45 Amendments of Sophia IN 'T VELD related to 2013/2188(INI)
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas in September 2001 the world entered a new phase which resulted in the fight against terrorism being listed among the top priorities of most governments; whereas the revelations based on leaked documents from Edward Snowden, former NSA contractor, put democratically elected leaders under an obligation to address the challenges of the increasing capabilities of intelligence agencies in surveillance activities and their implicatiact ons forundamental rights, the rule of law in a democratic society and civil liberties of citizens;
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D – point 2
Recital D – point 2
· the high risk ofgrave violation of EU legal standards, fundamental rights and data protection standards;
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D – point 6 a (new)
Recital D – point 6 a (new)
the undermining of press freedom, the confidentiality of lawyer-client communications, the professional secrecy of doctors and the independence of politicians;
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Q
Recital Q
Q. whereas the extra-territorial application by a third country of its laws, regulations and other legislative or executive instruments in situations falling under the jurisdiction of the EU or its Member States may impact on the established legal order and the rule of law, or even violate international or EU law, including the rights of natural and legal persons, taking into account the extent and the declared or actual aim of such an application; whereas, in these exceptional circumstances, it is necessary to take action at the EU level to ensure that the rule of law, and the rights of natural and legal personsEU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, in the Charter of fundamental rights, in the ECHR and in Member States' Constitutions, i.e. fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law, and the rights of natural and legal persons as enshrined in secondary legislation applying these fundamental principles, are respected within the EU, in particular by removing, neutralising, blocking or otherwise countering the effects of the foreign legislation concerned;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital R a (new)
Recital R a (new)
Ra. whereas international negotiations on data protection agreements cannot set aside EU rules on access to documents, notably Regulation 1049/2001, whereas negotiation documents cannot automatically be withheld from the public based on the sole request of (one of the) negotiating parties;
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AA
Recital AA
AA. whereas Safe Harbour Principles may be limited ‘'to the extent necessary to meet national security, public interest, or law enforcement requirements’'; whereas, as an exception to a fundamental right, such an exception must always be interpreted restrictively and be limited to what is necessary and proportionate in a democratic society, and the law must clearly establish the conditions and safeguards to make this limitation legitimate; whereas the scope of application of such exception should have been clarified by the US and the EU, notably by the Commission, to avoid any interpretation or implementation that nullifies in substance the fundamental right to privacy and data protection, among others; whereas consequently such an exception should not be used in a way that undermines or nullifies the protection afforded by Charter of Fundamental Rights, the ECHR, the EU data protection law and the Safe Harbour principles; insists that in case the national security exception is invoked, it must be specified under which national law;
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AI a (new)
Recital AI a (new)
AIa. whereas the European Parliament, given its competence stipulated by Article 218 TFEU, has the responsibility to continuously monitor the value of international agreements it has given its consent to;
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AL
Recital AL
AL. whereas following the allegations published by the media, the Commission decided to open consultations with the US pursuant to Article 19 of the TFTP Agreement; whereas on 27 November 2013 Commissioner Malmström informed the LIBE Committee that, after meeting US authorities and in view of the replies given by the US authorities in their letters and during their meetings, the Commission had decided not to pursue the consultations on the grounds that there were no elements showing that the US Government has acted in a manner contrary to the provisions of the Agreement, and that the US has provided written assurance that no direct data collection has taken place contrary to the provisions of the TFTP agreement; whereas it is not clear whether the US authorities have circumvented the Agreement by accessing such data through other means, as indicated in the letter of 18 September 2013 by the US authorities30a; __________________ 30a [1] The letter states that "the US government seeks and obtains financial information [...](which) is collected through regulatory, law enforcement, diplomatic and intelligence channels, as well as through exchanges with foreign partners [...] the US Government is using the TFTP to obtain SWIFT data that we do not obtain from other sources";
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AN a (new)
Recital AN a (new)
ANa. whereas the European Commission reassured the Parliament to create a TFTP data extraction system on EU soil, whereas up until now the Commission has not proposed the establishment of such a system, considers the Commission has not fulfilled one of the conditions for Parliament to give its consent;
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AN b (new)
Recital AN b (new)
ANb. whereas the Commission has reserved 50 million EUR for the development of PNR systems by the Member States, whereas the European Parliament has not adopted the EU PNR directive;
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BA
Recital BA
BA. whereas mass surveillance activities give intelligence agencies access to personal data stored by EU individuals under cloud services agreements with major US cloud providers; whereas the US intelligence authorities have accessed personal data stored in servers located on EU soil by tapping into the internal networks of Yahoo and Google36 ; whereas such activities constitute a violation of international obligations and European fundamental rights standards, as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the ECHR, Member States Constitutions and secondary law; whereas it is not excluded that information stored in cloud services by Member States’ public authorities or undertakings and institutions has also been accessed by intelligence authorities; __________________ 36 The Washington Post , 31 October 2013.
