BETA

15 Amendments of Marco FALCONE related to 2024/2055(INI)

Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Asks the Commission to ensure that the completion of BU remains a key priority; highlights that this project offers households and SMEs access to broader funding, increases financial stability, reduces the impact of economic downturns, funds the transition to a green and digital economy and and supports competitiveness by unlocksing the EU’s growth potential;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Notes that the Banking Union would improve access to credit while, at the same time, reducing the costs of the banking system, to the benefit of the institutions themselves and users;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Welcomes the adoption by co- legislators of the new banking package implementing Basel III standards in the EU; stresses that the Commission should evaluate thoroughly whether a delay in implementation is necessary to maintain the competitiveness of EU banks; welcomnotes, in this regard, the delegated act postponing the date of application of the new market risk framework by one year to 1 January 2026; urges the need to fully commit to the complete implementation of the globally agreed standards;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Notes that the non- performing loans ratio has remained stable at 2.30 % and the liquidity coverage ratio at 159.39 %, which nevertheless reflects Member States' efforts to reduce their NPL stock;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 157 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Notes that the current levels of banking sector profitability may provide an opportunity for some Member States to implement additional targeted increases in macroprudential buffers and help to preserve banking sector resilience; calls also on the Commission to review the entire macroprudential framework in order to prevent an undue increase in capital requirements;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 168 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Stresses the need to enhance the resilience of non-bank financial intermediaries and establish a level playing field with the banking sector, including by designing specific regulatory and supervisory tools to prevent a liquidity crisis;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Welcomes the objective of the proposal on crisis management and deposit insurance of ensuring a more consistent approach across all Member States to the application of resolution tools and deposit protection to enhance financial stability, taxpayer protection and depositor confidence; notes that small banks do not pose any risks to financial stabilitypotential risks to financial stability should be assessed not only based on the size of the institution but due to contagion effects among other relevant factors;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 190 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Highlights the importance of preserving shareholders’ and creditors’ primary responsibility for bearing losses in the event of a bank’s failure, which is still a key lesson learned from the global financial crisis; stresses that the bail-in of shareholders and creditors must remain the main source for resolution financing before any recourse is made to industry-funded sources; nevertheless considers that, in specific social circumstances, public intervention can be considered an instrument of last resort;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 199 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Recalls that a sufficient minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities is crucial for a credible resolution framework and for ensuring that resolution authorities have sufficient flexibility to effectively apply the resolution strategies needed in a specific crisis situation; warns that reductions in this minimum requirement, resulting from specific resolution strategies in the resolution planning phase, could hamper the resolvability of banks; calls for the SRB's recommendations on the crisis resolution strategy to be taken into account;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 202 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Highlights that liquidity support in resolution should not be based on any additional public funds; nNotes that any reliance on taxpayer money for the resolution of banks should be avoided;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 214 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Welcomes the ‘SRM Vision 2028’ strategic review initiated by the SRB to set its long-term goals, address new challenges and further strengthen collaboration with the national resolution authorities and other stakeholders;deleted
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 221 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Highlights the need for additional efforts to ensure full resolvability for all banks falling under the scope of resolution; recalls that achieving resolvability cannot be considered a ‘moving target’ and therefore calls for more standardisation and harmonisation of the resolvability assessment;deleted
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 233 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Underlines the fact that the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme was published back in 2015, and that the landscape has changed significantly since then; welcomes the fact that its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted its position in favour of a creation of a European deposit insurance scheme in April 2024; calls on the European Parliament to adopt its mandate to enter into interinstitutional negotiations; urges the Council to agree on its position on EDIS without any further delay;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 257 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Takes note of the Eurogroup statement of 16 June 2022 on the future of the BU; laments no further developments at Eurogroup level to push the completion of the BU, most notably the third pillar;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 263 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. Recalls that breaking the link between bank and sovereign risk remains a challenge for the BU; emphasises that the risk on banks’ balance sheets can be reduced further through the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON