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Activities of Wolf KLINZ related to 2011/0295(COD)

Plenary speeches (1)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2011/0295(COD)

Shadow reports (1)

2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2011/0295(COD)
Documents: PDF(701 KB) DOC(586 KB)

Amendments (34)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8

(8) The scope of Directive 2003/6/EC focused on financial instruments admitted to trading on regulated markets but in recent years financial instruments have been increasingly traded on multilateral trading facilities (MTFs). There are also financial instruments which are only traded on any other types of organised trading facilities (OTFs) such as broker crossing systems or only traded over the counter. The scope of this Regulation should therefore be extended to include any financial instrument traded on a MTF or an OTF, as well as financial instruments traded over the counter, such as for example credit default swaps, or any other conduct or action which can have an effect on such a financial instrument traded on a regulated market, MTF or OTF. This should improve investor protection, preserve the integrity of markets and ensure that market manipulation of such instruments through financial instruments traded over the counter is clearly prohibited.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9

(9) Stabilisation of financial instruments or trading in own ~~share~~financial instruments in buy-back programmes can be legitimate, in certain circumstances, for economic reasons and should not, therefore, in themselves be regarded as market abuse.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14 a (new)

(14 a) Having access to inside information relating to another company and using it in the context of a public take-over bid for the purpose of gaining control of that company or proposing a merger with that company should not in itself be deemed to constitute insider dealing.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14 b (new)

(14 b) Since the acquisition or disposal of financial instruments necessarily involves a prior decision to acquire or dispose taken by the person who undertakes one or other of these operations, the carrying out of this acquisition or disposal should not be deemed in itself to constitute the use of inside information.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Wolf KLINZ, Sirpa PIETIKÄINEN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14 c (new)

(14 c) The mere fact that market-makers, bodies authorised to act as counterparties, or persons authorised to execute orders on behalf of third parties with inside information confine themselves, in the first two cases, to pursuing their legitimate business of buying or selling financial instruments or, in the last case, to carrying out an order dutifully, should not in itself be deemed to constitute use of such inside information.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14 d (new)

(14 d) Information regarding the market participant's own plans and strategies for trading should not be considered as inside information.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14 e (new)

(14 e) Directive 2003/6/EC applies the concept of inside information triggering a ban on, inter alia, dealing in financial instruments to which such information relates and the obligation on the issuer to disclose such information to the market. The interpretation of inside information is a central issue in the matter C-19/11 ('Geltl') currently pending with the European Court of Justice. This Regulation, while starting from the concept of inside information underlying Directive 2003/6/EC, is making important adjustments to the legal framework around inside information. Inside information has to be interpreted in line with the overall framework of insider dealing, but also with regard to market manipulation. Therefore, the interpretation by the European Court of Justice of inside information under Directive 2003/6/EC will not per se determine the interpretation of inside information under this Regulation.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Wolf KLINZ, Sirpa PIETIKÄINEN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18

(18) This Regulation should provide measures regarding market manipulation that are capable of being adapted to new forms of trading or new strategies that may be abusive. To reflect the fact that trading of financial instruments is increasingly automated, it is desirable that market manipulation should be supplemented by examples of specific abusive strategies that may be carried out by a~~lgorithmic~~ny available means of trading, including algorithmic and high frequency trading, as defined in MiFID. The examples provided are neither intended to be exhaustive nor are they intended to suggest that the same strategies carried out by other means would not also be abusive.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27

(27) Insider lists are an important tool for regulators when investigating possible market abuse, but national differences in regards to data to be included in those lists impose unnecessary administrative burdens on issuers. Data fields required for insider lists should therefore be uniform and subject to full harmonisation in order to reduce those costs for companies of all sizes. The requirement to keep and constantly update insider lists imposes administrative burdens specifically on issuers on SME growth markets. As competent authorities are able to exercise effective market abuse supervision without having those lists available at all times for those issuers they should be exempt from this obligation in order to reduce the administrative costs imposed by this Regulation.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28

(28) Greater transparency of transactions conducted by persons discharging managerial responsibilities at the issuer level and, where applicable, persons closely associated with them, constitutes a preventive measure against market abuse. The publication of those transactions on at least an individual basis can also be a highly valuable source of information to investors. It is necessary to clarify that the obligation to publish those managers' transactions also includes the pledging or lending of financial instruments and also transactions by another person ~~exercising discretion for the manager~~acting on behalf of the manager except in case of a portfolio manager entering into transactions on the basis of a discretionary mandate. In order to ensure an appropriate balance between the level of transparency and the number of reports notified to competent authorities and the public, a uniform threshold should be introduced in this Regulation below which transactions shall not be notified.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32

(32) Since market abuse can take place across borders and markets, competent authorities should be required to cooperate and exchange information with other competent and regulatory authorities, and with ESMA, in particular in relation to investigation activities. Where a competent authority is convinced that market abuse is being, or has been, carried out in another Member State or affecting financial instruments traded in another Member State, it should notify that fact to the competent authority and ESMA. In cases of market abuse with cross-border effects, ESMA ~~should be required to~~may coordinate the investigation if requested to do so by one of the competent authorities concerned.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Sirpa PIETIKÄINEN, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32 a (new)

(32 a) Early detection and effective investigation of market manipulation poses substantial difficulties for competent authorities. In particular when such manipulation is conducted through order-book activity the fragmentation of trading venues hinders market oversight due to lack of consolidated data. In order to address this shortcoming, an effective mechanism needs to be established to allow cross-market order-book surveillance. To that end, the competent authorities of the issuers' primary listing venue need to monitor order-book data from regulated markets and MTFs on a real-time basis. In accordance with Article 48(2) of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments1, the competent authorities should be able to delegate surveillance tasks to third parties. This means that a competent authority that receives the data should consolidate order-book data and then forward it to the third party in charge of surveillance. The competent authority should allow that consolidated order-book data to be available upon request to other Member States' competent authorities should they require it for investigative purposes.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1

1. The prohibitions in Articles 9 and 10 of this Regulation do not apply to trading in own ~~share~~financial instruments in buy-back programmes when the full details of the programme are disclosed prior to the start of trading, trades are reported as being part of the buy-back programme to the competent authority and subsequently disclosed to the public, and adequate limits with regards to price and volume are respected.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2

2. The prohibitions in Articles 9 and 10 of this Regulation do not apply to ~~trading in own shares for~~ the stabilisation of a financial instrument when stabilisation is carried out for a limited time period, when relevant information about the stabilisation is disclosed, and adequate limits with regards to price are respected.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) in relation to derivatives on commodities, information of a precise nature, which has not been made public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more such derivatives or to the related spot commodity contract, and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of such derivatives or related spot commodity contracts; ~~notably~~or where there is information which is required to be disclosed in accordance with legal or regulatory provisions at the Union or national level, market rules, contracts or customs, on the relevant commodity derivatives or spot markets.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point e

(e) information not falling within paragraphs (a), (b), (c) or (d) relating to one or more issuers of financial instruments or to one or more financial instruments, which is not generally available to the public, but which, if it were available to a reasonable investor, who regularly deals on the market and in the financial instrument or a related spot commodity contract concerned, would be regarded by that person as relevant when deciding the terms on which transactions in the financial instrument or a related spot commodity contract should be effected.deleted

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 9 a (new)

9 a. This article applies to all transactions or orders taking place on a regulated market, MTF, OTF or over-the-counter.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part

(a) entering into a transaction, placing an order to trade or any other behaviour which ~~has the following consequences~~:

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point a – indent 1

– it gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the supply of, demand for, or price of, a financial instrument or a related spot commodity contract; or

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point a – indent 2

– it secures, or is likely to secure, the price of one or several financial instruments or a related spot commodity contracts at an abnormal or artificial level;

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point c – introductory part

(c) disseminating information through the media, including the Internet, or by any other means, which has the consequences referred to in subparagraph (a), where the person who made the dissemination knew, or ought to have known, that the information was false or misleading. When information is disseminated for the purposes of journalism, such dissemination of information shall be assessed taking into account the rules governing the freedom of the press and freedom of expression in other media as well as the rules or codes governing the journalist profession, unless:

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 3 – point c – introductory part

(c) the sending of orders to a trading venue by ~~means of algorithmic~~any available means of trading, including algorithmic and high frequency trading, as defined in MiFID, without an intention to trade but for the purpose of:

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Wolf KLINZ, Sirpa PIETIKÄINEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 a (new)

Operators of trading venues shall have in place rules to avoid abusive order entry. Those rules shall provide that market participants that make more than [to be specified] ratio of orders to transactions pay an additional fee. The ratio shall be established by ESMA based upon the results of a feasibility study. The amount of the fee shall be established by the operator of the trading venue.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 3

3. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions totalling under EUR 250,000 over the period of a calendar year.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 3 a (new)

3 a. Every time the threshold is reached, the calculation of the threshold should restart from zero until the limit has been reached again.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Sirpa PIETIKÄINEN, Wolf KLINZ, Arlene McCARTHY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – point a

(a) ~~request~~have access to any document in any form, and to receive or take a copy thereof;

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Sirpa PIETIKÄINEN, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 a (new)

Article 17 a Cross-market order-book surveillance 1. For any financial instrument admitted to trading on a regulated market or an MTF, the competent authority of the issuers' primary listing venue shall have the power to conduct real-time cross- market surveillance of market manipulation and abuse conducted through order-book activity. In accordance with Article 48(2) of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments, the competent authorities should be able to delegate surveillance tasks to third parties. 2. Operators of regulated markets and MTFs shall provide order-book data regarding financial instruments that are actively traded on that regulated market or MTF to their home Member State competent authority. Where that competent authority is not the competent authority referred to in paragraph 1, it shall make the necessary arrangements to consolidate and forward the corresponding order-book data to the competent authority referred to in paragraph 1. In any event, the home Member State competent authority of the regulated markets or MTF shall remain responsible for ensuring that regulated markets and MTFs under its supervision report orders in compliance with applicable data standards. 3. The order-book data referred to in paragraph 2 shall be clear, precise and appropriately detailed so as to allow the competent authorities to perform real- time cross-market supervision pursuant to paragraph 1. Such data shall include the following: a) the identification code of the member which transmitted the order to the regulated market or MTF; (b) the identification of the financial instrument; (c) the date and time (with milliseconds) on which the order was transmitted to the regulated market or MTF; (d) the characteristics of the order including in particular: - the buy / sell indicator; - the initial and remaining / outstanding quantity (taking into account any partial execution(s) or event(s) affecting the order), both displayed and hidden; - the type of the order (e.g., market, limit, stop); - the limit price (if applicable); - the validity period as specified by the market participant (e.g., end of day, good till cancelled, any specified date and time, next closing); - any condition(s) for the order to be executed (e.g., minimum executable size, stop price); (e) date and time (with milliseconds) of any event affecting those characteristics; (f) type of event which resulted in a change of these characteristics (e.g., modification of characteristics by the market participant, cancellation, partial (or full) execution, market interruption, stop trigger); (g) the identification code of the order; (h) whether the order is entered by the market member (of the regulated market and where available the MTF) on own account (principal capacity) or on behalf of a third party (agent capacity). That information shall be provided for every characteristic validity period of the order, defined as a period of time during which the characteristics listed in point (d) remain the same and are not affected by any event. For the avoidance of doubt, that information shall include for each characteristic validity period its start date / time (with milliseconds), end date / time (with milliseconds) and the type of event which resulted in its ending. 4. The competent authority referred to in paragraph 1 shall make order-book data available to any other competent authority on its request. 5. ESMA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards in order to define: (a) the list of financial instruments that should be subject to cross-market supervision, the details and the technical specifications for order book data as well as the periodicity in which such data must be provided; (b) the instances where other competent authorities may in accordance with paragraph 4 request order book data from the designated competent authority. ESMA shall submit the draft regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph to the Commission by ...*. Power is conferred to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. 7. By ...* ESMA shall draw up a report assessing the functioning of cross-market order book surveillance including how ESMA could assist and support the execution of this task. _______________ * OJ: please insert date: 24 months after the entry into force of this Regulation.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

The competent authority shall inform ESMA of any request referred to in the first subparagraph. In case of an investigation or an inspection with cross- border effect, ESMA ~~shall~~may if requested to do so by one of the competent authorities coordinate the investigation or inspection.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

ESMA shall facilitate and coordinate the development of cooperation arrangements between the competent authorities of Member States and the relevant competent authorities of third countries. For that purpose, ESMA shall prepare a template document for cooperation arrangements that may be used by competent authorities of Member States.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

ESMA shall also facilitate and coordinate the exchange between competent authorities of Member States of information obtained from competent authorities of third countries that may be relevant to the taking of measures under Articles 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point l

(l) in respect of a natural person, administrative pecuniary sanctions ~~of up to [EUR 5 000 000] or in the Member States where the Euro is not the official currency, the corresponding value in the national currency on the date of entry to force of this Regulation~~shall be set at an appropriate level;

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point m

(m) in respect of a legal person, administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to 10 % of its total annual turnover in the preceding business year; where the legal person is a subsidiary of a parent undertaking [as defined in Articles 1 and 2 of Directive 83/349/EEC], the relevant total annual turnover shall be the total annual turnover resulting from the consolidated account of the ultimate parent undertaking in the preceding business year.deleted

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Member States shall ~~put in place~~ensure that effective mechanisms are put in place to encourage reporting of breaches of this Regulation to competent authorities, including at least:

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 2

2. Financial incentives to persons who offer salient information about potential breaches of this Regulation may be granted in conformity with national law where such persons do not have a pre- existing legal or contractual duty to report such information, that the information is new, and it results in the imposition of an administrative sanction or measure or a criminal sanction for a breach of this Regulation.deleted

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON