29 Amendments of Gunnar HÖKMARK related to 2010/0277(NLE)
Amendment 46 #
Recital 1 a (new)
1a. The budgetary frameworks regulation is a part of the economic governance legislation which is aimed at long term economic stability in Europe.
Amendment 73 #
Recital 7
7. Biased and unrealistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts may considerably hamper the effectiveness of fiscal planning and consequently impair commitment to budgetary discipline, while transparency and validation of forecasting methodologies mayshould significantly increase the quality of macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts for fiscal planning.
Amendment 74 #
Recital 8
8. A crucial element in ensuring the use of realistic forecasts for the conduct of budgetary policy is transparency, which must entail public availabilityation and therefore public availability not only of the official macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts but also of the methodologies, assumptions and parameters on which the official macroeconomic and budgetarysuch forecasts are based.
Amendment 79 #
Recital 10 a (new)
10a. Agreement between the Commission and each Member State on forecasting methodology and type and range of assumptions which are used to draft budgetary forecasts could ensure transparency and clarity of forecasts made by the Member State. This should lead to avoidance of conflicting macro- fiscal scenarios and enhance the validity of the forecasts used for budgetary planning.
Amendment 83 #
Recital 12
12. Considering the documented effectiveness of rules-based budgetary frameworks of the Member States in promoting budgetary discipline, strong national fiscal rules that are consistent with the budgetary objectives at the level of the Union must be a cornerstone of the strengthened budgetary surveillance framework of the Union. Strong fiscal rules should be equipped with well-specified target definitions together with mechanisms for effective and timely monitoring. In addition, policy experience has shown that for numerical fiscal rules to work effectively, consequences must be attached to non-compliance, where the costs involved may be simply reputationalich should include reputational, political as well as financial costs.
Amendment 86 #
Recital 12 a (new)
12a. Independent institutions with expertise in fiscal policy can have an important role in securing transparency of budgetary forecasts and credibility. Such independent public bodies can perform the necessary research and audit to assess the performance of national fiscal policy.
Amendment 88 #
Recital 12 b (new)
12b. The number of specific circumstances in which temporary non- compliance with numerical fiscal rules is permitted should be limited.
Amendment 99 #
Recital 13
13. Member States should avoid pro- cyclical fiscal policies and fiscal consolidation efforts should be greater in good times. Well-specified numerical fiscal rules are conducive to these objectives. These numerical fiscal rules should incorporate the aim of strengthening government expenditure control.
Amendment 110 #
Recital 18
18. To be effective in promoting budgetary discipline and the sustainability of public finance, budgetary frameworks should comprehensively cover public finances. For this reason, operations of extra- budgetary funds and bodies that have an immediate or medium-term impact on Member States’ budgetary positions should be given particular considerationreported in a transparent manner. Their expected or potential impact on general government budget balances and debt should be explicitly addressed in the medium-term budgetary frameworks.
Amendment 112 #
Recital 18 a (new)
18a. The purpose and the features of the Directive call for a national transposition which is as close as possible to the text of the Direcitve. While this is true for all Member States, it is particulary true for the participating Member States.
Amendment 113 #
Recital 18 b (new)
18b. There is a need for euro area Member States to implement into their national budgetary frameworks several features in addition to the features contained in this Direcitve for all the Member states. A chapter with specific provisions for the euro area Member States establishes these two features: top- down budgetary processes and independent institutions with expertise in fiscal policy tasked with providing independent monitoring, analysis, assessments and forecasts. Non euro area Member States can voluntary incorporate several or all of these additional features into their national budgetary frameworks.
Amendment 117 #
Article 1 – paragraph 1
This Directive sets out detailed rules concerning the characteristics of the budgetary frameworks of the Member States that are necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the excessive deficit procedurecompliance with the obligation of the Member States to avoid excessive government deficits as referred to in Article 126(1) of the Treaty.
Amendment 120 #
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point f
(f) arrangements for analysisindependent monitoring, analysis, assessments and validation to enhance the transparency of elements of the budget process, including inter alia the mandate of independent national budget officesinstitutions with expertise in fiscal policy or institutions acting in the field of budgetary policy;
Amendment 121 #
Article 3 – paragraph 1
1. As concerns national systems of public accountingTo ensure the timely and accurate reporting of annual and quarterly ESA- based government data as required by the ESA transmission programme, Member States shall have in place public accounting systems, applying the accural basis of accounting and comprehensively and consistently covering all sub-sectors of general government as defined by Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 (ESA 95), and containing the information needed to compile ESA 95-based data. Those public accounting. Those systems shall be subject to internaldependent control and audit.
Amendment 124 #
Article 3 – paragraph 2
Amendment 130 #
Article 4 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that fiscal planning is based on realistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts using the most up-to-date information. Budgetary planning shall be based on the most likely macro-fiscal scenario or on a more prudent scenario that highlights in detail deviations from the most likely macro-fiscal scenario. The macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts shall be precompared taking into accountwith the Commission forecasts as appropriate. Differences between the chosen macro- fiscal scenario and the Commission forecast shall be explained.
Amendment 136 #
Article 4 – paragraph 3
3. Before the making of macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts each Member State and the Commission shall reach agreement on the forecasting methodology and type and range of assumptions taken into account when macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts are drafted. Member States shall make public the official macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts prepared for fiscal planning, including the methodologies, assumptions, and parameters used.
Amendment 138 #
Article 4 – paragraph 4
4. Member States shall have the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts for fiscal planning regularly audited by independent bodies, including ex post evaluation. The auditing shall be conducted once a year. The result of this independent auditing shall be made public.
Amendment 152 #
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) effective and timely monitoring of compliance with the rules, such as by independent national budget officbodies or institutions acting in the field of budgetary policy;
Amendment 153 #
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) consequences in the event of non- compliance that involve a clear political and financial cost for the authorities responsible for non-compliance;
Amendment 154 #
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) consequences in the event of non- compliance, such as fines for the authorities carrying out the tasks;
Amendment 155 #
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point d
Amendment 157 #
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) escape clauses, if any, setting out a limited number of specific circumstances in which temporary non-compliance with the rule is permitted.
Amendment 165 #
Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) comprehensive and transparent multi- annual budgetary objectives in terms of the general government deficit, debt, expenditure and any other summary fiscal indicator, ensuring that these are consistent with any fiscal rules as provided for in Chapter IV in force,
Amendment 168 #
Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) detailed projections of each major expenditure and revenue item, by general government sub-sector, for the budget year and beyond, based on unchanged and changed policies,
Amendment 171 #
Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) a statement of the government's medium-term priorities broken down by major revenue and expenditure item and by general government sub-sector, showing how the adjustment towards the medium- term budgetary objective is achieved compared to projections under unchanged and changed policies.
Amendment 175 #
Article 12 – paragraph 1
1. All sub-sectors of general government shall be covered by numerical fiscal rules. Numerical fiscal rules shall be designed in order to ensure that fiscal targets cover all sub-sectors of general government and are in line with Member States' obligations under the Stability and Growth Pact.
Amendment 178 #
Article 13 – paragraph 3
3. For all sub-sectors of general government, Member States shall publish information on contingent liabilities with potentially large impacts on public budgets, including government guarantees, non-performing loans, and liabilities stemming from the operation of public corporations, including their extent and likelihood and potential due date of expenditure.
Amendment 180 #
Chapter 6 a (new)
Chapter 6a Specific provisions for the participating Member States 1. In addition to their obligations under this directive and without prejudice to them, participating Member States shall incorporate into their budgetary frameworks: (a) a top-down approach, meaning a budgeting approach starts off from an agreement on the total spending level that is then allocated in spending allotments for different ministries or government agencies and thereby supports adherence to spending limits; (b) an independent institution with expertise in fiscal policy whose task is to provide independent monitoring, analysis, assessments and forecasts in all areas of domestic fiscal policy which may have an impact in the compliance by the euro area Member State with its obligations deriving from Article 121 and 126 of the Treaty and from any legislation and measures adopted under an of these Articles or under Article 136 of the Treaty. 2. Also in addition to their obligations under this Direcitve and without prejudice to them, Member States with a derogation may incorporate any or all of the above features into their budgetary frameworks, on a voluntary basis, in accordance with the procedure in Article 2 (1a).