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BA a (new)
Recital BA a (new)
BAa. Whereas the fact that intelligence agencies have accessed personal data of users of online services has severely distorted the trust of citizens in such services and therefore has an adverse effect on businesses investing in the development of new services using "Big Data" and new applications, such as the "Internet of Things";
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BA b (new)
Recital BA b (new)
BAb. Whereas it is essential for companies providing such new services and applications to respect the data protection rules and privacy of data subjects whose data is collected, processed and analysed in order to maintain a high level of trust among citizens;
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BB
Recital BB
BB. whereas intelligence services perform an important functin democratic societies have the mission into protecting democratic society fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law, citizens' rights and the State against internal and external serious threats; whereas they are given special powers and capabilities only to this end; whereas these powers are to be used within the legal limits imposed by fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law, as otherwise they risk losinglose legitimacy and eroding the democratic nature of societyrisk undermining democracy on the ground of defending it;
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BC
Recital BC
BC. whereas the high level of secrecy that is intrinsic to thefact that a certain level of secrecy is conceded to intelligence services in order to avoid endangering ongoing operations, revealing modi operandi or putting at risk the lives of agents impedes full transparency, public scrutiny and normal democratic or judicial examination, such secrecy cannot override or exclude rules on democratic and judicial scrutiny and examination of their activities, as well as on transparency, notably in relation to the respect of fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law;
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that recent revelations in the press by whistleblowers and journalists, together with the expert evidence given during this inquiry, admissions by authorities, and the lack of denial with respect to certain allegations, have resulted in compelling evidence of the existence of far-reaching, complex and highly technologically advanced systems designed by US and some Member States’' intelligence services to collect, store and analyse communication anddata, including content data, location data and metadata of all citizens around the world on an unprecedented scale and in an indiscriminate and non-suspicion-based manner;
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes the allegations of ‘'hacking’' or tapping into the Belgacom systems by the UK intelligence agency GCHQ; reiterates the indication by Belgacom that it could not confirm nor deny that EU institutions were targeted or affected, and that the malware used was extremely complex and required the use of extensive financial and staffing resources for its development and use that would not be available to private entities or hackers;
Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. States that trust has been profoundly shaken: trust between the two transatlantic partners, trust among EU Member States, trust between citizens and their governments, trust in the respect of the rule of law, and trust in the security of IT services; believes that in order to rebuild trust in all these dimensions a comprehensive planresponse plan comprising a series of actions is urgently needed;
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that several governments claim that these mass surveillance programmes are necessary to combat terrorism; wholeheartedly supports the fight against terrorism, but strongly believes that it can never in itself be a justification for untargeted, secret and sometimes even, or outright illegal mass surveillance programmes; expresses concerns, therefore, regarding the legality,, as they cannot be considered necessitary and proportionality of these programmeste measures in a democratic society;
Amendment 155 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the vast, systemic, blanket collection of the personal data of innocent people, often comprising intimate personal information; emphasises that the systems of mass, indiscriminate surveillance by intelligence services constitute a serious interference with the fundamental rights of citizens; stresses that privacy is not a luxury right, but that it is the foundation stone of a free and democratic society; points out, furthermore, that mass surveillance has potentially severe effects on the freedom of the press, thought and speech, as well as a significant potential for abuse of the information gathered against political adversaries; stresses that mass surveillance severely undermines the rights of EU citizens to be protected against any divulging of communications with their lawyers and therefore threatens access to justice, the right to a fair trial and the rule of law; emphasises that these mass surveillance activities appear also to entail illegal actions by intelligence services and raise questions regarding the extra-territoriality of national laws;
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Sees the surveillance programmes as yet another step towards the establishment of a fully -fledged preventive state, changing the established paradigm of criminal law in democratic societies whereby any interference with suspects' fundamental rights has to be authorised by a judge or prosecutor on the basis of a reasonable suspicion and regulated by law, promoting instead a mix of law enforcement and intelligence activities with blurred and weakened legal safeguards, often not in line with democratic checks and balances and fundamental rights, especially the presumption of innocence; recalls in that regard the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court37 on the prohibition of the use of preventive dragnets (‘präventive Rasterfahndung’) unless there is proof of a concrete danger to other high-ranking legally protected rights, whereby a general threat situation or international tensions do not suffice to justify such measures; __________________ 37 No 1 BvR 518/02 of 4 April 2006. No 1 BvR 518/02 of 4 April 2006.
Amendment 162 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Points out that any judgment of a secret court or tribunal and any decision of an administrative authority of a non- EU state secretly authorising, directly or indirectly, surveillance activities shall not be recognised or enforced;
Amendment 206 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Calls on certain EU Member States, including the UK, Germany, France, Sweden and the Netherlands, to revise where necessary their national legislation and practices governing the activities of intelligence services so as to ensure that they are in line with the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights and comply with their fundamental rights obligations as regards data protection, privacy and presumption of innocence; in particular, given the extensive media reports referring to mass surveillance in the UK, would emphasise that the current legal framework which is made up of a ‘complex interaction’ between three separate pieces of legislation – the Human Rights Act 1998, the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 – should be revised; all EU Member States, and in particular those participating in the so- called "9-eyes" and "14-eyes" programmes, to comprehensively evaluate and revise their national legislation and practices governing the activities of intelligence services – including their (strategic) surveillance powers, authorisation procedures and oversight mechanisms - so as to ensure that they are in line with the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights and comply with their fundamental rights obligations as regards data protection, privacy, presumption of innocence, the necessity and proportionality of surveillance activities, as well as parliamentary and judicial oversight, as also set out in the UN compilations of good practices38iand the recommendations of the Venice Commission38j; 20a.Calls on the UK to revise its national legislation and practices governing the activities of intelligence services so as to ensure that they are in line with the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights and comply with their fundamental rights obligations as regards data protection, privacy and presumption of innocence; in particular, given the extensive media reports referring to mass surveillance in the UK, would emphasise that the current legal framework which is made up of a 'complex interaction' between three separate pieces of legislation – the Human Rights Act 1998, the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 – should be revised; 20b. Calls on Germany to revise the law on the German foreign intelligence service (BND) and the G-10 Law by making them more specific, reinforcing the rights of all persons whose communications are intercepted, providing for more public information in particular as to the activities of the G10 Commission, reinforcing the technical capabilities and investigative powers of the parliamentary oversight bodies, and adjusting the laws to the developments regarding internet technology and use; 20c. Calls on France to reinforce the system of checks and balances in the field of intelligence activities so as to ensure it is in line with the European Convention on Human Right's requirements, to strengthen its general oversights mechanisms, both as regards the ex ante authorisation procedures, the involvement of the Parliament in monitoring of intelligence activities and the reinforcement of technical capabilities and investigate powers of the latter. Moreover encourages the National Commission for the Control of Security Interceptions (CNIS), independent administrative authority to monitor more closely and effectively the processing of data collected by the various intelligence agencies. Urges France to clarify the situation on allegations regarding potential agreements between intelligence services and telecommunication companies as regard access to and exchange of personal data and access to communication facilities including Transatlantic cables. Takes notes of the adoption of the "Loi de programmation militaire 2014-2019" in December 2013 clarifying the framework according to which intelligence services may have access to communication data, with regards to fighting against terrorism. 20d. Calls on Sweden to revise the internet laws which authorised the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) to monitor communications traffic into and out of Sweden, cable bound as well as in the ether (radio and satellite), including emails, text messages and telephone calls and Act on signals intelligence which allows for the bulk transfer of data to other states if authorised by the Government, in order to specify the means and the scope of the surveillance and to improve the foreseeability of law which would enable an individual to foresee whether their communication or data about their communication is collected by FRA; recommends further to reinforce the system of checks and balances in oversight of the signals intelligence by including at the composition of the Inspection for Defence Intelligence Operations the parliamentarians in office. 20e. Takes notice of the review of the Dutch Intelligence and Security Act 2002 (report by the "Dessens Commission" of 2 December 2013); supports the recommendations made by this review commission to strengthen the transparency of and the control and oversight on the Dutch intelligence services; expresses its concern regarding the recommendations to extend the powers of the intelligence services so that untargeted surveillance could also be performed on cable-bound communications, especially given the fact that one of the biggest Internet Exchange Points in the world is located in Amsterdam (AMS-IX); calls for caution in defining the mandate and capabilities of the new Joint Sigint Cyber Unit, expresses its concern about the dragnet- method applied by the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) for the surveillance of specific internet forums, expresses its concern about the presence of US intelligence personnel operating equipment to intercept satellite communications in the Dutch municipality of Burum, without the necessary oversight on the surveillance operations' compliance with EU and national law, thereby considering these operations to amount to exploitation of Dutch territory as if it were US territory; 20f. Calls on Poland to revise data protection legislation in particular as far as their access by different (law enforcement or intelligence) authorities to citizens' personal data from various sources is concerned) and introduce an independent supervisory mechanism over their activity, notably in the area of intelligence and general crime prevention; strongly recommends that Poland properly applies freedom of information laws with respect to national security issues ; recommends further that any freedom of information requests shall be duly and adequately treated, notably when relevant for explaining government involvement in programs of mass surveillance and for thereby holding decision-makers accountable; __________________ 38i UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Combating Terrorism 2010, Compilation of good practices on legal and institutional frameworks and measures that ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies, UN General Assembly, A/HRC/14/46, 17 May 2010. 38j European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Report on Democratic Oversight of the Security Services in Council of Europe States, Study 388/2006, June 2007 (update due in spring 2014).
Amendment 214 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Calls on the Member States immediately to fulfil their positive obligation under the European Convention on Human Rights to protect their citizens from surveillance contrary to its requirements, including when the aim thereof is to safeguard national security, undertaken by third states or by their own intelligence services and to ensure that the rule of law is not weakened as a result of extraterritorial application of a third country’'s law;
Amendment 268 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 51
Paragraph 51
51. Calls on the Council Presidency and the majority of Member States who support a high level of data protection to show a sense of leadership and responsibility and accelerate their work on the whole Data Protection Package to allow for adoption in 2014, so that EU citizens will be able to enjoy better protection in the very near future; stresses that determined action and implementation of the Data Protection Package at European level and full support from the Council are necessary preconditions in order to demonstrate credibility and assertiveness vis-à-vis third countries;
Amendment 272 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 26
Subheading 26
Cloud computing and new services and applications
Amendment 285 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57 a (new)
Paragraph 57 a (new)
57a. Underlines that access to personal data stored by service providers through intelligence services in violation of citizens' fundamental rights decreased citizens' trust in such providers; therefore stresses the need to enforce the respect of fundamental rights in order to avoid negative effects on businesses investing in new services and applications, which rely on the use of big amounts of data;
Amendment 286 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57 b (new)
Paragraph 57 b (new)
57b. Calls on the Commission and the Member States competent authorities to evaluate the extent to which EU rules on privacy and data protection have been violated through the cooperation of EU legal entities with secret services or through the acceptance of court warrants of third country authorities requesting personal data of EU citizens contrary to EU data protection legislation;
Amendment 287 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57 c (new)
Paragraph 57 c (new)
57c. Calls on business providing new services using "Big Data" and new applications, such as the "Internet of Things" to build in data protection measures already in the development stage in order to maintain a high level of trust among citizens;
Amendment 313 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62
Paragraph 62
62. Calls for the setting up of a high-level group to strengthen cooperation in the fielddemocratic oversight ofn intelligence cooperation at EU level, combined with a proper oversight mechanism ensuring both democratic legitimacy and adequate technical capacity; stresses that the high-level group should cooperate closely with national parliaments in order to propose further steps to be taken for increased oversight collaboration in the EU;
Amendment 343 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 74 a (new)
Paragraph 74 a (new)
74a. Professional secrecy and confidentiality
Amendment 344 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 74 b (new)
Paragraph 74 b (new)
74b. Considers that lawyers' role, whether retained by an individual, a corporation or the state, is as the client's trusted adviser and representative, as a professional respected by third parties, and as an indispensable participant in the fair administration of justice and democracy; without the certainty of confidentiality, there can be no trust and if the right of EU citizens and businesses to be protected against any divulging of communications with their lawyers is denied, they may be denied access to legal advice and to justice under the rule of law;
