BETA

7 Amendments of Richard ASHWORTH related to 2012/2151(INI)

Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion
Recital A
A. Whereas the debt crisis has prompted the Union and Member Statesespecially the Euro area to set up new financial solidarity instruments in Europetabilisation mechanisms: the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and other projects related to the 'banking union'; whereas the financial impact of those instruments is much greater, in terms of the amounts involved, than the Union Budget and whereas the innovative idea of a central budget for the euro area funded by members of the Euro area is now being proposed as the ultimate guarantee for this new financial solidarity;
2012/10/08
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion
Recital B
B. Whereas the multiplication of these solidarity instrumenttabilisation mechanisms makes it difficult to evaluate on the one hand, the actual contribution and guarantees made by each Member State to European solidarityongoing stabilisation efforts, which far exceeds the Member States' respective financial contributions to the Union Budget; whereas, moreover, the diversity of existing instruments, in terms of legal bases, intervention mode and the Member States concerned, is likely to make the whole set-up hard to steer by European leaders,, and, on the other hand, the possible impact of all these stabilisation mechanisms combined, especially on Member States that have not yet adopted the euro or have an opt-out; whereas, moreover, the diversity of existing instruments, in terms of legal bases, intervention mode and the Member States concerned, is likely to lead to systemic control deficiencies, mutual spill- over effects between the participating countries of the 'banking union' and the non-participating ones, and make it difficult to understand for the European citizens at large and unamenable to any parliamentary control;
2012/10/08
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 4 #
C. Whereas, without appropriate consolidated data on the public accounts of the Union, Member States and local and regional authorities, it is impossible to assess the right policy mix within the euro area and within the rest of the Union; whereas such data should also make it possible to evaluate which proportion of national, regional and local budgets is dedicated to the financing of the Union's objectives, such as the Europe 2020 strategy; whereas, currently, even the magnitude of such basic data is unknown;
2012/10/08
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 9 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
1. All commitments and guarantees undertaken by the Union or by some of its Member States in the framework of the new European solidarity instrumenttabilisation mechanisms, such as the EFSF, ESM or other projects related to the 'banking union', should be summed up in an overview annexed to the Union Budget and broken down Member State by Member State;
2012/10/08
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
2. Further budgetary coordination within the Union requires consolidated data on the public accounts of the Union, Member States and local and regional authorities, reflecting the Union's objectives. The Commission should therefore include the establishment of such consolidated data in upcoming legislative proposals; together with forecasts on budgetary trends related to the duration of the proposed legislative proposals;
2012/10/08
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 11 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
3. The situation whereby the financing needs of the Union Budget conflict with the necessary budget consolidation in Member States should be addressed urgently. The time has come, therefore, to engage in a progressive return to a situa in order to allow for a evidence based and thorough assessment of all options, in which the Union Budget is financed by genuine own resources, which would relieve national budgets accordinglycluding the possibility of a temporary budget freeze of all or some sections of the EU budget;
2012/10/08
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 13 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
4. In the meantime, the Commission should explore the possibility of excluding, in a spirit of solidarity and consistency, Member States' gross GNI- based contributions to the Union Budget from the calculation of the structural deficit as defined in the 'two-pack' and in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union.deleted
2012/10/08
Committee: BUDG