1623 Amendments of Anna FOTYGA
Amendment 8 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)
Citation 6 a (new)
– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and other international human rights treaties and instruments, in particular the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; having regard to the 2014 Protocol to the 1930 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Forced Labour Convention, which China has not signed,
Amendment 9 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)
Citation 6 a (new)
– having regard to the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries (2021/0406(COD)),
Amendment 10 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 b (new)
Citation 6 b (new)
– having regard to its previous Resolutions on the human rights situation in China, in particular that of 17 December 2020 on forced labour and the situation of the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, that of 18 April 2019 on China, in particular the situation of religious and ethnic minorities, and that of 4 October 2018 on the mass arbitrary detention of Uyghurs and Kazakhs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,
Amendment 11 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 c (new)
Citation 6 c (new)
– having regard to its previous Resolutions and Recommendations on Hong Kong, in particular the Resolution of 19 June 2020 on the PRC National Security Law for Hong Kong and the need for the Union to defend Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy, and the Recommendation of 13 December 2017 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Hong Kong, 20 years after handover,
Amendment 12 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 d (new)
Citation 6 d (new)
– having regard to the report by Safeguard Defenders, titled "110 Overseas. Chinese Transnational Policing Gone Wild",
Amendment 20 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
Citation 8 a (new)
– having regard to UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
Amendment 42 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas China is simultaneously a partner and also increasingly a competitor and systemic rival to the EU; whereas China, as expressed by President Xi Jinping in his 2017 report to the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress, firmly intends to play the role of a leading power on the world stage by 2049, both as an economic power and in the field of foreign policy, which poses significant political, economic, security and technological dangers to the EU, as well as threats to democratic values in the world;
Amendment 47 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas China is simultaneously a partner and also increasingly, a competitor and systemic rival to the EU and like-minded allies, challenging our interests, security and values;
Amendment 49 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas Chinathe People's Republic of China (PRC) is simultaneously a partner and also increasingly a competitor and systemic rival to the EU;
Amendment 59 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas both the European Union and China have a shared interest in pursuing constructive and stable relations, which must be based on respect for the rules-based international order, international law, balanced engagement and reciprocity; whereas, in the EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy, the EU commits itself to promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law;
Amendment 62 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas both the European Union and China have a shared interest in pursuing constructive and stable relations, which must be based on respect for the rules-based international order, international law, human rights, balanced engagement and reciprocity;
Amendment 67 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas China is a communist state ruled by a single party, the Chinese Communist Party, committed to Marxism- Leninism; whereas the Chinese Communist Party does not share the same values as European democracies, has become increasingly authoritarian and promotes governance models internationally that contradict the EU’s values in order to strengthen autocrats and contribute to the erosion of democracy on a global scale;
Amendment 69 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the Chinese Communist Party does not share the same values as European democracies, has become increasingly authoritarian and promotes Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Xi thought of governance models internationally that contradict the EU’shuman rights inherent to all human beings and universal values;
Amendment 74 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas China has rejected all recommendations made by different international bodies with regard to freedom of association, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, independence of the judiciary, guarantees for the legal profession, protection of human rights defenders, rights of ethnic and religious minorities, abolition of the death penalty, abolition of 're-education' through labour, prohibition of torture, and the effective fight against discrimination, among many others;
Amendment 77 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)
Recital C b (new)
Cb. whereas in 2017, several Catholic priests and worshippers were injured in the Shanxi province while trying to prevent the Chinese authorities from demolishing a Church-owned building, and whereas they received no financial compensation; whereas in December 2018, as part of a deliberate Chinese government policy against the celebration of Christmas, 'house churches' and their worshippers were raided in the Sichuan and Guangdong provinces, and in the Langfang province the authorities banned outright the sale of Christmas trees or Santa Claus figures; whereas, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese government continued its harassment of Christians through actions such as the demolition of the Xiangbaishu Church in the city of Yixing and the removal of the cross from a church steeple in the Guiyang county; whereas, in 2020, the authorities further restricted religious education and proselytising through new regulations;
Amendment 78 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C c (new)
Recital C c (new)
Cc. whereas in 2021 the panel of experts of UN Human Rights Council Special Procedures expressed concern about reports of organ harvesting in China from prisoners of conscience and members of ethnic and religious minorities, such as the Uyghurs, Christians, Tibetans and Falun Gong, for the purpose of selling them on the black market;
Amendment 80 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C e (new)
Recital C e (new)
Ce. whereas, according to Safeguard Defenders, China maintains at least 54 police service centres operating clandestinely around the world, particularly in democratic countries where Chinese political dissidents and individuals fleeing ethnic and religious persecution in China find refuge; whereas 36 of these centres operate illegally on European soil, and whereas one EU Member State, Spain, has the highest number of such centres worldwide, nine to be precise;
Amendment 94 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the EU can only credibly defend its interests and values against an increasingly assertive China if it acts with a single, united approach, with better understanding and cooperation with like- minded partners;
Amendment 100 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the EU can only credibly defend itsthe interests and valuof the Member States against an increasingly assertive China if it acts with a single, unicoordinated approach;
Amendment 106 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas in order to defend its core values and be treated as an equal partner, Europe needs a new approach towards China based on European strategic autonomyenhanced resilience, reciprocity, cooperation with like-minded partners and opposition to coercion;
Amendment 107 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas in order to defend its core values and be treated as an equal partner, Europethe EU and Member States needs a new approach towards China based on European strategic autonomy, reciprocity, cooperation with like-minded partners and opposition to coercion;
Amendment 110 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas the PRC demonstrates increasing willingness to use economic dependency as a tool to promote its increasing geopolitical ambitions;
Amendment 112 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas the EU must not accept critical political or military support by China for Russia’s illegal war of aggression in Ukraine or for any circumvention of EU sanctions imposed following Russia’s illegal invasionwe witness a deepening strategic partnership between the PRC and Russia and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests; whereas the EU must not accept critical political or military support by China for Russia’s illegal war of aggression in Ukraine or for any circumvention of EU sanctions imposed following Russia’s illegal invasion as well as blocking accountability for crimes committed by Russia and legitimizing the narratives of the Kremlin; is concerned with Sino-Russian 'partnerships without limits' which all demonstrate the gulf in values between the PRC and the international order based on the rule of law and firm multilateralism, and should be taken into account in the EU's policy towards China;
Amendment 122 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas China's grey-zone activities, such as warplane incursions, missile drills, economic coercion, and cyberattacks, aim to pressure Taiwan into submission; whereas China's expansionist policies and harassment behaviour in the South China Sea demonstrate a flagrant disregard for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the freedom of navigation;
Amendment 144 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas the PRC conducts the biggest military build up in peace time history, additionally militarizing its economy;
Amendment 159 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – subheading 1
Paragraph 1 – subheading 1
Amendment 170 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a
Paragraph 1 – point a
(a) continue engaging with China to tackle global challenges such as climate changethe preservation of the environment and biodiversity, health and pandemic preparedness, debt relief and humanitarian assistance, and increase dialogue with China on security issues in view of China’s increasingly critical role in global security;
Amendment 172 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a
Paragraph 1 – point a
(a) continue engaging with China to tackle global challenges such as climate change and biodiversity, health and pandemic preparedness, debt relief and humanitarian assistance, and increase dialogue with China on security issues in view of China’s increasingly critical role in global security;
Amendment 176 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point b
Paragraph 1 – point b
(b) call on China to uphold the rules- based international order, especially the principles of the UN Charter, including respect for the territorial integrity or political independence of all states and refraining from the threat or use of force in their international relations;
Amendment 182 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point b
Paragraph 1 – point b
(b) call ondemand China to uphold the rules- based international order, especially the universal principles of the UN Charter, includinghuman rights, and to respect for the territorial integrity or political independenceand sovereignty of all states;
Amendment 192 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c
Paragraph 1 – point c
(c) maintain diplomatic stability while increasinge the EU’s assertivenessdiplomatic pressure towards China in order for China to assume its responsibility as a member of the UN Security Council to pressure Russia into stopping its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine;
Amendment 199 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point d
Paragraph 1 – point d
(d) reiterate that China, a is the world’'s largest carbon emitter, must commit to peak its CO2 emissions before 2030 in line wmost polluting country, and hold ith the Paris Agreement and its own promiseo its environmental commitments;
Amendment 209 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e
Paragraph 1 – point e
(e) densurounce that China plays a constructive role in's increased engagement with multilateral organisations such as the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization (WHO) and, the United Nations and support steps towards allowing Taiwan’s participation in the meetings, mechanism, Interpol and others, is aimed at reshaping global rules, norms and practivities of relevant international institutions such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Changeces in order to further China's geopolitical strategy and long-term economic interests;
Amendment 211 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e
Paragraph 1 – point e
(e) ensure that China plays a constructive role in multilateral organisations such as the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations and support steps towards allowing Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the meetings, mechanism and activities of relevant international institutions such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change;
Amendment 214 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
(ea) strongly oppose China's constant misinterpretation and distortion of the UN Resolution 2758(XXVI) which contains no mention of the People's Republic of China's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, nor does it authorize the PRC to represent Taiwan in the UN system; express grave concerns that Taiwanese passport holders, including journalists, NGO workers and political activists, continue to be barred from accessing tours and events in the UN;
Amendment 220 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f
Paragraph 1 – point f
(f) note that the Chinese government is strengthening its role and influence in international institutions, including in the United Nations and its Human Rights Council; respond adequately to China’s efforts to build alternative international organisations, including through the BRICS group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), by ensuring better coordination among the EU Member States and intensifying partnerships with like-minded partners around the world;
Amendment 228 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
(fa) be aware that the continued growth of Sino-Russian strategic partnership, including in the areas of technology and military capability transfers, may increase China’s ability to coerce the EU’s partners in Asia and around the world;
Amendment 235 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – subheading 2
Paragraph 1 – subheading 2
Opposing China’s persisting human rights violations
Amendment 242 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g
Paragraph 1 – point g
(g) insist that China fulfils its responsibilities as a global power by upholding universal human rights and the rule of law;
Amendment 251 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point h
Paragraph 1 – point h
(h) ensure a unified European approach when China uses its economic leverage to silence opposition against its persistent human rights abuses; intensifyexplore avenues to increase the effectiveness of the Human Rights Dialogue with China, to make it more result-oriented and include Members of the European Parliament in the Human Rights Dialogue with China anddialogue; work towards a united approach on cultural and academic cooperation with China while preventing undue influence from Chinese sources of finance, thereby rejecting self-censorship and assuring transparency while countering and preventing manipulative cultural and educational diplomacy through Chinese sources of finance; safeguard intellectual freedom and freedom of research taking into account the potential ideological and cultural threat of Chinese government-run projects such as Confucius Institutes;
Amendment 260 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point h
Paragraph 1 – point h
(h) ensure a unifiedwork for a strong European approachresponse when China uses its economic leverage to silence opposition against its human rights abuses; intensify and include Members of the European Parliament in the Human Rights Dialogue with China and work towards a united approach on cultural and academic cooperation with China while preventing undue influence from Chinese sources of finance;
Amendment 261 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point h a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point h a (new)
(ha) call for a thorough review of the EU-China Comprehensive Investment Agreement in principle as long as China fails to guarantee and show respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all its citizens, and fails to comply with international commitments and its own obligations, such as the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Hong Kong Basic Law;
Amendment 265 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point h b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point h b (new)
(hb) condemn China's use of current advances in science, technology and innovation for purposes contrary to European principles, and its development of a sophisticated invasive digital surveillance network, including facial recognition and data collection technology, which it uses to surveil and repress population groups that are inconvenient for the Communist Party;
Amendment 272 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i
Paragraph 1 – point i
(i) support an independent and impartial UN investigation into human rights violations and acts of genocide in China, in particular in Xinjiang and Tibet, and urge the Chinese authorities to grant meaningful access to the regions concerned and immediately and unconditionally release the Uyghur scholar and 2019 Sakharov Prize Laureate Ilham Tohti, as well as all other prisoners of conscience;
Amendment 273 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i
Paragraph 1 – point i
(i) support an independent and impartial UN investigation into human rights violations in China, in particular in Xinjiang and Tibet, and urge the Chinese authorities to grant meaningful access to the regions concerned and immediately and unconditionally release the Uyghur scholar and 2019 Sakharov Prize Laureate Ilham Tohti and other political prisoners;
Amendment 278 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
(ia) note that religious freedom and human rights have continued to deteriorate in China; condemn Chinese government measures aimed at suppressing believers, such as Christians, who resist being controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and which force bishops to join the CCP-controlled Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association; work to protect religious freedom from authoritarian regimes like China;
Amendment 296 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j
Paragraph 1 – point j
(j) address China's 'hostage diplomacy' and individual cases of European citizens being held in ‘administrative detention’ in China, such as the Swedish bookseller Gui Minhai, and use all diplomatic channels to pressure for their release;
Amendment 314 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point l
Paragraph 1 – point l
(l) identify and close down any avenues that currently facilitate transnational repression efforts by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including in the European Union and in particular those targeting diaspora communities, in cooperation and coordination with like-minded partners; call on Member States, and in particular the Spanish Government, to resolutely persecute the activity of police service centres that China clandestinely maintains on EU territory;
Amendment 323 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point m
Paragraph 1 – point m
(m) reviewassess the autonomous status of Hong Kong in the light of the National Security Law and the PRC’s violation of its international commitments, its breaches of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, the Hong Kong Basic Law and the crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy and opposition figures, including members of civil society;
Amendment 329 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n
Paragraph 1 – point n
(n) condemn attempts by the Chinese authorities to target Tibetan and Hong Kong diaspora communities within the EU and call on Member States to suspend all existing extradition treaties with the PRC and Hong Kong;
Amendment 334 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point n a (new)
(na) promote a timetable for the ratification and effective compliance of China with all international human rights standards and principles, as well as key International Labour Organisation conventions on labour rights; to promote a strong monitoring, control and sanction mechanism, as well as specific measures to prevent further human rights violations;
Amendment 336 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point n a (new)
(na) condemn China for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom; raise religious freedom concerns in all bilateral dialogues and engagements with the Chinese authorities;
Amendment 341 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point n b (new)
(nb) urge China to end the enforced disappearance and forced repatriation of North Korean escapees;
Amendment 342 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point n c (new)
(nc) address deep concerns about the new "Administrative Measures for Religious Activity Venues” that came into force on 1 September 2023 and that require religious activity venues like churches, mosques, temples and monasteries to actively broadcast CCP propaganda and require the establishing of study groups of CCP documents in all places of worship;
Amendment 346 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n d (new)
Paragraph 1 – point n d (new)
(nd) condemn Chinese authorities assimilationist policies in Tibet that violate the educational, religious, cultural and linguistic rights of the Tibetan people, in particular the compulsory boarding school and pre-school system which separates over 1 million Tibetan children from their families and enforces Chinese- language education;
Amendment 352 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – subheading 3
Paragraph 1 – subheading 3
Amendment 361 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point o
Paragraph 1 – point o
(o) work closely towards fostering unity among the Member States’ approach towards China and strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomyresilience to ensure that Europe is able to defend its values and economic interests, as well as the global rules-based order;
Amendment 368 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point p
Paragraph 1 – point p
(p) work towards a renewed, assertive and coherent EU approach towards China that shapes relations with the PRC in the interest of the EU as a wholeMember States and takes full account of the challenges stemming from the PRC’s rise as a global actor and its increasingly oppressive domestic policies and assertive foreign policy;
Amendment 373 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point q
Paragraph 1 – point q
(q) assess the potentially severe prospective economic impact of the most likely scenarios in case of a significant deterioration and further aggressive policies of Beijing; strengthen the EU’s economic autonomy, ensure mutually beneficial economic relations and prevent sensitive technologies from being used for military purposes by de-risking trade flows and reducing critical dependencies on the PRC without aiming to decouple or turning inwards;
Amendment 389 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point r a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point r a (new)
(ra) highlight that Taiwan's semiconductor industry is vital for the global economy and more that 50 percent of the world's shipping containers pass through Taiwan Straits; urge the EU and the Member States to take a firm stand against China's intimidation and coercion towards Taiwan; welcome Taiwan's semiconductor manufacturing diversification in Europe and reiterate its longstanding support to a EU-Taiwan Bilateral Investment Agreement and any arrangements mutually beneficial to bilateral trade and investment;
Amendment 393 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point r a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point r a (new)
(ra) develop a strategy to deter escalations from the PRC and to develop capabilities to address possible further escalation of Beijing's aggressive policies;
Amendment 403 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point s a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point s a (new)
(sa) note the subordination of Chinese industry, and in particular big tech multinationals of Chinese origin, to the agenda and interests of the Chinese Communist Party; propose strengthened rules requiring companies of Chinese origin to undergo security screening before investing in certain strategic sectors, such as IT, telecommunications, energy and transport, in order to expose their governmental and Communist Party links, as in the case of Huawei and ZTE;
Amendment 407 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point s c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point s c (new)
(sc) encourage, protect and promote European projects related to the deployment of 5G technology and research on 6G, artificial intelligence (AI) and big data, in order to ensure the security of networks in the future, as well as to increase Europe's digital industry, which will be vital for digitisation, economic growth and for bridging the growing technology gap with China;
Amendment 408 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point s d (new)
Paragraph 1 – point s d (new)
(sd) bring together a coalition of states and non-state actors to counter Beijing's attempts to limit a free and open global internet;
Amendment 409 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point s e (new)
Paragraph 1 – point s e (new)
(se) denounce publicly the goals set by the Chinese Communist Party in its "Made in China 2025" plan, in particular the Chinese government's boosting of its companies through government funds made available for them to acquire, and with which they are already acquiring, parts of the European economy that are critical to the security of the EU bloc;
Amendment 410 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point s f (new)
Paragraph 1 – point s f (new)
(sf) review in depth the EU-China Comprehensive Investment Agreement in principle, which provides for China's access to EU strategic sectors (telecommunications, energy infrastructure, modern information and digital technologies related, for example, to big data, AI, robotics and smart manufacturing), facilitating thus China's 'technological supremacy'; warn that, if this agreement in principle is not thoroughly revised, it would increase also the EU's dependence in agriculture, as the Chinese government is investing large amounts of money in agricultural technology and innovation, with a regulatory framework far removed from European standards, for example in terms of food safety; warn that, as it currently stands, this agreement in principle makes it easier for China to acquire strategic sectors of the European economy, as well as agricultural land on European soil;
Amendment 418 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point u
Paragraph 1 – point u
(u) highlight that the EU’s ‘One China policy’ remains the foundation of our engagement with both the PRC and Taiwan but also; maintain that whilst the EU's relationship with Taiwan remains unofficial, the EU recognises Taiwan as a reliable and valued like-minded partner in Asia; underline the positive effects and strategic importance of deepening ties between the EU and Taiwan;
Amendment 424 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point u
Paragraph 1 – point u
(u) highlight that the EU’s ‘One China policy’ remains the foundation of our engagement with both the PRC and Taiwan but also underline the importance and positive effect of deepening ties between the EU and Taiwan;
Amendment 427 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point v
Paragraph 1 – point v
(v) revisitupgrade the EU’s engagement policy with Taiwan and continue supporting democracycommon values and principles there together with like-minded partners, including by pursuing a resilient supply chain agreement and a bilateral investment agreement (BIA), which would help protect the interests of the EU as a whole and of its Member States; encourage further exchanges between the European Parliament and itsthe Taiwanese counterpartsLegislative Yuan in this context;
Amendment 431 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point v
Paragraph 1 – point v
(v) revisit the EU’s engagement policy with Taiwan and continue supporting democracy there together with like-minded partners; encourage further exchanges between Parliament and its Taiwanese counterparts in this context, as well as cooperation between Member States and Taiwan on issues of common interest;
Amendment 442 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point w
Paragraph 1 – point w
(w) ensure that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is not changed by means of force or coercion by supporting initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue, cooperation and confidence-building between the two sides; take concrete steps, including increasing Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP) in the Taiwan Strait, facilitating Taiwan's military capability- building, and considering economic sanction packages in the event of a Chinese invasion, to discourage China from escalating tensions in the region; prepare a scenario-based strategy for tackling potential security challenges in the Taiwan Strait;
Amendment 444 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point w
Paragraph 1 – point w
(w) ensure that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is not changed by means of force or coercion by supporting initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue, cooperation and confidence-building between the two sides; prepare a scenario-based strategy for tackling potential security challenges in the Taiwan Strait; raise concerns over China’s use of cognitive warfare by spreading disinformation to sow confusion among the Taiwanese population and undermine trust in Taiwan’s democracy and governance;
Amendment 448 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point w
Paragraph 1 – point w
(w) ensure that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is not changed by means of force or coercion by supporting initiatives aimed at promoting stability, dialogue, cooperation and confidence-building between the two sides; prepare a scenario- based strategy for tackling potential security challenges in the Taiwan Strait;
Amendment 449 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point w a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point w a (new)
(wa) increase the EU's economic and diplomatic presence throughout the Indo- Pacific region and recalls that the world’s strategic and economic centre of gravity is shifting to this region, and that the EU therefore has a clear interest in forging a clear and credible EU-level approach to the Indo-Pacific;
Amendment 450 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point w b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point w b (new)
(wb) underline the importance of freedom of navigation to be respected by China, including in the South and East China seas;
Amendment 456 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point x
Paragraph 1 – point x
(x) establish a ‘Far-East StratCom Task Force’ as part of the European External Action Service, to be tasked with identifying, monitoring and countering disinformation efforts and nation-specific actions by China in its attempt to reshape the global information environment to its advantage;
Amendment 458 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point x a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point x a (new)
(xa) denounce China's support to the world's most oppressive regimes, in particular Syria, Iran and North Korea, but also Venezuela and Cuba; review EU strategies for those regions that face increasing Chinese influence and penetration, such as Africa and Ibero- America;
Amendment 463 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point y
Paragraph 1 – point y
(y) fully leverage the Global Gateway strategy as a tool to intensify the EU’s engagement and business relations with partners from developing countries and provide an alternative to Chinese-driven foreign investment strategieand China-centric trade networks and foreign investment strategies such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), the Digital Silk Road and the Global Data Security Initiative (GDSI) which all present many risks and threats such as debt risks, governance risks, environmental concerns as well as risks related to data protection and privacy, connected to China's enhancing of repressive capacities and actions;
Amendment 470 #
2023/2127(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point y a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point y a (new)
(ya) take note of the success of the industrial relocation policies implemented a few years ago by the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan, which can and should serve as an example and inspiration for the EU to carry out a gradual process of relocation of the European industry established in China, in order to promote job creation and new opportunities for the almost 13 million unemployed men, women and young people in the European Union; ensure the participation of Member States, social partners and civil society in the design of such policies;
Amendment 1 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1
Citation 1
– having regard to Parliament’s recommendations and resolutions on Russia, including of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism,
Amendment 1 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1
Citation 1
– having regard to Parliament’s recommendations and resolutions on Russia, including of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism,
Amendment 5 #
Amendment 5 #
Amendment 6 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 b (new)
Citation 1 b (new)
– - having regard to NATO strategic concept and findings of the NATO Reflection Group of 2021,
Amendment 6 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 b (new)
Citation 1 b (new)
– - having regard to NATO strategic concept and findings of the NATO Reflection Group of 2021,
Amendment 9 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 c (new)
Citation 1 c (new)
– having regard to the he UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Amendment 9 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 c (new)
Citation 1 c (new)
– having regard to the he UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Amendment 10 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 d (new)
Citation 1 d (new)
– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Amendment 10 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 d (new)
Citation 1 d (new)
– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Amendment 13 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 e (new)
Citation 1 e (new)
– having regard to The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),
Amendment 13 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 e (new)
Citation 1 e (new)
– having regard to The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),
Amendment 14 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 f (new)
Citation 1 f (new)
– having regard to international confidence- and security-building measures, such as Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and others,
Amendment 14 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 f (new)
Citation 1 f (new)
– having regard to international confidence- and security-building measures, such as Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and others,
Amendment 15 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 g (new)
Citation 1 g (new)
– having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 and subsequent documents,
Amendment 15 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 g (new)
Citation 1 g (new)
– having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 and subsequent documents,
Amendment 16 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 h (new)
Citation 1 h (new)
– having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
Amendment 16 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 h (new)
Citation 1 h (new)
– having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
Amendment 17 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 i (new)
Citation 1 i (new)
– having regard to Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948,
Amendment 17 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 i (new)
Citation 1 i (new)
– having regard to Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948,
Amendment 18 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 j (new)
Citation 1 j (new)
– having regard to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols,
Amendment 18 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 j (new)
Citation 1 j (new)
– having regard to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols,
Amendment 22 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the inconsistency of the EU strategy to support and defend democracy in Russiaamong many factors that precluded democracy to occur in Russia across the centuries, are inner structural determinants of Russia but also naive policies of some Western countries such as“Wandel durch Handel”, which hasve contributed to the Kremlin regime’s suppression of all rights and freedoms of the Russian people over the last few decades, ultimately leading to the destruction of Russia’s constitutional statehood and to the establishment of dictatorship in Russiaand denying freedom to numerous nations conquered by Russia in Europe and Asia, whereas those factors ultimately led to the rebirth of totalitarian dictatorship in Russia and facilitated its brutal aggression against its neighbours;
Amendment 22 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the inconsistency of the EU strategy to support and defend democracy in Russiaamong many factors that precluded democracy to occur in Russia across the centuries, are inner structural determinants of Russia but also naive policies of some Western countries such as“Wandel durch Handel”, which hasve contributed to the Kremlin regime’s suppression of all rights and freedoms of the Russian people over the last few decades, ultimately leading to the destruction of Russia’s constitutional statehood and to the establishment of dictatorship in Russiaand denying freedom to numerous nations conquered by Russia in Europe and Asia, whereas those factors ultimately led to the rebirth of totalitarian dictatorship in Russia and facilitated its brutal aggression against its neighbours;
Amendment 30 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
A a. whereas the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union has offered to the Russian Federation an unprecedented level of cooperation, including special participation in international organizations, including accepting Russia in the WTO , upgrading the EU-Russia relations to strategic partnership, establishing a NATO-Russia Council, signing numerous agreements, conventions and memorandums; whereas all of them have been breached or rejected by Moscow in the recent wave of its imperial posture; whereas based on all those failed relations, rebuilding of trust and confidence in any future relations with the Russian Federation will not be possible in short to medium term and will require constant checks and control even in the long term;
Amendment 30 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
A a. whereas the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union has offered to the Russian Federation an unprecedented level of cooperation, including special participation in international organizations, including accepting Russia in the WTO , upgrading the EU-Russia relations to strategic partnership, establishing a NATO-Russia Council, signing numerous agreements, conventions and memorandums; whereas all of them have been breached or rejected by Moscow in the recent wave of its imperial posture; whereas based on all those failed relations, rebuilding of trust and confidence in any future relations with the Russian Federation will not be possible in short to medium term and will require constant checks and control even in the long term;
Amendment 34 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Recital A b (new)
A b. whereas the resources needed to sustain the Russian Federation and to run the imperial wars, including human resources and natural resources, come mostly from conquered nations, whereas Moscow is using ethnic minorities and indigenous people such as Tuvan, Buryat, Sakha, Kalmyk, Yakut and other, as colonial subjects in its imperial war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas minority groups are reportedly suffering per-capita casualty rates far higher than among native Russian soldiers in Ukraine;
Amendment 34 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Recital A b (new)
A b. whereas the resources needed to sustain the Russian Federation and to run the imperial wars, including human resources and natural resources, come mostly from conquered nations, whereas Moscow is using ethnic minorities and indigenous people such as Tuvan, Buryat, Sakha, Kalmyk, Yakut and other, as colonial subjects in its imperial war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas minority groups are reportedly suffering per-capita casualty rates far higher than among native Russian soldiers in Ukraine;
Amendment 38 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A c (new)
Recital A c (new)
A c. whereas ethnic and racial discrimination constitutes a structural problem of the Russian Federation;
Amendment 38 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A c (new)
Recital A c (new)
A c. whereas ethnic and racial discrimination constitutes a structural problem of the Russian Federation;
Amendment 39 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the dictatorship in Russia has been one of the main causes of thedrivers of the imperial policy which reemerged shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union with genocidal wars in Chechnya, aggression against Georgia , hybrid warfare against the EU Member States, meddling in elections in Europe and America, assassinations of Putin’s critics inside the country and abroad and the recent Kremlin’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which began with the occupation of Crimea in 2014 and continued with Russia’s large scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022;
Amendment 39 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the dictatorship in Russia has been one of the main causes of thedrivers of the imperial policy which reemerged shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union with genocidal wars in Chechnya, aggression against Georgia , hybrid warfare against the EU Member States, meddling in elections in Europe and America, assassinations of Putin’s critics inside the country and abroad and the recent Kremlin’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which began with the occupation of Crimea in 2014 and continued with Russia’s large scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022;
Amendment 46 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
B a. whereas the Russian Federation deliberately called into question the fundamental principles of Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security cooperation by blatantly breaching principles guiding relations between states and withdrawing from international conventions, treaties and bilateral agreements which had been a cornerstone of stability and security of Europe even in the Cold War times;
Amendment 46 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
B a. whereas the Russian Federation deliberately called into question the fundamental principles of Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security cooperation by blatantly breaching principles guiding relations between states and withdrawing from international conventions, treaties and bilateral agreements which had been a cornerstone of stability and security of Europe even in the Cold War times;
Amendment 52 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Recital B b (new)
B b. whereas the current Russia's posture is a direct continuation - both in official narratives and actions - of Muscovite imperial claims and ideology;
Amendment 52 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Recital B b (new)
B b. whereas the current Russia's posture is a direct continuation - both in official narratives and actions - of Muscovite imperial claims and ideology;
Amendment 54 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B c (new)
Recital B c (new)
B c. whereas the recent aggression against Ukraine was preceded by hostile actions against sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova, but also genocidal wars against Chechens and brutal war crimes in Syria;
Amendment 54 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B c (new)
Recital B c (new)
B c. whereas the recent aggression against Ukraine was preceded by hostile actions against sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova, but also genocidal wars against Chechens and brutal war crimes in Syria;
Amendment 55 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B d (new)
Recital B d (new)
B d. whereas the Russian Federation is directly responsible for numerous hostile acts against the Member States and citizens, including assassination and use of banned military-grade nerve agents, hostile military intelligence actions such as 2014 Vrbětice ammunition warehouse explosions, the downing of MH-17 plane and the role of Russian services in the catastrophe of the Polish governmental plane near Smolensk in April 2010, as well as many other acts of open hostilities, which led to death of numerous EU citizens;
Amendment 55 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B d (new)
Recital B d (new)
B d. whereas the Russian Federation is directly responsible for numerous hostile acts against the Member States and citizens, including assassination and use of banned military-grade nerve agents, hostile military intelligence actions such as 2014 Vrbětice ammunition warehouse explosions, the downing of MH-17 plane and the role of Russian services in the catastrophe of the Polish governmental plane near Smolensk in April 2010, as well as many other acts of open hostilities, which led to death of numerous EU citizens;
Amendment 58 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B e (new)
Recital B e (new)
B e. whereas the Russian Federation consists of large number of autonomous districts and republics, many of which have culture, history, and language different from Russia’s Slavic population; whereas some of these entities have previously aspired for freedom and in 1990 many of them declared their sovereignty;
Amendment 58 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B e (new)
Recital B e (new)
B e. whereas the Russian Federation consists of large number of autonomous districts and republics, many of which have culture, history, and language different from Russia’s Slavic population; whereas some of these entities have previously aspired for freedom and in 1990 many of them declared their sovereignty;
Amendment 60 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B f (new)
Recital B f (new)
B f. whereas Russia's historical trajectory, marked by authoritarian rule and persistent concerns about political freedoms and human rights, contributes to a critical perspective on the claim that Russia will turn into an enduring democracy;
Amendment 60 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B f (new)
Recital B f (new)
B f. whereas Russia's historical trajectory, marked by authoritarian rule and persistent concerns about political freedoms and human rights, contributes to a critical perspective on the claim that Russia will turn into an enduring democracy;
Amendment 62 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B g (new)
Recital B g (new)
B g. whereas the examples of the tsars, communist dignitaries and the present regime do not provide a basis for considering the Russian Federation a country built on humanist principles and shared values of the Western civilization;
Amendment 62 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B g (new)
Recital B g (new)
B g. whereas the examples of the tsars, communist dignitaries and the present regime do not provide a basis for considering the Russian Federation a country built on humanist principles and shared values of the Western civilization;
Amendment 64 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B h (new)
Recital B h (new)
B h. whereas the Russian Federation for centuries is being known as a prison of nations; whereas the EU and its Members States should cooperate closer with the US Congress which proclaimed the Capture Nation Week in support of subjugated nations in their right to determine their destiny, future and freedom;
Amendment 64 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B h (new)
Recital B h (new)
B h. whereas the Russian Federation for centuries is being known as a prison of nations; whereas the EU and its Members States should cooperate closer with the US Congress which proclaimed the Capture Nation Week in support of subjugated nations in their right to determine their destiny, future and freedom;
Amendment 69 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the EU’s objective in this war is Ukraine’s ultimate victory, to be accomplished with the support from a broad coalition of liberal democracieske-minded partners and international actors, most notably NATO; whereas this victory is necessary not only for the sake of Ukraine, but for that of the whole democratic world;
Amendment 69 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the EU’s objective in this war is Ukraine’s ultimate victory, to be accomplished with the support from a broad coalition of liberal democracieske-minded partners and international actors, most notably NATO; whereas this victory is necessary not only for the sake of Ukraine, but for that of the whole democratic world;
Amendment 75 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
C a. whereas the imperial policy of the Russian Federation, including the brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, has been supported by the entire Russian political, military, religious, cultural, sport, intellectual elite and the vast majority of the society, both inside Russia and throughout the diaspora, with only very few exceptions;
Amendment 75 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
C a. whereas the imperial policy of the Russian Federation, including the brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, has been supported by the entire Russian political, military, religious, cultural, sport, intellectual elite and the vast majority of the society, both inside Russia and throughout the diaspora, with only very few exceptions;
Amendment 76 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)
Recital C b (new)
C b. whereas even a majority of those Russians in the country and abroad, including the youth, academia members, cultural circles, sportsmen etc., who have access to independent media, e.g. Western ones, choose to reject independent and objective information about Mr Putin's regime and his war of aggression against Ukraine;
Amendment 76 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)
Recital C b (new)
C b. whereas even a majority of those Russians in the country and abroad, including the youth, academia members, cultural circles, sportsmen etc., who have access to independent media, e.g. Western ones, choose to reject independent and objective information about Mr Putin's regime and his war of aggression against Ukraine;
Amendment 79 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas since 24 February 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU hasMember States, also using instruments provided by the EU and NATO, have been providing substantial military and budgetary support to make Ukraine capable of defeating the Russia and its proxiesn Federation; whereas the EU has adopted 11 packages of sanctions against Russia to strategically weaken its military capacity; whereas the EU supports the establishment of a special tribunal to prosecute Russia’s leaders and their allies for the crime of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the EU’s financial institutions, together with those of G-7 countries, have frozen the assets and reserves of the Central Bank of Russia in response to Russia’s aggression and these assets should be used to support Ukraine’s reconstruction;
Amendment 79 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas since 24 February 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU hasMember States, also using instruments provided by the EU and NATO, have been providing substantial military and budgetary support to make Ukraine capable of defeating the Russia and its proxiesn Federation; whereas the EU has adopted 11 packages of sanctions against Russia to strategically weaken its military capacity; whereas the EU supports the establishment of a special tribunal to prosecute Russia’s leaders and their allies for the crime of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the EU’s financial institutions, together with those of G-7 countries, have frozen the assets and reserves of the Central Bank of Russia in response to Russia’s aggression and these assets should be used to support Ukraine’s reconstruction;
Amendment 105 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas a decisive Ukrainian victory against the Russian Federation could open a window of opportunity for fundamental political changes in Russia, potentially ledwhich can be driven only by the Russian people and resulting in the fall of the Kremlin regime and the possibility of rupture of the Russian Federation; whereas this may lead to major political transformations in the broader region of Eastern Europe, including Belarus; whereas this scenario, being the most desired one, is not the most likely outcome to happen, as another possibility is Mr Putin being replaced by another dictator; whereas, according to NATO, Russia is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and will remain such in the foreseeable future; whereas another scenario could include the rupture of the Russian Federation, as it happened twice to Russia in the previous century;
Amendment 105 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas a decisive Ukrainian victory against the Russian Federation could open a window of opportunity for fundamental political changes in Russia, potentially ledwhich can be driven only by the Russian people and resulting in the fall of the Kremlin regime and the possibility of rupture of the Russian Federation; whereas this may lead to major political transformations in the broader region of Eastern Europe, including Belarus; whereas this scenario, being the most desired one, is not the most likely outcome to happen, as another possibility is Mr Putin being replaced by another dictator; whereas, according to NATO, Russia is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and will remain such in the foreseeable future; whereas another scenario could include the rupture of the Russian Federation, as it happened twice to Russia in the previous century;
Amendment 113 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
E a. whereas in the previous century the Moscow's empire collapsed twice, and we cannot exclude the possibility that it will happen again in the 21st century, after Russia's imperial impetus will be inevitably deterred in Ukraine;
Amendment 113 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
E a. whereas in the previous century the Moscow's empire collapsed twice, and we cannot exclude the possibility that it will happen again in the 21st century, after Russia's imperial impetus will be inevitably deterred in Ukraine;
Amendment 121 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the EU, its partners and allies should not be afraid of these transformationclosely observe the situation and be prepared for all possible scenarios;
Amendment 121 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the EU, its partners and allies should not be afraid of these transformationclosely observe the situation and be prepared for all possible scenarios;
Amendment 122 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas in recent decades Putin and his Kremlin regime have eradicated any opposition and democratic forces, have been doing everything possible to convince the western democracies that democracy in Russia is not possible; whereas the strategy of liberal democracies should maintain that the Russian nation, like other Eastern European nations (such as Ukraine or Belarus), is aspiring, and is able, to live in a democracRussia's regime is democratic and democracy in Russia has its unique style called 'sovereign democracy' ; whereas so far the Russian nation has not shown any inclinations to change the oppressive governments that were holding the country in their firm grips for decades, and refer to only semi-democratic period in Russia’s modern history under Yeltsin as a very difficult and bad time for the country;
Amendment 122 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas in recent decades Putin and his Kremlin regime have eradicated any opposition and democratic forces, have been doing everything possible to convince the western democracies that democracy in Russia is not possible; whereas the strategy of liberal democracies should maintain that the Russian nation, like other Eastern European nations (such as Ukraine or Belarus), is aspiring, and is able, to live in a democracRussia's regime is democratic and democracy in Russia has its unique style called 'sovereign democracy' ; whereas so far the Russian nation has not shown any inclinations to change the oppressive governments that were holding the country in their firm grips for decades, and refer to only semi-democratic period in Russia’s modern history under Yeltsin as a very difficult and bad time for the country;
Amendment 132 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the EU has to be ready for and help the transformation of Russia into ay future scenarios for Russia and assist the people of Russian Federation on eventual path towards democracy, when such an opportunity arisile making sure that they reject any imperialistic policies, in the near to medium-termcluding the concept of Russkiy Mir;
Amendment 132 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the EU has to be ready for and help the transformation of Russia into ay future scenarios for Russia and assist the people of Russian Federation on eventual path towards democracy, when such an opportunity arisile making sure that they reject any imperialistic policies, in the near to medium-termcluding the concept of Russkiy Mir;
Amendment 138 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Recital H a (new)
H a. whereas any strategy and policy regarding the Russian Federation should take into account the reality of Muscovy’s innate imperialism;
Amendment 138 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Recital H a (new)
H a. whereas any strategy and policy regarding the Russian Federation should take into account the reality of Muscovy’s innate imperialism;
Amendment 140 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas democracy in Russia is the only way to ensure a sustainable peace in Europe oncea realistic approach to Russia, based on strong deterrence and defence, as well as unity among the Transatlantic allies, combined with Ukraine's victory over Russia, is defeated in its war against Ukrainea prerequisite to finally establish a Europe that is whole, free and in peace, which may lead also to positive changes within the Russian Federation;
Amendment 140 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas democracy in Russia is the only way to ensure a sustainable peace in Europe oncea realistic approach to Russia, based on strong deterrence and defence, as well as unity among the Transatlantic allies, combined with Ukraine's victory over Russia, is defeated in its war against Ukrainea prerequisite to finally establish a Europe that is whole, free and in peace, which may lead also to positive changes within the Russian Federation;
Amendment 146 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas Parliament’s recommendation of 16 September 2021 on the direction of EU-Russia political relations1 made recommendations to the EU institutions in six policy directions asking for the adoption of a comprehensive strategy of future relations between the EU and a democratic Russia, which will assist the Russian people in its struggle to have a normal life and transform Russia back into a democracy; , which unfortunately is unlikely and is only one of scenarios that may develop in the future; _________________ 1 OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 170.