Amendment 345 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 74 c (new)
Paragraph 74 c (new)
74c. Calls on the Commission to put forward a proposal for the protection of professional secrecy from government electronic surveillance, including the use of electronic communication services or other cloud service for lawyer-client communications;
Amendment 349 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 75
Paragraph 75
75. Considers that the detention of Mr Miranda and the seizure of the material in his possession under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (and also the request to The Guardian to destroy or hand over the material) constitutes an interference with serious violation of the right of freedom of expression, as recognised by Article 10 of the ECHR and Article 11 of the EU Charter, with the effect of curtailing media freedom and creating a chilling effect on media reporting on surveillance on citizens;
Amendment 361 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 77 a (new)
Paragraph 77 a (new)
77a. Calls on the President of the European Parliament to ensure that the European Parliament's communications are secure; considers that, to this end, Members should be able to obtain a certificate for the European Parliament's encryption of emails; considers that the European Parliament would act as trust centre in this regard;
Amendment 405 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 88 – introductory part
Paragraph 88 – introductory part
88. Calls on the European Parliament’s Secretariat under the responsibility of the EP's President to carry out, by September 2014 at the latest, a thorough review and assessment of the European Parliament’s IT security dependability focused on: budgetary means, staff resources, technical capabilities, internal organisation and all relevant elements, in order to achieve a high level of security for the EP’s IT systems; believes that such an assessment should at the least provide information analysis and recommendations on:
Amendment 440 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 97 – indent 3
Paragraph 97 – indent 3
– respect for fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law, ands well as the credibility of democratic safeguards in a, judicial and parliamentary safeguards and oversight, in a more and more digital society;
Amendment 457 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 107
Paragraph 107
107. Also believes that that the involvement and activities of EU Members States has led to a loss of trust, including between Member States and between citizens and their Member States' authorities; is of the opinion that only full clarity as to purposes and means of surveillance, public debate and, ultimately, revision of legislation, including a strengthening of the system of judicial and parliamentary oversight, will be able to re-establish the trust lost; underlines that it is impossible to develop a real EU Security Strategy in a situation where certain Member States spy on others in collaboration with third countries, or where Member States spy on each other, in violation of the EU principle of loyal cooperation;
Amendment 470 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 109 a (new)
Paragraph 109 a (new)
109a. Emphasizes that in a new EU Treaty, the European Parliament should be given real parliamentary inquiry powers, including the possibility to question under oath;
Amendment 475 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 110 a (new)
Paragraph 110 a (new)
110a. Deplores the refusal of the US administration to adopt and implement all recommendations of the ad hoc EU US Working Group on Data Protection, calls on the US authorities to reconsider;
Amendment 476 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 110 b (new)
Paragraph 110 b (new)
110b. Questions the three year data retention of all data collected during the Sotchi Olympic Games by Russian secret services;
Amendment 486 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 114 – point 2
Paragraph 114 – point 2
Action 2: Conclude the EU-US Umbrella Agreement guaranteeing the fundamental right of citizens to privacy and data protection and ensuring proper redress mechanisms for EU citizens, including in the event of data transfers from the EU to the US for law-enforcement purposes;
Amendment 490 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 114 – point 3
Paragraph 114 – point 3
Action 3: SImmediately suspend Safe Harbour until a full review has been conducted and current loopholes are remedied, making sure that transfers of personal data for commercial purposes from the Union to the US can only take place in compliance with highest EU standards;
Amendment 497 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 114 – point 4 a (new)
Paragraph 114 – point 4 a (new)
Action 4a: Suspend the EU US PNR Agreement until (i) the Umbrella Agreement negotiations have been concluded (ii) the judicial and administrative avenues of EU citizens to protect their fundamental rights are guaranteed;
Amendment 498 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 114 – point 4 b (new)
Paragraph 114 – point 4 b (new)
Action 4b: Evaluate any agreement, mechanism or exchange with third countries involving personal data in order to ensure that the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data are not violated due to surveillance activities and take necessary follow-up actions;