Activities of Antolín SÁNCHEZ PRESEDO related to 2010/2302(INI)
Plenary speeches (2)
Explanations of vote
Explanations of vote
Amendments (12)
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Expresses the view that market participants should not invest in structured products if they cannot assess the underlying credit risk themselvesappropriately, or alternatively that they should apply the highest risk weighting;
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Is aware of the inherent conflict of interest if market participants devise internal credit risk assessments for their own regulatory capital requirements, and hence sees the need to increase supervisors‘' capacity and resources for monitoring, assessing, and overseeing the adequacy of the internal models and imposing prudential measures;
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Highlights the global nature of the credit rating industry and urges the Commission and Member States to work together with other G20 countries on a global approach in order to preserve a level playing field and prevent regulatory arbitrage while keeping markets open;
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15 a. Notes that, in addition to their rating activity, most Credit Rating Agencies issue a number of outlooks, reviews, warnings and watches which do have a significant impact on the markets. Is of the opinion that they should be disclosed according to predetermined criterion and protocols that ensure transparency and confidentiality;
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)
Paragraph 15 b (new)
15 b. Believes that increased competition in the sector should not result in “rating shopping” practices;
Amendment 148 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20 a. Notes that CRA's shall use clear criteria to score country performance, is aware of the fact that the actual rating is not a mechanical weighting of these factors. Asks the industry to clarify which methodology and judgements are used to calibrate sovereign ratings and to explain deviation from this model-generated ratings and from the forecasts of the main international financial institutions;
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 b (new)
Paragraph 20 b (new)
20 b. Is concerned about the fact that the most traditional sustainability rating drivers, such as the fiscal balance and debt level, played a proportionally greater role in driving negative rating actions than positive ones;
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 c (new)
Paragraph 20 c (new)
20 c. Notes that, according to the IMF, ratings could explain up to almost a 70% of the CDS spreads. Is concerned about the pro-cyclical effects that ratings may have and demands a special consideration of these sensitive issues;
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 d (new)
Paragraph 20 d (new)
20 d. Believes that, in order to reduce the negative “cliff effects” in prices and spreads that rating changes imply, the regulation that hardwire buy or sell decisions to ratings should be eliminated;
Amendment 168 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Supports the existence of various payment models in the industry as long as inherent conflicts of interest are addressed by regulatory means; asks the Commission, following consultation with stakeholders, in particular the credit rating industry, to come forward with proposals for alternative viable payment models that involve both issuers and users;
Amendment 177 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22 a. Notes that conflicts of interests are still present and considers that the credit rating activity should respond to a new model in which tight operational is introduced (internal controls, qualification standards, etc.); asks the industry to put relevant information about their analysts (such as remuneration incentives, patrimonial interests, agenda and other relevant records) at the disposal of the supervisors;
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Considers that if credit ratings fulfil a regulatory purpose they should not be classified as mere opinions, and that CRAs should be held accountable for their credit ratings; recommends therefore that CRAs‘’ exposure to civil liability in the event of gross negligencesignificant negligence, misconduct and rating inaccuracy be increased and that provisions to that effect be anchored in Member States’ civil law;