s war of aggression and restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, enabling it to effectively exercise its sovereignty, protect its civilians and fulfil their wish for EU and NATO membership; stresses, that Ukraine’s military victory and its EU and NATO membership is needed for overall security, stability and sustainable peace on the European continent;
Amendment 201 #
2023/2119(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Underlines the outcome of the Vilnius Summit that clearly confirms Ukraine’s future is in the alliance; welcomes the Summit’s support package for Ukraine and the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Council that will prepare Ukraine for NATO membership; supports continued transatlantic efforts and coordination on military assistance and weapons deliveries to Ukraine; maintains that the upcomming Washington summit should pave the way to extending an invitation to Ukraine to join NATO and that Ukraine’s NATO accession process should start after the war is over and be finalised as soon as possible;
Amendment 254 #
2023/2119(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Highlights the urgency to substantially enhance and invest in the military mobility of our armed forces, prioritising investments removing bottlenecks and missing links; calls on Members states to act in simplifying and harmonizing procedures for military mobility and shorten the timelines of granting permissions to enable the EU Member States to act faster and increase the efficiency of response, in line with their defence needs and responsibilities, both in the context of Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations, as well as national and multinational activities (e.g.in the framework of NATO);
Amendment 346 #
2023/2119(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Highlights that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is part of a wider strategy to undermine the rules-based international order; calls for the EU to enhance its capacities for responding to hybrid warfare, including the detection and response to Russia, and other state and non-state actors carrying out foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) campaigns which challenge our interests and values, including by instrumentalising migrants with an intention to destabilise the Union or a Member State, spreading false-narratives about the EU or by targeting CSDP missions and operations in strategic areas;
Amendment 363 #
2023/2119(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Calls for heightened attention to China’s escalating hybrid warfare tactics in the Indo-Pacific, particularly pertaining to Taiwan, which faces five million cyberattacks every day, primarily from China. Acknowledges that the potential repercussions of destabilisation in the region would resonate far beyond the Taiwan Strait and impact the security of the EU; stresses the importance of developing regular dialogue, cooperation, and capacity building with Taiwan, which possesses substantive expertise and employs scientific methods to counter Chinese cyberattacks and FIMI based on its extensive experience, technological advantages, and linguistic proximity to China;
Amendment 457 #
2023/2119(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)
Paragraph 26 a (new)
26a. Expresses deep concern about China’s increasingly aggressive behaviour in the Taiwan Strait, including its 1,727 fighter jet incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone in 2022, which is undermining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Encourages Member States to increase the frequency of freedom of navigation operations in the Taiwan Strait and deepen security dialogues with Taiwan to deter Chinese aggression against the democratic island. Condemns China’s disruptive activities in the South China Sea, including island- building, harassment, and dangerous manoeuvres conducted by its navy, coast guard, and maritime militia. These actions have raised tensions with neighbouring countries and threatened maritime security in one of the most important global trade routes. Calls for greater Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP) and capacity building with the EU’s partners in the region. Stresses the need to cooperate with a broader set of actors in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, and Taiwan, in terms of information exchange, burden-sharing, and strategic alignment, in order to optimise the use of the EU’s limited resources;
Amendment 491 #
2023/2119(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)
Paragraph 27 a (new)
27a. Calls on the European External Action Service and VP/HR Mr Josep Borrell to reconsider the decision and provide necessary technical assistance to Armenia through the European Peace Facility (EPF) instrument, which will strengthen the resilience of Armenia in the context of ensuring security, independence and sovereignty and which will lead to a more comprehensive and enhanced cooperation of the EU and Armenia in the field of defense;
Amendment 500 #
2023/2119(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 b (new)
Paragraph 27 b (new)
27b. Calls on the Council to be prepared to impose targeted and individual sanctions against perpetrators of aggression, including but not limited to the political and military entourage of President Aliyev, and also embargo sanctions on oil and gas exports, if Azerbaijani Army will try to enter the Armenian territory in order to create any transport “corridors” or under any other pretext;
Amendment 504 #
2023/2119(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 c (new)
Paragraph 27 c (new)
27c. Calls on the Commission to impose a price cap on the Azerbaijani oil and gas, if Azerbaijan does not immediately allow the entry of the UN agencies and the EU to Nagorno-Karabakh to monitor the deteriorating humanitarian situation;
Amendment 506 #
2023/2119(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 d (new)
Paragraph 27 d (new)
27d. Calls for an increased number of the EUMA observers and their instalment to the Armenia-Türkiye border and the extension of the EUMA mandate for 5 more years; demands Azerbaijan to allow the EU Monitoring Mission on their side of the border as well;
Amendment 28 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas common historical narratives and common evaluation of key historical events serve as a foundation for shared culture and identity;
Amendment 32 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Recital A b (new)
Ab. whereas there remain gaps of historical awareness of key historical events between different regions within the EU;
Amendment 39 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas history must never be relativised, distorted or falsified for political purposes both from the EU member states and from the candidate countries;
Amendment 40 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas all three major 20th century totalitarian regimes (Nazism, Fascism and Communism) should be fully acknowledged as dictatorships and none of them should be considered as “less totalitarian”;
Amendment 43 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas historical narratives in some EU Member States and candidate countries may be misused for political reasons thus opening the door to disinformation and undue Russian influence in the region; whereas disinformation campaigns, anti-European narrative and Russian propaganda are mainly spread through digital channels, thus accentuating the need for digital upskilling and media literacy campaigns in the EU;
Amendment 45 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas dealing with the past requires utmost impartiality, objectivity and dispassion both in historical scholarship and theamongst political realmians;
Amendment 46 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas objectively accurate accounts of crimes committed in the name of totalitarian ideologies should be taken into account, even though they might not fit into the narrative of the “winners” and “losers” or the “good side” and the “bad side”;
Amendment 51 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas while there are ‘historical facts’ grounded in professional historical work, there is no single monolithic, indisputable and everlasting ‘historical truth’ that one specific group or nation can monopolise and exclusively claim for itselfwhich can be used to negate another state’s history;
Amendment 71 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas European historical consciousness is understood as an individual as well as collective ability and skill to understand, (self-)critically assess and learn from history, which facilitates the recognition of the inextricable connection and interdependency between past, present and future which facilitates the recognition of the inextricable connection and interdependency between past, present and future;
Amendment 87 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Acknowledges that the diverse and often conflicting histories of European nations and states make any effort to deal with history at a supranational political level a difficult and potentially dangerous endeavour, and that attempts to regulate how to commemorate and interpret the past always prove to be challenging;
Amendment 95 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Emphasises the potential of the principle of historia magistra vitae and considers especially the dark elementtragic periods of Europe’s history – including communism, totalitarianism, racism, jingoaggressive nationalism and militarism and colonialism – not only to be a vigorous reminder of past mistakes whose repetition is to be avoided, but also as a call to work jointly towards democratic and inclusive societies in the Union and globally;
Amendment 99 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers a responsible, evidence- based and critical dealing with history a sine qua non for any democratic body politicpolitical and non-political State authority and democratic institutions, in order to sensitise current and future generations for achievements and aberrations of the past alike, strengthen a self-reflexive public discourse and foster understanding and reconciliation within and among particular social groups, nations and states, focusing on common European values;
Amendment 110 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Acknowledges the array of past and present initiatives at European level to foster a common European historical memory, including Holocaust Remembrance Day, the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of all Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, the establishment of a dedicated remembrance strand in the former Europe for Citizens and current Citizenship, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programmes, and various Parliament resolutions such as the one of 19 September 2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe and the Resolution of 2 April 2009 on European conscience and totalitarianism that condemned all three major 20th century totalitarian regimes (Nazism, Fascism and Communism) and was passed with a large majority and a broad political support;
Amendment 116 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Expresses its concern that there continues to be a latent competition and partial incompatibility between different memory frames and remembrance cultures in the Union, especially between Western and Eastern Europnot only between Western and Eastern Europe but also amongst some Eastern European countries due to the continuous Russian influence in the region; emphasises the need to bridge the gap of historical remembrance of key foundational events among European countries and people;
Amendment 117 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Expresses its concern that there continues to be a latent competition and partial incompatibility between different memory frames and remembrance cultures in the Union, especially between Western and Eastern Europe and expresses its concern regarding the lack of public, political and historical condemnation for the Communism in comparison with the widely accepted condemnation of Nazism and fascism;
Amendment 120 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Encourages the Union and the Member States to promote historical awareness and remembrance of Soviet and Russian crimes into education curricula, civic remembrance culture and public spaces;
Amendment 121 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to upscale media and digital literacy campaigns as main instruments against any disinformation campaigns; is worried by the current Russian propaganda, and asked the Member States and the Commission to already strengthen these instruments;
Amendment 123 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Recognises that the Union’s concern mainly with narrating a story about itself ex negativo, with the horrors of the past and especially National Socialism and Stalinism serving as a ‘negative foundation myth’communism, provides a strong sense of purpose for the European project, yet bears the risk of nurturing a teleological and simplistic black-and-white scheme of history which potentially hampers a fully informed understanding of Europe’s intricate past and reduces incentives to challenge stereotypes and sacred cows of national histories;
Amendment 128 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Maintains that Europe-wide understanding of Eastern European, Russian, and Soviet history is a crucial element to stopping the ongoing cycle of Russia’s imperial and colonial aggression in the continent; calls on the Union to evaluate and condemn 20th century communist and Soviet crimes; Encourages the Union and the Member States to promote historical awareness and remembrance of Soviet and Russian crimes into education curricula, civic remembrance culture, and public spaces; supports the building of a pan-European memorial to the victims of 20th century totalitarianisms in the EU capital, Brussels;
Amendment 129 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Highlights that the Russian aggression against Ukraine has been prepared and justified with a high level of historical disinformation coming from Russia and its allies; notes that Soviet communism and Stalinism in particular have not received political or legal Europe-wide evaluation and condemnation; highlights that the lack of awareness of Eastern European history and Soviet crimes increases the vulnerability of European societies;
Amendment 130 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Expresses its concern also about national stereotypes and sacred cows from communism, an example being glorification of former Yugoslav dictator, Tito, who is still being used to name squares, streets and parks in some Member States;
Amendment 132 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7b. Maintains that Europe-wide understanding of Eastern European, Russian, and Soviet history is a crucial element to stopping the ongoing cycle of Russia’s imperial and colonial aggression in the continent; encourages the Union and the Member States to promote historical awareness and remembrance of Soviet and Russian crimes into education curricula, civic remembrance culture, and public spaces; supports the building of a pan-European memorial to the victims of 20th century totalitarianisms in the EU capital, Brussels;
Amendment 136 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Recognises the need for a broader and more holistic understanding of European history for a (self-)critical European historical consciousness to emerge, in particular by widening the focus of current European remembrance initiatives;
Amendment 142 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Emphasises the importance of testimonies of the last living witnesses from the 20th century that often bring out historically mostly overlooked aspects of the European past;
Amendment 148 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Acknowledges the crucial importance of approaching Europe’s past on the foundation of European core values such as humanism, tolerance, democracy and the rule of law, and of and on the religious and philosophical traditions that underpin such values, creating an open sphere of discussion that also makes it possible to address difficult elements of national histories and that provides for mutual understanding and reconciliation both within and between European nations;
Amendment 154 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Stresses the need to highlight, in teaching curricula, the various national historical identities of the Member States, allowing learners to understand the complexity of the European cultural and historical heritage and the uniqueness of each Member State’s past;
Amendment 158 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Calls on the Member States to revisecomplement current curricula and teaching methodologies with a view to shifting focus from national towardselements a related to European and global history and in order to allow for more emphasis on a supranational historical remembrance, in particular by allowing for multiple interpretations of the same historical period and event and by fostering corresponding teaching styles that favour reflection and discussion over knowledge transfer and that are guided by the overall objective of making students learn ‘how to think’ rather than ‘what to think’;enabling European students to critically assess of the same historical period and event
Amendment 169 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Calls on the Member States to provide tailor-made (history) teacher training that enables teachers to grasp transnational aspects of history, imparts adequate didactics and principles of modern teaching and is primarily concerned with forming self-reflective young peopleadapted guidelines and material that enables teachers to put an adequate focus on transnational aspects of history;
Amendment 191 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Requests that the European institutions, the Member States and candidate countries, educational institutions and civil-society actors step up efforts to abstain from and repudiate any attempt to instrumentalise history for political purposes and fight historical denialism both in the European Union and beyond;
Amendment 195 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. EspousesIs of the idea that the ideal of a ‘culture of remembering’ and historical consciousness based on shared European values and practices in approaching the past, yet at the same time avoiding any undue levelling or simplification of history;
Amendment 196 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Expresses its hope that on the basis of critical self-reflection relating to history and historical responsibility at national level, a truly European reflective discourse on the continent’s past may emerge, with history not being abused for power- political purposes; expresses its hope that a community of fate among European peoples will emerge from a common historical work for the better for the future generations;
Amendment 202 #
2023/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Envisions national collective memories eventually contributing to and merging into a European public sphere, withxpresses its hope that national remembrance cultures will complementing each other rather than being in competition, and will be able to dealings with history becoming an issue of civic rather than political action;
Amendment 79 #
2023/2107(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Observes with interest Japan’s efforts to promote a stable architecture in the Indo-Pacific, for instance through its participation in the Quad, its engagement with Pacific island states or the recent Camp David Agreement with Korea and the US; continues to note Japan’s concerns about North Korea; intends to continuously cooperate with Japan in order to oppose China’s aggressive policies towards its neighbours; shares Japan’s position that Taiwan is an important partner and a precious friend; reaffirms that the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community; shares, further, Japan’s high regard for the Association of Southeas Asian Nations (ASEAN); welcomes the fact that some new vice- ministerial formats also include the EU (in groupings such as Japan/Australia/Korea/EU and Japan/Korea/US/EU);
Amendment 89 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Strongly advocates for the diversification of suppliers and partners in critical infrastructure initiatives to reduce the vulnerability to external influences, ensuring that reliance on any single source is minimized;
Amendment 97 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Notes that the establishment of a thorough risk assessment and mapping framework is imperative to identify critical infrastructure assets and their susceptibilities; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to compile an exhaustive inventory of critical assets and systematically evaluate their vulnerability to external influences;
Amendment 99 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)
Paragraph 8 b (new)
8b. Underlines that routine evaluations of critical infrastructure projects that involve non-EU stakeholders are essential; this process should encompass scrutiny of ownership structures, dependencies within supply chains, and the transfer of technology associated with these projects;
Amendment 103 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects encompassing all modes of participation in critical infrastructure endeavors, including collaborative ventures, partnerships, and technology transfers; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to map, track and assess China’s access to critical infrastructure in the EU; stresses that the Member States are ultimately responsible for infrastructure protection, but have not consistently implemented current guidelines on foreign direct investment or set up national-level investment-screening mechanisms;
Amendment 77 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3
Recital 3
(3) The European Council of 23 June 2022 decided10 to grant the status of candidate country to Ukraine, which expressed a strong will to launch the EU accession process for Ukraine and to link reconstruction with reforms on its European path. Ongoing strong support to Ukraine is a key priority for the Union and an appropriate response to the Union’s strong political commitment to support Ukraine for as long as necessary. _________________ 10 European Council Conclusions, 23-24 June 2022; EUCO 24/22.
Amendment 78 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) The Union is also providing significant financial support through an additional package combining funds under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI) established under Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council12 and, as well as assistance under the Instrument for Pre- Accession (IPA), which among many things includes the thematic and cross- border cooperation priorities and key performance indicators to assess the readiness of the acceding countries and effectiveness of the assistance, as well as loans by the European Investment Bank. _________________ 12 Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1).
Amendment 84 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) Given the damage from Russia’s war of aggression to the Ukrainian economy, society and infrastructure, the support to the country to maintain its functions, as well as short relief, fast recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of Ukraine will require comprehensive support and an institutional finance management and reform capacity provided by the Union for Ukraine, which is adequate to the needs of recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of Ukraine to rebuild the economy, to create the foundations of a free and prosperous country, anchored in European values, well integrated into the European and global economy, and progressing well on its path of accession to the European Union.