Amendment 146 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas Parliament’s recommendation of 16 September 2021 on the direction of EU-Russia political relations1 made recommendations to the EU institutions in six policy directions asking for the adoption of a comprehensive strategy of future relations between the EU and a democratic Russia, which will assist the Russian people in its struggle to have a normal life and transform Russia back into a democracy; , which unfortunately is unlikely and is only one of scenarios that may develop in the future; _________________ 1 OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 170.
Amendment 153 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas the first step of effective assistance to transform Russia into a democracy should be for the EU to establisthe genuine will of the Russian society, which should be supported by the EU through a regular and structured political dialogue with credible Russian democratic forces, on the condition that they openly reject Russian imperialism; whereas the new consultative group launched by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative (VP / HR) in June 2023 between the EU and Belarusian democratic forces and civil society is a good model for such a dialogue in the future when important changes in the Russian society will take place; whereas the example of the Belarusian opposition, with its elected democratic leader, remains unique; whereas the majority of Belarusians do not accept the Kremlin’s aggressions and massively reject the undemocratic system in Belarus and are paying a huge price for their courageous opposition to both dictators; whereas in Russia the society and their anti-Kremlin leaders have not yet demonstrated similar standards on both organizational and political levels, despite more people and resources remaining at the disposal of Russian diaspora; whereas there is no cooperation between Belarusian opposition and those Russians who present themselves as a democratic alternative to Putin, and this is caused by the latter's nationalistic views including on diminishing the value of Belarusian culture, heritage and language;
Amendment 153 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas the first step of effective assistance to transform Russia into a democracy should be for the EU to establisthe genuine will of the Russian society, which should be supported by the EU through a regular and structured political dialogue with credible Russian democratic forces, on the condition that they openly reject Russian imperialism; whereas the new consultative group launched by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative (VP / HR) in June 2023 between the EU and Belarusian democratic forces and civil society is a good model for such a dialogue in the future when important changes in the Russian society will take place; whereas the example of the Belarusian opposition, with its elected democratic leader, remains unique; whereas the majority of Belarusians do not accept the Kremlin’s aggressions and massively reject the undemocratic system in Belarus and are paying a huge price for their courageous opposition to both dictators; whereas in Russia the society and their anti-Kremlin leaders have not yet demonstrated similar standards on both organizational and political levels, despite more people and resources remaining at the disposal of Russian diaspora; whereas there is no cooperation between Belarusian opposition and those Russians who present themselves as a democratic alternative to Putin, and this is caused by the latter's nationalistic views including on diminishing the value of Belarusian culture, heritage and language;
Amendment 157 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital K a (new)
Recital K a (new)
K a. whereas the EU should treat as credible partners only those Russians who condemn Russia's ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine and the war againts Georgia in 2008, accept the right of states to choose their own alliances and reject the concept of Russkij Mir;
Amendment 157 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital K a (new)
Recital K a (new)
K a. whereas the EU should treat as credible partners only those Russians who condemn Russia's ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine and the war againts Georgia in 2008, accept the right of states to choose their own alliances and reject the concept of Russkij Mir;
Amendment 160 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas for in recent monthis purpose on 5-6 June 2023 the largest political groups in the European Parliament organised the first Brussels dialogue conference with the participation of EU policymakers and Russiathere have been numerous initiatives regarding the future of Russia, including dialogue with Russian democratic forces, which until now did not bring any tangible results nor led to increased anti-war activities of numerous Russians in exile residing in democratic forccountries; whereas the outcome of this conference was the launch of a regular Brussels dialogue between the EU and the Russian oppositionre are also numerous initiatives of nations captured by the Russian Federation who continue to struggle for their freedoms;
Amendment 160 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas for in recent monthis purpose on 5-6 June 2023 the largest political groups in the European Parliament organised the first Brussels dialogue conference with the participation of EU policymakers and Russiathere have been numerous initiatives regarding the future of Russia, including dialogue with Russian democratic forces, which until now did not bring any tangible results nor led to increased anti-war activities of numerous Russians in exile residing in democratic forccountries; whereas the outcome of this conference was the launch of a regular Brussels dialogue between the EU and the Russian oppositionre are also numerous initiatives of nations captured by the Russian Federation who continue to struggle for their freedoms;
Amendment 165 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital M
Recital M
M. whereas the EU should take a holistic view of reject naive views about smoothe transformation of Russia into a democracy, which should include a broad array of democracy support measures before and after the change of power in Russia, including the even after Putin's collapse; whereas in the history of Russia there were only few short periods which can be hardly described as democracy- oriented, followed by sudden regress in reforms; notes that even during these short periods the posture of Russia was not free from oppressions against conquered nationes necessarand neighbours, which put into question a possibility to sustain democratic change in Russia over the long term;
Amendment 165 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital M
Recital M
M. whereas the EU should take a holistic view of reject naive views about smoothe transformation of Russia into a democracy, which should include a broad array of democracy support measures before and after the change of power in Russia, including the even after Putin's collapse; whereas in the history of Russia there were only few short periods which can be hardly described as democracy- oriented, followed by sudden regress in reforms; notes that even during these short periods the posture of Russia was not free from oppressions against conquered nationes necessarand neighbours, which put into question a possibility to sustain democratic change in Russia over the long term;
Amendment 172 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital M a (new)
Recital M a (new)
M a. whereas Russia, in its imperial wars of conquest, has seized numerous national treasuries, objects of cultural and religious heritage, including from Poland, Romania, Baltic States and others, and continues such criminal activities in the occupied territories of Ukraine;
Amendment 172 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital M a (new)
Recital M a (new)
M a. whereas Russia, in its imperial wars of conquest, has seized numerous national treasuries, objects of cultural and religious heritage, including from Poland, Romania, Baltic States and others, and continues such criminal activities in the occupied territories of Ukraine;
Amendment 176 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Calls for the EU institutions, in particular, the European External Action Service and the Commission, to prepare and pursue, together wiin close cooperation with Member States, in particular those neighbouring the Russian civil society and democratic forces, a strategy empowering the transformation of Russia into a democracy in the following three timeframes of power changeFederation, as well as like-minded partners worldwide, to closely follow situation in Russia and prepare strategies taking into account three possible scenarios: no changes in Russia even after Putin, rupture of the Russian Federation or advent of democracy in Russia;
Amendment 176 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Calls for the EU institutions, in particular, the European External Action Service and the Commission, to prepare and pursue, together wiin close cooperation with Member States, in particular those neighbouring the Russian civil society and democratic forces, a strategy empowering the transformation of Russia into a democracy in the following three timeframes of power changeFederation, as well as like-minded partners worldwide, to closely follow situation in Russia and prepare strategies taking into account three possible scenarios: no changes in Russia even after Putin, rupture of the Russian Federation or advent of democracy in Russia;
Amendment 180 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Underlines that all the attempts to transform the Russian Federation into a nation state, a civic state or a stable modern state, have failed; therefore urges to take this fact into account when formulating any future strategies towards Russia;
Amendment 180 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Underlines that all the attempts to transform the Russian Federation into a nation state, a civic state or a stable modern state, have failed; therefore urges to take this fact into account when formulating any future strategies towards Russia;
Amendment 184 #
Amendment 184 #
Amendment 186 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – introductory part
Paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. Emphasises that Ukraine’s victory and Russia’s defeat will open a window of opportunity for the transformation of Russia into ashould be followed by the implosion of the current system of the Russian Federation and by the radical transformation of Russia, which are the preconditions to root democracy andin Russia; therefore the EU should strengthen the following policies:
Amendment 186 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – introductory part
Paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. Emphasises that Ukraine’s victory and Russia’s defeat will open a window of opportunity for the transformation of Russia into ashould be followed by the implosion of the current system of the Russian Federation and by the radical transformation of Russia, which are the preconditions to root democracy andin Russia; therefore the EU should strengthen the following policies:
Amendment 193 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point a
Paragraph 2 – point a
(a) timely delivery of weapons to Ukrainetechnologically advanced weapons to Ukraine, including modern fighter jets, helicopters, mounted breaching equipment, missiles and air defence systems;
Amendment 193 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point a
Paragraph 2 – point a
(a) timely delivery of weapons to Ukrainetechnologically advanced weapons to Ukraine, including modern fighter jets, helicopters, mounted breaching equipment, missiles and air defence systems;
Amendment 199 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point b
Paragraph 2 – point b
(b) adoption and implementation of further severe and effective sanction packages against Russia and its allies, especially on oil and gas;
Amendment 199 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point b
Paragraph 2 – point b
(b) adoption and implementation of further severe and effective sanction packages against Russia and its allies, especially on oil and gas;
Amendment 201 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point b a (new)
Paragraph 2 – point b a (new)
(b a) investment in strong deterrence and defence;
Amendment 201 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point b a (new)
Paragraph 2 – point b a (new)
(b a) investment in strong deterrence and defence;
Amendment 207 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point c a (new)
Paragraph 2 – point c a (new)
(c a) developing tools to effectively counter Russian propaganda, including the use of wide range of proxies, such as the Russian Orthodox Church, sport organisations and Russkiy Mir network, all of them subordinated to Russian secret services;
Amendment 207 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point c a (new)
Paragraph 2 – point c a (new)
(c a) developing tools to effectively counter Russian propaganda, including the use of wide range of proxies, such as the Russian Orthodox Church, sport organisations and Russkiy Mir network, all of them subordinated to Russian secret services;
Amendment 211 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point d a (new)
Paragraph 2 – point d a (new)
(d a) support to the independence and sovereignty of Belarus and the democratic aspirations of its people;
Amendment 211 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point d a (new)
Paragraph 2 – point d a (new)
(d a) support to the independence and sovereignty of Belarus and the democratic aspirations of its people;
Amendment 213 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point d b (new)
Paragraph 2 – point d b (new)
(d b) cease all support to all non- democratic regimes within Russia itself, such as the Kadyrov regime in Chechnya, and in other countries, particularly in Belarus, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and other places;
Amendment 213 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point d b (new)
Paragraph 2 – point d b (new)
(d b) cease all support to all non- democratic regimes within Russia itself, such as the Kadyrov regime in Chechnya, and in other countries, particularly in Belarus, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and other places;
Amendment 218 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point e
Paragraph 2 – point e
(e) accession of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova to Euro- Atlantic structures and implementation of security guarantees on their path to full membership;
Amendment 218 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point e
Paragraph 2 – point e
(e) accession of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova to Euro- Atlantic structures and implementation of security guarantees on their path to full membership;
Amendment 223 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. points out that Russia has always regarded any naive efforts of the West, such as the dual-track approach, as signs of weakness and used against some Member States, allowing the Russian Federation to rebuild and strengthen its capabilities and to conduct its imperial policy, thus constituting a direct threat to Euro-Atlantic security;
Amendment 223 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. points out that Russia has always regarded any naive efforts of the West, such as the dual-track approach, as signs of weakness and used against some Member States, allowing the Russian Federation to rebuild and strengthen its capabilities and to conduct its imperial policy, thus constituting a direct threat to Euro-Atlantic security;
Amendment 229 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes that the preparation for the transformation of Russia into a democracy has to be inclusive and be shaped in a regular and structured EU political dialogue with Russian civil society and democratic forcescenturies of authoritarian rule in Russia has deeply rooted it in minds of the Russians and it may take generations to transform Russia into a democracy;
Amendment 229 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes that the preparation for the transformation of Russia into a democracy has to be inclusive and be shaped in a regular and structured EU political dialogue with Russian civil society and democratic forcescenturies of authoritarian rule in Russia has deeply rooted it in minds of the Russians and it may take generations to transform Russia into a democracy;
Amendment 232 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Highlights that any permanent transformation requires a bold debate and reflection about Russia's history, including genocides committed by Moscow in gulags and communist prisons against its citizens and conquered nations; reminds that the renewed attempts to cultivate the Katyn lie in modern times, 70 years after this genocidal act, and falsification and concealment of the truth about other Soviet crimes shows the real intentions of Moscow and have an impact on the entire society; regrets that the policy of rehabilitation of Stalin spearheaded by the former KGB officers who captured power in Moscow, has a broad support of ordinary Russians, who were also among the victims of genocidal policy of Moscow aimed also at Poles, Balts, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Circassians and many other nations who had the misfortune to be under the Russian rule;
Amendment 232 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Highlights that any permanent transformation requires a bold debate and reflection about Russia's history, including genocides committed by Moscow in gulags and communist prisons against its citizens and conquered nations; reminds that the renewed attempts to cultivate the Katyn lie in modern times, 70 years after this genocidal act, and falsification and concealment of the truth about other Soviet crimes shows the real intentions of Moscow and have an impact on the entire society; regrets that the policy of rehabilitation of Stalin spearheaded by the former KGB officers who captured power in Moscow, has a broad support of ordinary Russians, who were also among the victims of genocidal policy of Moscow aimed also at Poles, Balts, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Circassians and many other nations who had the misfortune to be under the Russian rule;
Amendment 234 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3 b. Underlines that the EU must take into account that approval for Joseph Stalin in the Russian population has surged to the highest level in Vladimir Putin's era, with 70 percent of the society claiming that Stalin played a positive role in Russian history; the EU should recognise that this is caused by Putin's policy of "stalinization of mass consciousness" and repressions against independent historians; the EU must insist that Soviet archives are opened for scholars and researchers and that genocidal acts of Stalinists towards Russians, as well as other nations of the Soviet Union and its satellite states, are made public, investigated and condemned, including files of the criminal Augustow Roundup military operation;
Amendment 234 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3 b. Underlines that the EU must take into account that approval for Joseph Stalin in the Russian population has surged to the highest level in Vladimir Putin's era, with 70 percent of the society claiming that Stalin played a positive role in Russian history; the EU should recognise that this is caused by Putin's policy of "stalinization of mass consciousness" and repressions against independent historians; the EU must insist that Soviet archives are opened for scholars and researchers and that genocidal acts of Stalinists towards Russians, as well as other nations of the Soviet Union and its satellite states, are made public, investigated and condemned, including files of the criminal Augustow Roundup military operation;
Amendment 235 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Emphasises that the EU strategy needs to include mechanisms to strengthen its support to civil society and the political opposition and indigenous nations of the Russian Federation, both inside and outside Russiathe country, and to improve Russian democratic forces’ communication with Russian society and societies in liberal democraciearound the globe, while countering Putin’s apround the globpaganda machine;
Amendment 235 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Emphasises that the EU strategy needs to include mechanisms to strengthen its support to civil society and the political opposition and indigenous nations of the Russian Federation, both inside and outside Russiathe country, and to improve Russian democratic forces’ communication with Russian society and societies in liberal democraciearound the globe, while countering Putin’s apround the globpaganda machine;
Amendment 241 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. Underlines that Russian withdrawal from all occupied territories in third countries is a condicio sine qua non of any normalisation in the future;
Amendment 241 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. Underlines that Russian withdrawal from all occupied territories in third countries is a condicio sine qua non of any normalisation in the future;
Amendment 247 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Invites the EU institutions to establish a ‘democracy passpEncourages members of the Russian democratic opposition in exile as well as anti-war civil society activists and diaspora members to step up their anti- war effort’s and special visa arrangements allowing democratic opposition and civil society activists toactivities in the EU member states; underlines however, that genuine transformation and change of the regime cannot be imported from the outside and requires people inside the countinue their work in the EU member states while in exilery to fight for their freedoms and democratic future, as it was the case in many nations subjugated by Moscow in the past, with the recent courageous example of Ukrainians and Belarusians;
Amendment 247 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Invites the EU institutions to establish a ‘democracy passpEncourages members of the Russian democratic opposition in exile as well as anti-war civil society activists and diaspora members to step up their anti- war effort’s and special visa arrangements allowing democratic opposition and civil society activists toactivities in the EU member states; underlines however, that genuine transformation and change of the regime cannot be imported from the outside and requires people inside the countinue their work in the EU member states while in exilery to fight for their freedoms and democratic future, as it was the case in many nations subjugated by Moscow in the past, with the recent courageous example of Ukrainians and Belarusians;
Amendment 256 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2
Subheading 2
The Day Afterrupture of the Russian Federation and prospects for its re-federalization and decolonization
Amendment 256 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2
Subheading 2
The Day Afterrupture of the Russian Federation and prospects for its re-federalization and decolonization
Amendment 268 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – introductory part
Paragraph 6 – introductory part
6. Notes that any democracy-support actions to be implemented immediately after the change of power in Russia have to involve thein view of historical experience and current aspirations of captive nations of the Russian Federation, following milestone conditions that must be accepted by the transitional government of Russia in order for the EU to acknowledge that a real transition towards democracy in Russia is under wayto build a modern state that rejects colonial and imperial past:
Amendment 268 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – introductory part
Paragraph 6 – introductory part
6. Notes that any democracy-support actions to be implemented immediately after the change of power in Russia have to involve thein view of historical experience and current aspirations of captive nations of the Russian Federation, following milestone conditions that must be accepted by the transitional government of Russia in order for the EU to acknowledge that a real transition towards democracy in Russia is under wayto build a modern state that rejects colonial and imperial past:
Amendment 269 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point -a (new)
Paragraph 6 – point -a (new)
(-a) Acknowledges the anti-Western vector of the Russian Federation and underlines the fundamental and systemic incompatibility of the socio-political systems of Russia and the West;
Amendment 269 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point -a (new)
Paragraph 6 – point -a (new)
(-a) Acknowledges the anti-Western vector of the Russian Federation and underlines the fundamental and systemic incompatibility of the socio-political systems of Russia and the West;
Amendment 271 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point -a a (new)
Paragraph 6 – point -a a (new)
-a a being realistic about Russia’s democratic and free market prospects;
Amendment 271 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point -a a (new)
Paragraph 6 – point -a a (new)
-a a being realistic about Russia’s democratic and free market prospects;
Amendment 272 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point -a b (new)
Paragraph 6 – point -a b (new)
-a b start planning for the new geopolitical reality on the territories of the current Russian Federation;
Amendment 272 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point -a b (new)
Paragraph 6 – point -a b (new)
-a b start planning for the new geopolitical reality on the territories of the current Russian Federation;
Amendment 276 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point a
Paragraph 6 – point a
(a) withdrawal of Russian troops from all the occupied territories of Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership countries as well removal of nuclear weapons from the territory of Belarus;
Amendment 276 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point a
Paragraph 6 – point a
(a) withdrawal of Russian troops from all the occupied territories of Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership countries as well removal of nuclear weapons from the territory of Belarus;
Amendment 281 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point a a (new)
Paragraph 6 – point a a (new)
(a a) re-federalisation of the Russian Federation;
Amendment 281 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point a a (new)
Paragraph 6 – point a a (new)
(a a) re-federalisation of the Russian Federation;
Amendment 282 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point a b (new)
Paragraph 6 – point a b (new)
(a b) considers Russia’s pre-forward deployment of and rhetoric surrounding tactical nuclear weapons to be a complete break from responsible nuclear policy and a high risk for disasterous miscalculations;
Amendment 282 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point a b (new)
Paragraph 6 – point a b (new)
(a b) considers Russia’s pre-forward deployment of and rhetoric surrounding tactical nuclear weapons to be a complete break from responsible nuclear policy and a high risk for disasterous miscalculations;
Amendment 284 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point b
Paragraph 6 – point b
(b) release ofand rehabilitate all political prisoners and imprisoned civil society activists;
Amendment 284 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point b
Paragraph 6 – point b
(b) release ofand rehabilitate all political prisoners and imprisoned civil society activists;
Amendment 285 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point b a (new)
Paragraph 6 – point b a (new)
(b a) guaranteeing the rights of minorities, including the rights of the indigenous people and allowing them to cultivate their culture and heritage;
Amendment 285 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point b a (new)
Paragraph 6 – point b a (new)
(b a) guaranteeing the rights of minorities, including the rights of the indigenous people and allowing them to cultivate their culture and heritage;
Amendment 286 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point b b (new)
Paragraph 6 – point b b (new)
(b b) cooperate with representatives and leaders in-exile of nations of the Russian Federation and study their history, culture, economy and aspirations;
Amendment 286 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point b b (new)
Paragraph 6 – point b b (new)
(b b) cooperate with representatives and leaders in-exile of nations of the Russian Federation and study their history, culture, economy and aspirations;
Amendment 287 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point b c (new)
Paragraph 6 – point b c (new)
(b c) work with partners to coordinate a response to these calls for self- determination in a way that is aligned with Europe's interests and is in accordance with international law;
Amendment 287 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point b c (new)
Paragraph 6 – point b c (new)
(b c) work with partners to coordinate a response to these calls for self- determination in a way that is aligned with Europe's interests and is in accordance with international law;
Amendment 289 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point c
Paragraph 6 – point c
(c) restoration of media andfreedom of speech, freedom of assembly and other political freedoms;
Amendment 289 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point c
Paragraph 6 – point c
(c) restoration of media andfreedom of speech, freedom of assembly and other political freedoms;
Amendment 297 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point d
Paragraph 6 – point d
(d) holding of democratic elections according to international standards;
Amendment 297 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point d
Paragraph 6 – point d
(d) holding of democratic elections according to international standards;
Amendment 301 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point d a (new)
Paragraph 6 – point d a (new)
(d a) rejecting imperial and neo- colonial policies;
Amendment 301 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point d a (new)
Paragraph 6 – point d a (new)
(d a) rejecting imperial and neo- colonial policies;
Amendment 302 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point e
Paragraph 6 – point e
(e) paying reparations to Ukraine and to victims of persecution in RussiaRussia's aggressive posture worldwide and return of stolen or appropriated national and cultural treasures belonging to other nations and recompensate for all the damages it has caused during years of occupation;
Amendment 302 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point e
Paragraph 6 – point e
(e) paying reparations to Ukraine and to victims of persecution in RussiaRussia's aggressive posture worldwide and return of stolen or appropriated national and cultural treasures belonging to other nations and recompensate for all the damages it has caused during years of occupation;
Amendment 308 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point f
Paragraph 6 – point f
(f) launch of an accountability agenda which will include prosecution, lustration, vetting and reconciliation processes, as well as the reform of public institutions, in particular in the justice and security sectors, which cannot be succesful without the radical disbanding of security services rooted in the Soviet times and their replacement with new formations subject to transparent democratic oversight;
Amendment 308 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point f
Paragraph 6 – point f
(f) launch of an accountability agenda which will include prosecution, lustration, vetting and reconciliation processes, as well as the reform of public institutions, in particular in the justice and security sectors, which cannot be succesful without the radical disbanding of security services rooted in the Soviet times and their replacement with new formations subject to transparent democratic oversight;
Amendment 313 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point f a (new)
Paragraph 6 – point f a (new)
(f a) open condemnation of all crimes committed by Moscow and opening of all KGB archives;
Amendment 313 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point f a (new)
Paragraph 6 – point f a (new)
(f a) open condemnation of all crimes committed by Moscow and opening of all KGB archives;
Amendment 319 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that theany eventual EU’s support to a transitional government in Russia should be provided in an inclusive manner, encompassing support to pro-democratic political, justice and security elitesdetermined by explicit rejection of imperialism and clear condemnation by to pro-democratic political, intellectuals, grassroots civil society and democratic forces of the hitherto practices of rulers of the Kremlin;
Amendment 319 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that theany eventual EU’s support to a transitional government in Russia should be provided in an inclusive manner, encompassing support to pro-democratic political, justice and security elitesdetermined by explicit rejection of imperialism and clear condemnation by to pro-democratic political, intellectuals, grassroots civil society and democratic forces of the hitherto practices of rulers of the Kremlin;
Amendment 325 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Learn the lessons from the 1990s- 2022 period when Western decision- makers naively hoped for democratic governance and economic reforms in Russia that never materialized;
Amendment 325 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Learn the lessons from the 1990s- 2022 period when Western decision- makers naively hoped for democratic governance and economic reforms in Russia that never materialized;
Amendment 326 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. NoteExpects that the EU should expect a broad coalition of Russian democratic forces in Russia to immediately start work on preparingwork on a new constitutional framework which should be based on the principles of parliamentary democracy and delegation of important decision-making powers to the regions, and that this framework should include the major economic and social reforms Russia needs to facilitate the transition and build a solid basis for sustainable democracy over the long ter; notes that building stable democracy over the long term will not be possible without deimperialization, decolonization and re- fedarlization of Russia; warns against repeating the situation of the 1990s, when optimists hailed Russia’s advances toward democracy and market economics without profound changes in the core structure of the system;
Amendment 326 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. NoteExpects that the EU should expect a broad coalition of Russian democratic forces in Russia to immediately start work on preparingwork on a new constitutional framework which should be based on the principles of parliamentary democracy and delegation of important decision-making powers to the regions, and that this framework should include the major economic and social reforms Russia needs to facilitate the transition and build a solid basis for sustainable democracy over the long ter; notes that building stable democracy over the long term will not be possible without deimperialization, decolonization and re- fedarlization of Russia; warns against repeating the situation of the 1990s, when optimists hailed Russia’s advances toward democracy and market economics without profound changes in the core structure of the system;
Amendment 340 #
Amendment 340 #
Amendment 342 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 – introductory part
Paragraph 9 – introductory part
9. Notes that the long-term strategy to support and sustain political and socio- economic reforms in Russia has to be drafted and published bybased on realistic scenarios and situation on the ground; underlines theat EU without delay accompanied by the draft of a new generation EU agreement with a prospective democratic Russia, which should include the followinghas to be ready to start working on such strategy only when it will be clear that democratic changes in Russia will take place, and until then to work closely with like- minded allies, most notably NATO, on containing possible further Russian aggressive moves and closely watching ongoing trends and changes in the country:
Amendment 342 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 – introductory part
Paragraph 9 – introductory part
9. Notes that the long-term strategy to support and sustain political and socio- economic reforms in Russia has to be drafted and published bybased on realistic scenarios and situation on the ground; underlines theat EU without delay accompanied by the draft of a new generation EU agreement with a prospective democratic Russia, which should include the followinghas to be ready to start working on such strategy only when it will be clear that democratic changes in Russia will take place, and until then to work closely with like- minded allies, most notably NATO, on containing possible further Russian aggressive moves and closely watching ongoing trends and changes in the country:
Amendment 346 #
Amendment 346 #
Amendment 349 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 – point a a (new)
Paragraph 9 – point a a (new)
(a a) acknowledge the limits of Western influence to create a democratized Russia;
Amendment 349 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 – point a a (new)
Paragraph 9 – point a a (new)
(a a) acknowledge the limits of Western influence to create a democratized Russia;
Amendment 350 #
Amendment 350 #
Amendment 352 #
Amendment 352 #
Amendment 354 #
Amendment 354 #
Amendment 357 #
Amendment 357 #
Amendment 360 #
Amendment 360 #
Amendment 363 #
Amendment 363 #
Amendment 371 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9 a. regrets that EU institutions as well as many Member States lack the historical knowledge about the imperial posture of Russia which dates as far back as Muscovy, which is one of the causes of wrong and sometimes detrimental policies towards Russia, despite numerous warnings over the years from many politicians and members of academia from Central and Eastern European coutries; encourages the EU institutions to engage with them more closely when working on future policies regarding Russia;
Amendment 371 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9 a. regrets that EU institutions as well as many Member States lack the historical knowledge about the imperial posture of Russia which dates as far back as Muscovy, which is one of the causes of wrong and sometimes detrimental policies towards Russia, despite numerous warnings over the years from many politicians and members of academia from Central and Eastern European coutries; encourages the EU institutions to engage with them more closely when working on future policies regarding Russia;
Amendment 373 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9 b. takes into account that whoever will replace Putin may be in the end just as nationalistic and authoritarian; therefore advises to stop hoping for a “moderate” Russian leader who wants peace with his neighbors and reforms at home to govern the country without deep structural changes in the system of the Russian Federation,
Amendment 373 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9 b. takes into account that whoever will replace Putin may be in the end just as nationalistic and authoritarian; therefore advises to stop hoping for a “moderate” Russian leader who wants peace with his neighbors and reforms at home to govern the country without deep structural changes in the system of the Russian Federation,
Amendment 375 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 c (new)
Paragraph 9 c (new)
9 c. emphasizes that even if a group of moderate leaders somehow emerges within Russia, in the long term, significant number of Russians will never abandon its imperial ideology;
Amendment 375 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 c (new)
Paragraph 9 c (new)
9 c. emphasizes that even if a group of moderate leaders somehow emerges within Russia, in the long term, significant number of Russians will never abandon its imperial ideology;
Amendment 377 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission, the VP / HR, governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Eastern Partnership countries and the G7 countries, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the authorities of the Russian Federation.
Amendment 377 #
2023/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission, the VP / HR, governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Eastern Partnership countries and the G7 countries, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the authorities of the Russian Federation.
Amendment 47 #
2023/2107(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas the EU and Japan have both committed to climate neutrality by 2050; whereas the climate neutrality objective cannot be reached without an active cooperation between the EU, Japan and other partners, aimed at deterring China from increasing its emissions, in a current global context where China emits more carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases than EU and Japan together;
Amendment 60 #
2023/2107(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital M a (new)
Recital M a (new)
Ma. whereas NATO and Japan work together bilaterally on a range of common security challenges such as cyber defence, new technologies and maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region;
Amendment 69 #
2023/2107(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Acknowledges the fundamental role of the EU-Japan economic partnership agreement and the EU-Japan SPA in the relationship; encourages the remaining three EU Member States that have not yet done so to ratify the SPA; calls for the full implementation of both agreements; welcomes the development of an increasingly dense network of bilateral dialogues, consultations, memoranda and agreements with the annual EU-Japan Summit at the centre; welcomes also ever closer relations between Japan and individual EU Member States;
Amendment 80 #
2023/2107(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Observes with interest Japan’s efforts to promote a stable architecture in the Indo-Pacific, for instance through its participation in the Quad, its engagement with Pacific island states or the recent Camp David Agreement with Korea and the US; continues to noterecognizes Japan’s concerns about North Korea, notably regarding threats emerging from DPRK's ballistic missile launches and development of nuclear weapons; intends to continuously cooperate with Japan in order to oppose China’s aggressive policies towards its neighbours; shares Japan’s position that Taiwan is an important partner and a precious friend; shares, further, Japan’s high regard for the Association of Southeas Asian Nations (ASEAN); welcomes the fact that some new vice-ministerial formats also include the EU (in groupings such as Japan/Australia/Korea/EU and Japan/Korea/US/EU);
Amendment 113 #
2023/2107(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Welcomes Japan's tough stance against Russia since the beginning of the war of agression against Ukraine; commends Japan for its commitment to intensify its diplomatic, financial, humanitarian and other support for Ukraine and for establishing restrictive measures against Russia, in line with G7;
Amendment 124 #
2023/2107(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Regrets the fact thatEmphasises the importance of the EU-Japan Green Alliance of 2021 still remains a largely unfulfilled promise, and stresses the importance of deterring PRC from increasing its emissions, as China’s emissions have returned to record levels in 2023, which makes it the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gas and the emitter of 27% of the world’s carbon dioxide ; notes that Japan has committed to releasing water from the Fukushima power plant only on the basis of scientific standards, transparency and independent supervision; hopes for a more proactive Japanese role on loss and damage, as well as climate finance, at the 28th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 28);
Amendment 18 #
2023/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (EPCAs) are new-generation agreements that are the cornerstone of the EU’s engagement with Central Asia; whereas the EPCA entered into full force on 1 March 2020 following its ratification by all Member States and should be periodically reviewed;
Amendment 19 #
2023/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas on 28 March 2023, the European Union’s Special Envoy on Sanctions called on the countries in the region to avoid assisting Moscow’s attempts to evade sanctions imposed on Russia over its was of aggression against Ukraine;
Amendment 20 #
2023/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its disastrous ideologically-driven agricultural policy and water management systems, the region has been greatly affected by environmental disasters intensified by climate change, affecting water resources; whereas reckless water mismanagement and pollution of major rivers for irrigation of cotton fields resulting in ineffective use and exploitation of water resources in the region, initiated by the Soviet regime and largely continued in the modern era, affecting the six countries of the region, has resulted in the almost complete disappearance of the Aral Sea and many of its sub-basins, exposing the vulnerable populations of the region to catastrophic health, environmental and social problems as well as affecting various sectors of economy;
Amendment 25 #
2023/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Recital D b (new)
Db. whereas in Central Asia there are well grounded fears of radicalisation, growing extremism, and a terrorist threat, with a very high number of former ISIS fighters returning to the region and a dire security situation in Afghanistan; whereas this threat was used by the Kazakh authorities as an excuse to invite CSTO forces under Russian lead and legitimize the violent crackdown;
Amendment 50 #
2023/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Recognises that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its implications present both challenges and opportunities for the Central Asian states, which have traditionally maintained close relations with Russiaafter decades of Russian rule, in 1991 regained their independence; highlights that after years of forced Russification and Sovietization, we witness a rapid renewal of traditional cultures and unique heritage, with the most symbolic decisions to detach themselves from Moscow by gradual shifts to a Latin alphabet; expresses deep concern about Central Asian states’ circumvention of EU sanctions against Russia, which are intended to stop the war in Ukraine; calls on the authorities of the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, to cooperate closely with the EU, in particular its Sanctions Envoy; in order to intensify their efforts to prevent sanctions circumvention; condemns the procedure of recruiting of Central Asian migrants and citizens by Russia to fight in Ukraine and supports actions aimed at halting it;
Amendment 76 #
2023/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Notes the Central Asian states’ long-standing close relations with Afghanistan and their evolving pragmatic engagement with the Taliban, which they nevertheless do not recognise, since the takeover in 2021; underlines that countries of the region, in particular Pakistan and China, but also the Central Asian states, play a key role in ensuring stability in Afghanistan through the provision of humanitarian aid, electricity, trade opportunities and joint connectivity projects; encourages the EU Special Envoy for Afghanistan to continue cooperating closely with counterparts in the Central Asian states as part of the EU- Central Asia dialogue on Afghanistan; recognises that Central Asia is a crucial area for containing religious extremism, terrorism and drug trafficking networks and faces increased migratory pressure due to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan;
Amendment 113 #
2023/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Underlines that the EU should capitalise on its positive image in Central Asia by engaging in more cultural and public diplomacy; advocates for strengthening ties and increasing opportunities for collaboration between European and Central Asian institutions and fostering people-to-people contact and mobility, offering opportunities in education and science through the Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 programmes and increasing tourism;
Amendment 3 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 a (new)
Citation 5 a (new)
– having regard to the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries (2021/0406(COD)),
Amendment 4 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 b (new)
Citation 5 b (new)
– having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy (2021/2037(INI)), inter alia aimed at strengthening the EU’s `trade toolbox` to help mitigate the current disproportioned bilateral economic and trade relations between China and the EU,
Amendment 8 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
Citation 8 a (new)
– having regard to the embargo imposed by China on Lithuania in December 2021, following the approval of the establishment of a representative office of Taiwan in Vilnius,
Amendment 16 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 11 a (new)
Citation 11 a (new)
– having regard to the Critical Raw Materials Act proposed by the Commission on 16 March 2023 (COM(2023) 160),
Amendment 22 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas pursuant to the international commitments undertaken in the WTO, in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and in the trade and investment agreements concluded with third countries, it is possible for the EU and the Member States to adopt restrictive measures relating to foreign direct investment on the grounds of security or public order, subject to certain requirements;
Amendment 23 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)
Recital C b (new)
Cb. whereas the three largest Chinese shareholders in European ports have assets in almost half the ports (14 out of 29) that are located either close to naval bases or provide logistical support to NATO forces, highly increasing the risk of espionage;
Amendment 34 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas China is involved in constructing EU-funded infrastructure in different EU Member States;
Amendment 37 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)
Recital E b (new)
Amendment 38 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E c (new)
Recital E c (new)
Ec. whereas the Chinese government has demonstrated that it is willing to weaponize its overwhelming control of global rare earth supplies to obtain political concessions;
Amendment 65 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Underlines that PRC projects power overseas by using a network of commercial ports and dual-use facilities that provide logistics and intelligence support to the Chinese navy; notes that in 2022, Chinese companies owned or operated terminals in 96 ports across 53 countries; further notes that in at least 9 ports, two of which in Europe, PLAN warships have undergone significant repairs or maintenance for vessels and equipment; points out that naval visits reveal areas of influence, prioritised operational zones, intelligence collection objectives and cooperation priorities;
Amendment 74 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Emphasises that 98% of EU’s demand for rare earths is being met by the PRC, and that the EU is also reliant on China for solar panels, clean technology, cars, and pharmaceutical technology; underlines the importance of reshoring, using various ways to encourage it, such as financial incentives, innovation policies, industrial policies, trade policies, environmental policies or monetary policies;
Amendment 90 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Stresses that the EU and NATO must work together to develop a long-term plan to counter China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy in Europe;
Amendment 112 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission’s proposals and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF and to find alternatives for Chinese-financed projects in the EU;
Amendment 119 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Calls on the Commission to establish a regulatory framework and additional security standards for Chinese suppliers of 5G and 6G networks;
Amendment 134 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Stresses the importance of tracking and assessing China’s access to critical infrastructure in the EU, as well as strengthening FDI-screening procedures with due-diligence standards to identify China’s leverage on investors in critical infrastructure;
Amendment 136 #
2023/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)
Paragraph 13 b (new)
13b. Underlines the need to coordinate critical-infrastructure protection at EU and national levels; considers that responsibility for protecting critical infrastructure ultimately lies with Member States, which should enact critical-infrastructure protection regulations consistent with those in force at EU level;
Amendment 6 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 b (new)
Citation 2 b (new)
– having regard to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction,
Amendment 7 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)
Citation 2 a (new)
– having regard to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2170 as adopted on 15 August 2014 and Resolution 2254 as adopted on 18 December 2015,
Amendment 25 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the Geneva and Astana processes have failed to bring an end to the conflict and establish an inclusive transitional governing body, given the continued refusal of the Syrian regime to negotiate seriously a credible political solution with the opposition;
Amendment 33 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas since 2011 half a million Syrians have died and 14 million have been displacedforced to flee their homes due to violent attacks by armed and terrorist groups, but mainly as a result of the fierce repression by the Syrian regime, with the help of its allies, of its own people; whereas this repression has included the repeated use of chemical weapons, incendiary bombs, barrel bombs, missiles and conventional aerial bombardments on civilians; whereas at least 150 000 Syrians are missing after being captured and placed in the regime’s concentration-camp system and families have still not been informed of the fate of their loved ones;
Amendment 35 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas since 2011, more than 14 million Syrians have been forced to flee their homes and more than 6.8 million remain internally displaced in their own country; whereas approximately 5.5 million Syrian refugees live in neighbouring countries, such as Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt; whereas an irresponsible and unlawful pressure to open borders under Merkel's policy "Wir schaffen das!” has led to weakening of Europe's security and encouraged further weaponisation of migration; whereas the EU should continue the policy of helping refugees in the region, further supporting neighbouring countries; whereas robust support should be expected from wealthy Arab countries in the region;
Amendment 38 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)
Recital C b (new)
Cb. whereas the OPCW has blamed Damascus for a series of chemical attacks during the civil war;
Amendment 40 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C g (new)
Recital C g (new)
Cg. whereas Syria is ranked 175 out of 180 on Reporters Without Borders' press freedom index; whereas at least 300 professional and non-professional journalists have been killed since 2011;
Amendment 41 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Recital B b (new)
Bb. whereas the regime, through ethnic cleansing, conducted a brutal policy to change the country's demographic makeup; whereas Christians in Syria made up about 10% of the pre- war Syrian population, the brutality of the war caused a mass exodus of Christians; whereas 2.2 million Christians lived in Syria prior to the war and now approximately under 640 000 remain; whereas Christians in Syria have been persecuted by ISIS and other Islamist militias as well as the Syrian regime; whereas the Assad regime has attempted to project an image as a secular protector of Christians in Syria, the regime reportedly intentionally destroyed churches and detained at least hundreds of Christian citizens; whereas the regime, with the active support of the Russian Federation, besieged and completely decimated Aleppo, the largest Christian populated city in the country; whereas the country was ranked as the 12th most difficult place in the world to be a Christian;
Amendment 44 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas authoritarian foreign actors, including Russia, and Iran with their proxies - the Wagner militia, and Hezbollah and Iran-, have played a destructive role for the country since 2011, and; whereas Syria serves as a testing ground for Russia, practising and demonstrating its military capabilities, tactics, logistical reach as well as capacity for foreign military intervention to save a beleaguered allied regime; whereas the Syrian regime does not control the whole of national territory and can remain in power only with brutality and the support of these foreign actors;
Amendment 48 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas, since Hamas' brutal attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, Iran-backed militias in Syria have increased firing drones and rockets at Israel and US and international forces in north-eastern Syria; whereas Syrian airports have been used by Iran to transport weapons from Iran and Iraq to Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon, but also assisting Iran to supply weapons to Hamas; whereas at the same time while supporting Hamas, the regime has murdered thousands of Syrian Palestinians and refugees;
Amendment 55 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas there are several investigations and prosecutions of serious crimes committed in Syria, based on the principle of universal jurisdiction, giving some hope in the struggle for justice and accountability for acts of torture, crimes against humanity or war crimes in Syria;
Amendment 56 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C e (new)
Recital C e (new)
Ce. whereas France has issued an international arrest warrant for Syrian dictator Bashar Al-Assad, Bashar Al- Assad's brother Maher, the de-facto chief of a Syrian elite military unit, and two armed forces generals, accused of complicity in crimes against humanity over chemical attacks in 2013;
Amendment 57 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C c (new)
Recital C c (new)
Cc. whereas Russia and China have vetoed Western and Arab countries' sponsored resolutions on Syria at the UN Security Council, to prevent possible sanctions and military intervention, thereby shielding the Syrian regime from accountability for its war crimes;
Amendment 58 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C d (new)
Recital C d (new)
Cd. whereas the regime in Syria has supported Russia's invasion of Ukraine and recognised the occupied Luhansk and Donetsk region in eastern Ukraine; whereas in March 2022, Syria was the only Middle Eastern country and one of five in the world to vote against UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 of 18 March 2022, denouncing the Russian invasion of Ukraine and demanding a full withdrawal of Russian forces; whereas in July 2022, Syria announced that it would break relations with Ukraine, in response to a similar move by Ukraine;
Amendment 59 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C e (new)
Recital C e (new)
Ce. whereas Russia claims that it has sent over 63 000 Russian personnel since 2015, including special forces, military advisors, air force personnel and private military contractors like the Wagner Group, to support and protect the Assad regime from collapse; whereas Russia has consistently committed war crimes in Syria, including the bombing of medical facilities and civilian areas and the use of indiscriminate weapons; whereas Russia's military footprint in the country consist of two main bases: the Khmeimim Air Base and a naval base in Tartus, and more than a hundred smaller military sites across the country; whereas Russia is the largest supplier of weapons to the Assad regime amounting to billions of Euros in sales;
Amendment 60 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the territory of Syria has served as a safe haven for terrorist groups including PKK, officially listed by the EU as a terrorist organisation, planning and executing terror attacks on Türkiye; whereas, as a result, Türkiye is engaging in large-scale armed conduct on Syrian territory on a regular basis;
Amendment 67 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas ISIS committed crimes against humanity, including genocide, in the territories temporarily under its control prior to the intervention of the international coalntinues to commit gross, systematic abuses of human rights and violations of international law, including crimes against humanity and genocide, through indiscriminate killing and deliberate targeting of civilians, mass executions and extrajudicial killings, persecution of individuals and entire communities on the basis of their identity, kidnapping of civilians, forced displacement of Shia communities and minority groups, killing and maiming of children, rape and other forms of sexual violence, along with numerous other atrocitiones;
Amendment 72 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B d (new)
Recital B d (new)
Bd. whereas in 2014 the United States announced the formation of a broad international coalition to defeat The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), consisting of 86 coalition members, who committed themselves to the goals of: providing military support to partners, impeding the flow of foreign fighters, stopping financing and funding of ISIS, addressing humanitarian crises in the region and exposing the true nature of jihadist movements;
Amendment 89 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas the Syrian statregime is not sufficiently addressing the basic needs of the Syrian people, the country’s economic situation is extremely precarious and Syria has turned into a narco-state, further destabilising the region;
Amendment 90 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Recital J a (new)
Ja. whereas countries in the region have banned the import of fruits and vegetables from Lebanon to seek to crack down on the Captagon drug smuggling; whereas Europe has become both a destination but also a popular transit hub for Captagon, and according to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction over a million tablets and almost two thousand kilograms of Captagon have been seized in Europe since 2018; whereas in April 2023, the EU sanctioned 25 individuals and eight entities in Syria for their involvement in the trafficking of narcotics;
Amendment 112 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
(ca) communicate to those countries and societies, whose capitals seek to normalise relations with the Assad regime, the human costs of the atrocities and war crimes committed by the regime;
Amendment 123 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e
Paragraph 1 – point e
(e) stress that the policies of the regime as well as repression, negligence and corruption on the part of the regime are responsible for the economic situation, not the targeted sanctions from the EU against individuals and entities involved in the repression;
Amendment 131 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point h
Paragraph 1 – point h
(h) deplore the continuand counter the continued and even expanded presence on Syrian territory of hundreds of Iranian and Russian bases and militias; express concern about the economic exploitation of the country by predatory foreign powers;
Amendment 133 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i
Paragraph 1 – point i
(i) condemn the attacks by Turkish forces and their occupation of Syrian territories in the northnote that Türkiye, is the most affected NATO Ally by the conflict in Syria, which has suffered the most terrorist attacks, and which hosts millions of refugees; recognise that Turkish operations to combat threats from across the border and Turkish military presence on the Syrian territories should not only meet Türkiye's security concerns but also be aligned with international law and U.N. resolutions; express their deep concern about the persistence of radical Islamist oppositionmilitias and terrorist groups in Idlib province; support the continuation of the international coalition against the Islamic State, which remains active in Syria despite significant defeats;
Amendment 141 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
(ia) track, dismantle and prosecute members of the jihadist networks which campaigned, radicalised, recruited, transferred and commanded over five thousand foreign fighters from Europe to Syria and Iraq;
Amendment 142 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
(ga) continue to support the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS in terms of political, financial, operational and logistical means;
Amendment 150 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point k
Paragraph 1 – point k
(k) urgnote that it is up to the Member States to continuedecide whether to repatriatinge their nationals from the Al- Hol and Roj jihadist prison camps and to try them at home for the crimes they have committed abroad in Syria;
Amendment 159 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point l
Paragraph 1 – point l
(l) step up efforts to counter Russian and Iranian disinformation about Syria, including disinformation in Arabic;
Amendment 162 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point h b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point h b (new)
(hb) strongly condemn the launching of drones and rockets from Syrian territory towards Israel and stress that Syria should not be dragged into a regional war by Iran;
Amendment 170 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point m
Paragraph 1 – point m
(m) stress that the fight against impunity in Syria is a moral and political imperative for Europethe international community; welcome the judicial progress made by the Franco- German Joint Investigation Team regarding the 11 000 bodies of torture victims identified in the César report, the suspension of Syria from the International Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the progress made in Germany, France and Sweden in bringing Syrian criminals to justice;
Amendment 171 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point m a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point m a (new)
(ma) support attempts to bring the leadership of the Syrian regime to justice; welcome an international arrest warrant for Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and his inner circle issued by France for their complicity in crimes against humanity over chemical attacks in 2013;
Amendment 173 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n
Paragraph 1 – point n
(n) condemn the irresponsible policy of open borders "Wir schaffen das" which brought to the EU thousands of unverified people, including war criminals and terrorists, thus weakening Europe's security, as demonstrated in the tragic terrorist attacks of Paris and Brussels - both with links to Syria; urge that information be exchanged automatically between all Member States on war criminals whose asylum applications are rejected under Article 1(F) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees;
Amendment 177 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point n a (new)
(na) commend the work of journalists, bloggers and individuals as well as organisations, such as the White Helmets, who, despite the brutality of the regime, continue to carry out their work in the country, informing the international community, supporting victims on the ground and maintaining focus on the future of the country;
Amendment 179 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point o
Paragraph 1 – point o
(o) call for the pooling of expertise and interpreters among the judicial and police authorities, and for a public prosecutor to be appointed in each Member State for crimes against humanityto ensure an exchange of best practices between Member States and third country law enforcement, judges and prosecutors, to effectively prosecute the crimes against humanity committed by the Syrian regime; call for European scholarships to be specifically allocated to Syrians seeking legal training;
Amendment 185 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point p
Paragraph 1 – point p
(p) call on Member States to establish a European fund for victims of crimes against humanity in Syria, by developing a legal framework allowing the transfer to families of the victims funds frozen for being linked to property unlawfully acquired by the Syrian regime as well as wealth plundered by Assad and his accomplices;
Amendment 187 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point p a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point p a (new)
(pa) recognise the ongoing threat of looted art and illicit trafficking in cultural goods by both the Assad regime and ISIS carried out in Syria; urge the EU's action plan against trafficking in cultural goods to be strengthened along with third country cooperation to ensure that cultural goods are protected, removed from the black market, and are repatriated to the countries of origin when the conditions permit; recognise that the illicit trafficking of cultural goods remains a principle source of revenue for ISIS and the regime;
Amendment 199 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point d a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point d a (new)
(da) invite wealthy countries from the region to intensify their humanitarian efforts for refugees fleeing from the brutality of Assad's war;
Amendment 214 #
2023/2052(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point u
Paragraph 1 – point u
(u) recall that Syria cannot be regarded, in whole or in part,note that some Member States have recognised Syria as a safe country for the return of its nationals living as refugees in Europe,; however highlight that some people who have fled the crimes of the regime andstill may risk torture and enforced disappearance if they return to Syria and those cases require particularly thorough examination;
Amendment 1 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)
Citation 1 a (new)
– having regard to declaration of independence of Belarus from the Soviet Union on August 25, 1991,
Amendment 2 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 b (new)
Citation 1 b (new)
– having regard to Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic on July 27, 1990,
Amendment 3 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 c (new)
Citation 1 c (new)
– having regard to Belavezha Accords ratified on December 10 1991 by the Supreme Council of Belarus which proclaimed the Soviet Union had ceased to exist,
Amendment 4 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 d (new)
Citation 1 d (new)
– having regard to The Constitution of the Republic of Belarus on March 15, 1994,
Amendment 5 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2
Citation 2
– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to all, the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and to all other human rights conventions to which Belarus is a party,
Amendment 7 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)
Citation 2 a (new)
– having regard to The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Amendment 9 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 b (new)
Citation 2 b (new)
– having regard to The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances,
Amendment 11 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6
Citation 6
– having regard to the statement by High Representative Josep Borrell of 3 March 2023 on the sentencing of Ales Bialiatski and other Human Rights Defenders and of the statement by High Representative Josep Borrell of 17 January 2023 on the trial against Andrzej Poczobut - a journalist and member of the board of independent Union of Poles of Belarus,
Amendment 12 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 7 a (new)
Citation 7 a (new)
– having regard he United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC, also called the Palermo Convention) of 15 November 2000,
Amendment 13 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 7 b (new)
Citation 7 b (new)
– having regard The Council of Europe's Group of Experts on Action Against Human Trafficking (GRETA) second evaluation report on the implementation of the Council of Europe Anti-trafficking Convention by Belarus adopted on 28 June 2022,
Amendment 20 #
2023/2041(INI)
A. whereas almost three years after the so-called elections on 9 August 2020, the Belarusian authorities are continuexacerbating their repression against the Belarusian people; whereas more than 50 000 Belarusians have been illegally arrested and tortured, with more than 1 5700 persons remain imprisoned on political grounds andadmitting to be imprisoned on political grounds while thousands of others are forced with torture not to admit of having such status; whereas this number includes such vulnerable categories as: women, minors, elderly 60+, disabled, with severe or chronic diseases, with mental health problems, with three or more children, families where both parents are in prison; whereas in detention, they face tortures, isolation from other inmates, arbitrary punishments, and medical and legal help deprivation, it resulted in the death of political prisoners - Vitold Ashurak, Dzmitry Dudoits, Aliaksandr Vikhor, Mikalai Klimovicz and recently Dzmitryj Sarokin; whereas only in the recent years around 300 000 have left the country for fear of a similar fate;
Amendment 27 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights report on the situation in Belarus compares repression to atrocities against humanity; whereas, according to S.Tshihanouskaya 18,000 pieces of sufficient evidence were collected to launch a preliminary investigation against Lukashenka’s regime, and an international arrest warrant for Alexandr Lukashenka and his accomplices should be issued in order to seek criminal accountability for their atrocities;
Amendment 34 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas international community, including the EU and its Member States did not recognise the results of the presidential election and do not recognise Aliaksandr Lukashenka as president of Belarus;
Amendment 37 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the Lukashenka regime is dangerously undermining the sovereignty of Belarus by deepening Belarus’ integration into the Union State with Russiaallowing and actively participating in creeping annexation by the Russian Federation; whereas the regime allows the Russian security forces and military contingent and bases on its territory to be present in such numbers as to make the risk of direct occupation extremely high;
Amendment 49 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the Belarusian authoritiesLukashenka regime actively supports and haves become accomplices in Russia’s unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the regime is directly enabling and supporting the Russian military aggression against Ukraine, inter alia, by allowing Russia to attack Ukraine, including through the launching of ballistic missiles from Belarusian territory, enabling the stationing and transport of Russian military personnel, the storing, supplying and transport of military equipment and weapons, including heavy weapons, by allowing Russian military aircraft to fly from and over Belarusian airspace into Ukraine and by providing refuelling points;
Amendment 59 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas at least 2150 Ukrainian children have been forcibly deported to Belarus with the Dubrava camp owned by Belaruskali served as a primary destination;
Amendment 61 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Recital D b (new)
Db. whereas the Lukashenka regime continues to organise smuggling of people and illegal border crossings by undocumented migrants as tool of a hybrid war against the EU, which preceded and still accompany the escalation of war in Ukraine which caused a wave of refugees who seek shelter on the EU’s territory;
Amendment 67 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas a political prisoner and an activist of European Belarus civil campaign Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk had to renounce her Belarusian citizenship in protest against the torturous conditions she faces while being incarcerated; whereas Sharenda-Panasiuk filed a formal application to give up her Belarusian citizenship and was escorted to undergo a psychiatric examination, her location has been unknown since;
Amendment 70 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)
Recital E b (new)
Eb. whereas in recent months the Belarusian authorities have dramatically increased the pressure and cruel mistreatment of political prisoners; whereas the lives of a number of political prisoners are in imminent danger;
Amendment 71 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E c (new)
Recital E c (new)
Amendment 74 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the Belarusian democratic forces led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya have a well-established and internationally recognised structure, including the recent formation of the United Transitional Cabinet and the openCoordination Council, which was recognised by the European Parliament in 2020 as an interim representation of the people demanding democratic changes in Belarus, that is open to all political and social stakeholders and the establishing of the Mission of Democratic Belarus in Brussels;
Amendment 81 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and the leaders of democratic political parties have publicly declared their support for the European choice of new Belarus;
Amendment 83 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)
Recital F b (new)
Fb. whereas Lukashenka continues his policy of russification of Belarus, with strategic line towards marginalization and destruction of manifestations of national identity of Belarusians, including language and culture, by arbitrary arrests, detentions, and especially brutal treatment of cultural figures - writers, artists, musicians, and in general people who speak Belarusian on public, banning of national and historical symbols of Belarus such as white-red-white flag and Pahonia, closure of publishing houses, private schools and Belarusian language courses;
Amendment 84 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F c (new)
Recital F c (new)
Fc. whereas the Lukashenka regime continues to discriminate against national and religious minorities by persecutions of their leaders including Andrzej Poczobut, closure of educational institutions for Polish and Lithuanian minorities eliminating education in their national languages and destruction of Polish memorial cemeteries to violate the freedom of religion or belief and to repress religious communities and individuals; whereas numerous Roman Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox and Greek Catholic priests and pastors have been subjected to various forms of persecution, ranging from fines to lengthy imprisonment;
Amendment 85 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F d (new)
Recital F d (new)
Fd. whereas the former Archbishop of Grodno, Artemy (Kishchanka), who was the only hierarch of the Moscow- subordinate Belarusian Orthodox Church - the Belarusian Exarchate - to condemn the violence used by Aliaksandr Lukashenka's regime against peaceful protesters in 2020, died on 22 April, on Orthodox Easter Saturday; whereas the attempts of Metropolitan Benjamin to pacify Archbishop Artemy were not successful, he was "sent" into retirement with the diplomatic wording "for health reasons"; whereas after the so-called retirement, he was subjected to harassment, which affected his state of health;
Amendment 86 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F e (new)
Recital F e (new)
Fe. whereas, following the regime's denunciation of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Belarusians are left with practically no means of international protection: neither the Human Rights Council nor the European Court of Human Rights consider the complaints of Belarusians;
Amendment 107 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Condemns in the strongest terms the unabated repression and the systematic and widespread human rights violations committed by the Lukashenka regime, including manifold cases of mistreatment and torture of political prisoners; continues to stand in solidarity with the brave people of Belarus who stand up for a sovereign, free and democratic Belarus where justice, peace and human rights prevail, risking their freedom and lives;
Amendment 112 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Urges the Belarusian regime to end this spiral of violence, torture and repression against dissenting voices and perceived critics, to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners and all persons arbitrarily detained, and to engage in a genuine dialogueincluding relatives of democratic movement members taken as hostages, and to engage in the negotiations with representatives of the democratic forces and civil society in order to find a way out of the current political crisis through the organisation of free and fair elections to be organised under international observation led by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe;
Amendment 120 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Demands that the Lukashenka regime immediately guarantee proper medical supervision of the health of political prisoners and the possibility of independent international medical commissions to have access to them; in particular calls on the IRC to intensify its support for oppressed Belarusians, demands an independent investigation and expert report into the deaths of political prisoners which prove that Lukashenka's prisons are an instrument of killing;
Amendment 124 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Underlines that the usurper Lukashenka and his entourage should be removed from power and put to trial for their crimes against the people of Belarus; calls for the Member States and the EU to take all necessary action in international institutions and proceedings and at the International Criminal Court or other appropriate international tribunals or courts to support the investigation and prosecution, in relation to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, of the actions of those politically responsible in Belarus, in particular Aliaksandr Lukashenka, as war crimes and crimes against humanity;
Amendment 125 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 c (new)
Paragraph 2 c (new)
2c. Demands that Aliaksandr Lukashenka, the dictator of Belarus, who has been importing migrants and assisting their illegal crossing of the Polish and Lithuanian borders since 2021, should be sought by Interpol and other international institutions and tried for human smuggling at an international court, such as the International Court of Justice;
Amendment 127 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Reiterates that the Lukashenka regime’s unilateral withdrawal from the Eastern Partnership policy, announced on 28 January 2021, has no legitimacy as it does not reflect the true will of the Belarusian people; calls on the EU institutions to invite to their meetings Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, a legitimate representative of Belarus people; welcomes upcoming signing of the Agreement of Cooperation between EP and the Democratic forces of Belarus;
Amendment 143 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Denounces politically motivated ‘show trials’ aimed at instilling fear in representatives and supporters of the democratic forces, civil society, independent media, free trade unions and human rights defenders, religious communities and in particular the recent sentencing to long prison terms of Nobel Peace Prize and Sakharov Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski, Valiantsin Stefanovich, Zmitser Salauyou, Uladzimir Labkovich, Raman PrataseUladzimir Labkovich, Henadz Fiadynich, Vasil Berasneu and Vatslau Areshka, as well as the sentencing in absentia of leading figures of the democratic forces such as Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Pavel Latushka, Maryia Maroz, Volha Kavalkova, Siarhei Dyleuski, Valery Tsapkala, Stsiapan Putsila and Yan Rudzik on spurious charges of ‘conspiracy to seize power’ or ‘forming extremist organisations’;
Amendment 145 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Demands information and access to imprisoned political prisoners: former potential presidential candidate Viktar Babaryka, who was hospitalised with the signs of beating; political prisoner and Belarusian social democrat Mikalai Statkevich, about whom there has been no news since mid-February and Andrzej Poczobut, journalist and one of the leaders the Polish minority in Belarus and a political prisoner and an activist of European Belarus civic campaign Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk;
Amendment 155 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5b. Condemns the recent decisions of the Lukashenka’s authorities aimed at liquidation of Polish schools and eliminating education in the Polish language;
Amendment 183 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to take all the actions necessary to enable the criminal prosecution of, including issuing an international arrest warrant, of Aliaksandr Lukashenka and other Belarusian officials, who are complicit in the war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide and the crime of aggression committed in Ukraine as well as other crimes such as forced displacement of Ukrainian children and human trafficking;
Amendment 194 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Calls for the EU and its Member States to broaden and strengthen the scope of sanctions (‘restrictive measures’) against individuals and legal entities responsible for or complicit in grave human rights violations in Belarus under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Mechanisms (EU Magnitsky Act), including judges, prosecutors, law enforcement, prison and penal colony officials, propagandists and agents of the infamous KGB and GHUBOPiKAZiK ("Main Directorate for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption"); to designate the recent as terrorist organizations; insists that Belarusian potash, which is the main source of the regime’s income, should remain on the list of sanctions; urges the EU and its Member States to increase their capacity to assess the real effect of sanctions in order to ensure their full implementation and to thwart any circumvention schemes;
Amendment 210 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Notes with great concern the rampant economic, political and military integration of Belarus into the Union State with Russiacreeping annexation of Belarus into the Russian Federation as already visible in the field of rampant economic, political and military subordination to Moscow; condemns the announced deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons under Russian command on Belarusian territory; calls for the EU and the Member States to maintain unity in addresscountering the multifaceted threats posed by the Lukashenka regime to the EU, in particular the continued state-engineered illegal migration crisis at the borders of Belarus with Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, and to work in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure nuclear safety at the Belarusian NPP;
Amendment 214 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Denounces the announced deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons under Russian command on Belarusian territory, an irresponsible act of further breach of Russia’s arms control commitments, international law and Belarusian constitution and urges on the EU institutions and its Member States to take all the necessary steps to prevent such a development, including additional sanctions on Russian and Belarusian ruling regimes;
Amendment 219 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)
Paragraph 10 b (new)
10b. Condemns creation of unbearable conditions and restrictions that led to the formal liquidation of opposition democratic parties in Belarus in May, 2023; calls for the Member States parties and international organizations to continue and develop cooperation with them and their support;
Amendment 222 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 c (new)
Paragraph 10 c (new)
10c. Commemorates the memory of the former Archbishop of Grodno, Artemy (Kishchanka) who died on 22 April and who condemned the violence used by Aliaksandr Lukashenka's regime against peaceful protesters in 2020;
Amendment 224 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 d (new)
Paragraph 10 d (new)
10d. Strongly condemns the persecution of religious communities in Belarus, as well as the persecution of clerics and laity, who in their religious activities refuse to support the position of the regime, including the sentencing of Orthodox priest Siarhei Razanovich, his wife and son to 16 years in prison;
Amendment 227 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 e (new)
Paragraph 10 e (new)
10e. Considers unacceptable the pressure exerted by the Lukashenka regime on the leadership of the Christian churches in order to remove objectionable bishops and priests, as well as the regular arrests of clergy, including the arrest of the Catholic priests Vyacheslav Adamovich, Andrei Kulik, Aliaksandr Shautsou and ordinary members of the Church for preaching in May 2023, the confiscation of churches from Catholics in Minsk and the prohibition of the work of Protestant congregations;
Amendment 230 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 f (new)
Paragraph 10 f (new)
10f. Recognizes Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as legitimate representative of Belarus people, welcomes the creation of the United Transitional Cabinet as the central executive body of the democratic movement, which together with Coordination Council, a unified representative body of Belarusian democratic society, should be treated by the international community as the only representatives of the people of Belarus; welcomes upcoming signing of the Agreement of Cooperation between EP and the Democratic forces of Belarus;
Amendment 232 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 g (new)
Paragraph 10 g (new)
10g. Is of the opinion that EU restrictive measures against the Lukashenka regime in response to developments in Belarus are not adequate to the scale of regime's involvement in Russia's military invasion of Ukraine and the level of repressions and Lukashenka's support to Russia's war of aggression; therefore welcomes sanctions imposed by individual Members States and calls on the Council to adopt a new set of sanctions which will be an adequate response to the scale of Lukashenka's cruelty;
Amendment 241 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Calls for the EU, its institutions and its Member States to develop a more ambitious and comprehensive strategy in order to support democratic forces, civil society activists, independent trade unions and free media both in and outside Belarus; calls for improved EU communication with the people in Belarus in order to provide them with information and counter disinformation and propaganda by the state-controlled media; urges the EU Member States to coordinate their actions in order to alleviate the difficulties faced by democratic forces and civil society activists in exile, for example in the process of obtaining residence permits or, opening bank accounts and effective visa application procedure in Belarus and in the third countries;
Amendment 247 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Insists on continuation and broadening of support coming from the EU for the cultural and educational activities of the independent Belarusian civil society and academic institutions, including those directed to the support of Belarusian language; calls on the Commission to further support independent news outlets, especially new media such as Nexta, which has not received any EU financial support despite having a broad audience in Belarus; urges EU institutions to continue programs of internships for young Belarusians in order to be prepared for future democratic transitions, as well as legal expertise for the legislation drafts elaborated by Belarusian democratic forces;
Amendment 253 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)
Paragraph 11 b (new)
11b. Calls for a list to be drawn up of families of those linked to the criminal Lukashenka regime who are enjoying the hospitality of the countries of the European Union and are studying at schools and universities there; calls for their immediate removal from educational establishments and review their entry visas and residency status;
Amendment 258 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 c (new)
Paragraph 11 c (new)
11c. Welcomes the declaration of European choice made by Belarusian democratic leaders; considers it necessary to develop a common strategy for preserving the independence of Belarus, including international guarantees for it, and for Belarus transition to democracy with the participation of the EU and international institutions OSCE, CoE, G7;
Amendment 260 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 d (new)
Paragraph 11 d (new)
11d. Calls on the international community, the European Commission, EU Member States and institutions such as ICRC, UNICEF to organise systematic and comprehensive support for Belarusian political prisoners and their families who are in a precarious financial situation, as well as support for political prisoners who have served their sentences, including financial support and assistance with medical and psychological rehabilitation;
Amendment 264 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 e (new)
Paragraph 11 e (new)
11e. Calls on the international community to ensure that no invitation to attend meetings, symposia or seminars, sport or cultural events is extended to the representatives of Lukashenka regime and those individual and institutions which support its oppressive policy;
Amendment 271 #
2023/2041(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the representatives of the Belarusian democratic forces, International Red Cross, International Olympic Committee, UEFA, FIFA, IIHF, ITF, ATP, WTA and the de facto authorities of the Republic of Belarus.
Amendment 44 #
2023/2029(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Underlines the need to review the EU’s external and development policies in the light of geopolitical changes, in particular Russia's imperial war against Ukraine; recognises the enhanced importance of strategic partnerships with partnerlike-minded countries and the specific role of EU investments, which have to reflect both the interests of the EU and the interests of our partners;
Amendment 52 #
2023/2029(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine; stresses, however, that this support should not come at the expense of other partners and third countries, whose EU funding should not be unjustifiably cut; calls, therefore, forto take into account the new geopolitical context and conduct a thorough evaluation of the Instrument’s resources, which should also assess whether they are sufficient to meet the Instrument’s objectives;
Amendment 59 #
2023/2029(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Welcomes the consolidation of most of the EU’s external action in a single Instrument, gradually streamlining and harmonising the numerous previous instruments; is of the opinion, however, that although this simplification has enhanced flexibility and efficiency, it has not been accompanied by sufficient levels of effective accountability; reiterates the need to increase effectiveness of the EU’s security and defence policy, in particular in relation to the Eastern Partnership countries;
Amendment 66 #
2023/2029(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Calls for the MTE to evaluate in depth the Instrument’s capacity to achieve the EU’s overall external policy goals, and particularly the objective ofto support Ukraine's victory and safeguard rules- based international order while contributing to the promotion of multilateralism and of protecting, promoting and advancing democracy, the rule of law and human rights and fundamental freedoms;
Amendment 69 #
2023/2029(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Calls, in particular, for an honest assessment of the use of Article 42(4) and recital 40 of the Regulation establishing the Instrument, the latter of which states that assistance could be suspended in the event of degradation in democracy, human rights or the rule of law in third countries; as well as lack of cooperation in the fight against illegal migration; additionally, is of the opinion that such suspension should also take place in a case of serious conflict with shared values, such as support for the war of aggression;
Amendment 116 #
2023/2029(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Reaffirms the commitment outlined in the Instrument to addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; regrets that the EU continues providing funds to third countries that refuse to enter into return agreements with Member States; calls on the EU to consider suspension of funds until the beneficiary state has concluded agreements enabling the return of migrants from Member States; is of the opinion that, without prejudice to unforeseen circumstances, the commitment within the Instrument to dedicate an indicative 10 % of the Instrument’s financial envelope to actions supporting the management and governance of migration and forced displacement within the objectives of the Instrument should be respected and that this clause should not be reopened;
Amendment 224 #
2023/2029(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Considers that the geopolitical challengethreats that emerged with the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine but also China's assertive foreign policy and growing rivalry, require the Instrument’s budget to be increased considerably; highlights that the challenges are spread all over the world, meaning the EU must increase its geopolitical influence; stresses that it will only be possible to respond to these challenges in a balanced way if the proportion of allocations for each area of the Instrument is kept the same;
Amendment 227 #
2023/2029(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)
Paragraph 27 a (new)
27a. Stresses the importance of protecting the EU’s external borders; calls on the EU to finance border management measures, including physical barriers and other mobile or stationary infrastructures as well as to increase resources and enhance cooperation with our partners aimed at dismantling criminal networks of human trafficking;
Amendment 29 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 21
Recital 21
(21) Past crises have shown in some cases the relevance of contingency planning and the usefulness of joint consular contingency plans, known as ‘Joint EU Consular Crisis Preparedness Frameworks’, in third countries, involving the participation of the diplomatic and consular authorities of all Member States, as well as of the local Union delegation. Such plans should be tailored to local circumstances, set a clear division of responsibilities between represented and non-represented Member States and the Union delegation and include a set of procedures and activities to be carried out at local level in case of a crisis, with a specific attention to the consular protection of unrepresented citizens. The need for joint consular contingency plans should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in light of the situation and the principles of voluntary participation.
Amendment 29 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 21
Recital 21
(21) Past crises have shown in some cases the relevance of contingency planning and the usefulness of joint consular contingency plans, known as ‘Joint EU Consular Crisis Preparedness Frameworks’, in third countries, involving the participation of the diplomatic and consular authorities of all Member States, as well as of the local Union delegation. Such plans should be tailored to local circumstances, set a clear division of responsibilities between represented and non-represented Member States and the Union delegation and include a set of procedures and activities to be carried out at local level in case of a crisis, with a specific attention to the consular protection of unrepresented citizens. The need for joint consular contingency plans should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in light of the situation and the principles of voluntary participation.
Amendment 37 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 25
Recital 25
(25) Travel advice, that is, information issued by Member States about the relative safety of travelling to specific third countries, enables travellers to make an informed decision about a particular travel destination, including third countries where their Member State of nationality is not represented. While the issuance of travel advice is the responsibility of Member States, it is appropriate that they coordinate on that topic if they wish, notably in the context of crisis situations, with a view to ensuring, to the extent possible, consistency in the level of advice given. This could include agreeing on a common structure of the levels of risk indicated in travel advice, making use of the secure platform of the EEAS, while also taking into account the differences in risk levels that different Member States may be posed to. Where possible, such coordination should take place at an early stage when Member States are planning to change the level of their travel advice.
Amendment 37 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 25
Recital 25
(25) Travel advice, that is, information issued by Member States about the relative safety of travelling to specific third countries, enables travellers to make an informed decision about a particular travel destination, including third countries where their Member State of nationality is not represented. While the issuance of travel advice is the responsibility of Member States, it is appropriate that they coordinate on that topic if they wish, notably in the context of crisis situations, with a view to ensuring, to the extent possible, consistency in the level of advice given. This could include agreeing on a common structure of the levels of risk indicated in travel advice, making use of the secure platform of the EEAS, while also taking into account the differences in risk levels that different Member States may be posed to. Where possible, such coordination should take place at an early stage when Member States are planning to change the level of their travel advice.
Amendment 43 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 26
Recital 26
(26) Efficient coordination is vital to ensure effective crisis response. To ensure such coordination, Member States should bemay seek supported by from the Crisis Response Centre of the EEAS and the Emergency Response Coordination Centre of the Commission. Coordinated Union crisis response is particularly important in cases requiring evacuations to ensure that available support is provided efficiently, and that best use is made of available evacuation capacities. For that reason, information on available evacuation capacity should be shared in a timely manner, including in case of rescue and evacuation operations using military assets.
Amendment 43 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 26
Recital 26
(26) Efficient coordination is vital to ensure effective crisis response. To ensure such coordination, Member States should bemay seek supported by from the Crisis Response Centre of the EEAS and the Emergency Response Coordination Centre of the Commission. Coordinated Union crisis response is particularly important in cases requiring evacuations to ensure that available support is provided efficiently, and that best use is made of available evacuation capacities. For that reason, information on available evacuation capacity should be shared in a timely manner, including in case of rescue and evacuation operations using military assets.
Amendment 47 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 27
Recital 27
(27) The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for Member States to work together and support each other in the context of multi-disciplinary crisis teams referred to as joint consular teams. The deployment of a joint consular team to a third country in crisis situations can be critical in helping to prevent that the consular authorities of represented Member States become overwhelmed with the demands of the situation and be requested by the Member State to process provide support.
