13 Amendments of Pervenche BERÈS related to 2010/2038(INI)
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas government debt is rated by the very credit-ratings agencies that underestimatwrongly assessed the risks associated with private securities before the financial crisis,
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas it agrees with the Commission that ‘there is no one clear-cut definition of a sustainable fiscal position’, but nevertheless attempts to suggest a criterion for sustainability,
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas the health and macroeconomic benefitadvantages of reducing the compulsory component of social protection are dubiousmust be considered in the light of Article 9 of the Lisbon Treaty,
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas there is still considerable demand for a welfare state in some Member States, and whereas the welfare state has not necessarily sapped those countries’ economic dynamism in the pastEurope’s automatic stabilisers have softened the blow of the crisis and help make economies competitive,
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Takes the view that the Commission should define indicators of a ‘recovering economy’ in order to determine the point apredict whichen exit strategies should be deployed, for example where an economy has reached its normal production capacity utilisation rate, which must include clear targets as regards employment and the environment;
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Takes the view that, where there is an imbalance between savings and investment, budgetary policy must, by means of borrowing, be able to convert available savings into investment expenditure (such as investment in developing a zero-carbon economy in the European Union and in rising to the challenge of education);
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Emphasises that public-sector and welfare spending is more than just unare productive forms of expenditure, since it that provide a competitive edge, and also hasve a beneficial impact on the accumulation of physical and human capital and on effective demand;
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Emphasises that the role of social protection systems as ‘social safety nets’ has proven particularly effective in times of crisis, and that such systems canmust be maintained by, inter alia, broadening their financing base;
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Points out that the markets and credit- rating agencies may speculate and overestimate the risks of holding government securities, just as they underestimated the risks of acquiring private securities before the financial crisis;
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Takes the view that the national audit authorities should be given the task of rating sovereign debt, and that this should then be assessed by the European Court of Auditors;
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Suggests, in particular, that the Commission assess the effects of the fiscal spending deployed by the Member States in order to kick-start their economies, in terms of its impact on production, on jobs and on government accounts;
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Suggests that the term ‘excessive deficit’ be used where spending or poorly calibrated tax incentives increase the debt by depriving the government of significant resources without producing the effect on growth, jobs, income redistribution and tax revenue forecast in the budget legislation;
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Recalls that the Stability and Growth Pact was revised in 2005 in order to allow the de facto adoption of the principles underpinning a counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy, which have come into their own in the face of the crisi; notes that this instrument did not protect the eurozone countries that applied it correctly against the effects of the crisis, and neither did it foster the development of collaborative economic strategies;