Amendment 88 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
Recital 12
(12) In this context, it is necessary to set up a medium-term single instrument that brings together the bilateral support provided by the Union to Ukraine, ensuring coordination and efficiency. To that end, it is necessary to establish a Ukraine Facility (‘the Facility’), giving a necessary public and private finance management and reform implementation capacity and providing a balance between flexibility and programmability of the Union’s response to address Ukraine’s financing gap, recovery, reconstruction and modernisation needs, while at the same time supporting Ukraine’s reforms effort as part its accession path to the Union.
Amendment 91 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) The Ukraine Facility should be underpinned by a coherent and prioritised plan for reconstruction and accession (the ‘Ukraine Plan’), prepared bytogether by the EU and the Government of Ukraine, providing a structured and predictable framework for the recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of Ukraine, with EU's budgetary, reform and investment support and clearly articulated with Union accession requirements.
Amendment 96 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
Recital 15
(15) In this regard, Union support under the Facility should replacebe complimentary with the bilateral support provided under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), as well as under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI) established under Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council. It is nevertheless important to ensure that Ukraine can continue to benefit from regional, thematic, rapid response, and other forms of support under NDICI, including cross-border cooperation programmes, and more generally continue to advance regional, macro-regional and cross-border cooperation and territorial development, including through the implementation of Union macro-regional strategies.
Amendment 106 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
Recital 21
(21) The recovery, reconstruction and modernisation effort should build on Ukraine’s ownership,a shared Union's and Ukraine’s ownership, joint public and private finance management enterprise, as well as a close cooperation and coordination with supporting countries and organisations, and Ukraine’s path towards accession to the Union. Regional and local administrations are also expected to play an important role. PA joint management of programmes, acts, action plans or measures and peer-to-peer cooperation and programmes embedded in partnerships between cities and regions in the Union and those in Ukraine should enrich and accelerate the recovery, reconstruction and modernisation process.
Amendment 113 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24
Recital 24
(24) Support under the Facility should also build on and maximise synergies with G7 Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine, key organisations supporting Ukraine’s reforms and reconstruction, such as the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the International Monetary Fund.
Amendment 117 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26
Recital 26
(26) The enlargement policy framework, including the assistance under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) which constitutes the overall policy framework to prepare beneficiaries for future membership of the Union and to support their accession process, defined by the European Council and the Council, the association agreement, partnership and cooperation agreement, multilateral agreements to which the Union is a party and other agreements that establish a legally-binding relationship with Ukraine, as well as resolutions of the European Parliament, communications of the Commission and joint communications of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy should constitute the overall policy framework for the implementation of this Regulation. The Commission should ensure coherence between the assistance under the Facility and the enlargement policy framework.
Amendment 121 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29
Recital 29
(29) It is in the common interest of the Union and Ukraine to advance the efforts of Ukraine to reform its political, legal and economic systems with a view to Union membership. Considering Ukraine as a future member of the Union and a candidate to accession is a strategic investment of the Union in peace, security, stability and prosperity in Europe and allows the Union to be better positioned to address global challenges. It also provides increased economic and trade opportunities to the mutual benefit of the Union and Ukraine as an aspiring Member State, while supportensuring a gradual transformation of theUkraine as a beneficiary country. The prospect of Union membership has a powerful transformative effect, embedding positive democratic, political, economic and societal change.
Amendment 128 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31
Recital 31
(31) Reconstruction from the damage caused by the war of Russian aggression cannot be limited to rebuilding what was destroyed as it was before the war. The reconstruction offers an opportunity to support Ukraine in its process of fostering economic integration with the Union and promoting socioeconomic development, assistance for cross-border cooperation, integration into the Single Market and in accelerating its sustainable green and digital transitions, in line with Union policies. The Facility should promote reconstruction in a way that modernises and improves Ukraine’s economy and society, building on Union rules and standards, by investing in the transition of Ukraine towards a green, digital and inclusive economy and in the recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of its critical infrastructure, productive capacity and human capital in a resilient way.
Amendment 167 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 45
Recital 45
(45) Union support should be organised around three pillars, namely (i) financial support to the Ukrainian State for the implementation of reforms and investments, as well as to address the financing gap and maintain macro- financial stability of the country, as set out in the Ukraine Plan as part of Ukraine's EU accession; (ii) a Ukraine Investment Framework to mobilise investments and enhance access to finance; (iii) accession assistance to mobilise technical expertise and capacity building.
Amendment 177 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 47
Recital 47
(47) The overall maximum amount for the Union support to the Facility should be EUR 50 billion in current prices for the period from 2024 to 2027, for all types of support. In light of the evolving circumstances and of the objectives of the Facility itself, the Union support needs to provide a balance between flexibility and programmability. This amount is only an indicative one and will be revised upwards in the course of events, as it reflects the needs assessments made before March 2023 by the intenational institutions for the reconstruction of Ukraine to overcome the damages of Russia's war of aggression, to address immediate humanitarian needs of Ukraine and to restore Ukraine's access to financial markets as well as a sustainable level of its public revenues.
Amendment 190 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 62
Recital 62
(62) The Union should establish the Ukraine Facility programming framework 2024-2027 for the duration of the Union's current multiannual financial framework. A Framework agreement should be concluded with Ukraine to set up a joint programming and implementation mechanism, the principles of the financial cooperation between the Union and Ukraine, including necessary mechanisms to control and audit expenditures. Financing and loan agreements should also be concluded with Ukraine, where appropriate depending on each pillar, to define conditions for releasing funds.
Amendment 195 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 66
Recital 66
(66) Ukraine together with the Union should prepare the Plan as a coherent, comprehensive and adequately balanced response to rebuilding and modernising Ukraine, supporting its economic, social and environmental recovery and its progress towards accession to the Union. As such, the Ukraine Plan would also provide a basis for other donors to identify the priority funding areas for the reconstruction of Ukraine and foster ownership, coherence and additional contributions to that end. For that purpose, Ukraine should ensure that the Plan as prepared covers its recovery, reconstruction and modernisation needs in an integrated manner, identifying to what extent the measures of the Plan are expected to be financed by the Union through the Facility. In preparing the Plan, Ukraine should take into account support provided under other Union programmes. Ukraine should develop its Plan ensuring that other donors are able to contribute to supporting the measures of the Plan, including by increasing the funding available under the Facility.
Amendment 216 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 82
Recital 82
(82) Under pillar II of the Facility, an investment framework should be set up by the Union, aiming to support recovery and reconstruction investments undertaken by private sector companies, municipalities, state-owned enterprises or other actors. The Ukraine Investment Framework should address priorities identified in the Ukraine Plan, and support its objectives and its implementation. The Ukraine Investment Framework should involve Ukrainian authorities in its governance.
Amendment 238 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 91
Recital 91
(91) The Commission should ensure that the financial interests of the Union are effectively protected under the Facility. To this end, an independent Audit Board should be set up to provide the Commission with information on possible mismanagement of funds. Such information should be made available to OLAF and where appropriate to the relevant Ukrainian authorities. The Commission, with the assistance of the Union delegation, should be entitled to perform checks on how Ukraine implements funds under a joint mechanism along the whole project life cycle. The Audit Board should ensure regular dialogue and cooperation with the European Court of Auditors.
Amendment 250 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) Pillar I: financial support to be provided to Ukraine for the recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of the country as a future member of the EU and for the delivery of reforms and investments to implement the Ukraine Plan as well as to support Ukraine's budget and maintain macro- financial stability of the country, as set out in Chapter III;
Amendment 258 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) address the social, economic and environmental consequences of the war, thereby contributing to the recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of the country under a joint mechanism and by shared ownership;
Amendment 265 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) provide an additional support for Ukraine in adopting and implementing the political, institutional, legal, administrative, social and economic reforms required to comply with Union values and to progressively align withto Union rules, standards, policies and practices (‘acquis’) with a view to future Union membership, thereby contributing to mutual stability, security, peace, and prosperity and sustainability.
Amendment 302 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1
Article 4 – paragraph 1
1. Cooperation under the Facility shall be based on and shall promote the development effectiveness principles, where applicable, across all modalities, namely shared ownership of development priorities by Ukraine and the Union, a focus on results, inclusive development partnerships, transparency and mutual accountability. The cooperation shall be based on effective and efficient resources allocation and use.
Amendment 304 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2
Article 4 – paragraph 2
2. Support from the Facility shall be additional to the support provided under other Union programmes and instruments, including under the Instrument for Pre- accession (IPA). Activities eligible for funding under this Regulation may receive support from other Union programmes and instruments provided that such support does not cover the same cost.
Amendment 320 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1
Article 5 – paragraph 1
1. A precondition for the support to Ukraine under the Facility shall be that Ukraine continues to uphold and respect effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system,stitutions and the rule of law, and to guarantee respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities; it would also include a strengthened focus on economic development and improved competitiveness, which are the crucial areas of Ukraine's EU accession process.
Amendment 346 #
2023/0200(COD)
Ukraine Facility programming framework and Framework agreement
Amendment 347 #
2023/0200(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1
Article 9 – paragraph 1
1. Assistance under this Regulation shall be based on a Ukraine Facility programming framework for the delivery of the specific objectives referred to in Article 3. The Commission shall establish the Ukraine Facility programming framework for the duration of the current multiannual financial framework 2021- 2027. The Ukraine Facility programming framework shall be developed in accordance with the policy framework and general principles set out in Article 4. The Ukraine Facility programming framework shall include indicators for assessing progress towards the achievement of the specific objectives referred to in Article 3. The Ukraine Facility will havea a shared ownership between the Union and Ukraine and will establish an institutional public and private finance management and reform capacity under a joint programming and implementation mechanism for rebuilding of Ukraine, which is adequate to the needs of its recovery, reconstruction and modernisation. The Commission shall conclude a framework agreement with Ukraine for the implementation of the Facility setting out specific arrangements for the management, control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit of funds under the Facility, as well as to prevent, investigate and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest. The framework agreement shall be complemented by financing agreements in accordance with Article 10 and loan agreements in accordance with Article 21, setting out specific provisions for the management and implementation of funding under the Facility.
Amendment 5 #
2022/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)
Citation 6 a (new)
— having regard to the EU-Western Balkans summits held in Sofia and Zagreb in 2018 and 2020, and to their respective declarations,
Amendment 13 #
2022/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 9 a (new)
Citation 9 a (new)
— having regard to the European Council conclusions of 23-24 June 2022 on Wider Europe, Ukraine, the membership applications of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, Western Balkans, economic issues, the Conference on the Future of Europe and external relations,
Amendment 20 #
2022/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 10
Citation 10
— having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 June 2019, 25 March 2020 and 14 December 2021 on enlargement and the stabilisation and association process,
Amendment 48 #
2022/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
A a. whereas the EU is committed to supporting EU candidate and potential candidate countries, sharing EU’s common values, notably the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be their biggest trade partner and largest provider of investment and financial assistance through the IPA III, the Economic and Investment Plan (EIP) for the Western Balkans and Macro- Financial Assistance;
Amendment 58 #
2022/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas a new impetus is needed to reenergise the enlargement process, ensuring its continuity, consistency, credibility and impact; whereas in order to have a greater impact in the respective societies, the enlargement process must be less bureaucratic and more politically guided, as well as more dynamic and more outreach-oriented;
Amendment 86 #
2022/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
C a. whereas the European Council has taken the unprecedented decision to grant EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, sending a strong message of support and solidarity to these countries in the light of the unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine;
Amendment 100 #
2022/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas each enlargement country should be judged on its own merits; and its fulfilment of the EU membership criteria, which requires the effective implementation of EU-related reforms;
Amendment 149 #
2022/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c
Paragraph 1 – point c
(c) undertake a thorough assessment of the EU’s enlargement capacity and enhance it with the new EU strategy for enlargement, including through necessary institutional reforms, strengthening EU’s capabilities to accommodate new Member States;
Amendment 166 #
2022/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e
Paragraph 1 – point e
(e) strengthen Member States’ commitment to enlargement by delivering on EU’s obligations towards the Western Balkan countries; maintain its long- standing commitment to the Western Balkan countries and make sure their parallel track continues unaffected with more dynamism on the basis of merit, political reforms and agreed commitments;
Amendment 196 #
2022/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g
Paragraph 1 – point g
(g) strengthen strategic communication on the benefits of enlargement both in the accession countries and in the Member States; improve the visibility of EU funding and its tangible results in the region;
Amendment 219 #
2022/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i
Paragraph 1 – point i
(i) accelerate thepropose a meaningful strategy of accelerated integration of countries that demonstrate strategic orientation and unwavering commitment to EU-related reforms, democratic consolidation and foreign policy alignment;
Amendment 228 #
2022/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j
Paragraph 1 – point j
(j) offer membership-oriented roadmaps of tangible and concrete steps, as well as regular feedback on accomplished results to all aspiring countries by further enhancing the revised enlargement methodology;
Amendment 244 #
2022/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point l
Paragraph 1 – point l
(l) reward progress with a wider phasing-in of candidate countries into respective EU policies and initiatives while sanctioning any backtracking; ensure that the integration into the EU Single Market and other sectors is based on strict conditionality and tangible progress in the reform process;
Amendment 291 #
2022/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point q
Paragraph 1 – point q
(q) recognise the threat created by Russia’s war of aggression by immesupporting Ukraine and Moldova as candidately granting EU candidate status to Ukraine countries in meeting the criteria of the “acquis communautaire” and continuing to provide political and technical support to Moldova and Georgia with a view to enabling them country to reach this important milestone as soon as possible, as a clear political signal of support to the people of these countries, and a means to accelerate internal reform processes;
Amendment 415 #
2022/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point ae a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point ae a (new)
(ae a) encourage inclusive regional economic cooperation on an equal footing in EU accession countries, especially in the Western Balkan region; strongly support cooperation strengthening alignment with EU standards and the EU acquis, and contributing to EU integration processes;
Amendment 433 #
2022/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point af
Paragraph 1 – point af
(af) step up citizen participation and the involvement of civil society in the enlargement process and invest in the youth and intraregional mobility; support the implementation of reforms related to youth and education and assist accession countries in tackling youth unemployment;
Amendment 28 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 35 a (new)
Citation 35 a (new)
— having regard to the fact that Belarus has become an accomplice to Russia‘s war against Ukraine,
Amendment 44 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas Europe is facing the most complex combination of both military and non-military threats since the end of the Cold War accentuated by Russia’s unjustified and illegal war against UkraineRussia wages war not only against Ukraine, but also against the NATO and the EU and collective democracies as such; whereas Europe is facing the most complex combination of both military and non-military threats since the end of the Cold War; whereas Ukraine defends not only its sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also European common values of democracy; whereas this requires the EU to enhance the effectiveness of its security and defence policy to defend its interests and values; whereas the Strategic Compass aims to equip the EU with the necessary tools to make it an effective security provider and an assertive global actor; whereas there is a new urgency to boosting EU security and defence capabilities, including building on the unprecedented support for Ukraine and including the use of the EPF;
Amendment 102 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Highlights the dramatic deRemains committed to supporting Ukraine’s defence of its territoration in Europeial integrity and security accelerated by Russia’s unjustified and illegal war against Ukraine; stresses that this situation demands that the EU step up its defence capacities and show greater willingness to act overeignty; calls on the EU to increase its efforts and provide Ukraine with all necessary financial, humanitarian and military aid; calls on the EU together with other partners in the democratic world to come up with a clear plan for systemic financing order to deliver the security expected by the EU’s citizens; underlines the unprecedented and united EU responsef weapons deliveries for Ukraine, which would allow Ukraine to win the war against Russia; calls for a large-scale lend-lease military assistance facility for Ukraine, which would match the level of military deliveries from the US; calls on Member States to Rumassia’s wvely accelerate their military againstssistance to Ukraine, including particular the provision of militweapons in response to clearly equipment through the EPF; remains committed to supporting Ukraine’s defence of its territorial integrity and sovereignty; calls on the EU to sustain its efforts and provide Ukraine with all necessary financial, humanitarian and military aid; identified needs and in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which allows for individual and collective self-defence; calls on the EU to urgently launch CSDP military assistance mission to enhancing Ukraine's ability to regenerate its forces and effectively conduct operations with an aim to help Ukraine to restore its territorial integrity and effectively exercise its sovereignty, protect the civilians in Ukraine and be able to deter and respond to possible future military offensives by Russia; calls on Member States to increase intelligence cooperation with Ukraine regarding the ongoing war and to share satellite images through SatCen and other satellite systems; insists on the need for the EU to step up their cybersecurity assistance to Ukraine; calls for full use of the EU cyber sanctions regime against individuals, entities and bodies responsible or involved in the various cyber-attacks targeting Ukraine;
Amendment 108 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Highlights the dramatic deterioration in European security accelerated by Russia’s unjustified and illegal war against Ukraineat Russia’s war of aggression is the biggest geopolitical challenge and threat to European security the dramatic deterioration in European security; stresses that this situation demands that the EU step up its defence capacities and show greater willingness to act in order to deliver the security expected by the EU’s citizens; underlines the unprecedented and united EU response to Russia’s war against Ukraine, including the provision of military equipment through the EPF; remains committed to supporting Ukraine’s defence of its territorial integrity and sovereignty; calls on the EU to sustain its efforts and provide Ukraine with all necessary financial, humanitarian and military aid;
Amendment 221 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Welcomes the EU’s ambition to strengthen its military and civilian capabilities; reiterates its call for the Member States to increase defence spending and ensure more effective capabilities; stresses the need to make full use of EU capability-development initiatives and budgets, notably the EDIRPA, EDF, PESCO, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and Military Mobility, in order to fill critical capability gaps, reduce fragmentation in the defence-procurement sector, achieve full interoperability of our forces and strengthen a resilient, competitive and innovative European defence technological and industrial base, in order to strengthen the European pillar within NATO; calls for ensuring maximum consistency between these initiatives;
Amendment 227 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. Calls on Members states to act in simplifying and harmonizing procedures for military mobility and shorten the timelines of granting permissions to enable the EU Member States to act faster and increase the efficiency of response, in line with their defence needs and responsibilities, both in the context of Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations, as well as national and multinational activities (e.g.in the framework of NATO); calls for renewal of the Action Plan on Military Mobility;
Amendment 230 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. CStresses the need to increase weapons production by the EU military industries; considers it important to fill the identified defence investment gaps such as replenishing stockpiles, replacing Soviet- era systems, reinforcing air and missile defence systems, expanding existing main battle tank capabilities and armoured vehicles, strengthening naval forces and improving satellite-based secure connectivity; strongly calls on Member States to commit to a significant increase in funding for EU procurement mechanisms and to take swift and thorough action in this crucial field;
Amendment 396 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18 a. Reiterates the language set in the Strategic Compass that “a stronger and more capable EU in security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members. These two go hand in hand.”
Amendment 401 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)
Paragraph 18 b (new)
18 b. Expresses grave concern over China’s continued military belligerence, pressure, assault exercises, airspace violations and other grey-zone military actions including cyber and disinformation campaigns against Taiwan; urges China to stop all these actions, restore the full respect of the Taiwan Strait’s median line; reiterates any change to cross-strait relations must be neither unilateral nor against the will of the Taiwanese people; stresses that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait has a direct impact on European security and prosperity;
Amendment 419 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Considers synergies and coherence with the implementation of NATO’s Strategic Concept essential, particularly in the areas of countering Russian aggression of Russia and its accomplice Belarus, cyber defence, hybrid warfare and support to strategic partners;
Amendment 462 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)
Paragraph 25 a (new)
25 a. In the context of the increasing tensions and recurrent outbreaks of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, welcomes European Council President Michel's efforts to mediate with both countries to seek for a sustainable normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan to promote a South Caucasus that is a secure, stable, peaceful and prosperous region; notes that with the aim of further involving the EU in the search for sustainable peace would be to set up the EU CSDP mission;
Amendment 308 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. expresses grave concern at Chinese government’s position indicated at the CCP’s 20th Party Congress that China will never renounce the right to use force over Taiwan; reiterates that the status quo of the Taiwan Strait should not be unilaterally altered against the will of the Taiwanese people; is of the view that the dispute between Taiwan and China should be solved through peaceful dialogues without any preconditions;
Amendment 324 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Underlines that Taiwan is a key EU partner and democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region, one that contributes to maintaining a rules-based international order and upholds fundamental values; strongly urges the EU and its Member States to intensify cooperation and pursue a comprehensive enhanced partnership with Taiwan, notably essential cooperation on critical supply chain resilience, and countering disinformation and foreign interference.
Amendment 326 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)
Paragraph 17 b (new)
17b. Strongly advocate Taiwan’s meaningful participation as an observer in the meetings, mechanism and activities of the World Health Organization, UNFCCC, International Civil Aviation Organization and Interpol;
Amendment 158 #
2022/2025(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21 a. Stresses that particular attention should be paid to the uncontrolled and unsupervised diffusion orders exchanged directly between Interpol member countries, as diffusion orders carry the same risks of politically motivated abuses as red notices, but are not reviewed by the Interpol bodies; calls for the immediate suspension of the Russian Federation’s access to Interpol’s systems and calls on the EU Member States not to accept diffusion orders from the Russian Federation;
Amendment 187 #
2022/2025(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Notes the announcement by Interpol’s Secretary-General that it would implement enhanced monitoring measures to identify and prevent further abuse of Interpol’s systems by Russia; remains concerned, however, that monitoring alone will not fully mitigate the risks of Russian abuse; stresses, therefore, that given the current special circumstances Interpolthe Russian Federation should take immediate and firm measures to exclude the Russian Federation from the organisationly be excluded from Interpol;
Amendment 191 #
2022/2025(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24 a. Highlights the need to address the problem of lack of regulation of exclusion of member countries from Interpol;
Amendment 71 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Recital M
Recital M
Amendment 81 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Recital S a (new)
Recital S a (new)
Sa. whereas EU Common Foreign and Security policy is defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise, as provided for in the Article 24 TEU and whereas Member States are represented by their Heads of State or Government in the European Council and by their Governments in the Council, who are themselves democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments or to their citizens and whereas the functioning of the Union is founded on representative democracy and European citizens are directly represented at the Union level by the European Parliament and whereas every citizen has the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union as provided for in the Article 10 TEU;
Amendment 82 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Recital S b (new)
Recital S b (new)
Sb. whereas the European Parliament, as a direct representation at the Union level of the citizens, has a unique obligation to guarantee to the citizens of EU the right to be informed about the actions or inactions of the European Council and the Council and their individual members, which were made in order to define and to implement EU Common Foreign and Security Policy;
Amendment 278 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point s a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point s a (new)
(sa) involve the European Parliament in the scrutiny of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy implementation and create proper procedures for the Parliament to execute an obligation to guarantee to the citizens of EU the right to be informed about the actions or inactions of the European Council and the Council and their individual members, which were made in order to define and to implement EU Common Foreign and Security Policy; create proper parliamentary procedures for individual members of the European Council and the Council to inform the Parliament about their position, which they take during the process of definition and implementation of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy;
Amendment 2 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5
Citation 5
— having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia, in particular, that of 8 June 2022 on violations of media freedom and the safety of journalists and that of 16 September 2020 on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Georgia,
Amendment 7 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
Citation 8 a (new)
— having regard to the Joint Staff Working Document on Economic and Investment Plan for Eastern Partnership,
Amendment 8 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 9 a (new)
Citation 9 a (new)
— having regard to Reporters' Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index 2022,
Amendment 12 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas Georgia submitted its application for EU membership on 3 March 2022 in the context of continued strong public support for Georgia's European aspirations as well as Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine;
Amendment 28 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas freedom of expression, freedom of media and the safety of journalists are a cornerstone of a functioning democracy;
Amendment 31 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Recital D b (new)
Db. whereas the 19 April 2021 Agreement, mediated by the President of the European Council, underlined the need to address politicised justice through judicial reform in order to increase the independence, transparency and accountability of the judicial system;
Amendment 34 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D c (new)
Recital D c (new)
Dc. whereas the media environment of Georgia continues to deteriorate and, in the recent years, an unprecedented high number of violent physical attacks against journalists have occurred in Georgia; whereas in 2022 Georgia fell in the World Press Freedom Index from 60th to 89th place out of 180;
Amendment 37 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D d (new)
Recital D d (new)
Dd. whereas selective investigations and prosecutions targeting those critical of the current government undermine public trust not only in judicial institutions, but also in the Georgian authorities;
Amendment 40 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D e (new)
Recital D e (new)
De. whereas former President Mikheil Saakashvili, whose health has been constantly deteriorating, continues to be incarcerated;
Amendment 41 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D f (new)
Recital D f (new)
Df. whereas Nika Gvaramia, the director of the TV channel Mtavari, has been sentenced to three and a half years in prison on dubious charges of money laundering, bribery and document forgery;
Amendment 42 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D g (new)
Recital D g (new)
Dg. whereas 20% of Georgian territory continues to be occupied by the Russian Federation;
Amendment 43 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D h (new)
Recital D h (new)
Dh. whereas Russia continues to employ disinformation, cyber attacks and other hybrid methods to undermine Georgia's societal and institutional resilience;
Amendment 44 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D i (new)
Recital D i (new)
Di. whereas the Russian Federation has intensified the annexation of Georgia’s occupied territories, including through the intentions of holding the so- called 'referendum' in the Tskhinvali/South Ossetia region on the matter of 'joining' the Russian Federation, transfer of the “Bichvinta” property complex and the surrounding area to the Russian Federation, as well as the incorporation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia in military, economic, justice, social and other spheres of the Russian Federation;
Amendment 45 #
2021/2236(INI)
Dj. whereas ethnic cleansing, discrimination and other severe forms of human rights violations of Georgians in the Russian occupied territories of Georgia, erection of barbed wire fences and other artificial barriers and lengthy closure of so-called crossing points along the 'Administrative Border Line' continue to destabilise Georgia;
Amendment 46 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D k (new)
Recital D k (new)
Dk. whereas the Russian Federation and its occupation regimes are deliberately hampering the safe and dignified return of IDPs and refugees, forcibly expelled as a result of ethnic cleansing from the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia;
Amendment 47 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the decision of the European Council to recognise Georgia’s European perspective; notes that this decision is a strong signal of political support for the European aspirations of the people of Georgia; reiterates that to be granted candidate status, Georgia needs to successfully address the twelve key priorities, including de-oligarchisation and de-polarisation, as indicated by the Commission in its opinion on Georgia’s application for membership of the European Union and endorsed by the European Council;
Amendment 52 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Calls on the Georgian authorities to uphold the highest standards of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms and to determinedly pursue the priorities for reform set out in the Commission’s opinion in order to unambiguously demonstrate their political determination to implement the nation’s ambitious European aspirations, as expressed by the application for EU membership that Georgia submitted on 3 March 2022; calls on the Georgian authorities to initiate and lead the work on these priorities in an inclusive manner before the Commission reports on their implementation by the end of 2022; calls on all Georgian political forces to constructively participate in and contribute to these efforts; stresses that Georgia’s bid for accession to the EU will continue to be assessed based on its own merits and its success in meeting the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership; stresses that fulfilling the political criteria is as much necessary as implementing the formal criteria, and reminds a historical case when accession process was stopped due to democracy problems in an applicant country;
Amendment 54 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Calls on the Georgian authorities to uphold and ensure the highest standards of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms and to determinedresolutely pursue the priorities for reform set out in the Commission’s opinion in order to unambiguously demonstrate their political determination to implement the nation’s ambitious European aspirations, as expressed by the application for EU membership that Georgia submitted on 3 March 2022; calls on the Georgian authorities to initiate and lead the work on addressing these priorities in an inclusive manner before the Commission reports on their implementation by the end of 2022; calls on all Georgian political forces and civil society to constructively participate in and contribute to these efforts; stresses that Georgia’s bid for accession to the EU will continue to be assessed based on its own merits and its success in meeting the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership;
Amendment 66 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Underlines that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine calls for unity and solidarity on the part of the international community; welcomes the strong response of Georgian society in support of Ukraine; regrets the fact that Georgia has not aligned with EU sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; calls for political alignment by the Georgian authorities and all political stakeholders with EU positions on this important matter, in line with the country’s European ambitions;
Amendment 73 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Reiterates its steadfast support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; calls for the continuation of efforts to achieve a negotiated peaceful conflict resolution of the conflict, including through the Geneva International Discussionsand end to Russian occupation of Georgian territory, including through the effective and result-orientated functioning of Geneva International Discussions and Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) in Gali and Ergneti, the ongoing activities of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia and the efforts of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia, as well as the policy of non- recognition and engagement; notes with concern the continuation of illegal ‘borderisation’ activities, in the occupied regionsllegal detentions and kidnappings and restriction on freedom of movement along the Administrative Border Line; calls on the Council to extend the mandate of EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia beyond 14 December 2022 and to provide it with a budget that is commensurate with its tasks to stabilise and normalise the situation and build confidence between the parties in the conflict in an increasingly tense security environment; calls on the EU to further enhance its engagement for the peaceful resolution of the Russia-Georgia conflict, by effectively using all the instruments, including the Special Representative(EUSR) for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, the Geneva International Discussions (GID), the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs), the EUMM in Georgia, as well as the policy of non- recognition and engagement;
Amendment 78 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Reiterates its steadfast support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; calls for the continuation of efforts to achieve a negotiated peaceful resolution of the conflict, including through the Geneva International Discussions, the ongoing activities of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia and the efforts of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia; notes with concerncondemns the continuation of illegal ‘borderisation’ activities in the occupied regions; calls on the Council to extend the mandate of EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia beyond 14 December 2022 and to provide it with a budget that is commensurate with its tasks to stabilise and normalise the situation and build confidence between the parties in the conflict in an increasingly tense security environment;
Amendment 80 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Stresses that Georgia must put utmost effort to seize the historic opportunity for EU integration, which opened up due to heroic struggle of Ukraine in the face of military aggression of Russia waged against freedom and democracy and our common values; the main goal of the Kremlin against Georgia is to paralyse the geopolitical will of Georgia so that it would not seek the integration into Euro-Atlantic community, therefore the only way for Georgia to protect itself from the Kremlin’s hybrid and other type of attacks is to do its utmost to ensure fulfilment of all 12 conditions in the nearest future;
Amendment 81 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Amendment 86 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5b. Calls on the Russian Federation to fulfil its international obligations under the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement, notably to withdraw all its military and security from Georgia’s occupied territories and allow establishment of international security mechanisms therein, to allow the EUMM unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia pursuant to its mandate;
Amendment 93 #
2021/2236(INI)
6. Regrets that deep polarisation continues to be the defining feature of Georgia’s political environment; calls on all political stakeholders to unite their forces around the key goal of Georgia’s EU membership through the implementation of ambitious democratic, judicial and anti- corruption reforms, and which continues to fuel societal divisions; calls on all political stakeholders to refrain from divisive and inflammatory rhetoric, and unite their forces around the key goal of Georgia’s EU membership through the implementation of ambitious democratic, judicial and anti-corruption reforms; stresses with concern that deep polarisation continues to undermine Georgia's resilience, in particular, in the face of continued geopolitical challenges and Russian disinformation which seeks to further divide Georgian society; reiterates that the core provisions of the EU-brokered agreement of 19 April 2021 continue to present athe best pathway towards strengthening democracy and the rule of law in Georgia; calls on all political forces to return to and abide by the April 19 Agreement; notes that provisions of the 19 April Agreement have been incorporated in the EU-Georgia Association Agenda 2021-2027; calls on the Government of Georgia to ensure their strict implementation;
Amendment 97 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Stresses that addressing the issue of political polarisation, through ensuring cooperation across political parties in the spirit of the April 19 agreement, is at the top of the recommendations laid out by the European Commission and must be addressed as an immediate priority; regrets that instead the Georgian ruling party representatives embarked on a blame-game against the opposition parties and NGOs;
Amendment 100 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. Deplores the aggressive rhetoric targeting international allies of Georgia’s European path, namely the US and the EU ambassadors, as incompatible with the status of EU applicant country;
Amendment 101 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 c (new)
Paragraph 6 c (new)
6c. Regrets that the actions and rhetoric of the Georgian Dream representatives further escalate the polarisation of Georgia’s political environment and may point to a deliberate sabotage of Georgia’s European future by the governing political party;
Amendment 104 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Regrets the decision of the governing Georgian Dream party to withdraw from the agreement of April 19, 2021 and calls on the government to return to the agreement and start its implementation immediately, as it presents the way forward towards depolarization and implementing reforms;
Amendment 109 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Underlines the need to eliminate the excessive influence of vested interests, including oligarchs, in economic, political of the sole oligarch, Bidzina Ivanishvili, in Georgia's politics, economy and public life as one of the priorities identified by the Commission to be addressed before Georgia is granted candidate status;
Amendment 110 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Underlines the need to eliminate the excessive influence of vested interests, including oligarchs of the sole oligarch, Bidzina Ivanishvili, in economic, political and public life as one of the priorities identified by the Commission to be addressed before Georgia is granted candidate status;
Amendment 112 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Reiterates its concern over the destructive role played by the sole oligarch, Bidzina Ivanishvili, in Georgia's politics and economy, and the level of control he exerts over the government and its decisions, including those on the politically motivated persecution of journalists and political opponents; is deeply worried by Ivanishvili's exposed personal and business links to the Kremlin, which determine the position of the current Government of Georgia towards sanctions on Russia; calls on the Council and democratic partners to consider imposing personal sanctions on Ivanishvili for his role in the deterioration of the political process;
