BETA

Activities of Peter SKINNER related to 2011/2010(INI)

Reports (1)

REPORT on Insurance Guarantee Schemes PDF (197 KB) DOC (112 KB)
2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2011/2010(INI)
Documents: PDF(197 KB) DOC(112 KB)

Amendments (9)

Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas insurance guarantee schemes can be a valuable tool in reducing the risks facing policyholders and beneficiaries in the event of the failure of an insurance entity,
2011/03/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas there were no notable insurance policyholder or beneficiary losses as a result of the financial crisis, and the European insurance industry emerged from the crisis comparatively unscathed,
2011/03/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas Solvency II introduces a ladder of supervisory intervention minimising the likelihood of an insurer becoming bankrupt, and the disruption to policyholders or beneficiaries resulting from such an event,
2011/03/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
G. whereas under Solvency II policyholder and beneficiary claims are secure when an insurer enters into insolvency (when the insurer breaches its Solvency Capital Requirement), and only become at risk if the insurer becomes bankrupt (when assets are insufficient to cover liabilities),
2011/03/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Recognises that there are different ways of ensuring consumer protection: – Compensation: losses faced by policy holders or beneficiaries in the event of insolvency of an insurer are directly compensated following an orderly claims settlement process; – Continuity: the continuity of insurance contracts is secured through portfolio transfers to the remaining insurers in the market or a special entity created for this purpose; recommends that both ways are permitted under the future IGS framework taking into account the diverging size, concentration, product designs and respective insurance lines of the national markets;
2011/03/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses that the ‘home’ country approach to IGS can only be credible from a consumer perspective if there is consistency of consumer experience for both IGS functions (portfolio transfer and policyholder compensation claims); calls on the Commission to require a single own-language process and point of contact for consumers within their national supervisor for all insurance guarantee compensation claims regardless of the location of the ‘home’ IGS; recommends that EIOPA develop a harmonised approach for policyholder compensation claims on the basis of simplicity and best practice, if necessary through binding technical standards;
2011/03/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Believes that ‘home’ and ‘host’ supervisors should cooperate fully with the concerned national IGS to ensure minimised disruption for the policyholder or beneficiary in a ‘host’ country in the event of the failure of an insurer, acting through the college with the participation of EIOPA to ensure consistency of approach between schemes;
2011/03/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Insists that new EU legislation should not result in the dilution of protection offered by existing IGS in Member States, and that consumers should not face any losses as a result of regulatory failure to adequately supervise insurers or intermediaries; calls consequently on the Commission to ensure that a European framework for IGS either provides for the continuation of insurance contracts by portfolio transfer or compensates policyholders or beneficiaries for losses in full and without exception for all types of insurance products in the event of insurer bankruptcy, insurer or intermediary mis- selling, or fraud, within a set period of time, consistent throughout Member States;
2011/03/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Recognises that market concentration issues could place strains on the ability of an IGS to absorb all policyholder or beneficiary claims resulting from the bankruptcy of one or a number of insurers; believes that in order to avoid taxpayer exposure to such claims it is incumbent upon the responsible ‘home’ supervisor to ensure the robustness of the national IGS, if necessary employing additional supervisory standards to account for additional risks, which may include establishing an ex-ante IGS or additional capital requirements for certain insurers; foresees an oversight role for EIOPA in coordinating market-specific stress testing by national authorities and in conducting Europe-wide stress testing of IGS, issuing recommendations where appropriate, and in conducting regular peer reviews to ensure sharing of best practice approaches;
2011/03/24
Committee: ECON