Amendment 120 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Calls on the Georgian authorities to release former President Mikheil Saakashvili from prison on humanitarian grounds in order to allow him to undergo proper medical treatment abroad;
Amendment 123 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Stresses that hasty and non- transparent actions in making key appointments or institutional changes only reinforce the perception of politicised justice; in this respect notes, in particular, regrets that the Supreme Court judges were appointed before the shortcomings in the nomination process identified by ODIHR and the Venice Commission were addressed; reiterates that the lack of progress on judicial reform meant that the conditions for receiving the EUR 75 million tranche of EU macro-financial assistance by September 2021 were not fulfilled;
Amendment 135 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Regrets the sentencing of Nika Gvaramia, the director of a critical media Mtavari Arkhi, persecution of founders and directors of other critical media outlets, namely David Kezerashvili of Formula TV and Vakhtang Tsereteli of Pirveli TV, as well as the practice of suing critical media for libel, as putting political pressure on independent media; calls on the Georgian authorities to ensure media freedom and safety of journalists;
Amendment 137 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Notes that, despite Georgia's legal framework for guaranteeing freedom of expression and freedom of media, there is continued deterioration of the media environment and the safety of journalists;
Amendment 141 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)
Paragraph 11 b (new)
11b. Notes that the decision of the court to convict the leaders of Lelo for Georgia party, Mamuka Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze, and using the court’s verdict to strip Mr Japaridze of his parliamentary mandate raises further concerns of politicized justice and exacerbates the polarisation;
Amendment 142 #
2021/2236(INI)
11b. Condemns the increasing number of cases of intimidation, threats and violence against the persecution of journalists, including an increasing number of criminal investigations into media workers and owners;
Amendment 145 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 c (new)
Paragraph 11 c (new)
11c. Notes continued Russian disinformation campaigns targeting the Georgian society, including in the context of Russian aggression against Ukraine; calls on the EU institutions and Member States to continue strengthening cooperation with relevant Georgian institutions to address Russian disinformation and its consequences;
Amendment 156 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Condemns the sentencing of Nika Gvaramia, the director of the independent TV channel Mtavari, on 16 May 2022; notes that the postponement of Nika Gvaramia's appeal process is unacceptable and reiterates its call for a review of Gvaramia's conviction;
Amendment 165 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Reiterates the importance of independent oversight of Georgia’s state institutions; regrets, in this respect, the dismantling of State Inspector’s Service against ODIHR recommendations; highlights the positive role of the public defender of Georgia in protecting human rights, promoting good governance and strengthening the rule of law; calls for an inclusive process of selecting the new Public Defender;
Amendment 172 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Calls on the Georgian authorities to release former president Mikheil Saakashvili from prison on humanitarian grounds in order to allow him to undergo proper medical treatment abroad;
Amendment 173 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)
Paragraph 13 b (new)
Amendment 180 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Notes that, according to expert evaluations, the DCFTA has had a positive impact on legislative approximation and institutional development, but it only had a modest impact on trade between the EU and Georgia; calls on the Commission to review the DCFTA's potential to increase trade volumes between the EU and Georgia;
Amendment 187 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)
Paragraph 14 b (new)
Amendment 188 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 c (new)
Paragraph 14 c (new)
14c. Regrets the continued delays in the development of the Anaklia Deep Sea Port following the Georgian Government's cancellation of the project contract with the Anaklia Development Consortium (ADC) in 2020; is deeply concerned by the Panama Papers revelations concerning Bidzina Ivanishvili's investment in the rival Poti port project and the impact of vested interests on key projects as well as overall investors' confidence in Georgia;
Amendment 196 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)
Paragraph 15 b (new)
15b. Calls on the Commission to extend “Roam-like-at-home” Regulation to Georgia, which has the potential to bring significant benefits for EU and Georgian businesses and citizens;
Amendment 197 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 c (new)
Paragraph 15 c (new)
15c. Calls on the Commission to support creation of a common roaming space between Georgia and the EU through coordinated assistance with a focus on gradual reduction of international roaming tariffs between Georgia and the EU in line with the EU regulations thus protecting consumers’ rights, as well as assisting gradual approximation of Georgia to the EU acquis and contributing to Georgia’s European integration process;
Amendment 199 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 c (new)
Paragraph 15 c (new)
15c. Underlines Georgia's role as a significant contributor to the EU crisis management (CSDP) operations;
Amendment 200 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 d (new)
Paragraph 15 d (new)
15d. Calls for an increased assistance and enhanced partnership in the area of security and defence with Georgia as declared in the EU Strategic Compass, including through the European Peace Facility; welcomes EU’s commitment and determination to support Georgia in countering hybrid threats;
Amendment 202 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 e (new)
Paragraph 15 e (new)
15e. Calls on the Council and the EEAS to further engage with Georgia on the CSDP, particularly in view of Georgia’s interest in discussing the possibility of participating in PESCO projects and in developing cooperation with the relevant EU agencies, with a view to enhancing Georgia’s resilience;
Amendment 203 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 e (new)
Paragraph 15 e (new)
15e. Reiterates support to the human capital development, strengthening private sector role in Vocational education system management and addressing skills mismatch for better employment possibilities;
Amendment 204 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 f (new)
Paragraph 15 f (new)
15f. Welcomes Georgia’s strong commitment to starting the process of becoming the Third Country Associated to Erasmus+ Programme and encourages Georgia’s participation in the new Horizon Europe Program in order to make use of the opportunities for the Georgian scientific and innovation community;
Amendment 205 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 g (new)
Paragraph 15 g (new)
15g. Calls the European Commission and Georgia to consider increasing the number of Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) projects in Georgia in order to increase EU-Georgia connectivity;
Amendment 206 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 h (new)
Paragraph 15 h (new)
15h. Encourages European Commission, ENTSO-E and Georgia to start working on synchronization of Georgian electricity grid with the European Continental Grid and on the inclusion of Georgia in Continental Europe Synchronous Area (CESA);
Amendment 218 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Welcomes the signing of the Jean Monnet Dialogue between the European Parliament and the Georgian Parliament; regrets the delays in implementing the JMD; reiterates the European Parliament's commitment and calls on the Georgian Parliament to start the process as soon as possible;
Amendment 219 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)
Paragraph 17 b (new)
17b. Deplores and condemns the personal attacks against Members of the European Parliament by representatives of the Georgian Dream party; considers these attacks unacceptable and damaging to the mutual relationship between Georgia and the European Union;
Amendment 215 #
2021/2232(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the positive role Taiwan plays in fostering peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; urges the EU and Member States to take a proactive role in working with like-minded international partners to pursue peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and to intensify cooperation with Taiwan to promote common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and rule of law in the Indo- Pacific region;
Amendment 80 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
G a. whereas NATO has reconfirmed its Open Door Policy;
Amendment 81 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G b (new)
Recital G b (new)
G b. whereas integration of Ukraine to the European Union is as important as integration of Ukraine to NATO;
Amendment 82 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G c (new)
Recital G c (new)
G c. whereas the Commission, the EEAS and EU Member States should be responding to Kremlin`s threats not only with NATO-led hard security instruments, but also with the EU`s soft power of the European integration, which is central to economic and political success, as well as security of Ukraine;
Amendment 384 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16 a. Invites the EU institutions to provide a more ambitious integration agenda for Ukraine, as well as for the Association Trio, which could include the practical steps to the first intermediate stage of Ukraine`s accelerated full integration into the EU`s Single Market;
Amendment 42 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1
Subheading 1
Developing an EU defence doctrinesecurity defence policy using the Strategic Compass to drive strategic autonomy
Amendment 229 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Notes the EEAS’s needs assessment report regarding the Professional Military Education (PME) sector in Ukraine and welcomes the ongoing work in scoping a possible EU engagement in Ukraine on its basis, and complementing Ukraine’s and international partners’ efforts in reforming professional military education in Ukraine;
Amendment 288 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Calls for an integrated approach to the EU security and defence by strengthening not only conventional (military) but also other dimensions of security such as information, cyber, economic, energy, infrastructure, value chains in strategic sectors and other areas of security of the EU;
Amendment 291 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 b (new)
Paragraph 20 b (new)
Amendment 495 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 – introductory part
Paragraph 38 – introductory part
38. Welcomes the fact that the PESCO strategic review has led into a reduction in the number of projectsmaking projects more efficient and an increase in its political monitoring; laments the fact that Parliament has been excluded from the monitoring of its implementation; considers that the Strategic Compass should aim to:
Amendment 564 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 a (new)
Paragraph 41 a (new)
41a. Underlines the geopolitical importance of the Union in taking lead responsibility for its regional stability, security and prosperity and preventing destabilising processes in the EU neighbourhood, both East and South as well as the Arctic;
Amendment 565 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 b (new)
Paragraph 41 b (new)
Amendment 577 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Welcomes the establishment of an EU-US strategic dialogue on security and defence; stresses the operational dimension of the partnership and the importance of ensuring that the Union maintains its strategic autonomy, in particular a and assumes gregards the United States’ International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)ater responsibility in the transatlantic alliance; welcomes, in this regard, the involvement of third countries in the EDA on the basis of administrative agreements, provided that it is accompanied by legally binding counterparts and safeguards to protect the defence and security interests of the Union and its Member States;
Amendment 598 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Calls for a stronger NATO supported by a stronger European Union, and wishes to see very tangible development in the EU-NATO partnership; calls, in this context, for coherence between NATO’s new strategic concept to be coherent withand the EU’s Strategic Compass;
Amendment 619 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 a (new)
Paragraph 45 a (new)
45a. Notes with serious concern the recent display of force and escalating tensions in the regional hotspots such as South and East China Sea and Taiwan Strait; underlines that the peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific regions is of great importance for the EU and its Member States; expresses grave concern over China’s continued military manoeuvers in the Taiwan Strait, including those aimed at Taiwan or taking place in Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone; calls on the PRC to stop such military sabre-rattling that pose serious threats to the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and the Indo- Pacific region; reiterates that the relationship between China and Taiwan should be developed constructively through dialogues, without coercion or destabilizing tactics by either side; stresses the opposition to any unilateral action that may undermine the status quo of the Taiwan Strait and that any change to cross-strait relations must not be made against the will of Taiwan’s citizens;
Amendment 625 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 b (new)
Paragraph 45 b (new)
45b. Recalls that China, together with other non-democratic countries, also remains a major threat to democracies in Europe through disinformation campaigns, in which they exploit the openness and freedom of expression to propose an authoritarian alternative to the democratic system; note that cooperation in the fight against disinformation is therefore in the interest of both the EU and Taiwan;
Amendment 627 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 c (new)
Paragraph 45 c (new)
45c. Encourages the EU and the Member States to deepen cooperation with Taiwan in confronting disinformation from malign third countries, including the sharing of best practices, joint approaches to fostering media freedom and journalism, deepening cooperation on cybersecurity and cyber-threats, raising citizens’ awareness and improving overall digital literacy among the population in order to strengthen the resilience of our democratic systems; support intensified cooperation between relevant European and Taiwanese government agencies, NGOs and think tanks in this field;
Amendment 17 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas recent international developments and challenges, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the recent, the rapid collapse of the state structures of Afghanistan and recent hybrid actions against the EU and its Member States aimed at challenging our democratic foundations, have accelerated existing trends affecting key aspects of the EU’s CFSP;
Amendment 48 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – introductory part
Paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. To achieve the strategic objective of developing its global leadership role, the EU should shape its CFSP on the basis of the following fivesix actions:
Amendment 71 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – indent 3
Paragraph 1 – indent 3
- achieving European sovereignty by interlinking the EU’s external actions, and assuming greater responsibility in the transatlantic alliance,
Amendment 83 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1 a (new)
Subheading 1 a (new)
- engaging in a comprehensive strategic dialogue with democratic partners worldwide and coordinating common actions of shared interest;
Amendment 108 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Calls for the EU to promote alliances of democracies worldwide; insists on the need to pool resources and exchange best practices between democracies, including as regards countering malign interference and disinformation by authoritarian states and organisationtheir proxies; believes that, for this to be successful, the EU should promote on the global stage a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to counter hybrid threats;
Amendment 202 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Highlights the need for the EU to strengthen its ability to act efficiently and to shape the EU’s response to ongoing and upcoming challenges; therefore welcomes the ongoing Strategic Compass process as the starting point for the development of a common strategic culture respecting the specific character of the security and defence policies of the Member States and expects that it will help shape a shared vision for EU security and defence; stresses that the outcome should be reflected in a revised version of the 2016 EU Global Strategy;
Amendment 353 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Reaffirms its unwavering support to the Eastern Partnership countries, and in particular as regards their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within their internationally recognised borders; condemns Russia’s direct and indirect involvement in armed conflicts, occupations and military build-ups inside the region or on its borders with the region; urges the Eastern Partnership countries, and in particular those that have chosen to pursue the path of European integration, to ensure that fundamental freedoms are upheld and to continue implementing the necessary reforms; reiterates that the EU’s support is conditional upon concrete progress on those reforms; supports the EU Associated Trio format of countries most advanced on the European path; reminds that success of the EaP countries can be demonstrated and consolidated only through EU integration process, and it can show also to the Russian people what socio-economic benefits European-type reforms can bring;
Amendment 356 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24 a. Calls on the Commission and the Council to use the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit to develop an ambitious agenda for advancing reforms and democratic governance in the Eastern Partnership and thus support the CFSP goals;
Amendment 363 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 b (new)
Paragraph 24 b (new)
Amendment 437 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Is gravely concerned by the developments in Russia and reiterates the EU’s interest in maintaining freedom, stability and peace on the European continent and beyond; believes that the EU should deter Russia from carrying out destabilising and subversive actions in Europe and from repressing its own citizens; underlines that closer coordination, cooperation and unity among the EU Member States are necessary in order to maintain a constructive dialogue with the Russian authorities based on the five guiding principles, which is only possible if both parties are genuinely interested in it; urges the EU to engage more closely with the people of Russia, including by developing a clearly defined ‘engagement’ objective, which should focus not only on traditional selective engagement with the Kremlin, but also on ‘strategic’ engagement with Russian civil societyregrets that Russian Federation military forces continue to occupy parts of Ukraine and Georgia in violation of international law, that they are still present in the Republic of Moldova, and that Russia continues to destabilise peace and security in the region as well as actively use hybrid measures against democracies in Europe; condemns Russia’s military intervention and illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the keeping of the frozen conflict in Moldova; stresses the need to speak with one voice on the EUs policy in that context;
Amendment 447 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 a (new)
Paragraph 30 a (new)
30 a. Underlines that European Parliament has recommended the EU to review, together with the Member States, the EU policy vis-à-vis Russia, including the five guiding principles, and to develop a comprehensive EU strategy towards Russia; urges the EU to engage more closely with the people of Russia, including by developing a strategy on future EU relations with a democratic Russia, which would demonstrate clearly for the people of Russia the benefits such relations could bring; reiterates that the EU has to make it clear that if Russia continues its current policy on Belarus, the EU will have to introduce additional containment and deterrence measures on Russia;
Amendment 467 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Reiterates, as underlined in its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy4 , its call for the EU to develop a more assertive, comprehensive, and consistent EU-China strategy that unites all Member States and shapes relations with China in the interest of the EU as a whole by engaging China in a structured and systematic format of 27+1; emphasises that this strategy should promote a rules-based multilateral order, have the defence of EU values at its core and should be based on the three principles of cooperating where possible, competing where needed, and confronting where necessary; strongly advocates for Taiwan’s full participation as an observer in meetings, mechanisms and activities of international organisations; _________________ 4 Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0382.
Amendment 468 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32 a (new)
Paragraph 32 a (new)
32 a. Notes with serious concern the recent display of force and escalating tensions in the regional hotspots such as South and East China Sea and Taiwan Strait; underlines that the peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific regions is of great importance for the EU and its Member States; expresses grave concern over China’s continued military manoeuvers in the Taiwan Strait, including those aimed at Taiwan or taking place in Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone; calls on the PRC to stop such military sabre-rattling that pose serious threats to the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and the Indo- Pacific region; reiterates that the relationship between China and Taiwan should be developed constructively through dialogues, without coercion or destabilizing tactics by either side; stresses the opposition to any unilateral action that may undermine the status quo of the Taiwan Strait and that any change to cross-strait relations must not be made against the will of Taiwan’s citizens;
Amendment 470 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32 a (new)
Paragraph 32 a (new)
32 a. Denounces the Chinese Communist Party's coercion against Lithuania and other EU Member States and partners, and calls for greater solidarity with countries coerced by the CCP, including by collaborating with our democratic allies in opening our markets to economies suffering under the CCP's economic coercion;
Amendment 70 #
2021/2181(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Is deeply concerned by increasing number of illiberal democracies and autocratic regimes, which are in the majority for the first time in 20 years; calls for the EU and the Member States to make full use of the tools at their disposal to support good governance, democratic institutions and space for civil society worldwide; Calls on the EU to intensify cooperation with democracies worldwide and adopt new international tools and instruments for defending democracy, such as preventive sanctions for authoritarian leaders who intend to ‘steal’ elections and for oligarchs who finance these regimes, uncovering and freezing ‘dark’ money of vast corruption, and application of universal jurisdiction in cases of gross human rights violations;
Amendment 82 #
2021/2181(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Points out that the EU should not recognise the voting which took place in Russia on 17-19 September 2021, as the opposition candidates were not allowed to run, free media was persecuted, international observers from the OSCE/ODHIR were not allowed to come and observe the elections, electronic voting was marred and there were numerous instances of voting irregularities and electoral fraud;
Amendment 168 #
2021/2181(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Calls on the Russian Government to immediately release Alexei Navalny, who survived state-sponsored assassination attempt by military grade chemical weapon, but was detained in Russia, sentenced under trumped up charges and imprisoned for political reasons; reminds that there are over 400 political prisoners in Russia, and 685 political prisoners in Belarus and the number of political prisoners in both countries continues to grow;
Amendment 340 #
2021/2181(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)
Paragraph 35 a (new)
35a. Condemns instrumentalisation of illegal migration, a hybrid attack aimed to destabilize Europe by Lukashenko regime in Belarus, who devised a scheme ferrying migrants from Iraq and Turkey to Minsk and with the help of Belarusian border guards facilitating their illegal crossing into the European Union; calls on the European Commission to prepare relevant legislative proposals providing Member States necessary safeguards to effectively react and respond to instrumentalisation of migration by hostile third countries aimed at intimidating and destabilising the EU;
Amendment 356 #
2021/2181(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 a (new)
Paragraph 38 a (new)
38a. Points out that authoritarian Russia is an aggressive power that poses a threat to Europe’s peace and security; reminds that Russia is responsible for waging a war in Europe, in Donbas, for occupation of territories of neighbouring countries and for illegal annexation of Crimea;
Amendment 404 #
2021/2181(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 46 a (new)
Paragraph 46 a (new)
46a. Reminds that in the authoritarian states the internet and cyber space often remains the sole area free of state control and censorship for human rights defenders, free media and pro-democratic opposition and it must be defended; deplores the fact that Apple and Google have removed jailed Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s smart voting application from the iOS and Android stores under pressure from the Russian government;
Amendment 229 #
2021/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Encourages the US to move towards the abolition of the death penalty, the reform of the criminal justice system, including through addressing systemic racism, and the end of all discrimination against LGBTQI persons; urges dialogue and exchange of best practices between the EU and US on promoting racial and gender equality;
Amendment 315 #
2021/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Supports the proposal of President Biden to hold a Summit for Democracy with like-minded democracies, proposes that the EU establishes together with the US a transatlantic alliance to defend democracy globally and elaborate a democracy defence toolkit, which should include joint actions on sanctions, anti- money laundering policies, rules on the conditionality of economic and financial assistance, international investigations, and support for human rights activists and defenders of democracy;
Amendment 344 #
2021/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Believes that the EU should engage more with the US in the Western BalkansEastern Europe and Weastern EuropeBalkans in order to build resilient, prosperous, democratic multi- ethnic societies there, capable of resisting the disruptive influence of both local and external authoritarian forces;
Amendment 43 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
A a. whereas China, as stated by the European Council in 2019, is cooperation and negotiation partner, economic competitor and systemic rival to the EU;
Amendment 47 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Recital A b (new)
A b. whereas China is increasingly aspiring a more global role, as Chinese President Xi Jinping openly vowed in his report at the 19th Communist Party Congress in 2017 that by 2049 China would become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence;
Amendment 51 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A c (new)
Recital A c (new)
A c. Whereas the examples of long- term democracy tradition in Hong Kong and Taiwan demonstrate that democracy is the value for the Chinese people;
Amendment 104 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Recognizes China’s right to pursue its interests and fulfil its potential of global leadership, however, such leadership must be built on respect for universal human rights, democracy and the rule of law, therefore longer-term future development of China towards more authoritarianism or towards democracy will have a significant global impact;
Amendment 379 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20 a. Stresses that the EU and the US have the same strategic long-term geopolitical interest – to ensure that upcoming global leadership of China would not weaken the rules-based liberal world order, therefore the EU and the US must coordinate their policies towards China and concrete measures should be elaborated at a special EU-US Summit on China;
Amendment 381 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 b (new)
Paragraph 20 b (new)
20 b. Believes that the EU and the US should elaborate a joint strategy to help China adapt itself to democracy values and norms and by becoming “one nation, one democratic system” country to be welcomed by other democracies in taking up its new role of global leadership;
Amendment 419 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)
Paragraph 25 a (new)
25 a. Stresses that the lifting of countersanctions by China is a necessary and preliminary pre-condition for the scrutiny and ratification of the EU-China Investment Agreement;
Amendment 420 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 b (new)
Paragraph 25 b (new)
25 b. Underlines additional conditions and pre-ratification commitments that should be met before the European Parliament can give its consent to the EU- China Investment Agreement, notably: a) having a timetable for China’s ratification and implementation of key International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions on labour rights and a robust monitoring mechanism, as well as concrete measures or steps towards putting an end to other human rights violations against the Uyghur minority in China; (b) a recommitment by China to uphold its international commitments to Hong Kong under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Hong Kong’s Basic Law;
Amendment 501 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 a (new)
Paragraph 37 a (new)
37 a. Stresses urgent need to significantly boost the expert capacity on China in the EEAS and the Commission;
Amendment 502 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 b (new)
Paragraph 37 b (new)
37 b. Points out the importance of independent studies and research on China in Universities, think tanks, research institutions and schools across EU, free of Chinese financial support or influence, ensuring academic integrity and freedom of speech, therefore calls on EU to develop a program to finance China-related research and language training in the EU;
Amendment 22 #
2021/0406(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) Whilst always acting within the framework of international law, it is essential that the Union possess an appropriate instrument to deter and counteract economic coercion by third countries in order to safeguard its rights and interests and those of its Member States. This is particularly the case where third countries take measures affecting trade or investment that interfere in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State by seeking, including its governmental and judicial actions and decisions, by seeking, directly or indirectly, to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act by the Union or a Member State. Such measures affecting trade or investment may include not only actions taken on, and having effects within, the territory of the third country, but also actions taken by the third country, including through entities controlled or directed by the third country and present in the Union, that cause harm to economic activities in the Union.
Amendment 25 #
2021/0406(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
Recital 8
(8) The objectives of this Regulation, in particular counteracting third countries’ economic coercion of the Union or a Member State, cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States acting on their own. This is because Member States as distinct actors under international law may not be entitled under international law to respond to economic coercion directed against the Union. Additionally, because of the exclusive competence conferred on the Union by Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Member States are prevented from taking common commercial policy measures as a response to economic coercion. Therefore, those objectives can bare achieved with greater effectiveness at Union level, and in the spirit of unity and solidarity.
Amendment 32 #
2021/0406(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
Recital 14
(14) The Union should support and cooperate with third countries affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion or other interested third countries, in particular, like minded democratic partners. The Union should participate in international coordination in bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral fora that are geared towards the prevention or elimination of the economic coercion.
Amendment 34 #
2021/0406(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
Recital 15
(15) The Union should only impose countermeasures when other means such as negotiations, mediation or adjudication do not lead to the prompt and effective cessation of the economic coercion and to reparation of the injury it has caused to the Union or its Member States, and where action is necessary to protect the interests and rights of the Union and its Member States and it is in the Union’s interest. It is appropriate that the Regulation sets out the applicable rules and procedures for the imposition and application of Union response measures and permits expeditious action where necessary to preserve the effectiveness of any Union response measures.
Amendment 39 #
2021/0406(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
Recital 21
(21) It is important to ensure an effective and regular communication and exchange of views and information between the Commission on the one hand and the European Parliament and the Council on the other, in particular on efforts to engage with the third country concerned to explore options with a view to obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion and on matters that may lead to the adoption of Union response measures under this Regulation.
Amendment 49 #
2021/0406(COD)
— interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State, including its governmental and judicial actions and decisions, by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act by the Union or a Member State
Amendment 52 #
2021/0406(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – indent 2 a (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – indent 2 a (new)
- circumvents or assists another third country to circumvent restrictive measures imposed by the Union
Amendment 55 #
2021/0406(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) whether the third country is engaging in a pattern of interference seeking to obtain from the Union or from Member States or other countries particular acts, or to hinder the Union's or the Member States' capacity to act;
Amendment 64 #
2021/0406(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. The Commission shall use the Single Entry Point to allow all Union stakeholders to submit information concerning measures taken by a third country.
Amendment 74 #
2021/0406(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 3
Article 5 – paragraph 3
The Commission shall keep the European Parliament and the Council regularly informed of relevant developments.
Amendment 91 #
2021/0406(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1
Article 9 – paragraph 1
1. Any Union response measure shall not exceed the level that is commensurate with the injury suffered by the Union or a Member State due to the third country’s measures of economic coercion, taking into account the gravity of the third country’s measures and the rights in question, as well as the impact of the measures on the Union or a Member State.
Amendment 93 #
2021/0406(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1
Article 10 – paragraph 1
1. The Commission shall keep under review the measures of economic coercion deployed by a third country that have triggered the Union response measures, the effectiveness of the Union response measures adopted and their effects on the Union’s interests and shall keep the European Parliament and the Council regularly informed thereof.
Amendment 116 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Acknowledges that NATO remains the cornerstone of the collective defence for those States, which are members of it;
Amendment 128 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Highlights that the transatlantic community is faced with a broad array of unprecedented common challenges, ranging from the fight against to democracies, ranging from Russian aggression, terrorism to, hybrid threats, climate change, including disinformation, cyber attacks, emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), climate change, and a shifting global power balance, as well as the resulting challenge to the international rules-based order;
Amendment 157 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Considers that the ongoing and future work being carried out in parallel on both the EU’s Strategic Compass and the expected update of NATO’s Strategic Concept represents a unique opportunity to identify additional synergies in orderand to further the EU-NATO cooperation; underlines that both processes must come to cohesive conclusions; expresses its vision that the EU Strategic Compass could lay the foundations for an EU contribution to the update of NATO’s Strategic Concept; believes that these processes should separately highlight the added value of each organisation, help define a better division of tasks and, by means of a constant dialogue and close coordination, map out whether the EU or NATO should take the lead in a given field;
Amendment 164 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Underlines that security dimension of the Eastern Partnership countries should be properly reflected in the Strategic Compass because of the fact that security environment and resilience of both partners – the EU and NATO – cannot be achieved without long-term security resilience of all EaP countries;
Amendment 175 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Recalls all NATO member-states to adopt the decision on the margins of the upcoming NATO Summit regarding the Membership Action Plan for Ukraine and Georgia which is only one strategic precondition for future security stability of Trans-Atlantic community;
Amendment 180 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Highlights the EU’s competences and encourages the cooperation of both organizations in the key field of resilience, among other things in the area of protecting critical infrastructure, such as in the transport, energy and IT sectors;
Amendment 181 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Emphasises that improved military mobility will benefit the EU enhancing Member States’ connectivity in both military and civilian spheres as well as increase the preparedness of the EU and NATO response to crises; calls the EU and its Member States to step up efforts to continue to reduce procedural barriers to military mobility; notes that the coherence and mutual reinforcement of efforts should be ensured to improve military mobility as well as to achieve synergies between EU and NATO; calls on the EU and its Member States to ensure sufficient financial allocation for military mobility development needs;
Amendment 190 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Welcomes the requests by the United States, Canada, and Norway to participate in the PESCO project on military mobility; underlines that this marks an important step towards increased coherence between the common EU and NATO capability development efforts, and illustrates the revitalisation of the transatlantic partnership; encourages openness of other PESCO projects for participation of non-EU Allies;
Amendment 238 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Expresses its utmost concern regarding the continuous revisionist policies pursued by Russia under President Putin; underscores the need for both NATO and the EU to remain vigilant and to adequately respond to acts of aggression and provocation by Russia, such as, in particular, its illegitimate and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014; regrets President Putin’s evident rejection of dialogue, and considers Russia’s continued aggressive actions as a threat toexpresses its grave concern over the ongoing build-up of Russian military forces on Ukraine’s borders and in Russia`s occupied territories of Ukraine, which is a significant security threat not only to Ukraine and the Black sea`s region, but also threatens Euro- Atlantic security and stability; calls on the Euro-Atlantic community to contribute the strengthening of Ukraine’s military resilience;
Amendment 248 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Acknowledges that the current Putin’s regime is a key challenge as for the whole Transatlantic community as well as for neighbouring countries, in particular for Ukraine, Georgian and Moldova. This acknowledgment is a key strategic precondition for further strategic assessment of the security future of the Transatlantic community;
Amendment 282 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Expresses serious concern that authoritarian adversaries and competitors of the transatlantic partnership are not only using military but alsoalso using political and economic tools to undermine our societies and democracies; points to the significant security and economic challenges posed by hybrid threats, cyber attacks and disinformation campaigns, which in some cases constitute an attack against the very nature of our democracies;
Amendment 325 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Is convinced that the Member States must increase their efforts to improve the EU’sir ability to act with a more capable, deployable, interoperable and sustainable set of military capabilities and forces, which would give the EU the capacity to contribute more equitably to transatlantic security, enable it to achieve strategic autonomy, and further pave the way to progressively frame a European Defence Union (EDU) in line with Article 42 of the TEU; stresses that strategic autonomy strengthens transatlantic security, and by no means aims to decouple from or weaken NATO; underlines at the same time that strategic autonomy not only entails defence capability development but also the institutional capacity enabling the EU to act, where possible with partners, and independently if necessary; believes that these increased European military efforts will allow the EU to take greater responsibility for European security, to be more resilient and to better promote common EU-NATO interests and values, in particular in the European neighbourhood;
Amendment 344 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Underscores the need to advance defence capability development in order to adequately respond to commonly identified threats; believes that EU Member States, especially the 21 joint EU-NATO members, need to act coherently and should consider identifying a clear ‘European level of ambition’ in quantitative and qualitative terms regarding capability development in NATOimplement the NATO defence investment pledge; encourages stronger efforts by members of both organisations to achieve greater synergies and coordination between the EU’s Capability Development Plan (CDP), the EU’s Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and NATO’s Defence Planning Process (NDPP);
Amendment 407 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Calls for the EU and its institutions, building on the foundation laid by the ‘integrated approach’, to develop bothfurther contribute to a common European security and defence culture, which respects the specific character of the security and defence policies of the Member States, as well as a strategic approach, throughout its policy-making, which should apply in particular to decisions in the fields of trade, development cooperation, infrastructure, mobility and digital technologies;
Amendment 247 #
2020/2217(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Reminds the Commission and the Member States to respect Open Data Directive objectives when negotiating the implementing act on high-value data sets; calls for these data sets to include inter alia a list of company and, business registers, public procurement and other data sets pertinent to well functioning of the EU;
Amendment 43 #
2020/2080(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has shown the consequences of the EU not having enough competence when it comes to health care; whereas the pandemic has demonstrated the need to develop EU military mobility, as important element in support for management of major civilian crises; whereas by developing capabilities under PESCO this experience and lessons identified should be taken into account; whereas, by the same analogy, it would make sense to establish an EU common defence strategy in order to be able to respond to an attack on the EU’s borders and territories; whereas PESCO constitutes an important step towards achieving the objective of a common defence;
Amendment 223 #
2020/2080(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e
Paragraph 1 – point e
(e) maintain the EU’s budgetary ambition for the strengthening of defence capabiliinitiatives, notably thought the sufficient financing of EDF and military mobility in the upcoming MFF;
Amendment 180 #
2020/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – indent 4
Paragraph 2 – indent 4
- affirming and seeking widespread, binding recognition that migration is becoming ever more necessary as part of the resp understanding that climate change may become onse tof the impacts of climate changmain causes of mass migration in near future, and proposing international arrangements for managing climate-induced migration,
Amendment 1027 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1
Article 14 – paragraph 1
1. Providers of hosting services shall put mechanisms in place to allow any individual or entity to notify them of the presence on their service of specific items of information that the individual or entity considers to be illegal content or information that is incompatible with the terms and conditions of the provider. Those mechanisms shall be easy to access, user- friendly, and allow for the submission of notices exclusively by electronic means.
Amendment 1035 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. The mechanisms referred to in paragraph 1 shall be such as to facilitate the submission of sufficiently precise and adequately substantiated notices, on the basis of which a diligent economic operator can identify the illegality or incompatibility of the content in question. To that end, the providers shall take the necessary measures to enable and facilitate the submission of notices containing all of the following elements:
Amendment 1039 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) an explanation of the reasons why the individual or entity considers the information in question to be illegal content or incompatible with the provider’s terms and conditions;
Amendment 1046 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point b
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) a clear indication of the electronic location of that information, in particular the exact URL or URLs, and, where necessary, additional information enabling the identification of the illegal or incompatible content;
Amendment 1144 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Online platforms shall provide recipients of the service, and individuals or entities that have submitted a notice, for a period of at least six months following the decision referred to in this paragraph, the access to an effective internal complaint-handling system, which enables the complaints to be lodged electronically and free of charge, against the decision taken by the provider of the online platform not to act upon the receipt of a notice or against the following decisions taken by the online platform on the ground that the information provided by the recipients is illegal content or incompatible with its terms and conditions:
Amendment 1151 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) decisions whether or not to remove or disable access to or restrict visibility of the information;
Amendment 1160 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) decisions whether or not to suspend or terminate the provision of the service, in whole or in part, to the recipients;
Amendment 1162 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) decisions whether or not to suspend or terminate the recipients’ account.
Amendment 1165 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
(ca) decisions whether or not to restrict the ability to monetise content provided by the recipients;
Amendment 1172 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point c b (new)
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point c b (new)
(cb) decisions whether or not to apply labels or additional information on content.
Amendment 1269 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 19 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) it has particular expertise and competence for the purposes of detecting, identifying and notifying illegal content or an incompatibility of the content with the platform’s terms and conditions;;
Amendment 1321 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 1
Article 20 – paragraph 1
1. Online platforms shall suspend, for a reasonable period of time and after having issued a prior warning, the provision of their services to recipients of the service that frequently provide manifestly illegal content or that is incompatible with their terms and conditions.
Amendment 1490 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 24 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) the natural or legal person on whose behalf the advertisement is displayed and the natural or legal person who finances the advertisement;
Amendment 1636 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 27 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) identification and assessment of the most prominent and recurrenteach of the systemic risks reported by very large online platforms or identified through other information sources, in particular those provided in compliance with Article 31 and 33;
Amendment 1713 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 1
Article 30 – paragraph 1
1. Very large online platforms that display advertising on their online interfaces shall compile and make publicly available through application programming interfaces a searchable, easy to access and functional repository containing the information referred to in paragraph 2, until onthree years after the advertisement was displayed for the last time on their online interfaces. They shall ensure multi- criterion queries can be performed per advertiser and per all data points present in the advertisement. They shall ensure that the repository does not contain any personal data of the recipients of the service to whom the advertisement was or could have been displayed. They shall make sure that if advertisements have been labelled, moderated, or disabled, these labels shall be clearly visible and identifiable for users and researchers.
Amendment 1758 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 3
Article 31 – paragraph 3
3. Very large online platforms shall provide access to data pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 through online databases or application programming interfaces, as appropriate, and with an easily accessible and user-friendly mechanism to search for multiple criteria, such as those reported in accordance with the obligations set out in Articles 13, 23 and 33.
Amendment 1763 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 4
Article 31 – paragraph 4
4. In order to be vetted, researchers shall be affiliated with academic institutions, journalists, civil society organisations or international organisations representing the public interest, shall be independent from commercial interests, have proven records of expertise in the fields related to the risks investigated or related research methodologies, and shall commit and be in a capacity to preserve the specific data security and confidentiality requirements corresponding to each request.
Amendment 1770 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 5
Article 31 – paragraph 5
5. The Commission shall, after consulting the Board, and no later than one year after entry into force of this legislation, adopt delegated acts laying down the technical conditions under which very large online platforms are to share data pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 and the purposes for which the data may be used. Those delegated acts shall lay down the specific conditions under which such sharing of data with vetted researchers can take place in compliance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679, taking into account the rights and interests of the very large online platforms and the recipients of the service concerned, including the protection of confidential information, in particular trade secrets, and maintaining the security of their service.
Amendment 1796 #
2020/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1
Article 33 – paragraph 1
1. Very large online platforms shall publish the reports referred to in Article 13 within six months from the date of application referred to in Article 25(4), and thereafter every six months. The reports shall include information disaggregated by Member State and clearly stating the human and technical resources allocated for the purpose of content moderation for each official EU language.
Amendment 29 #
2020/0359(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) This Directive leaves unaffected the ability of Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure the protection of the essential interests of their security, to safeguard public policy and public security, and to allow for the investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, in compliance with Union law and fundamental rights. In accordance with Article 346 TFEU, no Member State is to be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which would be contrary to the essential interests of its public security. In this context, national and Union rules for protecting classified information, non-disclosure agreements, and informal non-disclosure agreements such as the Traffic Light Protocol14 , are of relevance. _________________ 14 The Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) is a means for someone sharing information to inform their audience about any limitations in further spreading this information. It is used in almost all CSIRT communities and some Information Analysis and Sharing Centres (ISACs).
Amendment 32 #
2020/0359(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 20
Recital 20
(20) Those growing interdependencies are the result of an increasingly cross- border and interdependent network of service provision using key infrastructures across the Union in the sectors of energy, transport, digital infrastructure, drinking and waste water, health, certain aspects of public administration, as well as space in as far as the provision of certain services depending on ground-based infrastructures that are owned, managed and operated either by Member States or by private parties is concerned, therefore not covering infrastructures owned, managed or operated by or on behalf of the Union as part of its space programmes. Infrastructure owned, managed or operated by or on behalf of the Union as part of its space programmes is particularly important for the security of the Union and its Member States and the proper functioning of the Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP ) missions. Such infrastructure is therefore to be adequately protected as set out in Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council.18a Those interdependencies mean that any disruption, even one initially confined to one entity or one sector, can have cascading effects more broadly, potentially resulting in far-reaching and long-lasting negative impacts in the delivery of services across the internal market. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown the vulnerability of our increasingly interdependent societies in the face of low- probability risks. _________________ 18aRegulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme and repealing Regulations (EU) No 912/2010, (EU) No 1285/2013 and (EU) No 377/2014 and Decision No 541/2014/EU (OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 69)
Amendment 34 #
2020/0359(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 26
Recital 26
(26) Given the importance of international cooperation on cybersecurity, CSIRTs should be able to participate in international cooperation networks in addition to the CSIRTs network established by this Directive. Member States could also explore the possibility of increasing cooperation with like-minded partner countries and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the United Nations with the aim to create an open, free, stable and secure cyberspace based on international law.
Amendment 35 #
2020/0359(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 26 a (new)
Recital 26 a (new)
(26 a) Due to the fact that cybersecurity has both a civilian and a military dimension, an integrated policy approach and close cooperation between the CSIRTs Network and the foreseen Military CERT-Network should be developed.
Amendment 37 #
2020/0359(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 36
Recital 36
(36) The Union should, where appropriate, conclude international agreements, in accordance with Article 218 TFEU, with third countries or international organisations, allowing and organising their participation in some activities of the Cooperation Group and the CSIRTs network. Such agreements should ensure adequate protection of data. The Union should also continue to support capacity building in third countries. Member States should, where appropriate, encourage the participation of like- minded partner countries, which share our European values, in relevant PESCO projects.
Amendment 38 #
2020/0359(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 37
Recital 37
(37) Member States should contribute to the establishment of the EU Cybersecurity Crisis Response Framework set out in Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584 through the existing cooperation networks, notably the Cyber Crisis Liaison Organisation Network (EU-CyCLONe), CSIRTs network and the Cooperation Group. EU- CyCLONe and the CSIRTs network should cooperate on the basis of procedural arrangements defining the modalities of that cooperation. The EU-CyCLONe’s rules of procedures should further specify the modalities through which the network should function, including but not limited to roles, cooperation modes, interactions with other relevant actors and templates for information sharing, as well as means of communication. For crisis management at Union level, relevant parties should rely on the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements. The Commission should use the ARGUS high-level cross- sectoral crisis coordination process for this purpose. If the crisis entails an important external or Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) dimension, the European External Action Service (EEAS) Crisis Response Mechanism (CRM) should be activated. In addition, the Union shoud make full use of its cyber diplomacy toolbox.
Amendment 41 #
2020/0359(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 40 a (new)
Recital 40 a (new)
(40 a) Member States should improve their capabilities to detect, analyse, and mitigate cyber security incidents in real time in order to stop malicious activities ideally before they can affect networks and systems. The Union and the Member States should also strenghten their capabilities to attribute cyber attacks in order to effectively deter and respond to cyber attacks in a proportionate way.
Amendment 45 #
2020/0359(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 43
Recital 43
(43) Addressing cybersecurity risks stemming from an entity’s supply chain and its relationship with its suppliers is particularly important given the prevalence of incidents where entities have fallen victim to cyber-attacks and where malicious actors were able to compromise the security of an entity’s network and information systems by exploiting vulnerabilities affecting third party products and services. Entities should therefore assess and take into account the overall quality of products and cybersecurity practices of their suppliers and service providers, including their risk- management systems and their secure development procedures.
Amendment 49 #
2020/0359(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 68
Recital 68
(68) Entities should be encouraged to collectively leverage their individual knowledge and practical experience at strategic, tactical and operational levels with a view to enhance their capabilities to adequately assess, monitor, defend against, and respond to, cyber threats. It is thus necessary to enable the emergence at Union level of mechanisms for voluntary information sharing arrangements. To this end, Member States should actively support and encourage also relevant entities not covered by the scope of this Directive to participate in such information-sharing mechanisms. In addition, Member States could also explore the possibility of including entities from like-minded partner countries in the information-sharing mechanisms. Those mechanisms should be conducted in full compliance with the competition rules of the Union as well as the data protection Union law rules.
Amendment 50 #
2020/0359(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 68 a (new)
Recital 68 a (new)
(68 a) Given that cybersecurity has both a civilian and a military dimension, information exchange across sectors (defence, civilian, law enforcement and external action) should also be encouraged. The Joint Cyber Unit could play an important role in protecting the EU from cyber-attacks by helping actors to acquire a common understanding of the threat landscape and to coordinate their response.
Amendment 67 #
2020/0359(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 3 – point k
Article 13 – paragraph 3 – point k
(k) cooperating and exchanging information with regional and Union-level Security Operations Centres (SOCs) and, where appropriate, with military CERTs in order to improve common situational awareness on incidents and threats across the Union;
Amendment 69 #
2020/0359(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 14 – paragraph 2
Article 14 – paragraph 2
2. EU-CyCLONe shall be composed of the representatives of Member States’ crisis management authorities designated in accordance with Article 7, the Commission and ENISA. ENISA shall provide the secretariat of the network and support the secure exchange of information. For large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises at Union level involving more than one Member State, a Union level crisis management structure involving all relevant actors, including the Joint Cyber Unit, shall be established.
Amendment 791 #
2020/0278(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 a (new)
Article 14 a (new)
Article 14 a Financial support Expenditure related to the implementation of this Regulation shall be covered by funding of home affairs policies, under the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework Asylum and Migration Management Fund. This includes the installation of verification infrastructure (creation and use / renewal of existing premises at border crossing points, reception centers, etc.), creation of access to relevant databases in new locations, recruitment of additional staff, training of border guards and other staff, recruitment of medical staff, purchase of medical equipment and the installation of premises for medical examinations (where necessary), the establishment of an independent mechanism for monitoring fundamental rights.
Amendment 83 #
2020/0036(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9 a (new)
Recital 9 a (new)
(9a) While emission reduction targets are set for 2030 and 2050, the Union has not yet set specific Union wide applicable objectives for removal; such objectives are necessary taking into account that the EU climate-neutrality objective cannot be achieved without gradually increasing carbon removals.
Amendment 124 #
2020/0036(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
Recital 14
(14) Adaptation is a key component of the long-term global response to climate change. Therefore, Member States and the Union should enhance their adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change, as provided for in Article 7 of the Paris Agreement, as well as maximise the co- benefits with other environmental policies and legislation. The Commission should develop specific indicators for measuring the progress of adaptation, while Member States should adopt comprehensive national adaptation strategies and plans.
Amendment 228 #
2020/0036(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 4
Article 2 – paragraph 4
4. By 30 June 2021, the Commission shall assess how the Union legislation implementing the Union’s 2030 target would need to be amended in order to enable the achievement of 50 to 55 % emission reductions compared to 1990 and to achieve the climate-neutrality-objective set out in Article 2(1), and consider taking the necessary measures, including setting specific and gradually increasing removal objectives as well as the adoption of other legislative proposals, in accordance with the Treaties.
Amendment 367 #
2020/0036(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. The Commission shall define specific indicators for measuring the progress of adaptation.
Amendment 386 #
2020/0036(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the collective progress made by all Member States on adaptation in accordance with specific indicators as referred to in Article 4.
Amendment 388 #
2020/0036(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new)
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new)
(b a) the collective progress made by all Member States towards the achievement of specific removal objectives set out in Article 2(4);
Amendment 406 #
2020/0036(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point b
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) the adequacy of Union measures to ensure progress on adaptation in accordance with specific indicators as referred to in Article 4.
Amendment 407 #
2020/0036(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point b a (new)
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point b a (new)
(b a) the adequacy of Union measures to ensure a gradually increasing proportion of removals in accordance with specific indicators as referred to in Article 2(4).
Amendment 413 #
2020/0036(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 3
Article 5 – paragraph 3
3. Where, based on the assessment referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the Commission finds that Union measures are inconsistent with the climate-neutrality objective set out in Article 2(1) or inadequate to ensure progress on adaptation as referred to in Article 4, or that the progress towards either the climate-neutrality objective or on adaptationadequacy of Union measures to ensure gradually increasing proportion of removals in accordance with specific indicators as referred to in Article 42(4) is insufficient, it shall take the necessary measures in accordance with the Treaties, at the same time as the review of the trajectory referred to in Article 3(1).
Amendment 437 #
2020/0036(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the adequacy of relevant national measures to ensure progress in accordance with specific indicators on adaptation as referred to in Article 4.
Amendment 440 #
2020/0036(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new)
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new)
(b a) the adequacy of relevant national measures to ensure a gradually increasing proportion of removals in accordance with specific indicators as referred to in Article 2(4).
Amendment 456 #
2020/0036(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2
Article 6 – paragraph 2
2. Where the Commission finds, under due consideration of the collective progress assessed in accordance with Article 5(1), that a Member State’s measures are inconsistent with that objective as expressed by the trajectory referred to in Article 3(1) or inadequate to ensure progress on adaptation as referred to in Article 4 or the proportion of removals is not increasing in a satisfactory manner, it may issue recommendations to that Member State. The Commission shall make such recommendations publicly available.
Amendment 4 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 a (new)
Citation 4 a (new)
- having regard to Euronest Parliamentary Assembly resolution of 9 December 2019 on the future of the Trio Plus Strategy 2030: building a future of Eastern Partnership; having regard to final statements and recommendations of Parliamentary Association Committees of 19 December 2019 with Ukraine and Moldova; having regard to European Parliament annual report on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy of 18 December 2019,
Amendment 6 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 b (new)
Citation 4 b (new)
- having regard to the Joint Statement of 5 December 2019 adopted by Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on the Future of Eastern Partnership,
Amendment 8 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 c (new)
Citation 4 c (new)
- having regard to the Joint Letter of 15 February 2020 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on the MFF 2021-2027,
Amendment 26 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the Eastern Partnership (EaP) is based on mutual interests and understanding, shared ownership and responsibility, differentiation, mutual accountability and a shared commitment between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and the European Union to deepen their relations and adhere to international law and core values such as democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, and a social market economy, sustainable development and good governance;
Amendment 50 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas the achievements and the strengthened differentiation in bilateral relations between the EU and the EaP countries with which it signed an Association Agreement are welcome, now it is time to provide those countries with clearer guidance on specific reform priorities, alignment criteria and on the next steps in the EU integration process;
Amendment 54 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)
Recital C b (new)
Cb. whereas the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in the Joint statement of 5 December 2019 on the Future of Eastern Partnership called upon the EU to engage further in joint discussions on the progress, opportunities and challenges concerning the association-related reforms with the aim of facilitating full implementation of the AAs/DCFTAs and invited the EU to consider establishing an EU+ Three Associated Partners dialogue in the areas including, but not limited to, transport, energy, justice and digital economy;
Amendment 56 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C c (new)
Recital C c (new)
Cc. whereas the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in the Joint letter of 15 February 2020 on the MFF 2021– 2027 reiterated their strong commitment to contribute to the strategic success of the EaP, in particular through the differentiation principle and the establishment of a EU+ Three Associated Partners enhanced dialogue, and emphasised that a dedicated financial tool providing a robust assistance to support complex reform commitments in line with AAs/DCFTAs would be decisive for all actors involved in the process;
Amendment 58 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas there is a necessity to encourage the development of ever closer relations with the EU and to set out a tailor made strategy for the most advanced EaP countries to support and sustain an ambitious pace of implementation of European integration reforms and that even more advanced forms of cooperation and integration are possible, provided that comprehensive reforms are implemented in a timely and sustainable manner;
Amendment 95 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas, the success of transformation in the EaP countries, in particular of the three associated partner countries, can yield a positive example, which could also have an influence on the society in neighbouring Russia;
Amendment 117 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a
Paragraph 1 – point a
(a) acknowledge and strive for a continuous transformational impact of EaP policy in order to bring about political, social, economic and legal change in the three associated partner countries (the EU Trio countries);
Amendment 123 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(aa) by taking into account the request from the EU Trio countries, create within the EaP policy a closer cooperation initiative – the EU Advanced Partnership Strategy (EU Trio Plus Strategy 2030) which will establish an EU reform and investment support platform, to be implemented first in the EU Trio countries, in areas including, but not limited to, investment capacity building, transport, energy, justice and digital economy, and will pave the way for an ambitious integration agenda with the EU;
Amendment 130 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point a b (new)
(ab) emphasise, that the implementation of the EU Trio Plus Strategy 2030 can be extended to the remaining Eastern Partners of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus on the basis of individual assessments of EU reform commitments and of the progress made; stress, that further setbacks with regard to democracy, reforms and the rule of law and the erosion of the European orientation may entail the exclusion of the countries concerned from the EU Trio Plus Strategy 2030; ensure that Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus will have individualised, beneficial and tailor-made partnership relationships with the EU, conditional on reform commitments;
Amendment 152 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c
Paragraph 1 – point c
(c) embrace an enhanced and future- oriented vision for the next decade of the EaP with the aim of ensuring lasting and irreversible achievements and deepening EU-EaP cooperation; invite the EU institutions to lead the creation of ever closer relations with the most advanced EaP countries, to begin with the EU Trio countries, and, with the support of a coalition of like-minded EU Member States, to establish for this purpose the EU Trio Plus Process, which shall be focused on tangible projects and programmes, such as the EU Support Group, Investment Framework platform, access to EU financing, and which will take into account the best reform support practices, including from the Western Balkans and the European Economic Area;
Amendment 187 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f
Paragraph 1 – point f
(f) devise additional measures for deeper integration such as in selected EU agencies, investment framework platforms, intra-EU programmes and initiatives, in full compliance with existing conditionalities and pursuant to the more for more principle and which will take into account the best reform support practices;
Amendment 217 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point h a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point h a (new)
(ha) invite the EaP countries acceding to the EU Trio Plus Strategy 2030, starting with the countries that signed an Association Agreement with the EU, to use the reinforced political steering and benchmark instruments of the implementation of the EU Association Agreements, such as joint reporting and monitoring, which would bring in a credible merit-based approach, to the benefit of the EU and its influence in the EaP countries and beyond;
Amendment 223 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point h b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point h b (new)
(hb) invite the EaP countries, especially the EU Trio countries, to the Conference on the Future of Europe, which could set out a list scenarios on the future relationship of those countries with the EU;
Amendment 228 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i
Paragraph 1 – point i
(i) acknowledge the associated partnership status of advanced EaP countries, notably the signatories of AAs with DCFTAs (the EU Trio countries), in order to accommodate the mutual need for more venues for political dialogue, further economic cooperation and legislative harmonisation;
Amendment 242 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j
Paragraph 1 – point j
(j) engage further in State building and in strengthening institutions, by making instruments similar to the Support Group for Ukraine (the EU Support Group) available to the associated partners first and foremost; strong, independent and efficient institutions at a central and local level are key to democratic accountability, deoligarchisation, and the fight against corruption and State capture;
Amendment 265 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point k
Paragraph 1 – point k
(k) acknowledge and encourage initiatives by the governments of associated countries (the EU Trio countries) to boost their mutual cooperation; a similar approach should be applied to cooperation amongst all the Eastern European Partners on various issues;
Amendment 280 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – subheading 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 – subheading 1 a (new)
New EaP instruments of financial support for the EU Trio Plus Strategy 2030
Amendment 281 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point l a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point l a (new)
(la) provide greater financial assistance, including in the context of the external financial instruments that are currently under legislative negotiation; such assistance should be tailored to the specific needs of the individual partners and used to implement activities under the EaP programme; note that this access to EU funding should be linked with reform commitments and should include a set of ambitious benchmarks of the European financial assistance for the EU Trio Plus Strategy 2030 countries;
Amendment 284 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point l b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point l b (new)
(lb) provide for the EU Trio Plus countries a greater access to EU funding, including via Connecting Europe Facility and the TEN programme as well as a gradual access to the Green Deal Fund of Just Transition to modernise emission- intensive industries; note that this access should be linked to differentiated benchmarks in line with the EU integration reform commitments;
Amendment 286 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point l c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point l c (new)
(lc) develop public investment management strategy for the EU Trio Plus countries, which would help absorbing the TEN infrastructure investments and would increase investment support, including via the Connecting Europe Facility;
Amendment 287 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point l d (new)
Paragraph 1 – point l d (new)
(ld) create for this purpose the Connectivity Agenda, which will include a list of major infrastructure projects implemented in the new Investment Framework platform and managed together with IFIs and the European Commission; propose that investments be tightly linked with reform implementation and suggest signing the Reform Contracts for Investments with the EU Trio countries and remaining Eastern Partners willing to join the EU Trio Plus Strategy 2030;
Amendment 288 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point l e (new)
Paragraph 1 – point l e (new)
(le) adopt a comprehensive infrastructure-building plan with the aim of improving connectivity between the EU and its Eastern European Partners, and among the EaP countries themselves;
Amendment 330 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point q
Paragraph 1 – point q
(q) extend to other associated partners the approach employed by the EU in its efforts to support the recovery of the Ukrainian economy, including by means of tailored and flexible macro-financial assistance and instruments and engagement and coordination of international financial institutions and donors, and by improving the environment for foreign direct investment (FDI); in the proposed single Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) stress the importance of differentiation within the EaP in assisting the EU Trio Plus countries in line with the principles of ‘more for more’ and ‘less for less’;
Amendment 355 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point r
Paragraph 1 – point r
Amendment 380 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point t
Paragraph 1 – point t
(t) strengthen intra-EaP academic cooperation by launching an EaP university focused onand targeted EaP programmes in specialised universities focused on European values and rule of law, good governance and public administration;
Amendment 483 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point y a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point y a (new)
(ya) establish an EaP European municipalities Twinning program to support Twinning Partnerships between municipalities in EaP countries and EU Member States, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, which have institutional memory of the European modernisation;
Amendment 15 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the continuous deepening of EU-Georgia relations and the firm support that Georgia’s chosen path of European and Euro-Atlantic integration enjoys across the political spectrum and in society; acknowledges the progress achieved by Georgia, which has made it a key partner of the EU in the region, and reiterates the need to continue implementing reforms under the Association Agreement (AA) and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area; reminds that the EU assistance is based on the principle "more for more" and conditional to reform progress in, but not limited to, areas of democracy and rule of law, independence of judiciary and electoral system reform;
Amendment 24 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Reiterates its full support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and condemns the illegal occupation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia by the Russian Federation; emphasises that the AA covers the entire territory of Georgia, including its occupied regions, and aims to benefit its whole population; calls on the Russian Federation to fulfil its obligations under the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008, notably to withdraw all its military forces from Georgia’s occupied territories and allow the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia; condemns "borderisation" activities along the Administrative Boundary Line by Russian and de facto South Ossetian security actors; asks the Commission and the EEAS to enhance their efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully, including through the EUMM and the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia;
Amendment 47 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Commends the Georgian authorities for completing the constitutional reform process and the major political parties for signing the Memorandum of Understanding and the Joint Statement of 8 March 2020, which established the key features of the electoral system to be used for the upcoming parliamentary elections; calls on all parties to ensure that the agreement is translated into law and fully implemented and the necessity of addressing actions that could be perceived as inappropriate politicisation of Georgia’s judicial process; calls on all parties to ensure that the agreement is translated into law and into full abandonment of practices of politicisation of judicial processes and fully implemented in letter and spirit as soon as possible;
Amendment 57 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Calls on the Georgian authorities to implement swiftly and fully the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations and review relevant legislation to address the identified shortcomings; recalls the assessment by the OSCE/ODIHR-led International Election Observation Mission of the last direct presidential election held in October - November 2018; notes with concern the negative character of the campaign and the use of harsh rhetoric on both sides; highlights that the process had been undermined by undue advantage enjoyed by the government side, use of violent rhetoric and impunity of violence against opposition; notes cases of misuse of administrative resources, undue pressure on voters and intimidation, vote buying, announcement of a massive debt relief offered by a private institution linked to the chairperson of the ruling party; notes that the run-off election day proceeded in an orderly manner, opening, voting and counting were assessed positively, the observed tracking of voters reinforced concern about potential intimidation; urges all stakeholders to fully address the recommendations of the OCSE/ODIHR;
Amendment 66 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Underlines the importance of media freedom, which should entail equal access for all political parties to the media during the upcoming electoral campaign, pluralistic and non-discriminatory coverage of political views in programmes by public and private broadcasters, clear provisions regulating free and paid advertisements, and improved transparency through strengthened media monitoring; underscores the importance of an independent and pluralistic media landscape, which is free from government or any other state interference; acknowledges that the media landscape in Georgia is dynamic and pluralistic, but also polarised; expresses deep concern that media outlets critical towards the government often become subject of pressure in the form of court cases against the founders (Nika Gvaramia of TV Mtavari), arrest of the shareholders (Giorgi Rurua and TV Mtavari), financial and tax related charges (Avtandil Tsereteli and TV Pirveli) and firing, or resignation of critical TV journalists and editors (Public Broadcaster of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara);
Amendment 69 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Urges the government of Georgia to ensure effective handling of information environment in the run up to the 2020 elections; urges the Georgian government to work with the civil society and the private sector to limit and prevent information manipulations, including disinformation and propaganda campaigns against any political group or the country by domestic or foreign actors; urges social media platforms to take effective actions to protect information environment and prevent undermining electoral integrity by misuse of social media platforms; expresses hope that the national public broadcaster will fulfil its obligation of editorial independence, fairness and impartiality in the run-up and during the 2020 parliamentary elections and that concerns raised by the OSCE/ODIHR election observation report of 2018 Presidential election specifically in relation to the bias of the Georgian Public Broadcaster will be addressed accordingly;
Amendment 74 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. Reaffirms support to the vibrant civil society in Georgia; expresses hope that in the run-up to the 2020 elections environment for independent watchdogs and activists will be free from any intimidation, interference or verbal attacks;
Amendment 79 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Expresses its concern about recent court cases against opposition politicians, which contributed to a climate of increased mistrust and heightened tensions between the ruling party and the opposition, and led to a polarisation of politics and society; calls on Georgia to respect the highest standards of judicial independence and fair trial as committed to under the AA; welcomes the decision of President Zourabichvili of 15 May 2020 to pardon two imprisoned leaders of opposition as an important step in the implementation of 8 March agreement and looks forward to the release of Giorgi Rurua; urges to stop any actions of politicised justice or any kind of other illegal or unjustified administrative pressure on opposition leaders;
Amendment 102 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Strongly condemns the cyber- attacks against Georgian institutions and media outlets widely attributed to Russian actors; calls on all political actors in Georgia to refrain from using social media to attack people, organisations and institutions and spread deliberate misinformation; reminds with concern that in December 2019 and, similarly, in May 2020 Facebook shut down an extensive network of accounts and pages funded by Georgia’s ruling party, which engaged in “coordinated inauthentic behaviour” and attacks against opposition, media, civil society and independent activists and spread anti- democratic and anti-Western messages;
Amendment 133 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Underlines the importance of reducing antagonism and the polarisation of politics and ensuring constructive cooperation in the country’s democratic institutions, in particular the parliament; therefore profoundly regrets that the ninth meeting of the EU-Georgia Parliamentary Association Committee of 12 and13 February 2020 in Strasbourg ended without an agreement on a final statement and recommendations being reached;
Amendment 136 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Recommends to give a special mandate to the European Parliament Delegation in the EU-Georgia Parliamentary Association Committee to watch and observe preparations and realization of fair and transparent forthcoming October 2020 parliamentary elections in Georgia;
Amendment 142 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5 a (new)
Subheading 5 a (new)
Acknowledges the associated partnership status of Georgia and the other signatories of AAs and DCFTAs, and calls for an enhanced political dialogue with them in order to advance further economic integration and legislative harmonisation; for example, as in the case of the EEA/EFTA countries, calls to include Georgia and the other associated countries as observers in the proceedings of the Committees established pursuant to Article 291 TFEU and Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, as well as in the meetings of the European Council working groups and committees, to show the EU's commitments to further integration and to strengthen the countries reform orientation and administrative know-how;
Amendment 163 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. In order to implement the principle “more for more”, calls on the EU to consider creating for the three associated countries, including Georgia, an enhanced cooperation strategy of reforms and investments, which would be conditional on the areas including, but not limited to, investment capacity building, transport, energy, justice and digital economy, and paving the way for an ambitious agenda of integration into the EU;
Amendment 165 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)
Paragraph 18 b (new)
18b. Highlights in this context the need to recommend the EU to: – in order to implement principle “more for more” in an effective way and to have institutional capacity to assist and to evaluate developments on the ground in associated countries to establish a special Support Group for the associated countries, including Georgia, as it was done in the case of Ukraine (SGUA), – to upgrade the EU macro-financial assistance conditionality, which will work hand in hand with upgraded steering mechanisms and detailed reporting on the progress made by Georgia, in particular in the area of justice sector reform, – to boost the EU investment assistance linked with conditionality in a similar manner as it was proposed in Reform Contract for Investment to Ukraine in coordination with International Financial Institutions, – in the context of the huge forthcoming challenges in managing socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic resulting in job losses, closures of businesses and keeping in balance the public finances, to invite the Commission in the autumn of 2020 to propose for Eastern Partners, especially for the ones associated with the EU and committed to EU integration reforms, including Georgia, a detailed, conditional and tailor-made economic and investment plan, as it will be also done for the Western Balkans region;
Amendment 47 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas the EU’s security environment isdepends on peace and stability in its neighbourhood and is also vulnerable to external pressure that prevents the EU from exercising its sovereignty;
Amendment 231 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for greater coherence, consistency and complementarity between the EU’s external financing instruments and the CFSP to enable the European Union to tackle growing security and foreign policy challenges; considers that the simplified structure of external instruments proposed under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument calls for proper checks and balances, a sufficient level of transparency, and strategic policy input and scrutiny of implementation by Parliament; stresses the importance of differentiation principle in the investment related assistance for Neighbourhood countries with more commitments to the European reforms under the principle 'more for more' and 'less for less'; stresses the need for efficient and adequate funding under the Instrument for Pre- accession Assistance for 2021-2027 (IPA III); highlights the role of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), particularly in supporting peace and stability around the world; expects a timely adoption of the post-2020 instruments, so as to avoid unnecessary funding gaps;
Amendment 233 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for greater coherence, consistency and complementarity between the EU’s external financing instruments and the CFSP to enable the European Union to tackle growing security and foreign policy challenges; considers that the simplified structure of external instruments proposed under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument calls for proper checks and balances, a sufficient level of transparency, and strategic policy input ands well as regular scrutiny of implementation by Parliament; stresses the need for efficient and adequate funding under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance for 2021-2027 (IPA III); highlights the role of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), particularly in supporting peace and stability around the world; expects a timely adoption of the post-2020 instruments, so as to avoid unnecessary funding gaps;
Amendment 259 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Recognises the importance of the stability of the Eastern Neighbourhood for the Union's own security and the EU's transformative potential for neighbouring regions and countries; calls for further strengthening of the Eastern Partnership policy for the next decade by creating a Strategy for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia - trio of most advanced EaP EU associated countries (Trio Strategy 2030), based on the principle of “more-for- more" and “less-for-less”, led by EU institutions and the coalition of like- minded EU countries (European Trio process) with a focus on tangible projects and programmes to follow the best practices from the Berlin process and European Economic Area integration; believes, that success of transformation in the EaP countries, especially EU associated countries of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, can provide for a positive effect also on the society of the neighbouring Russia;
Amendment 280 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Calls for the strengthening of the EU’s capacity to act autonomously in the area of security and defence; emphasises that NATO is the key security partner of the EU; stresses that efficient cooperation with partner organisations such as the UN or NATO is more vital than ever;
Amendment 283 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Calls for the strengthening of the EU’s capacity to act autonomously in the area of security and defence; stresses that efficient and close cooperation with partner organisations such as the UN or NATO is more vital than ever;
Amendment 314 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Welcomes the decision of the President of the Commission to build, within five years, a genuine and operational European Defence Union;
Amendment 367 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Promotes the boosting of the European Union’s strategic communication capabilities; calls, in that connection, for furthersubstantially increased budgetary and staffing support for the EEAS Strategic Communications Division and the three Strategic Communication Task Forces (East, South and Western Balkans);
Amendment 372 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)
Paragraph 26 a (new)
26a. Notes that Russia is the most imminent source of hybrid and conventional security threats to the EU and its Member States and is actively striving to undercut European unity, independence, universal values and international norms; maintains, that while no change in aggressive policy can be expected under the current leadership in Moscow, the positive change to a more democratic and European-style country is possible in a more distant future; calls therefore for increased efforts to strengthen resilience of the EU and its Member States and for the creation of a long-term EU strategy towards Russia, built on three pillars of deterrence, containment and transformation;
Amendment 380 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)
Paragraph 27 a (new)
27a. Calls on the Council to supplement the EU human rights and foreign policy toolbox with a Global Magnitsky Act type sanction regime enabling to impose asset freezes and visa bans on individuals involved in grave human rights violations;
Amendment 17 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Notes the lasting deterioration in the Union’s strategicecurity environment in the face of multiple challenges directly or indirectly affecting the security of its Member States and citizens: armed conflicts immediately to the east and south ofn the European continent and in its vicinity, jihadist terrorism, cyber attacks, hybrid threats, foreign interference into domestic elections, disinformation, uncontrolled migration, increasing threats to natural resources, climate change, etc.;
Amendment 34 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that instability and unpredictability on the Union’s borders and in its immediate neighbourhood (north Africa, the Middle East, Ukraine, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Russian aggression against Ukraine and Georgia, etc.) pose a direct threat to the security of the continent; stresses the inextricable link between internal and external security;
Amendment 46 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes that global actors (the US, China, Russia) and an increasing number of regional actors (Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, etc.) are seeking to assert power through a combination of unilateral diplomatic posturing and increasing military military build-ups;
Amendment 71 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that the Union has been slowincreasing demand for the Union to react and adapt – politically, diplomatically and militarily – to new crises and to this new international context; considers that, in the specific area of defence, insufficient investment, differences inlack of capabilities and a lack of interoperability, but also, and above all, a political reluctance to implement the robust provisions provided for in the European treaties and the numerous cooperation arrangements between Member States have weakenedlow level of responsiveness, but also political limitations to make full use of provisions provided for in the European treaties did not permit to realize the Union’s abilityfull potential to play a decisive role in external crises; recognises, further, that no country is able by itself to address the security challenges on the European continent and in its immediate environmentwithout working together with allies and partners;
Amendment 76 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. WelcomesCalls for, in this adverse and volatile context, the belated but real recognition of shared security interests and the growing political will on the part of European countries and the European institutions to act collectively for their security by endowing themselves with greater means to act autonomously, for further political action and higher defence expenditure;
Amendment 87 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Is convincedStresses that the response to the Union’s security challenges lies primarily in strengthening its strategic autonomyategic responsibility of the Member States, including increasing of defence spending and investing into development of capabilities;
Amendment 107 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Notes that the ambition of achieving European strategic autonomy was recognised for the first time in June 2016 by the 28 Heads of State and Government in the ‘Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, presented by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on 28 June 2016;
Amendment 118 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Considers that the principleidea of European strategic autonomy is based on the ability of the Union to strengthen reflects the aim of taking more responsibilitsy freedom to assess, take decisions and take actior European security with partners wherever possible and alone where circumstances so requiren necessary, in order to defend its interests and values;
Amendment 125 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Considers, therefore, that European strategic autonomy is based, above all, on the ability of the Union to assess a crisis situation and take a decision autonomously, which necessarily entails an independent has to be improved, which entails an better informed decision-making process, the availability of means of assessment and a freedomcapabilities to analyse and take action; considers, also, that European strategic autonomy is based on the ability of the Union to act alone when its interests Union has to act with partners whenever possible and alone when necessarey at stake (theatres of operations not considered as priorities by its European partners)nd its interests are at stake or within the framework of existing cooperation arrangements; considers, lastly, that European strategic autonomy is part of a multilateral framework whichdefence initiatives respects commitments within the UN and complements the (NATO) alliances and partnerships to which most Member States are signed up; stresses thatNATO; stresses that the idea of strategic autonomy does not mean that the Union will systematically act ing alone, everywhere and always;
Amendment 139 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Considers that the affirmation of European strategic autonomy depends on the establishment of European defence cooperation in the technological, capability, industrial and operational fields; considers that only practical and flexible is important for the affirmation of European strategic ambition; considers that cooperation bafocused on pragmatic initiativeaddressing European defence capability gaps will make it possible to gradually overcome the difficulties, forge a genuine common strategic culture and shape common responses tailored to the continent’s main security and defence issueneeds;
Amendment 148 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Stresses that strategic autonomy can only be genuinely achieved if Member States demonstrate solidarity, which is reflected in particular in the need to priorfor effective use of available resources innovative and competitisve the procurement of European capabilities where equipment is available and competitivedefence industry in Europe is necessary;
Amendment 159 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Considers that the principle of European strategic autonomy is a legitimate and necessary ambition and that it must remain a priority objective ofhas a positive impact for European defence policy; stresses that its practical and operational implementation is a common responsibility ofto be discussed among European states;
Amendment 166 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Maintains that European strategic autonomy must takdefence initiatives must provide practical formgains in the areas of industry, capability (joint programmes, investment in defence technologies) and operations (financing of operations, capacity building for partners, capacity to plan and conduct missions);
Amendment 180 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Considers that Europe’s defence is based largely on solid transatlantic alliance, the Union’s capacity to interveneact militarily, in a credible manner, in external theatres of operations;
Amendment 193 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Calls on the Member States and European bodies to prioritise and maintain a high level of commitment in Africa; welcomes, therefore,maintain the right geographical balance, ensure effective use of resources; in this spirit acknowledges the Council’s decision of July 2018 to extend the mandate of the EUTM RCA military training mission for two years and its intention to launch a civilian mission to complement the military component; notes that these recent developments are a positive sign of re-engagement on the part of the Member States;
Amendment 203 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Is concerned at the deteriorating situation in Burkina Faso; wonders whether it would be appropriate to deploy a civilian and/or military mission in order to strengthen security sector governance, human rights and the restoration of people’s trust in their security forces;
Amendment 218 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Notes, however, that the effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations in general is being hampered by athe security situation in creasing reluctanceisis regions, limited means on the part of Member States and the European institutions to make such missions and operations more robust, both in terms of human resources and their mandates; notes that CSDP military operations increasingly tend to be based on armed forces training (EUTM), with no executive dimension;
Amendment 258 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. Considers that the issue of financing for CSDP missions and operations is crucial to the sustainability of the policy; highlights the importance of reviewing the Athena mechanism so that it covers the full costswith the aim of making the financing mechanism of CSDP military operations and missions more effective; supports, in this connection, the proposal by the VP/HR, backed by the Commission, to create a European Peace Facility, which would finance part of the costs of EU defence activities, including the joint costs of CSDP military operations and those relating to military capacity-building for partners; hopes that the Member States will reach an agreement quickly so that this instrument can be introduced; stresses the importance of making the Union’s financial rules more flexible in order to enhance its ability to respond to crises and facilitate the implementation of Lisbon Treaty provisions; calls on the Member States and the Commission to consider a flexible mechanism to help Member States wishing to participate in a CSDP mission to bear the cost of doing so, thereby facilitating their decision to launch or strengthen a mission; notes that this instrument would be wholly consistent with the Union’s strategic autonomy objectives in the operational field;
Amendment 266 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Supports the creation of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) for executive missions to enable allcertain CSDP military operations to be carried out; calls for enhanced cooperation between the MPCC and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability; draws attention to the problems of recruitment and resource provision, which need to be overcome in order for the MPCC to be fully effective; calls on the EEAS to transform the MPCC from a virtual entity, with multiple-assignment posts, into a robust civilian-military entity which can plan and conduct operations;
Amendment 281 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Notes that the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU), which has been invoked once, demonstrates the solidarity among Member States in the common fight against terrorism; notes, however, that the conditions for triggering the article and the arrangements for providing the assistance required have never been clearly defined; calls for a more operational implementation of this instrumentdiscussion on experience in invocating this legal clause;
Amendment 286 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Believes that the implementation of CSDP missions and operations must be backed up by flexible instruments in order to make it easier for the Union and its Member States to commit to ensuring European strategic autonomy's ability to assume more responsibility , in the service of the stability of the European continent; stresses, in this connection, the effectiveness of modular, multipurpose and genuinely operational command structures, such as the European Corps (Eurocorps); notes that the missions of this command structure have been successfully extended and diversified: between 2015 and 2018 the European Corps was deployed four times as part of the EU training missions in Mali and the Central African Republic (EUTM Mali and EUTM RCA); calls on the Member States and the Commission to follow this example of flexible and operational cooperation, which has already proved valuable and effective;
Amendment 304 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Stresses that strengthening European strategic autonomy will necessarily be based on increasing the Member States’ capabilities and defence budgets, and on strengthening the European defence technological and industrial base;
Amendment 318 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Welcomes the recent efforts by the European institutions and the Member States, following on from the publication of the ‘EU Global Strategy’, to breathe new life into the hitherto virtual instruments of the CSDP and to fully implement the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty; stresses that these promising ambitions must now be consolidated and followed up with practical action so that they make an effective contribution to security on the European continent and in its immediate neighbourhood;
Amendment 324 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. Notes with satisfaction the Commission’s proposal of 2 May 2018 to establish a EUR 13 billion budget line for defence cooperation in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) under the heading of industrial policysupporting collaborative defence research and capability development; notes that this proposal, which reflects an unprecedented commitment by the Commission, remains subject to the unanimous agreement of the Member States in the next MFF;
Amendment 328 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal of June 2017 to create a European Defence Fund (EDF), which would foster cooperation between Member States and support the European defence industry throughout the Union, including cross-border SMEs; notes that this proposal is the first initiative for which Community funds are to be used in direct support of defence projects; recognises that this is a major step forward for European defence, from both a political and an industrial perspective; notes that the EDF could finance structural projects such as the future European aircraft or tank or a European anti-missile defence capability as well as small and medium projects creating innovative future orientated solutions for defence; notes that the 2019 work programme for the preparatory action will focus on electromagnetic spectrum dominance and future disruptive defence technologies, two key areas for maintaining Europe’s technological independence in the long term; welcomes, also, the adoption by the Commission in March 2019 of the first work programme European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) and the publication of nine calls for proposals for 2019, including for; notes that EDIDP 2019 calls included the Eurodrone, which is a keyn important capability for Europe’s strategic autonomy, and a call specifically devoted for small and medium enterprises, encouraging innovation throughout the Union; points out that 12 further calls for proposals will follow in 2020, covering priority areas in all domains (air, land, sea, cyber and space); notes the importance of EDF in contributing to innovation, competitiveness, efficiency and cross- border cooperation of the European defence industry throughout the EU; notes the link between the procurement decisions taken today by the Member States and the prospects for industrial and technological cooperation under the EDF;
Amendment 426 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 54
Paragraph 54
54. Stresses that the ambition of European strategic autonomy is based on the ability of Europeans to take action to defend their interests, either independently or within anwith partners whenever possible or independently when necessary, making full use of international institutional cooperation frameworks (NATO, UN);
Amendment 435 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55
Paragraph 55
55. Considers that European strategic autonomymbitions must be based on sustainable cooperation and strategic partnerships with countries and organisations sharing the Union’s values; welcomes, further, the contributions made by CSDP partners to Union missions and operations;
Amendment 461 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60
Paragraph 60
60. Supports, in parallel with institutional cooperation and partnerships, the combining of different forms of flexible, multifaceted, open and, at the same time, operational, ambitious and demanding cooperation, both within and outside EU, NATO and UN structures, which could facilitate joint commitments in operations, thereby strengthening the Union’s operational strategic autonomy; stresses, in this connection, that examples of cooperation such as the European Intervention Initiative, the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), Joint Expeditionary Force and the increasing integration of the German and Dutch armed forces refelect this drive for closer military cooperation between Member States;
Amendment 478 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61
Paragraph 61
61. Considers that progress in European defence will pave the way for majoris reflected in structural changes; notes the announcement of the creation of a Directorate-General for Defence and Space at the Commission under the responsibility of the Commissioner-designate for the Internal Market; notes that this new DG should be responsible for supporting, coordinating or complementing the Member States’ actions in the area of European defence and would thus contribute to strengthening European strategic autonomy; notes the definition of its five main tasks (implementation and oversight of the EDF, creation of an open and competitive European defence equipment market, implementation of the action plan on military mobility, enhancement of a strong and innovative space industry, implementation of the future space programme), but calls on the Commission to provide further details on the role and responsibilities of the new DG; Wonders how it will coordinate its work with that of other defence policy structures which have other responsibilities (EDA, EEAS, etc.);