Amendment 47 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 27
Recital 27
(27) The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for Member States to work together and support each other in the context of multi-disciplinary crisis teams referred to as joint consular teams. The deployment of a joint consular team to a third country in crisis situations can be critical in helping to prevent that the consular authorities of represented Member States become overwhelmed with the demands of the situation and be requested by the Member State to process provide support.
Amendment 53 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 30
Recital 30
(30) To support Union citizens in need, it is important to provide them with reliable information on how to avail themselves of consular assistance in third countries. The Commission services and the EEAS shouldmay contribute to that objective by disseminating relevant information, including information to be provided by Member States on their consular networks and third countries where they have concluded practical arrangements on sharing responsibilities for providing consular protection to unrepresented citizens. To facilitate the processing of such information, it should be provided in machine-readable format.
Amendment 53 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 30
Recital 30
(30) To support Union citizens in need, it is important to provide them with reliable information on how to avail themselves of consular assistance in third countries. The Commission services and the EEAS shouldmay contribute to that objective by disseminating relevant information, including information to be provided by Member States on their consular networks and third countries where they have concluded practical arrangements on sharing responsibilities for providing consular protection to unrepresented citizens. To facilitate the processing of such information, it should be provided in machine-readable format.
Amendment 57 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 32
Recital 32
(32) The financial provisions of Directive (EU) 2015/637 shouldmay be adapted to simplify reimbursements and continue ensuring financial burden-sharing. In particular, it should be possible for unrepresented citizens to directly reimburse costs, under the same conditions as nationals of the assisting Member State, for the service provided by that Member State to avoid the administrative burden resulting from seeking reimbursements from the citizen’s Member State of nationality. In addition, Member States should also be allowed to waive the charging of such costs. As, in certain situations, unrepresented citizens may not be able to pay when making the request for assistance, notably when their cash and means to access funds have been stolen, it is necessary to provide that they may be required by the consular authorities of the assisting Member State to sign an undertaking to repay. On the basis of such an undertaking, the authorities of the assisting Member State may ask for the reimbursement of the costs once four weeks have passed since the assistance was provided.
Amendment 57 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 32
Recital 32
(32) The financial provisions of Directive (EU) 2015/637 shouldmay be adapted to simplify reimbursements and continue ensuring financial burden-sharing. In particular, it should be possible for unrepresented citizens to directly reimburse costs, under the same conditions as nationals of the assisting Member State, for the service provided by that Member State to avoid the administrative burden resulting from seeking reimbursements from the citizen’s Member State of nationality. In addition, Member States should also be allowed to waive the charging of such costs. As, in certain situations, unrepresented citizens may not be able to pay when making the request for assistance, notably when their cash and means to access funds have been stolen, it is necessary to provide that they may be required by the consular authorities of the assisting Member State to sign an undertaking to repay. On the basis of such an undertaking, the authorities of the assisting Member State may ask for the reimbursement of the costs once four weeks have passed since the assistance was provided.
Amendment 66 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 43
Recital 43
(43) It is necessary to further specify safeguards applicable to the personal data processed, such as the maximum retention period of personal data collected. To ensure the collection of any applicable costs, a maximum retention period of 12 months for the assisting Member State or Union institutions and bodies and 24 months for the Member State of nationality is necessary, unless in cases of criminal or terrorism convictions. The longer retention period applicable to the Member State of nationality is also necessary to prevent possible abuses or other fraudulent activities, including by persons who repeatedly seek consular protection and attempt to conceal such behaviour by approaching the consular authorities of different Member States. Finally, where the personal data concerns the contact details of public officials such as honorary consuls, the personal data should be retained for as long as the person remains the relevant contact. The erasure of personal data of applicants should not affect Member States’ abilities to monitor the application of this Directive.
Amendment 66 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 43
Recital 43
(43) It is necessary to further specify safeguards applicable to the personal data processed, such as the maximum retention period of personal data collected. To ensure the collection of any applicable costs, a maximum retention period of 12 months for the assisting Member State or Union institutions and bodies and 24 months for the Member State of nationality is necessary, unless in cases of criminal or terrorism convictions. The longer retention period applicable to the Member State of nationality is also necessary to prevent possible abuses or other fraudulent activities, including by persons who repeatedly seek consular protection and attempt to conceal such behaviour by approaching the consular authorities of different Member States. Finally, where the personal data concerns the contact details of public officials such as honorary consuls, the personal data should be retained for as long as the person remains the relevant contact. The erasure of personal data of applicants should not affect Member States’ abilities to monitor the application of this Directive.
Amendment 85 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Directive (EU) 2015/637
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. In the context of local consular cooperation referred to in Article 12, Member States and the EEAS shallmay set up and agree a joint consular contingency plan for each third country. The need for joint consular contingency plans should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in light of the situation and the principles of voluntary participation. The joint consular contingency plan shall be updated annually and contain:
Amendment 85 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Directive (EU) 2015/637
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. In the context of local consular cooperation referred to in Article 12, Member States and the EEAS shallmay set up and agree a joint consular contingency plan for each third country. The need for joint consular contingency plans should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in light of the situation and the principles of voluntary participation. The joint consular contingency plan shall be updated annually and contain:
Amendment 98 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Directive (EU) 2015/637
Article 13 – paragraph 5
Article 13 – paragraph 5
5. Member States shall exchange information on changes to their travel advice to citizens at an early stage, in particular in the context of crisis situations, and shall seek to ensure consistency in the level of travel advice given, while also taking into account the differences in risk levels that different Member States may be posed to.;
Amendment 98 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Directive (EU) 2015/637
Article 13 – paragraph 5
Article 13 – paragraph 5
5. Member States shall exchange information on changes to their travel advice to citizens at an early stage, in particular in the context of crisis situations, and shall seek to ensure consistency in the level of travel advice given, while also taking into account the differences in risk levels that different Member States may be posed to.;
Amendment 116 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Directive (EU) 2015/637
Chapter 2 a – Article 13 b – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Chapter 2 a – Article 13 b – paragraph 1 – introductory part
At least once per year, Member States shallmay provide the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with the following information:
Amendment 116 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Directive (EU) 2015/637
Chapter 2 a – Article 13 b – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Chapter 2 a – Article 13 b – paragraph 1 – introductory part
At least once per year, Member States shallmay provide the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with the following information:
Amendment 132 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Directive (EU) 2015/637
Article 16 a – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1
Article 16 a – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1
The assisting Member State, the Member State of nationality and, where applicable, Union institutions and bodies shall retain the personal data of an assisted person only for as long as necessary to carry out the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. In no case shall that personal data be retained longer than 12 months by the assisting Member State and Union institutions and bodies, or longer than 24 months by the Member State of nationality, from the date of collection, unless in cases of criminal or terrorism conviction. Contact details exchanged in accordance with Article 10(4) and Article 13b(1) shall only be retained for as long as the persons exercise the relevant function.
Amendment 132 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Directive (EU) 2015/637
Article 16 a – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1
Article 16 a – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1
The assisting Member State, the Member State of nationality and, where applicable, Union institutions and bodies shall retain the personal data of an assisted person only for as long as necessary to carry out the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. In no case shall that personal data be retained longer than 12 months by the assisting Member State and Union institutions and bodies, or longer than 24 months by the Member State of nationality, from the date of collection, unless in cases of criminal or terrorism conviction. Contact details exchanged in accordance with Article 10(4) and Article 13b(1) shall only be retained for as long as the persons exercise the relevant function.
Amendment 133 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Directive (EU) 2015/637
Article 16 a – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2
Article 16 a – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2
The personal data shall be erased as soon as possible after the tasks referred to in paragraph 1 or 2 have been completed and, unless in cases of criminal or terrorism convictions, or at the latest upon the expiry of the retention periods referred to in the first subparagraph.
Amendment 133 #
2023/0441(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Directive (EU) 2015/637
Article 16 a – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2
Article 16 a – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2
The personal data shall be erased as soon as possible after the tasks referred to in paragraph 1 or 2 have been completed and, unless in cases of criminal or terrorism convictions, or at the latest upon the expiry of the retention periods referred to in the first subparagraph.
Amendment 42 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital -1 (new)
Recital -1 (new)
(-1) Strategy of ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials should be coherent with other EU's policies and strategies, in particular the EU's Strategic Compass on Security and Defence as well as those aimed at containment of Russia, future Ukraine's EU Membership, as well as focus on the Arctic, cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, Central Asia, Africa, European Maritime Security Strategy, Global Gateway and others.
Amendment 45 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
Recital 1
(1) AUnhindered access to raw materials is essential for the Union's security and defence, economy and the functioning of the internal market. There is a set of non- energy, non-agricultural raw materials that, due to their high economic importance and their exposure to high supply risk, often caused by a high concentration of supply from a few third countries, are considered critical. Given the key role of many such critical raw materials in realising the green and digital transitions, and in light of their use for defence and space applications, demand will increase exponentially in the coming decades. At the same time, the risk of supply disruptions is increasing against the background of rising geopolitical tensions and resource competition. Furthermore, if not managed properly, increased demand for critical raw materials could lead to negative environmental and social impacts. Considering these trends, it is necessary to take measures to ensure access to a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials to safeguard the Union's economic resilience and open strategic autonomysufficiency in order to prevent Europe and our allies from being coerced.
Amendment 50 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) Given the complexity and the transnational character of critical raw material value chains, security challenges facing many raw material suppliers as well as threats to transport, including to freedom of navigation, uncoordinated national measures to ensure a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials have a high potential of distorting competition and fragmenting the internal market. Therefore, to safeguard the functioning of the internal market, a common Union framework should be created to collectively address this central challenge.
Amendment 52 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2 a (new)
Recital 2 a (new)
(2a) A new framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials should take into account geopolitical developments and focus on like-minded partners as main suppliers and limiting or completely reducing dependency on actors that are recognised by the Union as adversaries, systemic rivals or as those who do not share the same vision of the rules based international order.
Amendment 54 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2 b (new)
Recital 2 b (new)
(2b) The Union should especially take into account the emerging threats posed by the Russian Federation by its full scale, unjustified aggression on Ukraine and attempts to destroy the rules-based international order, rivalry with China, threats posed by Iran as well as challenges to freedom of navigation and other factors that threaten our security, prosperity and future peaceful developlement.
Amendment 56 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3
Recital 3
(3) Firstly, in order to effectively ensure the Union's access to a secure, unhindered and sustainable supply of critical raw materials, that framework should include measures to decrease the Union's vulnerability to growing supply risks by strengthening Union capacities along all stages of the strategic raw materials value chain, including extraction, processing and, recycling and transport infrastructure, towards benchmarks defined for each strategic raw material and as a matter of priority, must reduce its dependence particularly on third countries such as Russia which are a direct threat to our security, or are recognised by the Union as systemic rivals such as the People’s Republic of China. Secondly, as the Union will continue to rely on imports, the framework should include measures to increase the diversification of external supplies of strategic raw materials. Thirdly, is necessary to provide measures to reinforce the Union’s ability to monitor and mitigate existing and future supply risks. Fourthly, the framework should contain measures to increase the circularity and sustainability of the critical raw materials consumed in the Union.
Amendment 67 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) To strengthen Union capacities along the strategic raw materials value chain, benchmarks should be set to guide efforts and track progress. The aim should be to increase capacities for each strategic raw material at each stage of the value chain, while aiming to achieve overall capacity benchmarks for extraction, transport, processing and recycling of strategic raw materials. Firstly, the Union should increase the use of its own geological resources of strategic raw materials and build up capacity to allow it to extract the materials needed to produce at least 10 % of the Union's consumption of strategic raw materials. Keeping in mind that extraction capacity is highly dependent on the availability of Union geological resources, the achievement of this benchmark is dependent on such availability. Secondly, in order to build a full value chain and prevent any bottlenecks at intermediate stages, the Union should in addition increase its processing capacity along the value chain and be able to produce at least 40 % of its annual consumption of strategic raw materials. Thirdly, it is expected that in the coming decades a growing share of the Union's consumption of strategic raw materials can be covered by secondary raw materials, which would improve both the security and the sustainability of the Union’s raw materials supply. Therefore, Union recycling capacity should be able to produce at least 15 % of the Union’s annual consumption of strategic raw materials. These benchmarks refer to the 2030 time horizon, in alignment with the Union's climate and energy targets set under Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council29 and the digital targets under the Digital Decade30 , which they underpin. Furthermore, quality jobs, including skills development and job-to-job transitions, will address risks in the sectoral labour market and help ensure the EU’s competitiveness. _________________ 29 Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1). 30 Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030 (OJL 323, 19.12.2022, p. 4–26 )
Amendment 73 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) In order to diversify the Union's supply of strategic raw materials, the EU should cooperate closely with Member States and like-minded partners, as well as other institutions and forums such as NATO, G7 and EFTA Members; the Commission should, with the support of the Board, should identify Strategic Projects in third countries that intend to become active in the extraction, transport, processing or recycling of strategic raw materials. To ensure that such Strategic Projects are effectively implemented, they should benefit from improved access to finance. In order to ensure their added value, projects should be assessed against a set of criteria. Like projects in the Union, Strategic Projects in third countries should strengthen the Union's security of supply for strategic raw materials, show sufficient technical feasibility and be implemented sustainably. For projects in emerging markets and developing economies, the project should be mutually beneficial for the Union and the third country involved and add value in that country, taking into account also its consistency with the Union’s common commercial policy. Such value may be derived from the project’s contribution to more than one stage of the value chain as well as from creating through the project wider economic and social benefits, including the creation of employment in compliance with international standards. Where the Commission assesses these criteria to be fulfilled, it should publish the recognition as a Strategic Project in a decision.
Amendment 84 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
Recital 19
(19) Given their role in ensuring the Union's security of supply for strategic raw materials, and their contribution to the Union's open strategic autonomysecurity, self-sufficiency, resilience and the green and digital transition, Strategic Projects should be considered by the responsible permitting authority as being in the public interest. Strategic Projects which have an adverse impact on the environment, to the extent it falls under the scope of Directive 2000/60/EC, Council Directive 92/43/EEC and Directive 2009/147/EC39 may be authorised where the responsible permitting authority concludes, based on its case-by-case assessment, that the public interest served by the project overrides those impacts, provided that all relevant conditions set out in those Directives are met. Where relevant, the case-by-case assessment should take into account the geological specificity of extraction sites, which constrains decisions on location. _________________ 39 Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds (OJ L 20, 26.1.2010, p. 7–25).
Amendment 91 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33
Recital 33
(33) Space data and services derived from earth observation can support the efforts towards sustainable critical raw materials value chains by providing a continuous flow of information, which could be useful for activities such as monitoring and management of mining areas, the environmental and socio- economic impact assessment, or mineral resource exploration. As earth observation is also able to provide data about remote and inaccessible areas, it should be considered by Member States when drawing up and implementing their national exploration programmes to the extent possible. Simultaneously, assessment should be made how to use the space technology and other tools such as Copernicus services to detect cases of illegal and predatory exploitations, which should be additionally combatted, increasing availability of those material for legal, environmentally friendly, sustainable projects.
Amendment 93 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 34
Recital 34
(34) Although the reinforcement of the Union’s critical raw materials value chain is necessary to ensure increased security of supply, the supply chains of critical raw materials will remain global and exposed to external factors. Recent or ongoing events ranging from the COVID-19 crisis to theRussia's unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukrainefull-scale aggression on Ukraine and attempts to demolish the rules based international order and territorial claims to the Arctic, the growing global tensions with the PRC, the COVID-19 crisis, challenges to the maritime security, terrorism threat directly destabilizing many regions such as the Sahel, underlined the vulnerability of some of the Union’s supply chains to disruptions. In order to ensure that Member States and European industries are able to anticipate supply disruption and prepared to withstand their consequences, measures should be developed to increase monitoring capacity, coordinate strategic stocks and reinforce the preparedness of companies.
Amendment 103 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 54
Recital 54
(54) The Union has concluded Strategic Partnerships covering raw materials with third countries in order to implement the 2020 Action Plan on Critical Raw Materials. In order to diversify supply, these efforts should be continued, with strengthened cooperation and coordination with like-minded partners. To develop and ensure a coherent framework for the conclusion of future partnerships, the Member States and the Commission should, as part of their interaction on the Board, discuss and ensure coordination on, inter alia, whether existing partnerships achieve the intended aims, the prioritisation of third countries for new partnerships, the content of such partnerships and their coherence and potential synergies between Member States' bilateral cooperation with relevant third countries. The Union should seek mutually beneficial partnerships with emerging market and developing economies, in coherence with its Global Gateway strategy, which contribute to the diversification of its raw materials supply chain as well as add value in the production in these countries.
Amendment 111 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1
1. The general objective of this Regulation is to improve the functioning of the internal market by establishing a framework to ensure the Union's access to a secure, unhindered and sustainable supply of critical raw materials.
Amendment 117 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b a (new)
(ba) bolster defence capabilities of the Member States and enhance the Euro- Atlantic's technological edge;
Amendment 122 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point d a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point d a (new)
(da) work towards limiting illegal and predatory extraction of raw materials, which should lead to greater availability of such materials to legally and environmentally friendly projects;
Amendment 124 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point d b (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point d b (new)
(db) strengthen cooperation with entities of like-minded countries in order to commonly address existing and future global challenges;
Amendment 137 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the project would make a meaningful contribution to the security of the Union's, including supply of strategic raw materials;
Amendment 153 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1
Article 7 – paragraph 1
1. Strategic Projects should take into account a holistic approach to geopolitical developments and shall be considered to contribute to the overall security of the transatlantic space through supply of strategic raw materials in the Unionand reducing our dependency on hostile and unreliable countries.
Amendment 170 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(aa) geopolitical developments and security challenges , including in the field of freedom of navigation;
Amendment 183 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 5 – point b a (new)
Article 24 – paragraph 5 – point b a (new)
(ba) Entities registered in or whose shares are controlled by Russia, China or Iran that are not currently on sanctions list mentioned in paragraph 5 must be analysed by competent authorities with additional scrutiny and have their credentials properly verified.
Amendment 205 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point a – point i
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point a – point i
(i) improving the Union's security, including the security of supply;
Amendment 209 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point a – point iii
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point a – point iii
(iii) improving cooperation and coordination along the critical raw materials value chain between the Union and partner countries, in particular like- minded states; especially the G7, as well as EFTA members or EU candidate countries such as Ukraine;
Amendment 212 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point c – point i
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point c – point i
(i) the potential contribution to security of the EU, not limited to security of supply, taking into account a third country's policies on the global stage in such important areas such as Russia's aggression on Ukraine, counter-terrorism cooperation, and also potential reserves, extraction, processing and recycling capacities related to critical raw materials, as well as other challenges, such as transport routes;
Amendment 219 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point c – point iii
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point c – point iii
(iii) whether there are existing cooperation agreements between a third country and the Union and, for emerging markets and developing economies, the potential for the deployment of Global Gateway investment projects., as well compliance with EU's CFSP priorities, such as threats and challenges emanating from Russia, the PRC, Iran or international terrorist organisations;
Amendment 225 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
Article 33 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
3. Member States shall:
Amendment 228 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 3 – point a
Article 33 – paragraph 3 – point a
(a) may coordinate with the Commission to ensure coherence between their bilateral cooperation with relevant third countries and the Union's non-binding Strategic Partnerships with third countries, whose scope at least includes critical raw materials value chain;
Amendment 229 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 3 – point b
Article 33 – paragraph 3 – point b
(b) shall support the Commission in the implementation of the cooperation measures set out in Strategic Partnerships.
Amendment 231 #
2023/0079(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 3 a (new)
Article 33 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. The strategic partners should also be evaluated taking into account challenges arising from transport restraints, including resulting from both the lack of proper infrastructure or problematic ownership or insecure transport routes. The Commission should address these challenges in cooperation with Member States and other institutions.
Amendment 4 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 a (new)
Citation 12 a (new)
– having regard to Uzbekistan's 2021 - 2026 National Strategy to counter extremism and terrorism,
Amendment 8 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 18 a (new)
Citation 18 a (new)
– having regard to the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984,
Amendment 10 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 18 b (new)
Citation 18 b (new)
– having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989,
Amendment 19 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas protests erupted in the Republic of Karakalpakstan on 1 July 2022 following the publication of the proposed amendments to Uzbekistan’s constitution, which would have abolished its status as a sovereign republic within Uzbekistan and its right to secede; whereas at least 21 people were killed, in the ensuing crackdown by the authoritiecluding 4 law enforcement officers and at least 243 people were injured; whereas 516 people were detained, including journalists, and some were held incommunicado for weeks following the protests; whereas 22 people were sentenced on 13 January 2023 for their participation in the unrest and Dauletmurat Tajimuratov, a lawyer accused of leading the unrest, was sentenced to 16 years in prison; whereas on 7 February 2023 the trial started against another 39 people charged with participating in the protests; whereas human rights groups and activists reported that security forces used unjustifiable lethal force and other excessive responses to disperse mainly peaceful protesters;
Amendment 32 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas on 19 April 2023 early voting started in Uzbekistan for a referendum on a new constitution, which amongst others, would enable President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to seek a third or even potentially a fourth term as President;
Amendment 36 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)
Recital E b (new)
Amendment 39 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E c (new)
Recital E c (new)
Ec. whereas child marriages are still prevalent in some rural areas of Uzbekistan and hinder women's rights in the country by limiting their educational and job opportunities; whereas domestic violence against women remains a problem that should be dealt with greater attention; whereas there is a lack of investigation and accountability for gender-based violence in Uzbekistan; whereas on 6 April 2023, the Parliament of Uzbekistan adopted the landmark legislation that aims to provide women and children with greater legal protections against gender-based violence; whereas the new law must still be approved by the President before it can come into effect; whereas the long- anticipated bill was approved unanimously by the upper house of the Parliament and is the first legislation of its kind in Uzbekistan to specifically target domestic abuse;
Amendment 44 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E d (new)
Recital E d (new)
Ed. whereas in light of growing Chinese influence in the region, Uzbekistan and China have been expanding their economic cooperation in recent years; whereas the China- Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway project would open up Uzbekistan's gateway to South Asia and connect the two regions while avoiding Taliban- controlled Afghanistan but also will serve as a core part of the Belt and Road Initiative;
Amendment 45 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E e (new)
Recital E e (new)
Ee. whereas while Uzbekistan's government expresses its neutrality on Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, Uzbekistan serves as a transship point to Russia and Belarus of goods and technologies under sanctions; whereas Uzbekistan has stated that it recognises Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and does not recognise Russia's annexation of Crimea and any other regions of Ukraine occupied by Russia;
Amendment 46 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E f (new)
Recital E f (new)
Ef. whereas great potential exists to increase trade relations between the EU and Uzbekistan, including metals, textile and apparels; whereas Uzbekistan's cotton industry can act as an important alternative to China's textile industry, in Member States' efforts to divest away from China and taking into account the gross violations of human rights in China, in particular in Xinjiang, where Uyghur detainees work as forced labourers to produce textiles;
Amendment 47 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E g (new)
Recital E g (new)
Eg. whereas Uzbekistan adopted the National Strategy to counter extremism and terrorism for 2021-2026 in July 2021; whereas the stated aim of the Strategy is to pursue an effective and coordinated state policy to counter extremism and terrorism, to ensure national security and the rights and freedoms of citizens; whereas the Taliban takover of Afghanistan heightened Uzbekistan's concerns about the potential spillover of terrorism from Afghanistan to its Central Asian neighbours, particularly by ISIS- Khorasan Province, as well as the Islamic Jihad Union, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Katibat al-Imam al-Bukhari and Jamaat Ansarullah; whereas Uzbekistan continues to remain an active participant in the C5+1 diplomatic platform and related counter-terrorism / counter violent extremism (CT/CVE) cooperation;
Amendment 48 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E h (new)
Recital E h (new)
Eh. whereas the government of Uzbekistan has been making efforts to balance economic growth with environmental protection; whereas reported environmental concerns include land degradation, soil salinization, reduced water quality and water erosion;
Amendment 67 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Expresses concern about the referendum on a new constitution that would allow President Mirziyoyev to run for two more consecutive terms; reminds the government of Uzbekistan that the EPCA includes even stronger emphasis on the rule of law than the previous PCA;
Amendment 70 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Encourages the EU and Member States to explore strengthening economic relations with Uzbekistan and to cooperate closer in international organisations;
Amendment 71 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 c (new)
Paragraph 2 c (new)
2c. Welcomes Uzbekistan's 2021 - 2026 National Strategy to counter extremism and terrorism and calls on the EU and Member States to explore closer counter-terrorism cooperation, especially in ensuring no spillover of terrorism from Afghanistan to the wider region;
Amendment 74 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes that Uzbekistan is uniquely positioned to be the driving force for regional cooperation that would help Central Asia become a more resilient, prosperous and more closely interconnected economic and political space; welcomes Uzbekistan's engagement in C5+1 format; encourages the EU to intensify its political engagement with Central Asia in line with its geostrategic importance; underlines the great potential of mutually beneficial cooperation on sustainable connectivity, in particular through its Global Gateway on initiative, energy and security but also through a multi-faceted approach to diversify trade routes, foster greater private investment, cooperation in science and technology, health care, industrial production, capacity building and providing job training, education and fostering people to people contacts;
Amendment 85 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Recognises that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its implications present both challenges and opportunities for Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states, which have traditionally maintained close relations with Russia; notes that Uzbekistan abstained in the votes on the United Nations General Assembly resolutions on Ukraine, in particular those of 2 March 2022, 24 March 2022 and 23 February 2023 demanding an end to the Russian offensive and immediate withdrawal from Ukraine; notes that Uzbekistan opposed the expulsion of Russia from the UN Human Rights Council on 7 April 2022; notes the commitment ofcalls on the political leadership of Uzbekistan not to allow the circumvention of sanctions imposed on Russia and Belarus; welcomes that the government and the people of Uzbekistan have stepped up to provide food and medical assistance to Ukraine; invites the Uzbek government and people to continue providing assistance to Ukraine in the face of Russia's war of aggression;
Amendment 94 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Notes Uzbekistan’s long-standing and close relations with Afghanistan, which have continued after the takeover by Taliban; commends its efforts to mitigate the severe humanitarian crisis in the country through the provision of humanitarian aid and electricity; invites Uzbekistan to use its contacts with the Taliban to call for respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans, in particular women, girls and minorities, which are essential conditions for greater international engagement with Afghanistan; reiterates its strong condemnation of the Taliban’s decisions to ban women and girls from attending secondary and university education and to prohibit the employment of women with non-governmental organisations and welcomes Uzbekistan's humanitarian assistance to Afghan women and girls;
Amendment 96 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Welcomes the statement of Uzbekistan's Embassy in Moscow in response to calls of some Uzbek citizens residing in Russia to join Russia's ongoing unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, in which the Embassy stated that any form of participation in military activities on the territory of foreign countries is considered to be a mercenary activity and will be punished by up to 10 years in prison;
Amendment 99 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5b. Invites the government of Uzbekistan to step up efforts to balance economic growth with environmental protection, including land degradation, soil salinization, reduced water quality and water erosion;
Amendment 100 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 c (new)
Paragraph 5 c (new)
5c. Invites the authorities of Uzbekistan to engage more intensively in the efforts by Kazakhstan and the international community to revert the disastrous agricultural policy by the Soviet Union, which led to the collapse of an entire ecosystem of the Aral Sea, one of the planet's worst environmental disasters; is of the opinion that to successfully address the adverse effects of the Aral Sea disaster, much stronger efforts of the Uzbek government are needed, with support of the international community to share innovative technologies and to financially assist in achieving this goal;
Amendment 114 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Regrets the loss of life during protests in the Republic of Karakalpakstan on 1 and 2 July 2022; calls on the authorities of Uzbekistan to refrain from using disproportionate force against peaceful protesters and calls on the authorities to investigate the actions and harsh repression of the security services that led to deaths and injuries among the protesters and calls on the authorities to bring those responsible to justice; calls for the independence and transparency of the judicial process to be ensured in the cases linked to the protests; welcomes the Uzbek authorities’ commitment to maintaining the current constitutional status of Karakalpakstan;
Amendment 143 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Stresses the need to ensure respect for the rights of journalists, independent bloggers and human rights defenders and their protection against harassment, pressure and threats and to investigate any attacks against them; reminds the authorities of the importance of upholding the freedom of expression, both online and offline, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of association and the independence of the media;
Amendment 149 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Strongly condemns the reports of torture, cruel and inhuman treatment in detention and prisons in Uzbekistan and calls on the authorities to investigate the reported incidents in a transparent manner;
Amendment 159 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. NWelcomes the adoption on 6 April 2023 of the landmark legislation that aims to provide women and children with greater legal protections against gender- based violence; calls on President Mirziyoyev to approve the legislation in order for it to come into effect; notes that despite the adoption of a number of laws, including the Law on Protection of Women from Harassment and Violence of 2019, gender-based violence against women remains widespread; regrets that domestic violence is not defined or specifically criminalised in Uzbekistan’s legislation; calls on the authorities to take measures to bring Uzbekistan into line with its obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, as indicated in the concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Uzbekistan by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women; calls on Uzbek authorities to work with civil society organisations and international partners to address these issues; encourages the authorities to step up efforts to stop child marriage in Uzbekistan and calls on the government of Uzbekistan to do more to end its practice in the country and protect the rights of girls and boys, including the right to education for girls and women;
Amendment 163 #
2022/2195(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Welcomes Uzbekistan's progress in labour rights, such as the Labour Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan that comes into force on 30 April 2023 and introduces innovations in the regulation of individual labour relations as well as the first-ever annual report on enforcement of labour standards of 2021; in particular welcomes the eradication of the pervasive practice of child and forced labour in the cotton sector, which has been confirmed and reported by the International Labor Organization last year; is convinced that this is a historic achievement and that it may serve as a model for neighbouring countries facing similar challenges; encourages the government to promote similar efforts in other sectors and invites the Uzbek authorities to continue to implement labour rights protection and invites the Uzbek authorities to continue to implement labour rights protection in other sectors and improved compliance with the international labour standards and ILO recommendations;
Amendment 90 #
2022/2188(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. UrgInvites the UK to seriously engagfurther cooperate with the EU on pressing strategic challenges by ensuring the complementarity and synergieeffectiveness of actions; points out that the parallel projects for developing future advanced combat air systems can be an inefficient use of resources and that the 2022 Common Securityd weapons should remain interoperable and inclusive for allies and like-minded partners where possible and taking into account effectiveness and Defence Policy annual reportficient use of resources, recommends that thsome projects shouldcan be merged;
Amendment 92 #
2022/2188(INI)
32a. commends the UK's contributions to supporting the security and territorial integrity of Ukraine, as the UK continues to be one of the main contributing nations providing critical technologies, armaments, trainings, and intelligence to Ukraine; recognises that the UK's indispensable role in supporting Ukraine further underlines the necessity of the EU-UK cooperation in the security and defence domain as the UK remains the leading and operationally capable, equipped and willing military in Europe, guaranteeing security on the European continent;
Amendment 3 #
2022/2051(INL)
Draft opinion
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the Conference on the Future of Europe served as an unprecedented platform for discussion between citizens and politicians and resulted in concrete proposals that need to be honoured even, however still engaging selective organizations and representing mostly the point of view of federalists, and resulted ifn they necessitated Treatir own desired outcomes that need full support in the Council before they changes be implemented;
Amendment 11 #
2022/2051(INL)
Draft opinion
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
A a. whereas foreign policy, security and defence remain core competences of the Member States, with unanimity in decision-making being an important tool for finding common positions without forcing any EU country to act against its national interests;
Amendment 31 #
2022/2051(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. CallNotes for the main citizens’ recommendations in the field of foreign and security policy, notably the need to switch to more efficient decision-making, through the use of qualified majority voting (QMV) instead of unanimity, and the need to improve the Union’s methods to impose sanctions, to be incorporated in a Treaty change; underlines, however, that foreign and security policy remains a core competence of Member States and the rule of unanimity serves as an important tool for finding compromises and build solidarity between them in most important areas, thus strengthening the Union and its unity and gives the EU stronger mandate for its global actions; recalls that even in a much bigger and more heterogeneous organisations such as NATO, decisions are taken on the basis of consensus;
Amendment 43 #
2022/2051(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Recalls that Article 48(7) and Article 31(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) contain passerrelle clauses that can make switching from unanimity to qualified majority voting possible in the area of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) without military implications; calls for a switch to QMV in all decisions in the field of CFSP, notably those concerning sanctions and human rights, as the passerelle clauses have never been used due to the lack of political willunderlines that using these clauses requires a decision of the European Council and the consent of all national parliaments;
Amendment 60 #
2022/2051(INL)
Amendment 70 #
2022/2051(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Underlines the needNotes the suggestions to strengthen the role of the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and to ensure that the Union speaks with one voice, as requested by the citizens of the Union in the Conference on the Future of Europin assisting to find compromises between the Member States in order to ensure that the Union speaks with one voice; points out that this can be done through a Tgreaty change that would name the Vice-President/High Representative a foreign minister of the Union, would maker willingness to reach the common perception of threats by deeper solidarity, respect for all Member States regardless of their size or political affiliation and cannot be him or her the main external representative of the Union in international fora and would allow him or her to be present ex-officio in negoposed by the largest and the most powerful Member States; in this regard reminds about mistakes and detrimental policies in the fields of energy, migration and naive and weak policy of mitigating formats initiated or led by the Memberon towards Russia despite numerous warnings from Poland and the Baltic States;
Amendment 82 #
2022/2051(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Considers it necessary to broaden the scope of threats defined in the mutual defence clause stipulated in Article 42(7) TEU to include hybrid threats, disinformation campaigns, energy blackmail and economic coercion by third countries;
Amendment 93 #
2022/2051(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Stresses the importance of reinforcing the Parliament’s scrutiny rights in the foreign policy field, notably by strengthening the wording of Article 36 TEU concerning the consultation of the European Parliament on the main aspects and strategic choices in the field of CFSP and common security and defence policy; calls for changing Article 218 TFEU to require the European Parliament’s consent for all international agreements and before decisions on the provisional application of international agreements are taken; recalls the proven value of parliamentary diplomacy; suggests therefore introducing provisions for involvement of the European Parliament on equal footing with the Council in the implementation of international agreements in Article 218(9) TFEU; calls recalls the proven value of parliamentary diplomacy; calls for more involvement of the European Parliament in the Team Europe approach;
Amendment 101 #
2022/2051(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Calls for inclusion of the principle of “strategic autonomy” into the list of objectives to bUnderlines that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has clearly exposed the lack of substance of the concept of “strategic autonomy”, as European security is impossible to maintain without a strong transatlantic bond; underlines that the lack of political will to act decisively, including in the fachieved through the Union’s foreign and security policy enshrined in Article 21 TEUe of responsibility to prevent genocide through appropriate and necessary means, even in the immediate neighborhood of the EU, should be considered as a real challenge and obstacle to gain the status of a global player;
Amendment 112 #
2022/2051(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Calls for the introduction ofNotes the provisions in Articles 42 and 46 TEU enabling the joint procurement of defence equipment and other security- related spending from the budget of the Union as well as the establishment of joint military units and command structures; underlines the need of close cooperation and coordination with NATO in order to avoid duplication of structures and duties;
Amendment 120 #
2022/2051(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9 a. In the process of amending the Treaties calls for the inclusion of wording stipulating constant structured cooperation in the area of security with NATO, which is and should remain the main guarantor of security and defence for the whole transatlantic area;
Amendment 3 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5
Citation 5
Amendment 8 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 17
Citation 17
Amendment 25 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 35
Citation 35
— having regard to Russia’s illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea as well as its unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine,unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea and other 4 regions of Ukraine as well as occupation of Georgia's regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Republic of Moldova's region of Transnistria;
Amendment 40 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas Europe is facing the most complex combination of both military and non-military threats since the end of the Cold War accentuated by Russia’s unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas this requires the EU to enhance the effectiveness of its security and defence policy to defend its interests and values; whereas the Strategic Compass aims to equip the EU with the necessary tools to make it an effective security provider and an assertive global actor but without a genuine will to act and transatlantic cooperation will not deliver strategically relevant results; whereas there is a new urgency to boosting EU security and defence capabilities, including building on the unprecedented support for Ukraine and including the use of the EPF;
Amendment 64 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas industrial fragmentation and inefficiency in developing European military capability costs between EUR 25 and EUR 100 billion each year; whereas Member States only procured some 11 % of their total equipment collaboratively in 2020; whereas the Member States have agreed on more and better defence spendingfrom 1999 to 2021, EU combined defence spending increased by 20% against 66% for the US, 292% for Russia and 592% for China; whereas the Member States have agreed on more and better defence spending; whereas defence industries of many member states are still ongoing processes of modernization, restructurization and consolidation;
Amendment 70 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
B a. whereas security and defence remain core competence of the Member States;
Amendment 73 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas CSDP has 11 civilian missions and 7 military operations under way with around 5 000 personnel deployed on three continents; whereas the EU since 2014 was unable to utilize its CSDP instruments to effectively support fighting Ukraine, with some change of direction in the recent year; whereas total personnel deployed by the Member States has steadily declined in recent years, and missions and operations persistently suffer from Member States not delivering on their pledges to provide sufficient military or civilian personnel; whereas such operational failures prevent structural change from taking hold, thus impeding the overall effectiveness of CSDP missions;
Amendment 86 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas security and defence partnerships are essential instruments in supporting the EU’s ambition to be a global actor; whereas the EU cannot be perceived as a successful and credible global actor without providing security in its immediate neighbourhood; whereas EU-NATO cooperation and other partnerships such as with the UN, the United States, the United Kingdom, Cand certain Eastern Partnership (EaP) and Western Balkada, Norway, Ukraine, Georgia, Western Balkan countries, Japan, Australia as well as certain African countries constitute an integral pillar of the CSDP;
Amendment 91 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
D a. whereas no sufficiently robust, legally binding measures were in place to deter Russian aggression against Ukraine, while Minsk agreements imposed on Ukraine were summarily disregarded and rejected by Russia while at the same time weakening Ukraine's position; whereas the weak position of the West emboldened Putin to intensify his aggressive policies, prompting his launching of a full-fledged invasion of Ukraine;
Amendment 92 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Recital D b (new)
D b. whereas Ukraine's victory is also a matter of credibility of the EU and its security and defence policy;
Amendment 94 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas Parliament’s active role in framing CSDP policies bolsters the EU’s democratic foundations; whereas Parliament can legitimately exercise political control and oversight over the executive at EU level; whereas Parliament’s diplomacy is a proven and complementary means of enhancing strategic communication, and the visibility and effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations; whereas Parliament recognizes the importance of Member State sovereignty and decision making with regard to deployment and defence spending; whereas Parliament reaffirms the sovereign right of each member state to choose its level of ambition and its goals with regard to CSDP missions;
Amendment 97 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
E a. whereas the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans are in need of peaceful conflict resolution, improved stability and security, and increased mutual cooperation; whereas security in these regions is greatly threatened by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the possibility of spill over of this aggression into neighbouring countries; whereas the destabilization of our immediate neighbourhood threatens the stability, peace and security of the EU;
Amendment 98 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E d (new)
Recital E d (new)
E d. whereas Russia continues to impose its hostile objectives by destroying the security architecture throughout the Euro-Atlantic area as demanded by Putin in December 2021; whereas the Russian Federation continues to threaten the international community with nuclear weapons;
Amendment 99 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E c (new)
Recital E c (new)
Amendment 100 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)
Recital E b (new)
E b. whereas the presence of Russian mercenaries, in particular the notorious Wagner Group, has been confirmed in certain African countries, in particular recently in Mali as of December2021; whereas their presence has greatly deteriorated the security environment, worsened human rights, threatened peace and reconciliation, and obstructed efforts to protect civilians and provide military support; whereas the suspension of the CSDP missions in Mali and their inability to meet their objectives has invited hostile forces to take their place; whereas as of September of 2022 French forces were pulled out of Mali after nearly 10 years of presence; whereas the Wagner Group has reportedly committed atrocities in Ukraine, Mali, Libya, Syria and the Central African Republic;
Amendment 107 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Highlights the dramatic deterioration in European security accelerated by Russia’s unjustified and illegal war against Ukrainof aggression against Ukraine and Putin's demands disclosed in December 2021 aimed at imposing new security architecture in Europe; stresses that this situation demands that the EU step up its defence capacities and show greater willingness to act in order to deliver the security expected by the EU’s citizens; underlines the unprecedented and united EU response to Russia’s war against Ukraine, including the provision of military equipment through the EPF, however, notes that the level of support delivered by Member States significantly differs, in particular the largest countries which seek for the stronger defence union remain the slower and less generous ones in contrast to Poland or the Baltic states; notes that the level of military and financial support delivered to Ukraine by the U.S. and UK is substantially higher than the EU's assistance; remains committed to supporting Ukraine’s defence of its territorial integrity and sovereignty; calls on the EU to sustainand Member States to increase and speed up its efforts and provide Ukraine with all necessary financial, humanitarian and military aid needed to win this war;
Amendment 125 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Underlines the need for solidarity among Member States, especially with those whose geographical position leaves them directly exposed to imminent threats and challenges such as frontline Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, by helping to fill the gap of military equipment delivered to Ukraine;
Amendment 137 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Welcomes new EU initiatives to enhance defence, notably the Versailles Declaration, the Strategic Compass and Joint Communication on defence investment gaps; welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a regulation to incentivise joint procurement while stressing the need for budgetary resources that genuinely meet the ambitious goals set; welcomes the upcoming review of the European defence investment programme regulation, the budget of which should be significantly increased as well; however, underlines that NATO’s 2 Percent Pledge, recommitted to in 2014, and since then despite numerous calls have not been implemented by many states; in this regard joins the call of Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Greece and other countries to exempt defence spending from EU rules on budget deficits;
Amendment 147 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Underlines that impunity which followed the 2008 invasion on Georgia is one of the factors that allowed Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine; is of the opinion that the Ukrainian victory not only will bring freedom to occupied Donbas and Crimea, but also will be decisive for the restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova;
Amendment 148 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
Paragraph 3 b (new)
Amendment 153 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Welcomes the new ambition in the Strategic Compass to enhance the CSDP to build resilience and make it more capable and responsive, so it can act rapidly to defend our interests and values and protect the EU and its citizens; considers the Strategic Compass a major step towards a genuine European Defence Union enabling the EU to act as a credible partner; calls for the timely and sound implementation of the approximately 80 concrete actions and for them to be updated regularly along with the EU Threat Analysis; calls for the sustained political will of all Member States and EU institutions in this process; underlines that the lack of political will to act decisively, including in the face of responsibility to prevent genocide through appropriate and necessary means, even in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU, should be considered as a real challenge and obstacle to gain the status of a global player; welcomes a particular focus on Eastern European partners in the Strategic Compass and calls on the EU to strengthen security cooperation with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, particularly in areas such as countering hybrid threats, disinformation and cybersecurity; underscores that maritime security in the Black Sea, indeed, is of key importance for the EU’s security, economic development, free trade, transport and energy security and calls on the EU to use all relevant mechanisms and instruments to promote stability and connectivity in the Black Sea;
Amendment 164 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Amendment 187 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Calls on Member States to assess the reform of the decision-making process wenhance EU solidarity and mutual assistance in the event of crises; reminds that the securithy a view to realising untapped potential within the Treaties, in particular by activating Article 31 TEU extending qualified majority voting (QMV) to areas relating to the CSDP and pursuing full use of the ‘passerelle clauses’ and scope ofnd defence remain a core competence of Member States and the rule of unanimity serves as important tool for finding compromises and build solidarity between them in most important areas, thus strengthening the Union and its unity and gives the EU stronger mandate for its global arcticles that enhance EU solidarity and mutual assistance in the event of crises; proposes changes to the Treaties in the CSDP, to be discussed and decided upon within a convention following up on the Conference on the Future of Europe, primarily focusing on switching from unanimity to QMV for Council decisions with military implications and on defence matters for situations where passerelle clauses do not apply; ons; recalls that even in a much bigger and more heterogeneous organisation such as NATO, decisions are taken on the basis of consensus; calls for greater willingness to reach the common perception of threats by deepening solidarity, reinstating respect for all Member States regardless their size or political affiliation; is of the opinion that decisions with military implications and on defence matters cannot be imposed by the largest and the most powerful Member States; in this regards reminds about mistakes and detrimental policies in the fields of energy, migration and naive and weak policy of mitigation towards Russia despite numerous warnings from Poland and the Baltic States;
Amendment 197 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. Underlines that Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has clearly exposed the lack of substance of the concept of “strategic autonomy”, as European security is impossible to maintain without a strong transatlantic bond; therefore welcomes abondement of this concept;
Amendment 215 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Welcomes the EU’s ambition to strengthen its military and civilian capabilities; stresses the need to make full use of EU capability-development initiatives and budgets, notably the EDIRPA, EDF, PESCO, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and Military Mobility, in order to fill critical capability gaps, reduce fragmentation in the defence-procurement sector, achieve full interoperability of our forces and strengthen a resilient, competitive and innovative European defence technological and industrial base; calls for ensuring maximum consistency between these initiatives; regrets that in terms of Military Mobility such ambitions are not followed by sufficient funds and political will, which was reflected in one of the Commission's budget proposals in 2020 suggesting zero funding for the military mobility programme; underlines that if Military Mobility, a “flagship initiative for NATO-EU cooperation", will be further left without adequate funding, all the EU ambitions on security and defence, as well as EU- NATO cooperation, will be seriously compromised; considers that the EU's CSDP architecture should actively cooperate with NATO and Transatlantic partners in order to facilitate inclusive joint technological and industrial developments; calls for the development of a task force between EU and NATO agencies for developing a roadmap on identifying ideal equipment for procurement and for the formulation of a ‘transatlantic DARPA’;
Amendment 226 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. Encourages the EU, as part of an innovative financial response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, to assess when a revision of the multiannual financial framework would be appropriate and to review, among other policies, greater defence spending, divestment from Russian hydrocarbons, alleviating the socio-economic consequences of the war for EU citizens, support for frontline countries which are assuming the greatest burden in supporting Ukraine, on top of the continued provision to support Ukraine’s self-defence;
Amendment 228 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)
Paragraph 8 b (new)
8 b. Encourages the EU to consider the co-funding of dual-use civil-military projects that enhance both crisis civilian and military mobility in the Arctic, including enhanced and resilient telecommunications; encourages that PESCO be used as a platform to promote enhanced search- and-rescue training and exercising in the Arctic, as well as better crisis management of ecological disasters, such as oil spills;
Amendment 239 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Considers it important to fill the identified defence investment gaps such as replenishing stockpiles, replacing Soviet- era systems, reinforcing air and missile defence systems, expanding existing main battle tank capabilities and armoured vehicles, strengthening naval forces and improving satellite-based secure connectivity; strongly calls on Member States to commit to a significant increase in funding for EU procurement mechanisms and to take swift and thorough action in this crucial field; regrets the non- inclusive format of Franco-German main battle tank project;
Amendment 245 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9 a. Takes the view that the EU maritime strategy should be updated to reflect new opportunities and challenges; believes that similar assessments and reviews should be carried out on other EU policies, including EU space policy in order to assess the expansion of existing satellite programmes to cover the Arctic region’s specific needs, including the use of Copernicus;
Amendment 305 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Supports the review and reinforcement of all CSDP missions and operations by providing them with more robust and flexible mandates; recognizes the necessity of revised mandates to ensure that effective training and operational capabilities are required to keep pace with the evolving threat environment; stresses the need to strengthen their resilience and effectiveness by enabling them to better address hybrid security challenges, such as through better cooperation with other EU actors and like-minded partners outside the EU;
Amendment 311 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14 a. Calls for a military CSDP mission in Ukraine due to Russia’s invasion and the necessity for support to Ukraine's self- defence; calls for a flexible and robust mission mandate that allows for the training of Ukrainian armed forces, strategic advising, non-executive accompaniment, capacity building of Ukrainian forces, and overall military support to combat Russian aggression and assist in the liberation of occupied regions of Ukraine;
Amendment 315 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 c (new)
Paragraph 14 c (new)
14 c. Notes that the High North falls within the area of responsibility of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and that any potential PESCO project in the High North should ensure cooperation with NATO in order to construct an overarching security concept for the Arctic; with that in mind, welcomes the conclusions of the reflection group tasked by the NATO Secretary- General with undertaking a forward- looking reflection process to assess ways to strengthen the political dimension of the NATO alliance, whereby NATO and the EU SatCen should enhance its situational awareness across the High North and the Arctic and should develop a strategy that takes into account broader deterrence and defence plans, including provisions for addressing aggressive moves by state actors;
Amendment 316 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)
Paragraph 14 b (new)
14 b. Calls for the EU to address the consistent and growing threats to the protection and preservation of cultural heritage and clamp down on the smuggling of cultural artefacts, especially in conflict zones; notes that depriving societies of their cultural heritage and historical roots makes them more vulnerable to radicalisation and more susceptible to global jihadist ideologies; calls for the EU to develop abroad strategy to counteract such threats;
Amendment 324 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15 a. Promotes the unimpeded access of the EU Monitoring Mission to Georgia’s territories occupied by Russia according to the Mission’s mandate; supports the extension of its mandate and strengthening its capacities in order to address properly the security and humanitarian needs of the local population in conflict-affected areas; at the same time, commends Georgia on continued contribution to the EU CSDP missions and operations since 2014;
Amendment 357 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Calls for faster operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) based on the increased readiness of Member States’ military forces; calls on Member States to commit to substantially narrowing critical gaps in strategic enablers by 2025, in particular linked to the RDC, such as strategic airlift, space communication assets, medical assets, cyber-defence capabilities and intelligence and reconnaissance to improve upon the current standards of troop deployment and mobilisation;
Amendment 361 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17 a. Stresses the need for further extension of CSDP missions in the Sahel Region and Horn of Africa as a longer mandate would ensure the continuation of stability and the enhancement of military capabilities as well as civilian capacity building; calls for the extension of EUNAVFOR Somalia’s mandate, which is set to expire at the end of 2022, in order to further combat piracy on the Horn of Africa and ensure safe transport of World Food Program (WFP) aid to displaced persons in Somalia;
Amendment 369 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)
Paragraph 17 b (new)
17 b. Strongly condemns the abuses of human rights by the Malian armed forces and the Wagner Group; underlines the suspension of both CSDP missions is Mali and the consequences of these failed objectives, including the Wagner Group's ability to capitalize on Mali’s vulnerability; calls for joint efforts between the EU and UN to address the destabilization and violence in Mali; calls for EU Member States to continue to contribute to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali to conduct investigations on the human rights abuses in Mali and work with local forces to promote stability and security; calls for the organisation of elections with the support of ECOWAS; calls for the Council to continue EPF assistance measures in order to strengthen the capabilities of the Malian armed forces, support the officer academy, renovate training infrastructure, and provide military equipment;
Amendment 375 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 c (new)
Paragraph 17 c (new)
17 c. Underlines the importance of EUAM Ukraine and its efforts to advise state security bodies on security, police, judiciary, prosecution, anti-corruption, and human rights; calls for a military CSDP mission in Ukraine due to Russia’s invasion and the necessity for military intervention and assistance; calls for a flexible and robust mission mandate that allows for the training of Ukrainian armed forces, strategic advising, non- executive accompaniment, capacity building of Ukrainian forces, and overall military support to combat Russian aggression and assist in the liberation of occupied regions of Ukraine;
Amendment 394 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18 a. Calls on Member States to increase the EPF’s budget to enable the EU to strengthen resilience and defence capabilities of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia;
Amendment 401 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)
Paragraph 18 b (new)
18 b. Expresses grave concern over China’s continued military belligerence, pressure, assault exercises, airspace violations and other grey-zone military actions including cyber and disinformation campaigns against Taiwan; urges China to stop all these actions, restore the full respect of the Taiwan Strait’s median line; reiterates any change to cross-strait relations must be neither unilateral nor against the will of the Taiwanese people; stresses that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait has a direct impact on European security and prosperity;
Amendment 438 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Welcomes the participation of the US, Canada and Norway in the PESCO project on military mobility as important to increase coherence between EU and NATO capability development efforts; welcomes the EU-NATO Structured Dialogue on Military Mobility; calls on the EU to invite Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova to participate in the PESCO projects, on a case-by-case basis;
Amendment 449 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. UCommends the UK's timely, strong and generous support to fighting Ukraine; urges institutionalised security and defence cooperation with the United Kingdom; encourages the United Kingdom to seriously engage with the EU on pressing strategic challenges; encourages the VP/HR to invite the United Kingdom to informal Council meetings of foreign affairs (and defence) ministers to exchange views on issues of common concern;
Amendment 467 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Calls for stronger military-security cooperation with Western Balkan countries, in particular in areas such as resilience, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, counter-terrorism and countering disinformation; underlines the growing possibility of the Russian invasion of Ukraine spilling over into these vulnerable countries; brings attention to Serbia’s relationship with Russia and its lack of condemnation of Russia’s unjustified and illegitimate actions against Ukraine and the consequences of this relationship in the Western Balkans; calls for the continued support of EUFOR ALTHEA, EULEX Kosovo, EUMM Georgia, and EUAM Ukraine;
Amendment 473 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)
Paragraph 26 a (new)
26 a. Calls for cooperation between the EU and Taiwan to address Chinese posture specifically in regards to the firing of missiles in the Taiwan Strait; calls for cooperation to generate a PESCO project to develop and implement missile defence technology and promote the non-proliferation of hyper sonic technology on behalf of the Chinese government; calls for EDA support and funding to promote the success of this PESCO project in order to protect Taiwan from further Chinese threats; calls for the use of the EU Hybrid Toolbox to combat the hybrid and cyber-attacks from China;
Amendment 491 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 – indent 1
Paragraph 27 – indent 1
Amendment 503 #
2022/2050(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Calls for further strengthening Parliament’s relations with the NATO PA, in the framework of which Parliament should support the establishment of the NATO Centre of Excellence for Democratic Resilience aimed at monitoring and identifying challenges to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and facilitating democracy and governance assistance to member and partner states;
Amendment 20 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, with support of the Lukashenko's regime, has brought war back to the European continent, has seriously undermined European and global security, has created economic uncertainty, has led to a spike in energy prices, has considerable potential to further destabilise many non-EU countries and has therefore significantly changed the geopolitical context of the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP); whereas Russia's intention of destruction the security architecture throughout the Euro-Atlantic as demanded by Putin in December2021, thanks to the heroic defence of Ukraine, has not succeeded; whereas the EU since2014 was unable to utilize its CSDP instruments to effectively support fighting Ukraine, with some change of direction in the recent year; whereas the EU cannot be perceived as a successful and credible global actor without providing security in its immediate neighbourhood;
Amendment 32 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans are in need of peaceful conflict resolution, improved stability and security, and increased mutual cooperation; whereas security in these regions is greatly threatened by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the possibility of spill over of this aggression into neighbouring countries; whereas the destabilization of our immediate neighbourhood threatens the stability, peace and security of the EU;
Amendment 35 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine was a wake-up call for the European Union, presenting a real threat to European and global security and creating momentum to achieve a geopolitical redefinition of the CFSP; whereas it is also an opportunity for the Member States to show the political will to transform the CFSP into a fully fledged European policy; , which however needs a genuine will to act and transatlantic cooperation in order to deliver strategically relevant results; whereas in face of Russian aggression, Finland and Sweden have applied to join NATO, leaving only three EU Members outside NATO's collective defence; whereas it is also an opportunity for the Member States to define a common perception of threats and demonstrate genuine solidarity with the frontline Members; whereas this war reaffirmed the role of NATO as bedrock of European security and endorsed U.S. leadership and U.K.'s role in the European security and indispensability of a strong transatlantic bond;
Amendment 47 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas, at the direction of Vladimir Putin, the Government of the Russian Federation has continued to conduct acts of international terrorism against political opponents and nation states, with culmination in Ukraine since 2014;
Amendment 48 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Recital B b (new)
Bb. whereas Poland has shouldered the heaviest burden in supporting Ukraine and her people;
Amendment 60 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Points out that the EU’s response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is a test ofand Putin's demands disclosed in December 2021 aimed at imposing new security architecture in Europe are a test of European solidarity and the effectiveness of the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy and of its role as a credible foreign policy player, a reliable international partner and a credible security and defence actor; underlines that the lack of political will to act decisively, including in the face of responsibility to prevent genocide through appropriate and necessary means, even in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU, should be considered as a real challenge and obstacle to gain the status of a global player;
Amendment 67 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Underscores that the tectonic shift in the geopolitical landscape caused by the war in Ukraine and other international challenges calls for a swifter and more resolute implementation of the concept of strategic sovereignty and for a geopolitical awakening of the EUtronger transatlantic bond and for a geopolitical awakening of the EU, at the same time showing the need for closer cooperation with NATO and like –minded allies across the globe;
Amendment 87 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Recalls that the Strategic Compass, adopted by the Council in March 2022, gives the EU the tools to be both an effective security provider in a hostile environment and a more assertive global actor for peace and human security, and therefore calls for its swift implementation in cohesion with NATO's strategic concept of 29 June 2022;
Amendment 102 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 – indent 3
Paragraph 4 – indent 3
- building partnerships for a better world, and strengthening the existing ones, most notably with the US and UK,
Amendment 113 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Welcomes the remarkable level of unity and resolve in responding swiftly and forcefully to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraineof the collective West, with the leading role of U.S., Canada, UK, Poland and the Baltic States, in responding swiftly and forcefully to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; however, notes that the level of support delivered by Member States significantly differs, in particular the largest countries which traditionally argued for the stronger defence union remain slower and less generous than Poland or the Baltic States; notes that the level of military and financial support delivered to Ukraine by the U.S. and UK is substantially higher than the combined EU assistance and calls for stronger EU engagement;
Amendment 119 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – introductory part
Paragraph 6 – introductory part
6. Underscores the importance of preserving this unity and continuing to strengthen the EU’s strategic sovereignuropean security and resilience through more efficient decision- making in the field of CFSP, which could be achieved by:
Amendment 122 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point a
Paragraph 6 – point a
(a) switching progressively to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of the CFSP that do not have military or defence implications, as well as for other EU external policy tools such as the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, by usreminds that the security and defence remain a core competence of Member States and the rule of unanimity serves as important tool for finding compromises and building solidarity between them in most important areas, thus strengthening the Union and its unity and gives the EU stronger mandate for its global actions; recalls that even in a much bigger and more heterogeneous organisation such as NATO, decisions are taken on the basis of consensus; calls for greater willingness to reach the common perception of threats by deepening solidarity, reinstating respect for all Member States regardless their size or political affiliation; is of the opinion that decisions with military implications and on defence matters cannot be imposed by the largest and theoretically most powerful Member States; ing the passerelle clauses provided for in the Treatiis regards reminds about mistakes and detrimental policies in the fields of energy, migration and naive and weak policy of mitigation towards Russia despite numerous warnings from Poland and the Baltic States;
Amendment 173 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2
Subheading 2
Amendment 174 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Underlines that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the grave and massive violation of human rights and the fundamental norms of international law have highlighted the need for stronger, more ambitious, credible, strategic and unified EU action on the world stage, and accentuated the necessity for the EU to autonommore vigorously set its own strategic objectives and develop the capabilities to pursue them; is of the opinion that regaining all occupied territories by Ukraine, safeguarding her independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, compensations for all human and material loses using confiscated Russian assets, as well as bringing the perpetrators, including Vladimir Putin, to international justice should be considered as the ultimate goal of EU policy towards Ukraine;
Amendment 184 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Welcomes the shift in the Member States’ approaches, moving towards creating more EU strategic sovereigntyUnderlines that Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has clearly exposed the lack of substance of the concept of “strategic autonomy”, as European security is impossible to be maintained without a strong transatlantic bond; therefore welcomes abandonment of this concept; However, welcomes declaration of some Member States’ to shift their approaches to security, including by adopting the Versailles Declaration of 11 March 2022 and the Strategic Compass on 21 March 2022, which highlight the need to strengthen EU defence capabilities and to contribute positively to global and transatlantic security, in close collaboration with NATO;
Amendment 210 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Welcomes the swift use of the European Peace Facility to support Ukraine, improve its ability to act and build on the European Peace Facility support already delivered to Ukraine, including through the Clearing House Cell and calls for increase in financial and military assistance to Ukraine and for immediate deployment of modern equipment, weapons, and new generation of air defence systems; notes that the support of the U.S. in terms of equipment, finance, intelligence substantially exceeds support delivered by the EU, in particular the biggest and theoretically the strongest one, are much slower and weaker than the assistance delivered also by Poland or the Baltic States;
Amendment 261 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Calls on all UN member states to take action to revoke Russia’s veto powers at the Security Council and to expel Russia from the UN, as happened with the USSR from the League of Nations in 1939 after its aggression towards Poland and Finland; calls for the suspension of Russia’s membership in international organizations including the World Trade Organization, World Customs Organization, UNICEF, UNESCO and the International Monetary Fund;
Amendment 262 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)
Paragraph 13 b (new)
13b. Is strongly convinced that only ultimate Ukraine's victory over Russia will defend the global order and deter other aggressive actors from conducting wars of aggression; underlines that only defeated, deimperialized and decolonized Russia may be a partner for any future cooperation;
Amendment 263 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 c (new)
Paragraph 13 c (new)
13c. Underlines the need for EU unanimity in condemning the Russian aggression and not opening separate lines of contact with Putin by leaders of some EU countries; stresses that there should be no pushing for any negotiations with Russia until and unless Ukrainian authorities decide enter into such and that until that happens EU should continue to provide financial, materiel and military assistance for Ukraine; in this regard reminds about Minsk Agreement and Normady format which proved to be ineffective and in many points detrimental for Ukraine's security;
Amendment 270 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 d (new)
Paragraph 13 d (new)
13d. Calls on the international community to make sure that all Russian instigators and perpetrators committing war crimes and crimes against humanity will be held fully accountable; urges every country to consider joining a special tribunal initiated by Ukraine to punish the Russian military and political leadership for their crimes of aggression and to launch an investigation into the crime of genocide currently being committed;
Amendment 278 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Highlights the need to intensify the dialogue with the UK on possible avenues for future cooperation and coordination in the area of foreign and security policy, including in the framework of the EU- NATO partnership, the United Nations and other international forums; calls to further strengthen cooperation with NATO and other partnerships such as with G7, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Georgia, Western Balkan countries, Japan, Australia as well certain African countries such as Morocco which partnerships should constitute an integral pillar of the CFSP;
Amendment 303 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Takes note of the outcome of the EU-China Summit ; in view of increasingly aggressive posture of the PRC; reiterates its requests for a renewed EU-China strategy; underscores the necessity of ensuring that any support to Russia’s war in Ukraine and any circumvention of the effects of the sanctions against Russia by China must have consequences for its relations with the EU;
Amendment 308 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. expresses grave concern at Chinese government’s position indicated at the CCP’s 20th Party Congress that China will never renounce the right to use force over Taiwan; reiterates that the status quo of the Taiwan Strait should not be unilaterally altered against the will of the Taiwanese people; is of the view that the dispute between Taiwan and China should be solved through peaceful dialogues without any preconditions;
Amendment 321 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to establish strategic cooperation with Taiwan, and to swiftly follow up on recommendations of its resolution on “EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation” of 21 October 2021;
Amendment 324 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Underlines that Taiwan is a key EU partner and democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region, one that contributes to maintaining a rules-based international order and upholds fundamental values; strongly urges the EU and its Member States to intensify cooperation and pursue a comprehensive enhanced partnership with Taiwan, notably essential cooperation on critical supply chain resilience, and countering disinformation and foreign interference.
Amendment 326 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)
Paragraph 17 b (new)
17b. Strongly advocate Taiwan’s meaningful participation as an observer in the meetings, mechanism and activities of the World Health Organization, UNFCCC, International Civil Aviation Organization and Interpol;
Amendment 350 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Points out that relations with India are deepening through the ongoing trade negotiations; is seriously concerned, however, about India’s stance on Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, especially providing financial support for Kremlin not only by not aligning with sanctions, but also increasing imports and purchasing Russian weapons;
Amendment 357 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Reaffirms its unwavering support to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Eastern Partnership countries within their internationally recognised borders; Acknowledges that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is having a negative impact on the Eastern Partnership countries first and foremost; calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to engage in a thorough reflection on a reform of the Eastern Partnership policy; ; underlines that Russia applies the same aggressive policy towards Georgia and Moldova; acknowledges that Georgia was the first to experience a full-scale Russian military aggression in August 2008 and its attempts to forcibly change the borders of a sovereign state in Europe, to occupy Georgia’s indivisible regions — Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/SouthOssetia and take steps towards their factual annexation, to expel hundreds of thousands of people from their homes as a result of ethnic cleansing and to divide societies with occupation lines; urges the EU to keep demanding Russia to implement its obligations under the EU- mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement; encourages the EU to strengthen its engagement in peaceful conflict resolution in the EaP region;
Amendment 366 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22a. Welcomes the EUMM presence along Armenia’s international border with Azerbaijan; highlights the importance of decreased Russian influence in the region through increased EU presence; calls on the EU Council to expand number of deployed experts and grow mission capacity and calls for stronger presence in the region;
Amendment 387 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. Is of the opinion that as long as Ukrainian citizens are suffering from the atrocities of Russia’s war of aggression, Russian citizens should not be allowed to enter the EU; calls therefore for a complete ban on tourist visas for Russian citizens and a review of those that have already been issued; moreover, calls to consider asylum applications only for those who actively opposed the Russian regime and are seeking shelter from repressions for that;
Amendment 388 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 b (new)
Paragraph 23 b (new)
23b. Underlines that impunity which followed the 2008 invasion on Georgia is one of the factors that allowed Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine; is of the opinion that the Ukrainian victory not only will bring freedom to occupied Donbas and Crimea, but also to Belarus and will be decisive for the restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova;
Amendment 389 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 c (new)
Paragraph 23 c (new)
23c. Calls on the EEAS to prepare a thorough report of violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement for which the EU as the mediator of the 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement bears special responsibility, identify and communicate clearly the provisions which have still not been fulfilled by the Russian Federation and submit recommendations which could induce the Russian Federation to fulfil them, notably to withdraw its military forces from Georgia’s occupied territories and allow establishment of international security mechanisms therein and to allow the EUMM unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia pursuant to its mandate;
Amendment 390 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 d (new)
Paragraph 23 d (new)
23d. Reaffirms that the future of peoples of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia as well the Western Balkans lies within the EU; Reaffirms its commitment to enlargement, to which there is no alternative and which is more than ever a geostrategic investment in a stable, strong and united EU; strongly believes that a prospect if full EU membership for the countries striving to become Member States of the EU is in the Union’s own political, economic and security interest;
Amendment 392 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 e (new)
Paragraph 23 e (new)
23e. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia within their internationally recognised borders and supports their efforts to fully enforce those principles; underlines the importance of the unity and solidarity of the Member States in this regard;
Amendment 440 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Calls for a swift restoration and full implementation by all parties of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which is a cornerstone of non- proliferation and the stabilisIn view of bloody crackdown on peaceful protestors after death of Mahsa Amini and Iranian hostile conduct in the region and globally, including delivery of weapons to the Russian aggressor, calls for suspension all negotiations ofn the Middle East and the Gulf regJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action;,
Amendment 479 #
2022/2048(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Calls on the international community to mitigate as much as possible the negative spillover of the consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on the Arctic, the peaceful conservation of which should remain a priority, however, the EU’s Arctic policy must reflect the new security realities after the Russian aggression on Ukraine;
Amendment 20 #
2022/0068(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 a (new)
Recital 5 a (new)
(5 a) The Commission should keep both the Council and the Parliament informed in a timely manner and well in advance of developments that may lead to situations requiring the adoption of autonomous measures. Both the European Parliament and the Council should also be duly and timely informed of any event of non- cooperation and of the possible responses at the disposal of the Union to ensure a full and proper implementation of these Agreements, as well as the follow-up to any measures taken. The latter principle also applies in the event when urgent action is required.
Amendment 27 #
2022/0068(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the temporary suspension of the relevant preferential treatment of the product or products concerned as set out in Article 34 of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement;
Amendment 28 #
2022/0068(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point f
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point f
(f) remedial temporary measures as set out in Article 469 of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement;
Amendment 29 #
2022/0068(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point l
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point l
(l) temporary measures restricting trade, investment or other activities within the scope of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, if adjudication is not possible because the United Kingdom is not taking the steps that are necessary for a dispute settlement procedure under that Agreement or the Withdrawal Agreement to function, including unduly delaying the proceedings amounting to non-cooperation in the process;
Amendment 32 #
2022/0068(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) where the measure consists of the temporary suspension of an obligation under any of the agreements referred to in Article 1(1), to impose restrictions on trade, investment or other activities within the scope of the agreement concerned which would otherwise be precluded by the suspended obligation.
Amendment 33 #
2022/0068(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Amendment 11 #
2022/0000(INI)
– having regard to its resolution of 1 March and 7 April 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine,
Amendment 12 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Citation 10 a (new)
Citation 10 a (new)
– having regard to its resolution of 14 June 2018 on Georgian occupied territories 10 years after the Russian invasion,
Amendment 20 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine following Russia’s invasion of Georgia, illegal occupation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia as well as illegal military presence in Transnistria and elsewhere and attempted annexation of Crimea is a blatant violation of international law, the UN Charter and the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, and seriously undermines European and global security and stability;
Amendment 26 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas thousands of Ukrainians have lost their lives in the war waged by the Kremlin against the population of Ukraine; whereas thousandsRussian Federation against the Ukraine since 2014; whereas even more people have been wounded and more than 10 million people have been forced to leave their homes or have fled to neighbouring countries;
Amendment 27 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the Russian armed forces are deliberately and indiscriminately shelling civilian infrastructure, including homes and shelterkindergartens, hospitals, homes and shelters and commit other atrocities that amount to genocide, including arbitrary mass executions, rapes, torture, forced deportations of Ukrainian citizens;
Amendment 31 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, these attacks are causing immeasurable human suffering and may amount to war crimeseet the definition of genocide contained in the UN Convention of 1948;
Amendment 41 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought war back to Europe and wthe Europeans in the European Union now Union, in close cooperation with like-minded partners and transatlantic allies need to use all our determination and resolve to protect and defend this UnionUkraine and the values and principles ithe EU stands for;
Amendment 48 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas Parliament is resolved to do its part to influence the Member States that have not done so already to render all necessary military, financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and to impose full embargo on Russian gas, oil and coal imports into the EU counter the Russian Federation’s attempts to destroy the foundations of international security and stability;
Amendment 51 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas Parliament called, in its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine, for the EU institutions to work towards granting EU candidate status to Ukraine as soon as possible and, in the meantime, to continue to work towards its integration into the EU single market along the lines of the EU- Ukraine Association Agreement;
Amendment 56 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas Parliament should initiate a deep analysis of the reasons why the West failed to deter Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine, whichfollowing Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 which constituted the first major open attack on the European order, violates the UN Charter and thus constitutes an attack on the very core of Europe’sinternational peace and security order, its values and prosperity, and its democratic foundations;
Amendment 61 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas there is an urgent need to end the humanitarian and security crises Europe is encountering and better prepare for the full spectrum of crises to cometake stock of lessons from previous mistakes in policy vis a vis Russia and review EU’s priorities and modify Commission Work Programme and other strategic documents accordingly; whereas the Union needs to utilise all the instruments at its disposal, with an emphasis on timely engagement, to protect the Union and its residents and its values and interests, and to contribute to international peace and security;
Amendment 67 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the Russian invasion has clearly shown that NATO remains the cornerstone of European security; whereas an active role for Parliament in framing a common Union defence policy and establishing common defencethat should be complimentary to and bolster NATO capabilities, and its political support therefore and democratic scrutiny thereof, would affirm and enhance the representative and democratic foundations of the Union;
Amendment 74 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Recital N
Recital N
N. whereas each EU institution should act within the limits of the powers conferred on it by the Treaties and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them in line with the principles of subsidiarity; whereas the institutions should practice mutual sincere cooperation;
Amendment 77 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Recital P
Recital P
P. whereas the specific role of Parliament Treaties define the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy is defined Member States and the Council as leading actors in framing and conducting the TreatiesCommon Foreign and Security Policy;
Amendment 90 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point a
Paragraph 1 – point a
(a) urgently demonstrate their political will to make genuine progress in foreign policy and defence cooperation at the EU levelprovide all necessary material, military, financial and humanitarian aid for Ukraine, as expressed in the Versailles Declaration and the Council’s conclusions of 24 and 25 March;
Amendment 98 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(aa) acknowledge that the failure to respond adequately to the Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008 and against Ukraine in 2014 prompted Russia to continue aggressive military and political campaigns, including full-scale invasion of Ukraine and by doing so to weaken and undermine the rules-based international order and stability in Europe and elsewhere;
Amendment 99 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point a b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point a b (new)
(ab) acknowledge that the strategic goal of the free World is to support Ukraine in her ultimate victory against the Russian aggressor and regaining control over Ukraine’s internationally recognised territory;
Amendment 103 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point b
Paragraph 1 – point b
(b) agree that the VP/HR shcould will be present ex officiobe invited in some negotiating formats in which EU Member States participate;
Amendment 106 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
(ba) thoroughly review the fulfilment of the provisions of the 12 August 2008 cease-fire agreement mediated by the French Presidency of the EU and draw conclusions from this lessons and Russia’s subsequent breaches;
Amendment 109 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point c
Paragraph 1 – point c
(c) introduce qualified majority voting for certain foreign policy areas, as already provided for in the Treaties, and strive to extend it in order to increase the effectiveness of EU foreign policyuphold the unanimity and solidarity in CFSP matters as the only way to maintain an inclusive and cohesive EU foreign policy, with stronger mandate for its global actions;
Amendment 117 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point d
Paragraph 1 – point d
(d) make progress in establishing a defence union, which would serve as a starting point for implementing a common EU defence, in line with the provision laid down in Article 42(2) TEUrengthening Europe’s defence capabilities and cooperation between the EU and NATO; acknowledge that recent events have shown the utopian nature of the concept of EU’s fully-fledged “strategic autonomy” and recognize the leading role of NATO and transatlantic bond in guaranteeing Europe’s security;
Amendment 132 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point e
Paragraph 1 – point e
(e) work together with like-minded partners around the globe in order to defend the rules-based order, thus promoting and defending peace, democratic principles and respect for human rights; to provide close coordination and cooperation with transatlantic NATO allies in this regard;
Amendment 141 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
(ea) acknowledge that Vladimir Putin, during his time in power, turned Russia back into a rogue totalitarian state; make sure that EU institutions and Member States to treat it as such;
Amendment 151 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point f
Paragraph 1 – point f
(f) increase the EU’s strategic sovereignty in specific areas that are fundamental to its continued pre-eminence on the international stage, for example by achieving full security of energy supply, energy diversification and energy independence, prioritising the reduction of energy dependencies, ensuring supply chains are diversified and that there is reciprocity in trade exchanges, and that investment and trade agreements reflect common values and close political ties and ensuring the Union has food and agricultural sovereignty;
Amendment 180 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point h
Paragraph 1 – point h
(h) draw lessons from the use of the European Peace Facility in order to support Ukraine, increase its funding and build on the clearing house mechanism which was first implemented with Ukraine; consider the ways for strengthening security and resilience of the EU Associated Partners, through utilizing the possibilities opened by the Strategic Compass, and increasing assistance to Georgia and Moldova within the framework of the European Peace Facility;
Amendment 188 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point i
Paragraph 1 – point i
(i) improve intelligence sharing among the Member States and engage in a systematic, regular and frequent updates of the threat analysis included in the Strategic Compass; in the context of the recent invasion, investigate the lack of proper EU reaction despite comprehensive information from Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence services warning against imminent attack;
Amendment 229 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point m
Paragraph 1 – point m
(m) strengthen the scope, staffing, resources and strategic communication of CSDP missions in Bosnia Herzegovina and, Georgia and Moldova and reinforce the EU’s diplomatic presence in the Eastern Partnership countries and in the Western Balkans; continue pushing to enable the EU Monitoring Mission’s access to the Russia-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia according to the EUMM’s mandate;
Amendment 266 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point r
Paragraph 1 – point r
(r) engage within the EU, then with NATO, on a reflection on the nature of possible security guarantees that can be provided to Ukraine; intensify the EU- NATO dialogue on the Black Sea region with a view of promoting peace, security and resilience in the EU Associated Partners – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine;
Amendment 286 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point u a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point u a (new)
(ua) establish a Special Committee to investigate the EU’s dependence on Russia, especially in the field of energy, in particular Nord Stream projects, and other harmful initiatives, including circumventing sanctions and exporting weapons, which enabled Russia to perform a full-scale invasion of Ukraine;
Amendment 310 #
Amendment 320 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point ac
Paragraph 1 – point ac
(ac) issue a statement acknowledging Ukraine’s EU aspirations, stating that the Union stands in solidarity with Ukraine and ensuring that under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, solidarity and cohesion will be ensured to support Ukraine as much as possible during the ongoing war, and work towards granting EU candidate status to Ukraine; issue similar statements with regard to Moldova and Georgia;
Amendment 331 #
2022/0000(INI)
Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1 – point ad a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point ad a (new)
(ada) establish a legal instrument allowing to confiscate frozen Russian assets and funds and use them for reparations and reconstruction of Ukraine;
Amendment 43 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Welcomes the Republic of Moldova’s constructive contribution to the cooperation within the Eastern Partnership, especially in the framework of the Associated countries, and expresses hope that the statements as regards the country’s ambitious agenda and sectoral integration in transport, energy and other fields will turn into concrete decisions and actions, both from the side of Moldovan authorities and of the Union;
Amendment 56 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Welcomes the Trio’s initiative to foster coordination between the associated partners and with the EU in consulting and aligning their policies, sharing of best practices on good governance, reforms and implementation of AA/DCFTAs, which all should lead to the broader agenda for the future and fulfilment of their European aspirations;
Amendment 59 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. Calls on the Moldovan authorities to put more efforts in order to ensure that the AA/DCFTA opportunities and EU assistance and programmes reach the local level, including in the remote parts of the country, in particular rural areas, so as to enable inhabitants to push for positive changes in their communities, in particular those more vulnerable to post- Soviet sentiments and Russian manipulation such as Gagauzia region;
Amendment 108 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Welcomes the agreement between the EU and the Republic of Moldova on launching a High-Level Political and Security Dialogue and the renewed engagement on security and CSDP through the bilateral political staff-to- staff consultations; encourages the EEAS and the Republic of Moldova to make full use of these platforms in order to advance cooperation on matters such as, but not limited to combating hybrid threats, enhancing resilience, strengthening cybersecurity, enhancing strategic communication; invites the Republic of Moldova to further align its positions with those of CFSP and to continue its contribution to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its missions as well as encourages EU and the Republic of Moldova to identify ways to expand this cooperation;
Amendment 115 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Amendment 120 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Reiterates its support for a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Transnistria conflict based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova with a special status for the Transnistrian region and reiterates its calls for the complete and unconditional withdrawal of the Russian forces;
Amendment 127 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Encourages the extension of the mandate of the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and Moldova (EUBAM) beyond 30 November 2023 and strengthen support customs and border guard authorities of both States on the central level and alongside the common border;
Amendment 130 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)
Paragraph 10 b (new)
10b. Calls for the EU and Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities to speed up the process of blocking illegal trade and shutting down contraband channels in the Transnistria region as a safe haven for smugglers which has been exploited by criminals and oligarchs and served to strengthen Russian influence and has been one of the major factors protracting the conflict;
Amendment 132 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 c (new)
Paragraph 10 c (new)
10c. Expresses its concern at the threat to the security and the environment of the region and beyond posed by the munitions stored in the Cobasna depots and calls on the international community to support efforts of the Moldavian authorities for the removal or the destruction of those hazardous weapons;
Amendment 133 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 d (new)
Paragraph 10 d (new)
10d. Calls on all interested parties to maintain consistent efforts in combating smuggling, money laundering, dismantling criminal networks and reducing the influence of oligarchs; calls for enhanced cooperation with Europol, Interpol, and customs organizations such as WCO and OECD's Anti-corruption Networks;
Amendment 137 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Welcomes the Council decision to provide EUR 7 million in assistance under the European Peace Facility to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova for the acquisition of medical and explosive ordnance disposal equipment and encourages the EEAS and the Council to further support strengthening capacity of the defence sector through assistance measures under this instrument;
Amendment 141 #
Amendment 142 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Welcomes the steps undertaken to asynchronously interconnect the electricity system of Moldova with the EU via Romania, being a significant milestone on the way to strengthening and diversifying Moldova’s energy infrastructure; calls on all the authorities to fulfil the objective of connecting Moldova with Romania’s power grid by 2024 with the support of the EU;
Amendment 145 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)
Paragraph 11 b (new)
11b. Invites the European Commission to include the Republic of Moldova in the stress tests conducted for the internal energy market;
Amendment 146 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 c (new)
Paragraph 11 c (new)
11c. Welcomes the launch of the EU- Moldova High-Level Dialogue on Energy and encourages launching High-level dialogues with the EU to strengthen cooperation in other sectorial fields;
Amendment 147 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 d (new)
Paragraph 11 d (new)
11d. Welcomes the Commission’s decision to provide the Republic of Moldova with EUR 60 million through a new budget support programme in order to deal with a gas supply crisis artificially created by Gazprom and to mitigate the impact of the rising prices on the most vulnerable Moldovans; welcomes efforts of Poland and Ukraine among others to swiftly provide alternative gas supplies; notes that the crisis further underscores the importance of the diversification of energy supplies and routes, and of building long-term resilience through a transition to more sustainable energy sources and investing in key infrastructure;
Amendment 148 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 e (new)
Paragraph 11 e (new)
11e. Stresses the inadmissibility of the weaponisation of the gas supply in order to put political pressure on the Republic of Moldova to change its geopolitical orientation; urges the Commission to continue providing the Republic of Moldova with the financial and technical support necessary to ensure its resilience against such external interference; calls on the Moldovan authorities to maintain the country’s commitment as a member of the Energy Community to implementing the EU’s Third Energy Package, in particular the unbundling of gas and electricity transmission and distribution;
Amendment 149 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 f (new)
Paragraph 11 f (new)
11f. Stresses the importance of further diversification of the Republic of Moldova’s energy supplies, strengthen energy efficiency, develop renewable energy sources; requests that the Commission supports the Republic of Moldova’s and Ukraine’s integration with the European continental power grid (ENTSO-E); notes that the support and promotion of the EU enhanced cooperation with the EaP associated countries in these sectors will also create economic growth and will strengthen the energy resilience of the region;
Amendment 150 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 g (new)
Paragraph 11 g (new)
11g. Welcomes the efforts and the continuing progress made by Moldovan authorities towards further improving its safety oversight system and implementing international aviation safety standards that led to the removal of all air carriers certified in the Republic of Moldova from the EU Air Safety List, and calls the Moldovan authorities to ensure the implementation of the EU-Republic of Moldova Common Aviation Area Agreement;
Amendment 156 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Recognises the need for deep reforms of the judiciary systems in the post-communist countries aimed at achieving efficiency, full and real independence of the judiciary, regaining public trust in the judiciary and public administration system and cutting the links with post-communist informal networks and oligarchs, fighting corruption and money loundering also on the highest political and business levels; supports Moldovan authorities and the Moldovan society in these efforts;
Amendment 186 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Urges more efforts to strengthen and establish legal and institutional guarantees for a pluralistic media landscape in the Republic of Moldova;
Amendment 208 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Calls for the Republic of Moldova and the EU to improve connectivity of Moldova within the Black Sea basin and the Carpathian region and advance work on the Moldovan sections of the trans- European extended transport network for EaP (TEN-T), to support the railway sector reforms and to explore together with Member States and International Financial Institutions possibilities for upgrading the EU-Republic of Moldova rail connections, while ensuring environmental sustainability; encourages the Republic of Moldova to advance in implementing the relevant acquis; and calls for increased cooperation and the gradually integration of the Republic of Moldova into the EU Transport Market and Transport Community;
Amendment 216 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Is of the opinion, that, by guaranteeing tariff-free access to EU markets for Transnistrian businesses registered on the west bank of the Dniester and submitted to customs checks by Moldovan officials, the DCFTA resulted in a massive swing in the direction of trade from the Eurasian Economic Union to the EU; encourages the Moldovan authorities to further advance towards trade and engagement with EU markets in order to enhance market access, transparency, good business practices and reduce the capacity for market manipulation and monopolization by oligarchs;
Amendment 223 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16b. Calls to continue efforts to build a genuine digital market economy, including progress with open data development, broadening access to conditional access systems for digital television and virtual network services, increasing the number of electronic communication services for citizens and public registers; highlights that further work must be done to ensure that the rights and needs of Moldovan citizens using the internet are protected and to fully implement the Digital Single Market requirements;
Amendment 246 #
2021/2237(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Welcomes and supports the interest of the Republic of Moldova to advance cooperation with the EU in the area of digitalization and telecommunications, including by reducing roaming tariffs between the Republic of Moldova and the EU;
Amendment 10 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas Georgia submitted its application for EU membership on 3 March 2022 in the context of Russia’s military aggression against Ukrainenew geopolitical situation resulting from Russia’s full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, providing a unique window of opportunity for fulfilling aspirations of Georgian people and successive governments since the Rose Revolution of 2003;
Amendment 22 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas the Russian Federation continues to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia through illegal occupation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, which is a blatant breach of international law as well as the EU- mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement;
Amendment 25 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas the Russian Federation continues the process of "creeping" annexation of Georgia’s occupied territories, including through the intentions of holding the so-called referendum in the Tskhinvali region on the matter of “joining” Russia, transfer of the “Bichvinta” property complex and the surrounding area to the Russian Federation, as well as further incorporation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia into military, economic, justice, social and other sectors of the Russian Federation;
Amendment 29 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Recital D b (new)
Db. whereas Russia and its proxies continue the policy of ethnic cleansing, discrimination, frequent kidnappings and illegal detentions, damaging of Georgian cultural heritage, erection of barbed wire fences and other artificial barriers, lengthy closure of so-called crossing points along the occupation line, as well as other severe forms of human rights violations of Georgians in the occupied territories of Georgia;
Amendment 35 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D c (new)
Recital D c (new)
Dc. whereas the Russian Federation and its occupation regimes are deliberately hampering the safe and dignified return of IDPs and refugees, forcibly expelled as a result of ethnic cleansing from the Russia-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia;
Amendment 49 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Emphasises that the European perspective, just as the Association Agreement, covers the entire territory of Georgia, including its occupied regions;
Amendment 63 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 (new)
Paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 (new)
Territorial integrity and security
Amendment 64 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Calls on all the stakeholders to update the terminology used in the context of Georgia's territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders and admit the fact of occupation of Abkhazia / South Ossetia (Tskhinvali) by the Russian Federation, and thus refrain from calling them "breakaway territories" and using the term ABL (Administrative Boundary Line), changing it to "occupied territories" and "Illegal Occupation Line" respectively;
Amendment 65 #
2021/2236(INI)
4. Underlines that impunity which followed the 2008 invasion on Georgia is one of the factors that allowed Russia’'s war of aggression against Ukraine calls for unity and solidarity on the part; is of the opinion that the Ukrainian victory not only will bring freedom to occupied Donbas and Crimea, but also will be decisive for the restoration of the international communityritorial integrity of Georgia; welcomes the strong response of Georgian society in support of Ukraine; calls for political alignment by the Georgian authorities and all political stakeholders with EU positions on this important matter, in line with the country’s European ambitions;
Amendment 69 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Is concerned with reports that Russian people and entities are allegedly using Georgia to bypass Western sanctions; calls on the EU institutions to further examine these allegations, in particular various reports, including one by Ukrainian National Agency on Corruption Prevention, about Bidzina Ivanishvili's ties to Russia; should these allegations be confirmed, calls for personal sanctions to be introduced against him and his closest associates;
Amendment 74 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Reiterates its steadfast support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; calls for the continuation of efforts to achieve a negotiated peaceful resolution of the conflict, including through the Geneva International Discussions, the ongoing activities of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia and the efforts of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia; notes with concern the continuation of illegal ‘borderisation’ activitiesto strengthen efforts to reverse consequences of Russia's invasion on Georgia in 2008, including through the effective and result- oriented functioning of Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms(IPRMs) in Gali and Ergneti, the ongoing activities of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia and the efforts of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia as well as the policy of non- recognition and punishment for atrocities and crimes committed by the aggressor and its proxies; emphasizes that any security formats which include the Russian Federation proved to be ineffective, which include the case of the Geneva International Discussions, lasting already for 14 years; notes with concern the continuation of illegal ‘borderisation’ activities, illegal detentions, kidnappings and restriction on freedom of movement along the occupation line; in the occupied regions; calls on the Council to extend the mandate of EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia beyond 14 December 2022 and to provide it with a budget that is commensurate with its tasks to stabilise and normalise the situation and build confidence between the parties in the conflict in an increasingly tense security environment;
Amendment 79 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Calls on the EEAS to prepare a thorough report of violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement for which the EU as the mediator of the 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement bears special responsibility, identify and communicate clearly the provisions which have still not been fulfilled by the Russian Federation and submit recommendations which could induce the Russian Federation to fulfil its international obligations, notably to withdraw all its military forces from Georgia’s occupied territories and allow establishment of international security mechanisms therein, to allow the EUMM unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia pursuant to its mandate;
Amendment 84 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5b. Condemns the illegal occupation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia by the Russian Federation, expresses concern over the dire security, humanitarian and human rights situation in Georgia’s occupied territories, and strongly denounces the violation of right of IDPs and refugees forcibly expelled from Georgia’s occupied territories as result of ethnic cleansing to return to their homes in safety and dignity;
Amendment 87 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 c (new)
Paragraph 5 c (new)
5c. Condemns the intensified ethnic discrimination and other forms of violations of human rights of Georgians who remain in the occupied territories; expresses concern over the violation of the right to receive education in native language and consistent impunity, as seen in connection with the fatal cases of murder of Mr Basharuli, Mr Otkhozoria, Mr Tatunashvili and Mr Kvaratskhelia; demands that Russia and its occupation regimes in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali immediately release illegally detained Georgian citizens, reopen the closed so- called crossing points without delay, allow freedom of movement, and stop the policy of ethnic cleansing towards the Georgians residing in the occupied territories;
Amendment 89 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 d (new)
Paragraph 5 d (new)
5d. Encourages the Georgian authorities to establish a special mechanism for international consultation and coordination similar to the Crimea Platform successfully implemented by Ukraine, aimed at improving the effectiveness of the international response to the ongoing occupation of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, responding to growing security threats, increasing international pressure on the Kremlin, preventing further rights violations and protecting victims of the occupation regime, as well as achieving the main goal - de-occupation of the regions and their return to Georgia;
Amendment 90 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 e (new)
Paragraph 5 e (new)
5e. Calls for an increased assistance and enhanced partnership in the area of security and defence with Georgia as declared in the EU Strategic Compass, including through the European Peace Facility; welcomes EU’s commitment and determination to support Georgia in countering hybrid threats and building resilience;
Amendment 91 #
2021/2236(INI)
5f. Calls on the Council and the EEAS to further engage with Georgia on the CSDP, particularly in view of Georgia’s interest in discussing the possibility of participating in PESCO projects and in developing cooperation with the relevant EU agencies, with a view to enhancing Georgia’s resilience, in particular from threats emanating from dictatorships such as the Russian Federation, China and Iran;
Amendment 92 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 g (new)
Paragraph 5 g (new)
5g. Welcomes the recognition in the Strategic Compass of the maritime security in the Black Sea as of key importance for the EU’ security; calls on the EU to identify robust assistance to Georgia in cyber-security, maritime security and countering hybrid threats among the priorities of the EU-US and EU-NATO cooperation;
Amendment 107 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Underlines the need to eliminate the excessive influence of vested interests, including oligarchsthe oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, in economic, political and public life as one of the priorities identified by the Commission to be addressed before Georgia is granted candidate status; in this regard reiterates its concern with the role played by him in the Georgian politics, especially the ongoing trend of nomination of his close former associates to the highest positions in the country, thanks to which he retains high level of control over the government and its decisions, including those on politically-motivated persecution of journalist supporting the opposition; is deeply worried by Ivanishivili’s personal and business links to the Kremlin which determine the position of the current government of Georgia towards sanctions on Russia; therefore reiterates its call on the Council and transatlantic partners to consider imposing personal sanctions on Mr Ivanishvili as person directly responsible for current backsliding in the areas of democracy, media freedom and ambiguous relations with Russia;
Amendment 134 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Calls on all stakeholders to safeguard the pluralistic and diverse media landscape in Georgia, which are based on solid legal framework that should provide a sound basis for freedom of expression and media rights but is under constant pressure from the ruling party; in this regard reminds about the case of Nika Gvaramia, former director of Rustavi 2 and Mtavari TV, outlets critical to the current government, and reiterates its call to release him; Notes the judgement of the Supreme Court of Georgia regarding the financial transparency of media and welcomes the efforts of the Communications Commission aiming at ensuring the availability to the public of detailed information related to funding sources of broadcasters;
Amendment 155 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Remains concerned about the health of imprisoned former President Mikheil Saakashvili; asks EU leaders and countries holding current and upcoming EU presidency, to exert pressure on the Georgian Dream leaders to fully respect Saakashvili’s rights and dignity; reminds that the government of Georgia is fully responsible for his health and well-being; invites the President of Georgia to use her constitutional prerogatives to solve this issue; regrets that the Georgian authorities refuse EU politicians to visit detained prominent public figures;
Amendment 159 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 b (new)
Paragraph 12 b (new)
12b. Commends the efforts of the civil society in countering Russian disinformation; notes that Russian propaganda uses the totalitarian past and the cult of Stalin as a tool of influence in Georgia; in this regard welcomes such initiatives as the Soviet Past Research Laboratory (SovLab) aiming to make a proper analysis and exploration of the Soviet totalitarian past, analysing its legacy and creating environment to reflect and debate on this complicated subject;
Amendment 169 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Underlines the role of the Public Defender of Georgia in safeguarding the rule of law, democratic and media freedoms; is aware of the crucial role played by this institution in overseeing the compliance of policies and actions of the executive with international human rights standards;
Amendment 178 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Underlines that Georgia's unique geographical location represents an important link within the EU Global Gateway though the Economic and Investment Plan and the flagship projects identified by the Plan aimed at, among others, building transport and energy links from Central Asia and Azerbaijan through Georgia to the EU; however, expresses concerns with the level of China's investments in Georgia's infrastructure, in particular strategic ports; therefore calls to move forward with infrastructural projects of strategic importance for developing regional transportation and trade; in this regard expresses its hope that Georgia will accelerate construction of the Anaklia Deep Sea Port, in line with Georgia’s strategic Euro-Atlantic objectives; is concerned, however, about the numerous obstacles of administrative and political nature that continue to hinder the project, as well as with signs of Russian interference;
Amendment 183 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)
Paragraph 14 b (new)
14b. Further encourages the Georgian authorities to consider that the joint imposition of sanctions against Russia which invaded Georgia and Ukraine and occupies 20 per cent of their territories, constitutes an historic opportunity to ultimately cut ties with the Russian Federation in particular in terms of trade and economic dependency; calls on the EU and Georgia to fully exploit potential of the DCFTA and future pre-accession funds to mitigate adverse effects of such shift/transition; simultaneously expresses its concerns that the growing number of the Russian entities which moved to Georgia after the invasion on Ukraine may lead to a diametrically opposite effect and undermine the efforts set out in AA; calls on the Georgian government to increase the control over Russian money flows and investments in the country and to join EU's anti-money laundering efforts;
Amendment 189 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 c (new)
Paragraph 14 c (new)
14c. Calls on the Commission to support creation of a common roaming space between Georgia and the EU through coordinated assistance with a focus on gradual reduction of international roaming tariffs between Georgia and the EU in line with the EU regulations thus protecting consumers’ rights, as well as assisting gradual approximation of Georgia to the EU acquis and contributing to Georgia’s European integration process;
Amendment 194 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Welcomes Georgia’s strong commitment to starting the process of becoming the Third Country Associated to Erasmus+ Programme and encourages Georgia’s participation in the new Horizon Europe Program in order to make use of the opportunities for the Georgian scientific and innovation community;
Amendment 195 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)
Paragraph 15 b (new)
15b. Calls the European Commission and Georgia to consider increasing the number of Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) projects in Georgia; at the same time is concerned with the growing Chinese investments in the strategic infrastructure, such as ports;
Amendment 198 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 c (new)
Paragraph 15 c (new)
15c. Encourages European Commission, ENTSO-E and Georgia to assess prospects of synchronization of Georgian electricity grid with the European Continental Grid and inclusion of Georgia in Continental Europe Synchronous Area (CESA);
Amendment 201 #
2021/2236(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 d (new)
Paragraph 15 d (new)
15d. Is concerned with a growing import of Russian gas and energy products by Georgia, a step which is in stark contradiction with EU's current efforts to diversify energy sources and stop imports from Russia;
Amendment 136 #
2021/2232(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Welcomes the very timely new EU- US dialogue on China and the establishment of EU-US consultations on the Indo-Pacific, and calls for a coordinated approach, including a transatlantic parliamentary dialogue, towards strengthening multilateral institutions and regional organisations, promoting democracy and enhancing democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond;
Amendment 157 #
2021/2232(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Believes that the ongoing process of drafting the EU’s Strategic Compass should identify the Indo-Pacific as a region of key strategic interest for the EU, while also identifying the required capabilities; recommends that EU-NATO cooperation on security challenges related to the Indo- Pacific be sufficiently taken into account while developing the EU Strategic Compass;
Amendment 176 #
2021/2232(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Highlights the longstanding cooperation between the EU and ASEAN on security and defence matters, and welcomes the recent upgrade of bilateral relations to a strategic partnership; reiterates its strong commitment to support ASEAN’s centrality and inclusive multilateral architecture; calls for the EU to anchor and extend its presence in the region by deepening cooperation with ASEAN and its members; invites the EU and ASEAN to identify ways to involve the EU in the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus and in the East Asia Summit; underlines the fundamental role of the parliamentary dimension for strengthening democracy in the region, and encourages, therefore, the establishment of an EU- ASEAN Parliamentary Assembly and more numerous and regularfrequent parliamentary exchanges and missions towith the region;
Amendment 209 #
2021/2232(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. WConsiders Taiwan a key partner and democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific; welcomes the positive role Taiwan plays in fostering peace and security in the Indo- Pacific region; urges the EU to work together with other like-minded partners, such as Australia, New Zealand, India, Japan, South Korea and the United States, and consider inviting Taiwan to participate with its partners in existing platforms and working groups on critical industries; stresses the need to enhance existing partnerships with Taiwan so as to promote common values, such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance in the Indo-Pacific region; calls on the EU and its Member States to intensify comprehensive cooperation with Taiwan, including by bolstering exchanges on hybrid threats, disinformation, cyber security, transnational crime, human trafficking and the development of Pacific states, and engaging in joint efforts to ensure secure sea lines of communication and an open and safe airspace, and tackle climate change;
Amendment 269 #
2021/2232(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Underlines the importance of information and cybersecurity as an element of the critical infrastructure of the global economy and for protecting democracies from disinformation and, malicious attacks and other hybrid threats;
Amendment 9 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5
Citation 5
— having regard to the statements of President Charles Michel of 14 December 2021, 6 April 2022, his Press Statements of 22May 2022, 31 August 2022 following the trilateral meeting with President Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan as well as Statement of 6 October 2022 following the quadrilateral meeting between President Aliyev, Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Macron and President Michel,
Amendment 32 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital -A (new)
Recital -A (new)
-A. whereas the EU supports closer economic integration with Azerbaijan through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership Initiative; whereas the EU is Azerbaijan's first trading partner, the biggest export and import market, and is the biggest investor in the country;
Amendment 34 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan provoked and later sustained by the Russian Federation, has resulted in tens of thousands of casualties, immense destruction of cultural and religious sites and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people;
Amendment 47 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the EU is committed to promoting a South Caucasus region that is secure, stable, peaceful and prosperous, with strong economic, political and cultural ties with the EU;
Amendment 53 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas in March 2022, Azerbaijan proposed five basic principles for the normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which included the mutual recognition of territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and political independence, mutual confirmation of the absence of territorial claims to each other, refraining from threatening each other’s national security, delimiting and demarcating the Armenia-Azerbaijan state border, and opening transport communications; whereas Armenia had given a preliminary agreement to those principles proposal, it later responded with additional principles, which included security and rights of ethnic Armenians in Karabakh, determining the final status of the region, return of prisoners of war and restoration of communications;
Amendment 58 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas a sustainable normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and base for a lasting and just peace requires that all violence cease and thatstops, all the root causes of conflict be addressare solved and the agreements reached between two parties are fully and swiftly implemented;
Amendment 68 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas Azerbaijan is a reliable and trustworthy supplier of fossil fuelsoil and gas supplier to the EU and whereas it is becoming increasingly important in this role;
Amendment 82 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas Azerbaijan’s record in terms of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is still unsatisfactory and needs further improvement;
Amendment 105 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 (new)
Paragraph -1 (new)
-1. whereas since the 2020 war, the Islamic Republic of Iran has held various military exercises along its border with Azerbaijan; whereas on 17 October 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted a large-scale military exercise, also known as "Mighty Iran", on its border with Azerbaijan, which included tanks, multiple-launch rocket systems and the same type of Iranian suicide drones Russia is using in Ukraine;
Amendment 111 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that the armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno- Karabakh conflict has significantly hampered the development and stability of the whole South Caucasus region; is convinced that a sustainable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan cannot be achieved through military means but requires a comprehensive political settlement in accordance with international law, including the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, the 1975 OSCE Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE Minsk Group’s Basic Principles;
Amendment 119 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Strongly condemns the clashes that erupted on 12 September 2022 and 11-12 November 2022, and their consequences for the peace process; reiterates that the territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan must be respected and underlines the EU’s readiness to be more actively involved in settling the region’s protracted conflicts; welcomes in this light the Council decision of 17 October 2022 to deploy up to 40 EU monitoring experts along the Armenian side of the international border with Azerbaijan with the objective of monitoring, analysing and reporting on the situation in the region; however, stresses that the presence of the EU monitors should not be used as another pretext to freeze the conflict and undermine the negotiations for a lasting and just peace;
Amendment 133 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Urges Armenia and Azerbaijan to fully implement the tripartite ceasefire agreement of 9 November 2020; calls on Armenia and Azerbaijan to avoid using inflammatory rhetoric and to implement measures to prepare their respective populations for peaceful coexistence; welcomes Azerbaijani's commitment to normalise relations with Armenia, including the proposal of five basic principles and calls on both sides to find a viable solution to link the Nakhchivan region with the rest of Azerbaijan;
Amendment 149 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls that the EU’s passive stance during and immediately after the 2020 war gave other regional actors, such as Russia, Iran and Turkey, the opportunity to gain influence; strongly supports, therefore, the initiative taken by the President of the European Council Charles Michel to convene and mediate bilateral meetings of the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Brussels and encourages the work of the EU’s special representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia; urges the governments of both countries to fully engage in the drafting of a peace treaty and welcomes in this regard the meeting of the foreign affairs ministers of both countries on 30 September in Geneva;
Amendment 151 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4b. Underlines that Russia plays a dishonest and damaging role in the region and has no interest in finding a peaceful solution to the conflict over Nagorno - Karabakh, as its prolongation gives Moscow an important leverage over both Armenia and Azerbaijan; therefore warns against any strategic agreements with Russia, which after the aggression on Ukraine should be treated as an international pariah;
Amendment 157 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Takes note of the initial progress made on the process of border delimitation; welcomes the agreement to deploy a civilian EU mission to build trust and contribute to the border commission, promote confidence-building, strengthen resilience and establish dialogue between the two sides who are the only owners of the peace process;
Amendment 189 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Strongly insists that Azerbaijan and Armenia refrain from destroygenuinely commit to preserving, protecting and promoting cultural, religious or historical heritage of the other side's origin; calls for the restoration of damaged sites in accordance with UNESCO standards and indications; calls on Armenia and Azerbaijan to quickly allow a UNESCO mission to visit both countries without preconditions;
Amendment 198 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Encourages increased bilateral contacts between the political authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as initiatives promoting people - to - people contacts between both countries, especially at the level of universities, youth organisations and NGOs;
Amendment 209 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2
Subheading 2
Energy, trade, environment, economic and political cooperation and connectivity
Amendment 219 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Recognises the important strategic role played by Azerbaijan as a reliable provider of fossil fuels to the EU and welcomes its willingness to contribute even more to the EU’s objectives in terms of security and diversification of energy supply and climate neutralitywith respect for the environment;
Amendment 231 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Welcomes the initiative to establish new Azerbaijan-Georgia-Armenia regional platform and calls upon the EU to support regional cooperation in order to foster peace, security and prosperity in the region;
Amendment 250 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Encourages increased interparliamentary cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan with broad agenda of issues of mutual interest;
Amendment 253 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Recognises Azerbaijan’s strategic geographical position as a potential gateway between Europe and Central Asia and beyond, within the so-called ‘Middle Corridor’, which to be fully operational, however, requires EU investment and funding in transport corridors and infrastructure;
Amendment 279 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Deeply regrets the current state of pressmedia freedom in Azerbaijan; expresses its concern at the new law on media adopted in December 2021; calls for a swift review of that law in accordance with the recommendations included in the opinion of the Venice Commission of 17-18 June 2022; urges Azerbaijan to stop persecuting bloggers and journalists;
Amendment 350 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. Strongly condemns Iran's military exercises along the Azerbaijan-Iranian border based on aggressive scenarios calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran to cease any provocations and respect Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
Amendment 352 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 b (new)
Paragraph 23 b (new)
23b. Calls for stronger cooperation on counter-terrorism and countering radicalization and Islamist extremism;
Amendment 353 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 c (new)
Paragraph 23 c (new)
23c. Invites the EU and other partners to assist Azerbaijan in demining activities; calls on Armenia to provide accurate maps of landmines in the de-occupied region of Azerbaijan;
Amendment 354 #
2021/2231(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 d (new)
Paragraph 23 d (new)
23d. Welcomes Azerbaijan’s support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine as well as the humanitarian aid provided to Ukraine during the ongoing war;
Amendment 6 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 37
Citation 37
— having regard to the joint statement of the EU and the UN of 25 September4 January 201822 on reinforcing the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peace Operations and Crisis Management: Priorities 201922-20214,
Amendment 7 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 37 a (new)
Citation 37 a (new)
— having regard to the Council conclusions (5591/22) on the European security situation, as approved by the Council at its meeting held on 24 January 2022,
Amendment 9 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 37 b (new)
Citation 37 b (new)
— having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
Amendment 11 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 38
Citation 38
— having regard to the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014, the Minsky Memorandum of 19 September 2014, the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, adopted and signed in Minsk on 12 February 2015, and endorsed as a whole by the UN Security Council in Resolution 2202 (2015) of 17 February 2015,
Amendment 15 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 49 a (new)
Citation 49 a (new)
— having regard to the creation of the Associated Trio that has come into being on May 17th 2021 as a platform of cooperation among the three most advanced countries of EaP (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine),
Amendment 16 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 49 b (new)
Citation 49 b (new)
— having regard to the common declaration of the Parliamentary Commissions of Foreign Affairs of the Associated Trio as well as the ones of Poland and Lithuania adopted on December 13th 2021 on strengthening the cooperation within the scope of human rights monitoring in the territories of the EaP states occupied by Russia,
Amendment 19 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 50
Citation 50
— having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia, especially those related to Russia’s actions in the territories of the EaP countries, violations of the rights of the Crimean Tatars, the occupation of parts of the territory of Georgia and Ukraine and related borderisation activities, ands well as hostile propaganda and disinformation against the EU and the EaP countries,
Amendment 56 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
D a. whereas the EU-US Security Dialogue represents an important opportunity to maximize the added value of transatlantic relations in security and defence and should dedicate ample time and resources to improving the security environment in the EaP region;
Amendment 57 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Recital D b (new)
D b. whereas The Three Seas Initiative (3SI) involving twelve countries on the EU’s Eastern and South flanks and some 112 million citizens co-operating to develop infrastructure, energy, transport and digital networks, is a critical development that can be expanded to include EaP countries in an effort to further strengthen ties with the EU;
Amendment 60 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas President Putin’s Russia has engaged in continuous hybrid warfare against EaP countries, backed by the ever- present threat of force across the region, armed aggression, illegal occupation and attempted annexation against Ukraine, to keep states politically off-balance and tied to Moscow’s self-declared sphere of influence, effectively removing the right of EaP countries to choose their own alliances in contravention of the relevant OSCE principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 the Paris Charter of 1990 as well as the Istanbul (1999) and Astana (2010) documents;
Amendment 67 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas in September 2021, Russia’s joint ZAPAD military exercise with Belarus and several other countries in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) comprised as many as 200 000 troops training in counterinsurgency, urban warfare and cyber-attacks in a non-transparent display of force, while the upcoming joint Russia- Belarus 'Allied Resolve' military exercises, demonstrated that Russia’s gap in military capabilities is rapidly closing while its aim of deepening its political and military relations with CSTO countries is rising;
Amendment 88 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the Normandy Format and Minsk I & II Agreements have failed to end hostilities between Ukraine and Russian-backed separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk; whereas theillegal armed formations in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine; whereas the international armed conflict in the Donbas region has killed more than 14 000 people;
Amendment 101 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas Russia, against the backdrop of a crisis on the EU-Belarusian border, has amassed over 10027 000 troops on the border of Ukraine in an offensive formation while increasing its hybrid warfare tactics targeting the elected government in Kyiv, creating widespread concern about a potential second invasion of Ukraine;
Amendment 119 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas following the electoral unrest, Belarus has largely abandoned its aim of fostering better relations with the EU, having reversed trends towards democratisation and taken to weaponising refugeemigrants in an attempt to uproot domestic aspirations towards liberalisation and destabilise EU Member States;
Amendment 124 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Recital J a (new)
J a. whereas Member States, Ukraine and other international partners established the International Crimea Platform – a consultation and coordination format aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the international response to the ongoing illegal occupation of Crimea, Ukraine, reaffirming the non- recognition of its annexation and achieving de-occupation of Crimea and its peaceful return under Ukraine’s control;
Amendment 153 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital O
Recital O
O. whereas hybrid threats in the years to come will see the systematic combination of information warfare, agile force manoeuvre, mass cyber warfare and emerging and disruptive technologies from sea-bed to space with both advanced air- breathing and space–based surveillance and strike systems deployed, all of which will be enabled by advanced artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, increasingly ‘intelligent’ drone swarm technologies, offensive cyber capabilities, hypersonic missile systems, and Nano- tech and bio-warfare;;
Amendment 156 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital O a (new)
Recital O a (new)
O a. whereas if CSDP missions are to achieve mission objectives, they must begin advisory and training in coping with emerging and disruptive technologies that are rapidly entering the ‘frozen conflict’ environment;
Amendment 158 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital P
Recital P
P. whereas the EU’s Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) will havehas to consider how to protect a deployed EU force-led missions against such increasing threats;
Amendment 160 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital P a (new)
Recital P a (new)
P a. whereas CSDP missions in EaP countries must remain in place as long as they are deemed necessary by recipient countries and Member States to ensure the accomplishment of mission objectives;
Amendment 170 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital R
Recital R
R. whereas the CSDP will also require close coordination with NATO’s defence and deterrence posture and the Open Door Policy in addition to close EU-NATO coordination being needed to ensure coherence between the EU’s Strategic Compass and the next NATO Strategic Concept;
Amendment 173 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital T a (new)
Recital T a (new)
T a. whereas the mission has a further five priorities: national and state security, organised and cross-border crime, criminal justice, community safety and police management, and digital transformation and innovation;
Amendment 174 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital t b (new)
Recital t b (new)
T b. whereas EUAM is conducting its activities in partnership with the National Security Council and the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;
Amendment 175 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital T c (new)
Recital T c (new)
T c. whereas EUAM works with Ukraine’s court system via its prosecutors to ensure independence and efficiency of the prosecution via digitisation, e-case management and human resources management with a key emphasis on attestation to ensure prosecutors prove the existence of claims via evidence;
Amendment 176 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital T d (new)
Recital T d (new)
T d. whereas EUAM collaborates with Europol’s Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) in assisting Ukrainian authorities in capacity building measures and integrated border management to support its criminal investigation capabilities and counter organised crime;
Amendment 177 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital T e (new)
Recital T e (new)
T e. whereas EUAM trains and equips Ukrainian police forces via its regional field offices and collaboration with neighbouring provinces to ensure the integrity of local law enforcement and safety of local communities;
Amendment 178 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital T f (new)
Recital T f (new)
T f. whereas EUAM concentrates its police training initiatives via the provision of strategic advice and a ‘Community Safety Dialogue’ and trains local police in key areas such as: defensive driving, interview techniques, gender mainstreaming, de-escalation techniques and digitisation;
Amendment 179 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital U
Recital U
U. whereas the EUAM’s work in assisting the reform of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), including under draft bill 3196, remains its highest priority and it must concentrate its efforts on implementingsupport to the implementation of the reform to ensure the SSU relephases any extrinsic functionsout pre-trial investigative powers, demilitarises the service, has a clear division of competences with other security agencies, effective oversight and fewer pre-trial and detention powers, and that it downsizes itself in accordance with democratic developments, and that it downsizes itself;
Amendment 180 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital U a (new)
Recital U a (new)
U a. whereas if properly implemented, Bill 3196 sets the SSU to concentrate its efforts on counterintelligence, counteraction to threats to state security, counterterrorism, cyber security, protection of national statehood and territorial integrity and protection of state secrets;
Amendment 181 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital U b (new)
Recital U b (new)
U b. whereas the necessary reforms to ensure democratic development call for the SSU to undergo: a clear separation of functions, removal from the investigation of economic and corruption crimes (except in exceptional cases when authorised by the Attorney General), political independence, demilitarisation and further optimisation, greater transparency and accountability and added focus on the protection of critical infrastructure;
Amendment 182 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital U c (new)
Recital U c (new)
U c. whereas the EUAM’s assistance in establishing the Bureau of Economic Security (BES), targeting financial crime throughout Ukraine is a key reform effort in Ukraine’s investigation and law enforcement on economic crime;
Amendment 184 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital U e (new)
Recital U e (new)
U e. whereas BES is set to inherit pre- trial investigative powers from SSU in the sphere of economic security and must support Ukraine’s efforts to resist pressure from law-enforcement institutions while effectively transferring the powers currently held by the Tax Militia;
Amendment 185 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital V
Recital V
V. whereas in 2020, the EUAM established its fourth field office in Mariupol, close to the lineto support the implementation of coentact, torally-led reforms at regional and local levels such as the training and adviseing of local law enforcement, reflecting the growing role of the EUAM in strengthening Ukraine’s resilience across the country and the desire of various oblasts to assist in their alignment with CSDP objectives;
Amendment 189 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital W
Recital W
W. whereas in its 13 years of existence, the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) has represented the strong political commitment of the EU in the region by providing stability and security to conflict-affected communitiescontributing to confidence building and providing stability on the ground and in the wider region;
Amendment 191 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital X
Recital X
X. whereas the EUMM currently hosts 325 Mission members, including over 200 civilian monitors with an allocated budget of EUR 44.8 million and a mandate up for renewal in December 2022;
Amendment 194 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital Y
Recital Y
Y. whereas the original mandate from 2008 remains unchanged as regards monitoring the implementation of the six- point agreement, which calls for: no recourse to use violence, cessation of hostilities, granting access to humanitarian aid, return of Georgian armed forces to their usual quarters, withdrawal of Russian armed forces to pre-hostility positions and the opening of international discussion on security and stability of South Ossetia and Abkhazia;
Amendment 196 #
2021/2199(INI)
Z. whereas Russia does not comply with the sSix-point aAgreement as it maintains a presence of armed forces and Federal Security Service (FSB) agents in the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions, who prevent the EUMM from entering the territories that are beyond the control of the Government of Georgia, a critical obstruction to the accomplishment of mission objectivesand Russian Federation Border Guards in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia;
Amendment 197 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital Z a (new)
Recital Z a (new)
Z a. whereas the EUMM continues to be denied physical access to the breakaway regions despite its mandate being valid throughout all of Georgia, a critical obstruction to the accomplishment of mission objectives;
Amendment 199 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AA
Recital AA
AA. whereas flagrant violations of the sSix-point aAgreement and ceasefire by occupying forces arethe Russian Federation continues and is often met with limited responses or calls to action by Member States, or no response at all, which risks emboldening the occupying forcesRussian Federation to carry out more such actions;
Amendment 201 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AA a (new)
Recital AA a (new)
AA a. whereas the mandate allows focusing on hybrid threats, human rights, radicalization, terrorism, minorities, and environmental aspects of security;
Amendment 202 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AA b (new)
Recital AA b (new)
AA b. whereas EUMM is not a typical civilian mission due to its mandate and focus on monitoring activities, civilian competency building and leads confidence-building activities via small grants and targeted projects between the two sides;
Amendment 203 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AA c (new)
Recital AA c (new)
AA c. whereas EUMM has created an Advisory Committee on Hybrid Warfare and participates in Joint Training Courses for Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) analysis;
Amendment 204 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AA d (new)
Recital AA d (new)
AA d. whereas EUMM has regular contacts with the NATO Liaison Office and the team that implements the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package;
Amendment 205 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AA e (new)
Recital AA e (new)
Amendment 207 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AB
Recital AB
AB. whereas the EUMM has a constant need to adapt its technical capabilities to address the growing threat of hybrid warfareexpand its analytical focus and capabilities to address the persistent hybrid threats;
Amendment 211 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AD
Recital AD
AD. whereas the EUMM has created a newbeen managing the “Hotline”, a confidence- building mechanism – a ‘hotline’ – which is the onlywhich serves as a channel of communication between the Government of Georgia and the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including Russia’s FSBn Federation border guards deployed in both territorieregions; whereas this hHotline was activated 3 0over 2100 times in 20201;
Amendment 213 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AE
Recital AE
Amendment 215 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AF
Recital AF
AF. whereas the EUMM’s role in securingfacilitating effective exchanges of information, for example in connection with medical crossings or the release of persons detained border guards, as well as its efforts to assist sick people from the territories in getting treatment in Georgiaat the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs), as well as in co- facilitating in-person discussions at the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meetings in Ergneti, adds tremendous value to the important role the EUMM plays in both conflict management and confidence building;
Amendment 218 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AF a (new)
Recital AF a (new)
AF a. whereas Georgia is one of the biggest contributors per capita to CSDP missions in Africa;
Amendment 221 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AG a (new)
Recital AG a (new)
AG a. whereas EUBAM is designed to bolster border and customs capabilities of Moldova and Ukraine and is tasked with: combating customs fraud, drug smuggling, irregular migration and trafficking in human beings, supporting trade facilitation, integrated border management and assisting a peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict through the ‘5+2’ process;
Amendment 222 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AG b (new)
Recital AG b (new)
AG b. whereas EUBAM assists Moldova and Ukraine to fulfil the obligations of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) as part of their Association Agreements with the EU;
Amendment 223 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AG c (new)
Recital AG c (new)
AG c. whereas tobacco smuggling, including counterfeit products, is presently assessed as one of the most serious risks to border security at the Moldova-Ukraine border, causing an estimated loss of €10 billion per year to the state budgets of Moldova, Ukraine and Member States;
Amendment 224 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AG d (new)
Recital AG d (new)
AG d. whereas EUBAM Task Force Drugs seeks to engage Mission’s partner services with other drug enforcement authorities in the region and to establish an intelligence-led approach in fighting drug smuggling;
Amendment 225 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AG e (new)
Recital AG e (new)
AG e. whereas EUBAM is assisting the border services of Moldova and Ukraine in the development of general common indicators used for the identification of victims of trafficking, the enhancement of risk analysis and selectivity during border checks, advising in the development of new relevant working methodologies and data collection methods;
Amendment 226 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AG f (new)
Recital AG f (new)
AG f. whereas EUBAM has been a consistent advocate for the re-opening of the international transport corridors that cross Transnistria and develops and advocates for technical confidence- building measures between Chisinau and Tiraspol on transport, customs, veterinary and phytosanitary, and law enforcement issues;
Amendment 227 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AG g (new)
Recital AG g (new)
AG g. whereas despite Transnistria serving as a safe haven for human smugglers and organized crime, EUBAM played an important role in helping to re- open rail freight through Transnistria that had been suspended for six years and in 2020 aided in launching a direct dialogue between Tiraspol and Chisinau;
Amendment 228 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AG h (new)
Recital AG h (new)
AG h. whereas from 2020-2021 EUBAM thwarted multiple smuggling operations, seizing copious amounts of ammunition, tobacco, alcohol, ethanol and heroin;
Amendment 229 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AG i (new)
Recital AG i (new)
AG i. whereas EUBAM collaborates with multiple international organisations including Europol, FRONTEX and OSCE via its Arms Working Group, ORIO II Joint Operations and ‘EU 4 Border Security’ initiatives;
Amendment 230 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AH a (new)
Recital AH a (new)
Amendment 235 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AK a (new)
Recital AK a (new)
AK a. whereas the Defence Reform Advisory Board, comprised of high-level experts from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Poland, Germany and Lithuania, is the highest-level international advisory body in Ukraine, reporting directly to the Ukrainian Minister of Defence and Chief of the General Staff;
Amendment 238 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AK b (new)
Recital AK b (new)
AK b. whereas the role of China in competing in the region for political, social and economic influence is growing in EaP countries where Chinese investment combines cheap loans that drive up debt-GDP ratios with the projected outcome being a default in EaP countries, leading to aggressive recompense, often in the form of ownership of strategic infrastructure and policy alignment;
Amendment 240 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AK c (new)
Recital AK c (new)
AK c. whereas the influence of third countries in EaP countries, notably Iran, is largely concentrated in the South Caucasus where its longstanding cultural, religious, political and economic influence continues to grow, which risks undermining the security and stability of some EaP countries due to assassination attempts linked to Iranian IRGC operatives in Georgia and Azerbaijan, creating further concern for the EU’s efforts to promote security, stability and good neighbourliness among EaP countries;
Amendment 245 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AL a (new)
Recital AL a (new)
AL a. whereas Nord Stream II represents an important tool for Russia to increase its political and economic leverage over Member States and EaP countries, likely to lead to further subversion and aggression towards EU’s EaP and CSDP policies;
Amendment 246 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AL b (new)
Recital AL b (new)
AL b. whereas there is a high biofuel potential in EaP countries which can better utilize domestic biofuel resources such as ethanol, silage and others as a means to reduce energy dependency;
Amendment 247 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AL c (new)
Recital AL c (new)
AL c. whereas the threats posed to the EU’s East not only concern friction with Russia but also terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking, corruption, mass irregular migration, and a host of other threats to the cohesion of societies both within and outside the EU;
Amendment 264 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the decision of the European Council of 2 December 2021 to utilise the European Peace Facility (EPF) in providing Ukraine with a package of EUR 31 million, Georgia with a package of EUR 12.75 million and Moldova with a package of EUR 7 million to assist in strengthening their resilience and defence capabilities, particularly cybersecurity, medical, engineering, mobile and logistics capabilities; encourages further utilisation of the EPF to increase the ability of EaP countries, particularly those hosting CSDP missions, in further addressing their security needs in key areas such as the equipment necessary to exchange intelligence via secure communication lines, particularly those EaP countries hosting CSDP mission and technical tools needed to counter hybrid threats;
Amendment 277 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Reaffirms its unwavering support to the EaP countries, and in particular for their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within their internationally recognised borders;
Amendment 280 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital AL d (new)
Recital AL d (new)
AL d. whereas CSDP’s access to both planning, resources and logistics gives it the potential to become the primary enabler of civilian crisis management during emergencies and should be used as a practice hub of societal resilience and recovery in the face of both man-made and natural disasters;
Amendment 292 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. Considers involving some EaP partners in the early stage of CSDP mission/operations planning, especially those missions/operations that the EaP partners host or will be hosting;
Amendment 294 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2 b. Encourages Member States to extend participation of EaP countries to the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid COE);
Amendment 315 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Calls on the CPCCivilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), EU Military Committee (EUMC) and EU military staff (EUMS) to develop a model for generating and sharing best practices with regard to campaign or mission planning concepts, at the earliest possible stage, with partners vital to campaign success;
Amendment 320 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Calls on the CPCC and the EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) to emphasise the importance of professional civil-military education for all staff in CSDP missions through mechanisms such as the Professional Development Program (PDP);
Amendment 322 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. Welcomes the roll out of Military Advisors to EU Missions and Delegations and encourages efforts to further strengthen security and defence expertise inside EU Delegations;
Amendment 347 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Invites Member States to reinforce cooperation with NATO, also through the upcoming EU-NATO joint declaJoint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation, in supporting the defence and security capacity of our neighboubuilding of our partners toin the eEastern neighbourhood;
Amendment 358 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12 a. Encourages Member States to ensure that the digital transition undertaken in EaP countries is safeguarded from malign activities and thus encourages further utilization of the EU’s existing flagship cyber capacity- building initiatives in the region – CyberEast and EU4Digitalto include the establishment of legal and administrative structures to certify software and hardware, coordinate national CERT teams and cyber forensic and investigative bodies across Europe;
Amendment 375 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Encourages Member States to use the third-country PESCO agreement over military mobility as a template for EaP country participation, with an emphasis onPESCO participating Member States to tailoring PESCO projects to the needs of EU CSDP missions and onperations, e.g. developing highly encrypted secure civilian communication systems, and in accordance with the general conditions for third-State participation in PESCO projects, to consider inviting EaP countries that meet these general conditions;
Amendment 387 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and particularly the CPCC to ensure that the EUAM maintains as its priority the reform of Ukraine’s national security servicethe Security Service of Ukraine and to extend the scope of the cooperation with the SSU on cybersecurity, countering terrorism and hybrid threats;
Amendment 394 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Encourages Member States to extend EUAM cooperation to all anti- corruption structures involved in the reform of the Civilian Security Sector and to include, either in the form of training and instruction or on the basis of sharing best practices and jointly setting future priorities, both Ukraine’s National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NAZK) and its Highthe anti-corruption apparatus of the Ukrainian state, NAPC, and the Supreme Anti- Corruption Court;
Amendment 397 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)
Paragraph 18 b (new)
18 b. Encourages Member states to recommend the inclusion in ongoing training courses for representatives of the Ukrainian services and administration, the studies of corruption cases and analyses of the reasons for the failure of investigations and the failure to enforce accountability for the perpetrators in order to assist personnel in anti- corruption roles to avoid repeating past mistakes;
Amendment 399 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Encourages Member States to expand their support to the EUAM’s digitalisation efforts related to the reform of Ukraine’s Civilian Security Sector via training and the provision of technologies that support data registry, human resource management and court filing procedures to assist in transparency, community trust building and countering corruption;
Amendment 401 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19 a. Encourages Member States to expand their support to EUAM digitisation efforts via trainings and provision of technologies that support data registry, human resource management and court filing procedures to assist in transparency, community trust building and countering corruption;
Amendment 408 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 b (new)
Paragraph 19 b (new)
19 b. Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the CPCC to ensure EUAM maintains prioritization on the reform of Ukraine’s National Security Service (SSU) to ensure greater oversight, less pre-trial investigative powers and detention centres, downsizing and demilitarisation of the SSU with a quarterly assessment on implementation once Bill 3196 is passed in the Verkhovna Rada;
Amendment 412 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20 a. Encourages Member States to implement more efficient intelligence sharing capabilities within and between CSDP missions and to give particular emphasis to enhanced collaboration and secondment of personnel from Europol and Interpol to CSDP mission headquarters to facilitate seamless intelligence sharing;
Amendment 413 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Implores Member States to advocate for EUMM physical access to the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and strengthen their public reactions to provocations against the EUMM, especially detentions of EUMM border guards and ceasefire violations;
Amendment 421 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23 a. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS and encourages Member States to contribute to the cooperation within the International Crimea Platform to address hybrid threats to the wider Black Sea region security posed by or related to Russia’s illegal occupation in Crimea and militarization of the Black and Azov Seas;
Amendment 423 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 b (new)
Paragraph 23 b (new)
Amendment 439 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)
Paragraph 25 a (new)
25 a. Calls on the Commission to establish a structural dialogue with the Associated Trio (A3) countries of EaP;
Amendment 440 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 b (new)
Paragraph 25 b (new)
25 b. Declares the will of the European Parliament Committees on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Human Rights to participate in the A3’s and willing EU Member States’ parliamentary activity on monitoring the situation in the territories of the A3 illegally occupied by Russia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Crimea and Donbas);
Amendment 442 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 c (new)
Paragraph 25 c (new)
25 c. Calls on the EEAS, MPCC, CPCC and CSDP HQ’s to foster a new culture of understanding between civilian and military partners based on enhanced institutional relationships and shared awareness and assessment in an effort to develop a comprehensive planning framework and culture;
Amendment 445 #
2021/2199(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 d (new)
Paragraph 25 d (new)
25 d. Encourages Member States to further strengthen military resilience of Ukraine through provision of defence weapons to Ukraine, including anti-ship, anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons;
Amendment 21 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 26 a (new)
Citation 26 a (new)
— having regard to Russia's illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea,
Amendment 22 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 26 b (new)
Citation 26 b (new)
— having regard to Russia's violation of airspace and maritime borders of member states,
Amendment 23 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 26 c (new)
Citation 26 c (new)
— having regard to China's increase in economic and military presence in the Mediterranean and African countries,
Amendment 24 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 26 d (new)
Citation 26 d (new)
— having regard to the threat of domestic and foreign terrorism, primarily from groups such as ISIS,
Amendment 25 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 26 e (new)
Citation 26 e (new)
— having regard to new technologies such as artificial intelligence, space capabilities and quantum computing which present new opportunities for mankind, but also create new challenges in defence and foreign policy that require a clear strategy and consensus among allies,
Amendment 47 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Stresses that the EU is facing new threats, including hybrid threats at the borders of EU Member States; new variants of the COVID-19 virus and the potential for renewed pandemics; fragile states on the European continent and in its vicinity, provoking migratory pressures and human rights abuses; Cyber-attacks and information manipulation. Corrosive capital flows; Weakening of disarmament efforts and international arms control regimes; Increasing threats to natural resources, energy insecurity, climate change, increased militarisation around the world and a still unstable neighbourhood, both in the East and in the South;
Amendment 63 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Recalls that NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence for those Member States that are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as explicitly recognised in the TFEU; believes that EU-NATO cooperation should be complementary and take full account of each of the two institution’s specific features and roles, and should not unnecessarily replicate or replace structures;
Amendment 66 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Considers that instability and unpredictability on the Union’s borders and in its immediate neighbourhood (North Africa, the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean, Russian aggression against Ukraine and Georgia, etc.), as well as in its extended neighbourhood(Sahel, Horn of Africa, etc.), pose both a direct and indirect threat to the security of the continent; stresses the inextricable link between internal and external security; acknowledges that active engagement in the neighbourhood is in the interests of the European Union;
Amendment 74 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Notes that 2020 was dominated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which exposed our dependencies vis-à-vis the rest of the world; stresses that the EU must learn lessons from this with a view, in particular, to increasing its resilience and strategic autonomy, operational capabilities and capacity to act autonomously if need be, but preferably in cooperation with our partners;
Amendment 86 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Welcomes the launch of the work on the Strategic Compass, which should be completed in March 2022; with a strong effort to coordinate with NATO’s new Strategic Concept; stresses that it is a beginning, not an end, and that it constitutes a major step towards a European Defence Unionincreasing defensive capacities of the Member States and making the EU a more prominent player within the Transatlantic security architecture;
Amendment 120 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses that the Strategic Compass must make it possible to strengthen the Union’s capacity to act as an increasingly credible strategic partner; stresses that this exercise must be regularly updated, must set out an ambitious and operational course – with a timetable for the implementation of decisions and monitoring mechanisms – and must enable the Union to have a coherent defence policy, a common strategic culture, a capacity to anticipate threats and provide a rapid and coordinated reaction and a capacity for autonomous resilience, to be able to mobilise resources on the basis of solidarity when a Member State is threatened and requests them, and ultimately to play a part in the protection of European citizens; also against terrorist threats; underlines the need to closely coordinate EU sanctions in this respect with NATO;
Amendment 138 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Recalls that the Union is currently deploying 11 civilian missions and six military missions and operations; recognises that these missions do not yet realize their full potential in security sector reform and require a revised mandate to ensure that effective training and operational capabilities are required to keep pace with the evolving threat environment to Europe’s East and South; recalls that only three of the military missions are executive missions; notes that these missions and operations are suffering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has limited their effectiveness;
Amendment 164 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Further calls upon the EU to keep its commitments in the Fourth EU- African Summit to support economic and political stability and to further support the capabilities of the African Standby Force; acknowledges that closer cooperation with existing regional forces such as the African Union, G5 Sahel Force and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as the US, are essential to successful operations in Africa;
Amendment 200 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Notes with satisfaction the results of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia); approves its extension for a perstresses the need for further prolongatiodn of two years; stresses the need for further reflection on CSDP commitments in the area; is concerned about the deterihe CSDP commitments in the area, as a strong presence is important to remain relevant as a regional actor; in the light of the current situation, a longer mandate extension would ensure stability and predictability, effectiveness of the mission; stresses that the situation is not evolving in a good direction for the EU; recognises that this mission can be enhanced by secure informating security situation in the region; on and communication channels to Member State capitals, improvement of open source intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities;
Amendment 218 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Welcomes the launch of the CSDP operation in the Mediterranean, EUNAVFOR MED IRINI; stresses its key role in the implementation of the arms embargo; deplores the fact that, in 2020, it encountered many refusals to allow inspections; calls for a transparent communication from the European External Action Service (EEAS) on this issue; laments the fact that NATO, which is active in the area through Operation Sea Guardian, is unwilling to cooperate; encourages greater burden sharing and cooperation with NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian;
Amendment 248 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Is deeply concerned about the low force generation for operations and missions, and urges the Member States to address this matter as soon as possible; considers that third-country participation in CSDP operations and missions must always be in line with European interests and values; calls on the EU to provide staff in missions and operations with appropriate equipment and training to become more alert and more resilient under less permissive conditions; considers that third-country participation should be expanded when and where appropriate; special consideration should be given to including participation from recipient countries that hosted former CSDP operations;
Amendment 261 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Is concerned about the increasing information manipulation, disinformation and hybrid threats affecting several theatres, stemming mostly from Russia, China, but also other actors; calls for a structured response to these threats by CSDP missions;
Amendment 267 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Calls for a strengthening of the Union’s command structures, in particular the Military Staff (EUMS) and the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), which must be provided with the requisite personnel, equipment and resources as soon as possible, and be able to exchange classified information safely, including with Member States and missions/operations; reiterates its calls for the creation of a European HQ for conduct of operationsclose coordination with NATO in order to avoid duplication and ensure greatest possible added value;
Amendment 303 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Supports the ambition of creating a ‘rapid entry force’; recalls the existence of battlegroups and the need to make them credible by conducting regular field exercises; deploresis concerned with the Member States’ lack of commitment to the battlegroups; criticises the fact that only one, led by Italy, is operational in 2021; lamentsis concerned with the weakness of the planning for 2022 and 2023;
Amendment 319 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Welcomes the establishment of the European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2020 and calls for it to be made operational swiftly; stresses that the requisite equipment and training must be delivered in the relevant theatres of operation; undertakes to ensure coherence and complementarity between CSDP missions and operations, the Union’s financial instruments (NDICI) and the EPF; underline that the EPF should be used to effectively support EU’s partners in the Eastern Partnership that are facing threats from Russia, most notably Ukraine and Georgia;
Amendment 326 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22a. Reaffirms its unwavering support to the Eastern Partnership countries, and in particular as regards their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within their internationally recognised borders; condemns Russia’s direct and indirect involvement in armed conflicts, its illegal occupation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, violent annexation of Crimea and occupation of certain parts of the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as Russia’s military build-ups inside the EaP region or on its borders with the region; urges the EU to keep demanding Russia to engage constructively in the Geneva International Discussions and the Normandy Process, and to implement its obligations under the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement and the Minsk Agreements; encourages the EU to strengthen its engagement in peaceful conflict resolution throughout the EaP region;
Amendment 331 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 b (new)
Paragraph 22 b (new)
22b. Notes with concern the increasing militarisation of the Crimean peninsula and the attempts by the Russian Federation to destabilise the Black Sea region, with this situation having led to the recognition, at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, of the vulnerability of the eastern flank of the Alliance; calls for the EU to recognise the vulnerability of eastern European Member States as a means of strengthening European defence, and to develop, together with NATO, a comprehensive strategy for securing and defending the eastern flank;
Amendment 332 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 c (new)
Paragraph 22 c (new)
22c. Welcomes in this regard Operation Atlantic Resolve and NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence on the European continent and recognises the importance of NATO troops in the effort to deter further Russian aggression and provide crucial support in the event of a conflict;
Amendment 333 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 d (new)
Paragraph 22 d (new)
22d. underlines the need to closely monitor actions of private security and military companies (PSMC’s), notably the Russian Wagner Group which is increasing its global footprint in vulnerable areas including Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe;
Amendment 377 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)
Paragraph 26 a (new)
26a. Recognizes the growing importance of cyber and automated intelligence capabilities, stresses that these provide threats to all the Member States and EU institutions, urges all EU institutions and Member States to continue to improve upon their cyber and automated technologies, further encourages cooperation on these technological advances;
Amendment 385 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)
Paragraph 27 a (new)
27a. Recognizes the growing importance of cyber and automated intelligence capabilities, stresses that these provide threats to all the Member States and EU institutions, urges all EU institutions and Member States to continue to improve upon their cyber and automated technologies, further encourages cooperation on these technological advances;
Amendment 388 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 b (new)
Paragraph 27 b (new)
Amendment 401 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Calls on the Union to develop a space defence strategy, which is essential for its strategic autonomy in space; encourages the Union to improve its situational awareness and geo-intelligence support; stresses the importance of the Union having its own launchers; insists that the Union should lead the way in strengthening the increasingly contested area of international space law;
Amendment 405 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 a (new)
Paragraph 28 a (new)
28a. Notes the growing importance of space security and satellites, stresses the importance of the European Union Satellite Centre and commissions the agency to analyse and provide a report regarding the safety and/or vulnerabilities of the EU and Member State satellites to space debris, cyber-attack and direct missile attack;
Amendment 420 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 a (new)
Paragraph 30 a (new)
30a. Calls for the EU to address the consistent and growing threats to the protection and preservation of cultural heritage and clamp down on the smuggling of cultural artefacts, especially in conflict zones; notes that depriving societies of their cultural heritage and historical roots makes them more vulnerable to radicalisation and more susceptible to global jihadist ideologies; calls for the EU to develop abroad strategy to counteract such threats;
Amendment 444 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. LamentsIs concerned with the reduction in the amount of the EDF under the MFF, which makes coherence between Union defence initiatives even more necessary; stresses, in this regard, the role of the European Defence Agency (EDA); Considers that EDF should collaborate actively with NATO in order to facilitate transatlantic technological and industrial development in a manner that removes barriers and protectionism and ensures export licensing processes/technological transfer policies are harmonized among Member States; special consideration should be given to the development of a task force between EDA and NSPA/NCIA for developing a roadmap on identifying ideal equipment for procurement and to generate the best value on defence expenditure as well as the formulation of a ‘transatlantic DARPA’;
Amendment 547 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)
Paragraph 40 a (new)
40a. Recognizes the growing political, economic, environmental, security and strategic value of the Arctic Circle, urges the Member States to continue cooperation with the Arctic Council on all issues of EU interest and to form a comprehensive strategy for the region;
Amendment 549 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 b (new)
Paragraph 40 b (new)
40b. Condemns the recent use of Chemical Weapons by Syria, North Korea, Russia and terrorist organizations and maintains the view that the lack of accountability for such incidents undermine the international norm against chemical weapons and requires Member States to consider how best to respond to the use of chemical weapons, including how future use could be deterred, and whether Member States are adequately protected and how to strengthen the OPCW to ensure speedy and accurate attribution and effective response mechanisms;
Amendment 550 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 c (new)
Paragraph 40 c (new)
40c. Reiterates its grave concern at the attempted assassination of Alexei Navalny as well as of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, by using a banned nerve agent Novichok, considered as use of a chemical weapons under the CWC (AM186); welcomes the sanctions imposed on Russian officials on 14 October 2020 in response to this blatant violation of international norms and of Russia’s international commitments;
Amendment 623 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 a (new)
Paragraph 45 a (new)
45a. Encourages Member States to continue to work with ASEAN countries in all aspects already agreed upon, further stresses the need to cooperate on economic manners and combatting terrorism;
Amendment 649 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 47 a (new)
Paragraph 47 a (new)
47a. Expresses grave concern at the continued escalations of tensions in the East and South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, including China’s increasingly provocative military manoeuvres aimed at Taiwan; calls for all parties concerned to resolve their differences through peaceful means to de- escalate the tensions and to refrain from taking unilateral action to change the status quo; underlines the importance of the peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait to maintain peace, stability and prosperity for China and Taiwan, and in the Asia-Pacific region, which remains of critical importance to the interests of the EU;
Amendment 670 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50
Paragraph 50
50. Stresses that Parliament should be regularly informed and consulted on the implementation of PESCO, given its essential linkage with the various financial instruments of the CSDP, in particular the EDF, over which Parliament exercises scrutiny; calls for the closest possible access to PESCO for third countries who are also NATO Members, acknowledging that such countries' defence industries have expertise, related instruments and capabilities that EU Member's industries could benefit from;
Amendment 672 #
2021/2183(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50 a (new)
Paragraph 50 a (new)
50a. Encourages that initiatives such as EDIDP, PESCO and EDF facilitate SME engagement by advancing efforts that support incubation and capital investment;
Amendment 33 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the EU institutions, in collaboration with Member States, needs to act on the global stage with a common strategic culture to develop its leadership role and to actively push for the revitalisation of multilateralism guided by its democratic values, social fairness and its vision for a sustainable future;
Amendment 41 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas a broad majority of EU citizens support a stronger role for the EU in matters of foreign and security policy, that reflects the consensual positions of the Member States, and wish to see a more coherent and effective EU foreign policy;
Amendment 47 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – introductory part
Paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. To achieve the strategic objective of developing its global leadership role, the EU, in cooperation with Member States, should shape its CFSP on the basis of the following five actions:
Amendment 63 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – indent 2
Paragraph 1 – indent 2
- improving EU decision-making and mMaking full use of the EU’s hard and soft powers,
Amendment 65 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – indent 3
Paragraph 1 – indent 3
- achieving European sovereignty by iInterlinking the EU’s external actions,
Amendment 85 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. WelcomesTakes note of the EU’s growing ambition and initiatives to take the lead in promoting global partnerships on key priorities and in strengthening the multilateral order through a reform of key institutions and organisations; regrets that China and Russia block the UN Security Council from condemning oppressive regimes for their actions and are hampering a united international response to Myanmar's military coup, Syria, Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela; welcomes united and decisive positions and actions of the G7 leaders, which due to the veto by Moscow and Beijing, cannot be implemented on the UN level;
Amendment 105 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Calls for the EU to promote alliances of democracies worldwide; insists on the need to pool resources and exchange best practices between democracies, including as regards countering malign interference and disinformation by authoritarian states and organisations; believes that, for this to be successful, the EU, together with Member States, should promote on the global stage a whole-of- government and whole-of-society approach to counter hybrid threats;
Amendment 135 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. Reiterates its call for a stronger support to the EU maritime security strategy as maintaining freedom of navigation presents a growing challenge both globally and for the neighbourhood; underlines that freedom of navigation should be respected at all times; calls on the EU to put more focus on ensuring freedom of navigation and on measures focusing on de-escalation and prevention of armed conflict and military incidents on the seas;
Amendment 147 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. WelcomNotes the EU’s efforts as a global frontrunner in the fight against climate change and urges the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to propose new initiatives such as the internationalisation of the European Green Deal; believes that the implementation of the European Green Deal will have significant geopolitical consequences and will influence the EU’s relations with some of its partners;
Amendment 154 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Calls for the EU to develop a robust global health strategy, including global and EU efforts to ensure preparedness and an effective response to upcoming crises and to secure fair and equitable access to vaccines around the world;
Amendment 169 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Urges the EU to develop global partnerships for the establishment of norms and standards on a rules-based, ethical use of technologies, in particular as regards artificial intelligence; notes that the exports of defence technologies and arms is still a competence of Member States and should remain so;
Amendment 186 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2
Subheading 2
Amendment 205 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Highlights the need for the EU, in cooperation with Member States, to strengthen its ability to act efficiently and to shape the EU’s response to ongoing and upcoming challenges; therefore welcomes the ongoing Strategic Compass process as the starting point for the development of a common strategic culture and expects that it will help shape a shared vision for EU security and defence; stresses that the outcome should be reflected in a revised version of the 2016 EU Global Strategy;
Amendment 209 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12 a. Encourages Member States to utilize to the full extent the capabilities afforded to them via NATO membership and call for synergy between the upcoming Strategic Compass and the upcoming Strategic Concept to ensure better collaboration and burden sharing;
Amendment 212 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Recalls that the Treaties provide for the possibility to improvstresses that unanimity should remain in the decision- making procedures for the CFSP; stresses that unanimity hampers the EU’s ability to act and therefore calls for the Member States to use qualified majority voting for specific aspects of the CFSP; in particular, reiterates its call for the introduction of qualified majority voting for the adoption of sanctions; stresses that the use of Article 44 TEU could improve the EU’s flexibility and capacity to act in CFSP as it strengthens solidarity within the EU and provides for a stronger mandate to its actions globally;
Amendment 223 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Reiterates its call for the establishment of new formats of cooperation such as thejects the establishment of a European Security Council; re and calls that the ongoing Conference on the Future of Europe provides a relevant framework to shape innovative proposals in this respectfor stronger consultations between the EU and NATO on the PSC and NAC levels;
Amendment 235 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Stresses that a holistic approach to the CFSP requires the synergy of all available EU assets in the field of external action; in this respect, highlights the key role of the European Parliament in the EU’s diplomacy; calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to recognise Parliament as an integral part of ‘Team Europe’ and to reflect this in the operational structures;
Amendment 250 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3
Subheading 3
Amendment 254 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Calls foron the EU to ensure its strategic sovereignty in specific areas that are fundamental to the Union’s existence on the global scene, such as economics, security and technology, and to establish a European Defence UnionEurope's positive global positioning in economics, security and technology;
Amendment 274 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Stresses that EU sovereigntyaction in the field of security and defence meanincludes the development, coordination and deployment of strategic capabilities, an efficient cooperation and division of labour between the Member States and the EU’s ability to decide and act autonomously, in line with its own interests, principles and values; stresses that this approach reinforces and within the framework of closer cooperation with partners, in particular within the framework of NATO; welcomes in this regard the Commission President’s announcement that the EU and NATO will present a joint declaration on cooperation by the end of 2021; welcomes the discussion on an ‘initial entry force’ as presented by the VP/HRadvises to conduct a thorough assessment of existing tools and capabilities, such as EU-battlegroups, which, despite continued political calls for a stronger CSDP, have not yet been utilized;
Amendment 292 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19 a. Recognises NATO as the foundation for European security and defence and encourages Allies on both sides of the Atlantic to reaffirm their commitment to NATO as the principal institution for the defence of the Euro- Atlantic area and should maintain and meet agreed burden-sharing requirements;
Amendment 308 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Underlines the need for the Union to develop its technological sovereigntyectors through the enhancement of industrial defence capabilities, in particular in emerging disruptive technologies (EDTs), and the protection and resilience of critical infrastructures;
Amendment 318 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Stresses that the European space sector is an enabler for achieving EU sovereigimportanty; underlines that space is rapidly becoming a political arena that might reflect geopolitical competition on Earth; supports initiatives aimed at boosting EU space policy, including the ambitious new EU space programme; supports the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) for providing decision- makers with early warnings of potential crises as well as global situational awareness;
Amendment 354 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Reaffirms its unwavering support to the Eastern Partnership countries, and in particular as regards their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within their internationally recognised borders; condemns Russia’s direct and indirect involvement in armed conflicts, occupations and military build-ups inside the region or on its borders with the region, especially the continued militarisation in the Georgian occupied territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia and in the Eastern Ukraine, as well as the illegal occupation of Crimea; urges the Eastern Partnership countries, and in particular those that have chosen to pursue the path of European integration, to ensure that fundamental freedoms are upheld and to continue implementing the necessary reforms; reiterates that the EU’s support is conditional upon concrete progress on those reforms;
Amendment 357 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24 a. Is deeply concerned about the situation in Belarus; condemns in the strongest possible terms the acts of violence against peaceful protesters and calls for the immediate and unconditional release and dropping of all charges against all persons detained for political reasons, before and after the so-called 9 August 2020 presidential elections; reiterates that it rejects the results of these; strongly supports EU sanctions against individuals responsible for the falsification of the election results and the repression in Belarus, including Aliaksandr Lukashenka; calls on the Council to implement without delay, and in close coordination with international partners, broad and effective sanctions against all Belarusian perpetrators of election fraud, violence and repression in Belarus; strongly condemns the use of irregular migrants at external EU borders by the Lukashenka regime and the instrumentalisation of human beings for political purposes, in breach of international norms;
Amendment 364 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 d (new)
Paragraph 24 d (new)
24 d. Stresses the need for more EU and Member State engagement in the Southern Caucasus for the region's stability and prosperity as well as to counteract the influence and interference of regional powers;
Amendment 367 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 b (new)
Paragraph 24 b (new)
Amendment 370 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 c (new)
Paragraph 24 c (new)
24 c. Welcomes the inauguration of the Crimean Platform and calls for the EU institutions, Member States and all like- minded partners to actively engage in this initiative aimed at the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine; reiterates its support to the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, as the only internationally recognised representative body of the Crimean Tatars and commends the indomitable stance of the Ukrainian citizens in occupied Crimea, in particular Crimean Tatars;
Amendment 377 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)
Paragraph 25 a (new)
25 a. Welcomes the Abraham Accords and stresses their importance for peace and cooperation in the region; acknowledges the important role the US played in the public diplomatic normalisation of relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco; recalls the EU's commitment to a negotiated and viable two-state solution, based on international parameters and on the 1967 lines, with land swaps as may be agreed between the parties, with a secure Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in peace, security and mutual recognition;
Amendment 378 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 b (new)
Paragraph 25 b (new)
25 b. Expresses grave concern about the situation in Lebanon and deeply urges the Lebanese leadership to keep their promises to create a functional government that is mission-driven, credible and accountable and that is free from foreign influence; stresses the particular responsibility of Hezbollah and other factions in repressing Lebanon’s 2019 popular movement and in Lebanon’s political and economic crisis; calls on Iran to refrain from meddling in Lebanon’s internal affairs and calls for Lebanon's sovereignty and political independence to be respected; expresses grave concern about the recent statement by Hezbollah leader Nasrallah that Hezbollah has over 100,000 fighters in Lebanon; strongly condemns the firing of rockets by Hezbollah from southern Lebanon towards civilian areas in Israel and expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress made towards the establishment of a permanent ceasefire and other key provisions of UN Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) in view of on-going tensions along Lebanon’s southern border;
Amendment 382 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 c (new)
Paragraph 25 c (new)
25 c. Notes that during the start of the civil war none of the main drivers of the conflict have been resolved, while regional tensions have increased and Syria's economic crisis has further deteriorated, causing terrible civilian suffering; rejects any role for President Bashar al-Assad in post conflict Syria with reference to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254 (2015); in this regard, welcomes and supports criminal inquiries that target al-Assad and his associates over the use of chemical weapons and hold them accountable for numerous war crimes; recommends that the Member States expand the list of those subject to targeted sanctions, including civilian and military officials within the Assad regime who are credibly implicated in war crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious violations;
Amendment 397 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Underlines the importance of the fullneed for flexibility in the comprehensive implementation of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, including the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland, as well as the Trade and Cooperation Agreement; welcomes steps towards the establishment of a Parliamentary Partnership Assembly for Members of the European Parliament and Members of the UK Parliament, as provided for by the agreement; hopes that foreign policy and security cooperation will be further developed and strengthened in areas of common concerninterest;
Amendment 414 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. UnderlinStresses the need to strengthen EU- US transatlantic cooperation on the basis of an equal partnership; welcomes in this context the statement ‘Towards a renewed Transatlantic partnership’ from the EU-US summit 2021, which provides a good basis for an ambitious transatlantic agenda; fully supports and commits to pursuing synergies and shared foreign and security objectives by further deepening cooperation in the framework of the EU- US transatlantic dialogue; highlights that the EU should be prepared to reflect on how to adapt to the changing role of the US on the global stage;
Amendment 420 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 a (new)
Paragraph 28 a (new)
28 a. Calls on the EU and US to collaboratively address the consistent and growing threats to the protection and preservation of cultural heritage and cultural smuggling, especially in conflict zones; urges the embracing of a strategy that includes robust public awareness campaigns, universal condemnation of trafficking in unprovenanced antiquities, establishment of a single code of conduct in protection of cultural sites, fostering of greater cooperation among different law- enforcement agencies that includes immediate information-sharing among national intelligence agencies and to increase cooperation between law enforcement and the art and archaeological communities;
Amendment 421 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 b (new)
Paragraph 28 b (new)
28 b. Underlines that the EU and the US must synergize their efforts to combat terrorism and radicalization and ensure that efforts made are supported by the necessary resources and commensurate with the threat that it poses; notes that both partners should strive to improve current practices of intelligence-sharing among Member States with particular emphasis on achieving better, common situational awareness in key areas including emerging safe havens and terrorists’ use of EDTs, as well as hybrid tactics;
Amendment 428 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Emphasises that the EU’s relations with Africa are of utmost importance; welcomes the joint communication of the Commission and the VP/HR entitled ‘Towards a comprehensive strategy with Africa’3 ; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to deepen discussions with the EU’s African partners in order to prepare for a successful EU-African Union Summit; emphasises the need to collaborate on a strategy in the areas of defence, development and peace building to counter the jihadist rise in the Sahel and in other parts of Africa; _________________ 3 JOIN(2020)0004.
Amendment 438 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Is gravely concerned by the developments in Russia and reiterates the EU’s interest in maintaining freedom, stability and peace on the European continent and beyond; believes that the EU should deter Russia from carrying out destabilising and subversive actions in Europe and from repressing its own citizens; underlines that closer coordination, cooperation and unity among the EU Member States areis necessary in order to maintain a constructive dialogue with the Russian authorities based on the five guiding principles, which is only possible if both parties are genuinely interested in it; urges the EU to engage more closely with the people of Russia, including by developing a clearly defined ‘engagement’ objective, which should focus not only on traditional selective engagement with the Kremlin, but also on ‘strategic’ engagement with Russian civil society; underlines that there can be no return to "business as usual" with Russia unless a number of conditions are met, including the de- occupation of Crimea, fulfilling the provisions of the 2008 cease-fire agreement with Russia, cessation of hostilities against EU Member States and EaP countries, as well as improving the internal human rights situation; expresses concern about the repeated violations by Russia of the arms control agreements and standards, leading to the collapse of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), as well as violations of the chemical weapons convention by using military grade nerve agents, both domestically and inside the EU territory; underlines the need to put pressure on the Russian civil societyFederation to comply with international law and treaties;
Amendment 462 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Reiterates, as underlined in its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy4 , its call for the EU to develop a more assertive, comprehensive, and consistent EU-China strategy that unites all Member States and shapes relations with China in the interest of the EU as a whole; emphasises that this strategy should promote a rules-based multilateral order, have the defence of EU values at its core and should be based on the three principles of cooperating where possible, competing where needed, and confronting where necessary; strongly advocates for Taiwan’s full participation as an observer in meetings, mechanisms and activities of international organisations; and calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to urgently begin an impact assessment, public consultation and scoping exercise on a Bilateral Investment Agreement (BIA) with the Taiwanese authorities in preparation for negotiations to deepen bilateral economic ties; denounces China's continued military belligerence against Taiwan and pressure on it and urges the EU and Member States to take a proactive role in working with like- minded international partners to pursue peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and to establish partnerships with the democratic government of Taiwan; _________________ 4 Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0382.
Amendment 468 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32 a (new)
Paragraph 32 a (new)
32 a. Notes with serious concern the recent display of force and escalating tensions in the regional hotspots such as South and East China Sea and Taiwan Strait; underlines that the peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific regions is of great importance for the EU and its Member States; expresses grave concern over China’s continued military manoeuvers in the Taiwan Strait, including those aimed at Taiwan or taking place in Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone; calls on the PRC to stop such military sabre-rattling that pose serious threats to the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and the Indo- Pacific region; reiterates that the relationship between China and Taiwan should be developed constructively through dialogues, without coercion or destabilizing tactics by either side; stresses the opposition to any unilateral action that may undermine the status quo of the Taiwan Strait and that any change to cross-strait relations must not be made against the will of Taiwan’s citizens;
Amendment 469 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32 a (new)
Paragraph 32 a (new)
32 a. Underlines the importance of the EU joining its transatlantic partners in pursuing an independent external investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 virus that originated in Wuhan, China to seek much needed answers and insights into possible prevention of future global disasters that directly impact foreign and security policy;
Amendment 471 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32 b (new)
Paragraph 32 b (new)
Amendment 472 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32 b (new)
Paragraph 32 b (new)
32 b. Strongly condemns ongoing human rights violations in communist China, notably against ethnic and religious minorities, mostly targeting Muslim Uygurs, Christians and Tibetans; condemns actions of the PRC in Hong Kong and underlines that ongoing undermining of Hong Kong's autonomy by Beijing does not only go against China's bilateral treaties obligations and international law, but also puts into question Beijing's role as a credible partner;
Amendment 476 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Welcomes the Commission President’s announcement of plans to present a new joint communication on a partnership with the Gulf region; calls for the EU to present a coherent strategy for balanced EU engagement in the region, with the promotion of regional security and cooperation as a key strategic objective; reiteranotes that the EU’s priority iefforts to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as a matter of security for Europe and the region and the only way to stop Iran’s worrying nuclear activities; stresses that any agreement with Iran needs to include sufficient safeguards that Iran will not be able to acquire nuclear weapons; expresses grave concern about the IAEA's reported lack of access to its monitoring and surveillance equipment at facilities and locations in Iran, which greatly hampers the IAEA's ability to verify and monitor Iran's nuclear activities and that safeguard issues remain unresolved over the last two years; condemns Iran's human rights violations against its own people, its ballistic missile programme and terror activities in the region and in Europe;
Amendment 487 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Underlines that the situation in Afghanistan is a wakeup call for the EU to deploy its external actions and meansDeplores the Taliban take over of Afghanistan and stresses that human rights, including women rights and those of religious and ethnic minorities, need to be preserved in the country; is concerned by the dramatic humanitarian and security situation in Afghanistan; stresses the need for those in power across Afghanistan to bear responsibility and accountability for the protection of human life and property and for the restoration of security and civil order; reiterates that Afghan women and girls, like all Afghan people, deserve to live in safety, security and dignity and welcomes the broad international support for their rights and freedoms; calls for the EU to preserve the achievements of the last 20 years and to ensure that Afghanistan does not descend into a safe haven for terrorist groups; emphasises the importance of cooperating with neighbouring and regional countries to ensure global security and regional stability; in this regard notes that not all of Afghanistan's neighbours and regional powers shared the same goals as the US- led coalition, with allegations of supporting the Taliban by supplying weapons, money and a safe haven to Taliban leaders and calls on the EU to take it into account in bilateral relations and regional strategies;
Amendment 504 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)
Paragraph 35 a (new)
35 a. Welcomes the trilateral defence partnership between Australia, United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS) that will significantly boost defensive capabilities of Australia; expresses its concern about hostile reactions to the partnership from China, whose considerable military build-up and development of A2/AD potential is seen as a most destabilising factor in South-East Asia;
Amendment 513 #
2021/2182(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Calls for special attention to be paid to enhancing cooperation with our partners in Latin America; believes that a strengthened relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is central to the EU’s geopolitical strategy in the world; stresses the need for the Union to strengthen the ties that unite the EU with LAC countries, particularly in defending the rules-based multilateral order; calls for the EU to use all available tools to deepen its cooperation with LAC partners, ensure the swift ratification of the EU-Mexico agreement, deliver on the sustainable and environmental protocol with Mercosur so that the EU association agreement with Mercosur can be ratified, and conclude the negotiations for updating the EU association agreement with Chile; urges the EU to recover its position as the preferred partner of Latin American countries in view of other geopolitical actors occupying increasing space in the region, especially as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and vaccine diplomacy; calls on the EU and Member States to implement more assertive policies towards communist and dictatorial regimes in Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia who have benefited from their relations with the EU and have dismantled, violated, or directly suppressed the rights and freedoms of their citizens;
Amendment 61 #
2021/2065(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 (new)
Paragraph -1 (new)
Amendment 77 #
2021/2065(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c
Paragraph 1 – point c
Amendment 144 #
2021/2065(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point k
Paragraph 1 – point k
Amendment 154 #
2021/2065(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point l
Paragraph 1 – point l
Amendment 171 #
2021/2065(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n
Paragraph 1 – point n
Amendment 15 #
2021/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 3 a (new)
Citation 3 a (new)
— having regard to the EU Emergency Trust Fund to Africa in Libya,
Amendment 63 #
2021/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas it is of utmost importance that the Member States speak with one voice, strengthening thethe UN's central role must be underlined and EU’s mediation efforts and underlining thmay be central role of the UNcouraged to support the UN's role;
Amendment 65 #
2021/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the increasing involvement in the conflict of local and foreign armed groups, as well as foreign forces, poses a threat to the security of Libya and the entire regionparticularly the Russian military and mercenaries of the Wagner Group, poses a threat to the security of Libya and the entire region; whereas despite some tactical withdrawal of Wagner fighters from Libya to be deployed to fight in the brutal and illegal Russian war against Ukraine, Wagner fighters remain entrenched in and around key military bases and oil facilities in Libya; whereas numerous investigations exposed the key role of Russian mercenaries in war crimes committed during the conflict, in particular during Haftar's offensive against the capital Tripoli;
Amendment 114 #
2021/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital K a (new)
Recital K a (new)
K a. whereas the EU Emergency Trust Fund to Africa in Libya has substantially contributed to the voluntary return of migrants to their countries of origin and provided support for their reintegration;
Amendment 138 #
2021/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a
Paragraph 1 – point a
(a) ensure a UN-led and Libyan-owned inclusive national reconciliation process is given the strongest support possible in order to deliver longer-term stability and security and lay the foundations for a peaceful and democratic transition that involves all Libyan stakeholders; join the call on the Libyan parties to engage in a genuine dialogue to address the ongoing political impasse and not to use force to resolve their differences;
Amendment 152 #
2021/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point b
Paragraph 1 – point b
(b) continue to cooperate closely with UNSMIL and actively support the renewal of its mandate; stress that, given the current political impasse, the continuation of UN- backed negotiations on a roadmap for free, fair and credible elections remains vital, while underlining the urgent need to finalise a constitutional basis as a step to move towards elections; evaluate the feasibility of the deployment of an EU electoral observation mission to monitor the electoral process;
Amendment 159 #
2021/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c
Paragraph 1 – point c
(c) step upcontinue EU diplomatic efforts to restore peace and security in the country, and ensure that the Member States speak with one vosupport efforts to bring perpetrators of war crimes to justice; to this end, nominate, as a matter of priority, an EU special representative for Libya;
Amendment 167 #
2021/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point d
Paragraph 1 – point d
(d) reinforce the call made during the Paris International Conference for Libya of 12 November 2021 for all mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces, particularly including the Wagner Group, to withdraw from Libyan territory;
Amendment 176 #
2021/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e
Paragraph 1 – point e
(e) increasecontinue to support to the internationally recognised Libyan authorities for the implementation of a comprehensive security sector reform and in the area of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration policies for armed groups;
Amendment 179 #
2021/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
(e a) condemn the recent violent clashes in Tripoli, which after a relatively calm period over the past two years, may lead to a new wave of hostilities;
Amendment 184 #
2021/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
(f a) support efforts to ensure accountability for the war crimes committed in Libya since the conflict, including violations of international humanitarian law, the recruitment and direct participation of children in hostilities, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and other forms of violence against vulnerable populations;
Amendment 190 #
2021/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g
Paragraph 1 – point g
(g) step up efforts within the EWG to call on the Libyan authorities to ensure fair, transparent, inclusive and sustainable redistribution of oil revenues by pursuing a vision of shared economic prosperity for all people in the country; stresses that the export of Libyan natural resources to Europe may serve as an important and much needed source to diversify Europe's independence from Russian oil and gas;
Amendment 204 #
2021/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point h
Paragraph 1 – point h
(h) support the valuable work of the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya and the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean operation Irini, two common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions, in contributing to sustainable peace, security and stability, in particular through their support for the implementation of the arms embargo imposed on Libya by the UN Security Council; renew, if necessary, the mandate of these two common security and defence policy missions in order to contribute to improving the security conditions on the ground, including by preventing terrorists, human traffickers and armed groups from carrying out cross-border activities; guarantee that all activities carried out or facilitated by these two missions respect human rights and are in line with international and EU laws, in particular the principle of non-refoulement; conduct and provide Parliament with regular human rights impact assessments of all their activities;
Amendment 247 #
2021/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point l
Paragraph 1 – point l
(l) urge the Libyan authorities to end arbitrary immigration detention and introduce alternatives to detention, inter alia by opening reception centres, developing screening and referral mechanisms and offering community housing optionssure humane reception conditions and to provide different emergency assistance;
Amendment 253 #
2021/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point m
Paragraph 1 – point m
(m) encourage the Libyan authorities to enhance cooperation with neighbourhood countries regarding the creation of safe and legal pathways for migrationthird countries regarding the voluntary return to countries of origin of migrants stranded in Libya, enhance cooperation with other countries of origin and transit including on resettlement and to continue to ensure measures to reduce illegal migration to the EU and fight human trafficking;
Amendment 269 #
2021/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n
Paragraph 1 – point n
Amendment 2 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1
Citation 1
— having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia, in particular those of 18 September 2014 on the situation in Ukraine and the state of play of EU- Russia relations, of 11 June 2015 on the strategic military situation in the Black Sea Basin following the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia, of 16 March 2017 on the Ukrainian prisoners in Russia and the situation in Crimea, of 12 March 2019 on the state of EU-Russia political relations1 , of 19 September 2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe2 , of 19 December 2019 on the Russian ‘foreign agents’ law3 , of 17 September 2020 on the poisoning of Alexei Navalny4 , of 21 January 2021 on the arrest of Alexei Navalny5 and of 29 April 2021 on Russia, the case of Alexei Navalny, the military build-up on Ukraine’s border and Russian attacks in the Czech Republic6 , of 14 June 2018 on Georgian occupied territories 10 years after the Russian invasion, of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties, _________________ 1 OJ C 23, 21.1.2021, p. 7. 2 Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0021, 3 Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0108. 4 Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0232. 5 Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0018, 6 Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0159,
Amendment 11 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 3 a (new)
Citation 3 a (new)
— having regard to the joint communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social committee and the committee of the Regions - Tackling Covid-19 disinformation -Getting the facts right (JOIN/2020/8 final),
Amendment 16 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital -A a (new)
Recital -A a (new)
-Aa. whereas the main interest of the EU is to keep stability and peace on the European continent, which is being threatened by aggressive external policies of the Russian authorities;
Amendment 23 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital -A c (new)
Recital -A c (new)
-Ac. whereas the EU strategy towards Russia needs to combine two major objectives: first, to stop the Kremlin’s external and domestic aggressiveness and second, to engage with the people of Russia and assist them in building a different future for Russia, which would benefit all the people on the European continent including the Russian;
Amendment 25 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital -A d (new)
Recital -A d (new)
-Ad. whereas the Kremlin authority can be described as a stagnating authoritarian kleptocracy led by a president-for-life surrounded by a circle of oligarchs, who has started wars against his neighbours, assassinates opponents inside and outside Russia, interferes in the US’ and European elections, and acts as an anti- Western spoiler at every opportunity;
Amendment 27 #
2021/2042(INI)
-Ae. whereas President Putin’s approach is clearly revisionist, trying to extend control over territories he considers lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union;
Amendment 28 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital -A f (new)
Recital -A f (new)
-Af. whereas the Kremlin’s regime continues the illegal occupation of territories and maintains frozen conflicts in Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia), interferes directly in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, engages in the destabilisation and effective control of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts directly and through Russian and local mercenaries, and especially annexed Crimea to Russia violently and illegally; whereas the Kremlin’s regime continues to consider these actions as favourable to its interests;
Amendment 32 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital -A h (new)
Recital -A h (new)
Amendment 60 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas Russia is continuing its aggressive behaviour on the border with Ukraineon against Ukraine since February 2014 and interfering with acts of terrorism on the territory of EU Member States, such as Czechia, and its eastern neighbours, inter alia by supporting the illegitimate regime of Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus;
Amendment 61 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the Kremlin’s regime has in several weeks of March and April 2021 substantially increased its military presence on the eastern and northern border of Ukraine, which is the biggest concentration of Russian troops since 2014; whereas the Kremlin regime suspended the right of passage for warships and commercial vessels of other countries through part of the Black Sea in the direction of the Kerch Strait, which is in violation of navigation rights guaranteed by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which Russia is a party;
Amendment 68 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Recital A b (new)
Amendment 74 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A c (new)
Recital A c (new)
Ac. whereas illegal actions by the Kremlin regime on the territory of the United Kingdom, Czechia, Bulgaria, as well as many other EU Member States and Eastern Partnership countries constitute a critical violation of their sovereignty; whereas the Kremlin regime is non-cooperative in investigating those crimes and is sheltering key suspects;
Amendment 79 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A d (new)
Recital A d (new)
Ad. whereas President Putin’s political and economic investment into the survival of the illegitimate Lukashenko regime is the only reason why Mr Lukashenko is still able to continue the brutal persecution of Belarusian people who are demanding respect for human rights, free and transparent elections, rule of law and justice; whereas from the summer of 2020 the illegitimate Lukashenko regime incarcerated more than 360 political prisoners and arrested, persecuted and in many cases tortured more than 30 000 protesters;
Amendment 87 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A f (new)
Recital A f (new)
Af. whereas the EU dependency on imports of Russia’s energy products is one of the major threats to EU’s geopolitical security;
Amendment 89 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A g (new)
Recital A g (new)
Ag. whereas more than 60 per cent of EU imports from Russia in 2019 were energy products; whereas the EU needs to reduce the dependency of its economy, especially in the energy sector, on Russian gas supplies to EU markets, which is now at 48 % and has a tendency to increase;
Amendment 92 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A i (new)
Recital A i (new)
Ai. whereas the Russian Federation poses not only an external threat to European security, but is also waging an internal war on its own people in the form of the systematic oppression of the opposition and arrests on the streets; whereas Russia has continued to unlawfully detain its citizens and target opposition leaders, independent journalists, protesters, human rights activists; whereas the prison conditions in Russia remain dreadful and people imprisoned are subject to torture, harassment, physical attacks;
Amendment 93 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A j (new)
Recital A j (new)
Aj. whereas, according to the Memorial Human Rights Centre, the Russian authorities currently hold nearly 400 political prisoners in violation of the Russian Federation’s obligations under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 23 of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;
Amendment 99 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas the Kremlin’s regime continues the systemic repressions of democratic forces by means of a significant number of attempted poisonings and murders, arrests and political sentencings of main oppositioners and activists such as Anna Politkovskaya, Boris Nemtsov, Alexander Litvinenko, Sergei and Yulia Skripal, Sergei Protazanov, Vladimir Kara-Murza and others; whereas the organisers of these crimes remain unidentified and unindicted; whereas the OSCE report on the murder of Boris Nemtsov has concluded that ‘the main issue for addressing impunity is not the capabilities of the Russian law enforcement, but the political will’;
Amendment 103 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Recital B b (new)
Bb. whereas the Russian authorities’ decision to declare the Anti-Corruption Foundation headed by Alexei Navalny an extremist organisation is baseless, discriminatory and has been adopted with only one goal: to destroy opposition’s possibilities to effectively participate in election campaigns; whereas the law on ‘foreign agents’ is allowing individuals, associations and media to be stigmatised as ‘foreign agents’, thereby violating human rights, in particular freedom of expression and association, restricting the citizens’ right to commit and contribute to Russian civil society and putting their personal safety at risk by bearing such a stigma;
Amendment 107 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B c (new)
Recital B c (new)
Bc. whereas the Kremlin’s regime adopted the laws on persons or entities supporting ‘foreign agents’ and ‘undesirable foreign organisations’, by which it has systemically banned active members of civil society, human rights NGOs, and the opposition from participating in the 2021 Parliamentary elections in Russia;
Amendment 109 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B d (new)
Recital B d (new)
Bd. whereas the Russian authorities are holding the key opposition players of parliamentary election campaign in prison or under home arrest; whereas continuing repressions by Russian authorities on opposition candidates by abusing the registration procedures and selectively targeting political opponents and civil society organisations in the streets and courts under fabricated cases will make it simply impossible to speak about fair parliamentary elections in September 2021, as by these actions the regime in Russia is destroying political competition and pluralist democracy as does the dictatorship in Belarus;
Amendment 110 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B e (new)
Recital B e (new)
Be. whereas the endlessly increasing systemic oppression by the Kremlin of the opposition in Russia is an eye opener for the whole international community and whereas the EU must be ready to face it and develop a coherent strategy of response if it wants to save its own reputation; whereas, in particular, the EU has to build an increasing pressure on the Kremlin regime in the run-up to the 2021 parliamentary election and in its aftermath in order to defend the right for the Russian people to have free elections;
Amendment 111 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B f (new)
Recital B f (new)
Bf. whereas in the light of recent developments in the area from Brest to Khabarovsk, Belarus and Russia are living through a moment of significant changes and the processes in both countries are very heavily influencing each other; whereas both regimes in Russia and Belarus are fearing the growing demand for change among their peoples, which is why stealing elections presents itself as a convenient political solution;
Amendment 121 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas in July 2020 the Russian authorities enacted a series of constitutional amendments – including an amendment giving President Putin a waiver from presidential term-limits in 2024 – in a procedure that violated both Russian law and the Russian Federation’s OSCE obligations, and that the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) has assessed as ‘clearly inappropriate’; whereas the constitutional and legislative amendments further eroded the right to a fair trial in Russia, including by giving the President the power to nominate the judges of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts, and initiate the appointment of all federal judges and dismissal of senior federal judges;
Amendment 125 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas Russia continues to be in breach of its international obligations and refuses to fully implement the ceasefire agreements of 12 August 2008 following its aggression of Georgia, and of 12 February 2015 following its aggression of Ukraine;
Amendment 131 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas in its resolutions of 17 September 2020, 21 January 2021 and 29 April 2021 Parliament called upon High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission, Josep Borrell for a review of the EU’s policy vis-à-vis Russia, including the five guiding principles agreed in 2016, emphasised that future EU relations with Russia would depend on the pace of Russia’s democratic transformation and called for the EU institutions to devise a new strategic approach on the assumption that any dialogue with Russia must be based on respect for international law and human rights, in particular to develop a new comprehensive strategy, which will be conditional on further developments in the area of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights by the Russian leadership and authorities;
Amendment 138 #
2021/2042(INI)
E. whereas the five EU guiding principles for relations with Russia have deterredcontribute to containing the Kremlin regime from furtherextension of direct aggression against Ukraine, butwhile they are silent with respectneed to be further strengthened, in particular complemented to containing President Putin’s war against the people of Russia;
Amendment 148 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the new EU strategy should consider Russia under its current regime as a long term threat to the European security in accordance with the recent assessment of NATO Reflection Group and be centred on the ‘push-back, contain and engage’ principles aimed at strengthening the EU’s capacity to combat the Kremlin’s threats, especially in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) region, including Belarus, as well as in Russia itself, by defending human rights and assisting Russia’s transformation into a democracy in accordance with the principle of ‘democracy first’;
Amendment 153 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas, according to the Memorial Human Rights Centre, the Russian authorities currently hold nearly 400 political prisoners in violation of the Russian Federation’s obligations under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 23of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;
Amendment 158 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)
Recital F b (new)
Fb. whereas in July 2020 the Russian authorities enacted a series of constitutional amendments – including an amendment giving President Putin a waiver from presidential term-limits in 2024– in a procedure that violated both Russian law and the Russian Federation’s OSCE obligations, and that the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) has assessed as “clearly inappropriate”; https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?p dffile=CDL-AD(2021)005-e
Amendment 168 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F g (new)
Recital F g (new)
Fg. whereas the transformation of Russia back into a democracy will depend on the willingness of the Russian people, and the EU must be ready to assist them in their wish to have a democratic country;
Amendment 171 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas the EU strategy on Russia should be based on the assumption that the people of Russia can transform their country into a democracy, while there are no prospects for any significant developments with the current Russian leadership;
Amendment 175 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas the organisers and masterminds of the 2015 assassination of Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov remain unidentified and unindicted, while the OSCE report on this issue has concluded that “the main issue for addressing impunity is not the capabilities of the Russian law enforcement, but political will”;
Amendment 177 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G b (new)
Recital G b (new)
Gb. whereas in 2020 Russia ranked 129th out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, ranking the lowest in Europe; whereas kleptocratic links between oligarchs, security officers and officials linked to the Kremlin have been partially exposed by anticorruption activists such as the late Sergei Magnitsky and the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) led by Alexei Navalny, implicating the highest echelons of power, including Vladimir Putin;
Amendment 178 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G c (new)
Recital G c (new)
Gc. whereas the construction of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, completed in 2012, was one of the factors which enabled the Russian Federation to implement its aggressive policies towards Ukraine and the ongoing construction of Nord Stream 2 constitutes a further threat to the security of Ukraine, as well as to the EU internal market, as it is not in line with EU energy policy or Europe’s strategic interests;
Amendment 186 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the EU strategy on Russia should work in the interest of the EU and offerprompt Russia ato respect the norms and principles of international law, thus encouraging future constructive dialogue aimed at promoting the values of human rights and democracy;
Amendment 217 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a
Paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the EU, together with NATO and international partners, should deter Russia and keep stability in the EaP region by pressing Russia not to interfere in the regionthose countries’ European, Euro-Atlantic and democratic choice as well as and to return the occupied territories in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, in accordance with their internationally recognised borders;
Amendment 228 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(aa) acknowledges that the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 OSCE Charter of Paris represent the cornerstones of a peaceful European continent and regrets that the Russian Federation consistently violates international law, international agreements and its own obligations and the measures implemented by the international community to change Kremlin's aggressive policy are insufficient and therefore need to be strengthened;
Amendment 230 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(aa) the EU, in particular the Member States, should deliver on their commitments for collective defence made within the frameworks of the EU and NATO, which is the only power on the European continent that can deter Russia’s nuclear capabilities and this is why NATO cannot be replaced by the EU’s strategically autonomous military capabilities;
Amendment 234 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point a b (new)
(ab) acknowledges that the continued failure to respond adequately to the subsequent Russian aggressions since against Georgia in 2008 prompted Russia to continue aggressive military and political campaigns, both in its neighbourhood and beyond, with no fear of retribution, and by doing so to weaken and undermine the rules-based international order and stability in Europe and elsewhere;
Amendment 235 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point a b (new)
(ab) the EU needs to strengthen the cooperation of security services of EU Member states in order to be more effective in preventing Russian special services to implement on EU territory their terrorist attacks, poisoning or killing of opponents; and to work further with the US administration on the new measures to push-back on Kremlin’s sponsored terrorism;
Amendment 237 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point a c (new)
(ac) the EU should have a strategic responsibility for stability and development in the EU neighbourhood, especially the Eastern Partnership region and should keep demanding Russia to implement its international obligations and give back control of the occupied territories, as well as remove its military resources from the sovereign territories of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, including in the Sea of Azov; the EU should keep its sanctions in place until Russia fully implements its commitments under the Minsk agreements;
Amendment 239 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a d (new)
Paragraph 1 – point a d (new)
(ad) the EU should be more effective in pushing back and broaden the scope of its sanctions to increase the price Russia pays for blocking the implementation of the Minsk agreements and the talks in the Normandy format; the EU should coordinate these measures with the US in order to increase their effectiveness;
Amendment 245 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point b
Paragraph 1 – point b
(b) the EU should be ready to call for the exclusion of Russia from the SWIFT payment system and to stop all the imports of oil and gas from Russia immediately if the Russian authorities continue their aggressive threats and military action against EU Member States and EaP neighbouring countries;
Amendment 247 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point b
Paragraph 1 – point b
(b) the EU should be ready to call forinitiate the exclusion of Russia from the SWIFT payment system if the Russian authorities continudoes not cease their aggressive threats and military action against EU Member States and EaP neighbouring countries;
Amendment 249 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
(ba) the EU should take resolute measures to deter Russia from circumventing existing EU sanctions imposed on Russia in connection with its aggressive actions against Ukraine. To this end, the EU should review and update its applicable regulations to close multiple loopholes in the sanctions rules to render them more efficient and to genuinely increase the cost of Russia’s hybrid aggressive action;
Amendment 251 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c
Paragraph 1 – point c
(c) the EU must have a clear goal and plans on how to cut its dependency on Russian gas and oil, at least while President Putin is in power; the EU needs to elaborate and implement a clear strategy on how to decrease dependency on Russian gas; the EU geopolitical security should have as a major priority the implementation of the Green Deal package to reduce EU’s dependency on Russia’s gas and oil supplies radically in the next 10 to 15 years, which includes measures, such as EU carbon leakage tax and decarbonisation initiatives with development of green hydrogen industries; the EU needs to implement immediately new physical measures, such as reverse flow capabilities and additional cross-border infrastructure between Member States; the EU needs to apply energy diversification, including by developing the new capacities for LNG imports, energy transition and decarbonisation initiatives, which are rapidly gaining traction and could lessen demand for fossil fuels thereby ending Russia’s energy dominance on the European continent;
Amendment 254 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c
Paragraph 1 – point c
(c) the EU must have a clear goal and plans on how to cut its dependency on Russian gas and oil, at least while President Putin is in power, in this regard, construction of the “Nord Stream 2” project must be immediately halted;
Amendment 265 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
Amendment 271 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point c b (new)
(cb) the EU should impose sanctions in response to the ongoing large-scale conferral of Russian nationality (passportisation) to Ukrainian citizens in the temporarily occupied certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and Crimea as well as for holding electoral procedures in the occupied Crimea;
Amendment 273 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point c c (new)
(c c) the EU should promptly apply its Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime for systemic and serious human rights violations in the temporarily occupied Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions
Amendment 275 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c d (new)
Paragraph 1 – point c d (new)
(cd) the EU should expand the EU global human rights sanctions regime (EU) and apply it to the grave human rights abuses in Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia to address the human rights violations in Georgia’s territories occupied by the Russian Federation;
Amendment 278 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point c e (new)
Paragraph 1 – point c e (new)
(ce) the EU should encourage its Member States to keep political dialogue with Russia downgraded until it stops its aggressive policy in flagrant violation of norms and principles of international law and the territorial integrity of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine is restored.
Amendment 285 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point d
Paragraph 1 – point d
(d) the EU should initiate security compacts with EaP countries that have an association agreement with the EU and propose at this stage a new EU integration strategyapproach for Eastern Partners building on former Commission President Romano Prodi’s formula of ‘everything, but the institutions’ that will create a new momentum for the European membership perspective of the associated partners;
Amendment 293 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point d a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point d a (new)
(da) the EU should continue to unequivocally condemn Russia’s illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and the de facto occupation of certain parts of the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk and support Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders;
Amendment 296 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point d b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point d b (new)
(db) the EU should urge Russia to uphold its obligation under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and to guarantee the freedom of navigation and transit passage, in particular on the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov; calls for the EU to develop, in close cooperation with Member States and other international partners, the permanent monitoring of the passage of all vessels coming through the Kerch Strait;
Amendment 301 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point d c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point d c (new)
(dc) the EU should demand that Russia immediately end all military build-ups, provocations or subversive actions against EaP countries and cease any future such plans;
Amendment 303 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point d d (new)
Paragraph 1 – point d d (new)
(dd) the EU should strongly condemn Russia’s violations of international law in occupied Crimea, including the enforcement of Russian legislation, the heavy militarisation of the Crimean peninsula and the massive and systematic human rights violations targeting, in particular, ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars;
Amendment 310 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e
Paragraph 1 – point e
(e) the EU should continue its work, together with its EaP partners, on the containment of Russian hybrid threats with instruments able to eliminate Russian hybrid influences fromin the EU and, its Member States and EaP countries;
Amendment 312 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e
Paragraph 1 – point e
(e) the EU should continue its work on the containment of Russian hybrid threats with instruments able to eliminate Russian hybrid influterferences from the EU and its Member States;
Amendment 315 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
Amendment 317 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
(ea) the EU has to clean its own house from the Kremlin hybrid interferences and Kremlin’s money laundering practices having an impact on European political and business elites, if it wants to be effective in assisting the Russian people on their path towards democracy;
Amendment 322 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e b (new)
(eb) the EU should make sure that the security dimension of the Eastern Partnership countries is also properly reflected in the Strategic Compass because the security environment and resilience of the EU cannot be achieved without the long-term security resilience of all Eastern Partnership countries;
Amendment 325 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e b (new)
(eb) the EU needs to have a consolidated, well-coordinated and holistic anti-hybrid containment strategy, which must also address cyber security threats and traditional forms of espionage;
Amendment 327 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e c (new)
(ec) the EU should increase pressure on the Russian Federation in order for it to reverse its decision to recognise the so- called independence of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia and withdraw its troops from occupied territories of Ukraine, including Crimea, as well as Transnistria;
Amendment 329 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e d (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e d (new)
(ed) the EU should boost cooperation with its Eastern Partners and learn from their expertise and experiences in the sphere of hybrid threats, traditional espionage, cyber security and the fight against disinformation; the EU needs to acknowledge that the Eastern Partnership countries possess a unique experience and knowledge of Russia’s interfering strategies and modus operandi, which is of a great value to the EU and its Member States;
Amendment 331 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e e (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e e (new)
(ee) the EU should be alerted by the role Kremlin is playing in the Western Balkans, which includes state-backed disinformation and building political and military ties to the regional political elites; the Kremlin’s interference in the elections and support of anti-democratic forces in the Western Balkan region remains an issue notably in the countries, which are also the members of NATO;
Amendment 332 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e f (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e f (new)
(ef) the EU needs to respond to the fact that the President Putin is openly supporting Mr Lukashenka’s regime in its brutal repressions against the people in Belarus and collaborates with Lukashenka on hybrid attacks against democratic forces of Belarus; President Putin’s support, manipulations and interference in Belarus is the only reason why Mr Lukashenka’s regime still keeps massively repressing Belarusian people; the EU needs to make it clear that this way the Kremlin is posing a direct threat to the sovereignty of Belarus, and has to demand that, if Russia continues this kind of policy on Belarus, the EU will have to introduce additional harsh measures of containment and deterrence of Russia;
Amendment 334 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e h (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e h (new)
(eh) in order to contain President Putin’s revisionist conduct towards his neighbours, the EU needs to further consolidate and strengthen its ties with the Eastern neighbourhood countries and to intensify its work for the rapprochement of these countries with the EU, in particular by taking into account that Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova are showing the same development and integration progress as the Western Balkan countries, therefore the EU needs to explore further areas of cooperation to bring a new momentum for European integration in these countries;
Amendment 339 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e m (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e m (new)
(em) in particular, in this context, the EU should call on the Russian Federation to cooperate fully with the investigation of major international crimes, incidents and tragedies, such as the downing of the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, as well other recent incidents involving the participation of the Russian intelligence services in the territory of EU Member States and Eastern Partnership countries, including in Belarus;
Amendment 341 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e n (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e n (new)
(en) the EU should reiterate its call made on numerous occasions upon the Russian authorities to return to Poland the wreckage and black boxes of the Tu- 154 Polish Government aeroplane, which crashed near Smolensk in April 2010;
Amendment 342 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e o (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e o (new)
(eo) the EU should urgently equip itself with the necessary resources and tools to analyse and effectively counter Russian State and non-state actors’ hybrid threats and multiple forms of interferences in our democratic systems, including in the cyberspace;
Amendment 343 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e p (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e p (new)
Amendment 344 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e q (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e q (new)
(eq) the EU should establish a regulatory framework to fight the Russian financing of our democratic processes, including the strategy of elite capture and the technique of co-opting top-level civil servants and former European politicians; it should respond to and prevent the funding, by Russian actors, of political parties, political movements and political campaigns;
Amendment 345 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e r (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e r (new)
(er) the EU should fight against Russian state-backed investments in strategic policy areas, strategic infrastructures and bodies, including universities, which risk creating or reinforcing the dependency of certain economic sectors on Russia and can serve as entry points for Russian espionage and security threats;
Amendment 346 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e s (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e s (new)
(es) the EU should deepen comprehensive cooperation with strategic partners who are facing similar hybrids threats and attacks from Russian state and non-state actors;
Amendment 347 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e t (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e t (new)
(et) concerning the fight against harassment, intimidations and attacks against Russian refugees and asylum seekers in Europe, the EU Members States should refrain from allowing or enabling deportations and extraditions of political opponents and asylum seekers to Russia, where their life or physical integrity would be in danger;
Amendment 352 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f
Paragraph 1 – point f
(f) the EU should establish with the US a transatlantic alliance to defend democracy globally and propose a democracy defence toolkit, which should include joint actions on sanctions, anti- money laundering policies, rules on the conditionality of economic and financial assistance, international investigations, and support for human rights activists and defenders of democracy; the EU transatlantic agenda should include a policy to support democracy in Russia and Belarus alongside China, Hong Kong and other countries;
Amendment 354 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f
Paragraph 1 – point f
(f) the EU should establish with the US a transatlantic alliance to defend democracy globally and propose a democracy defence toolkit, which should include joint actions on sanctions, anti- money laundering policies, rules on the conditionality of economic and financial assistance, international investigations, and support for human rights activists and defenders of democracy, as well as strengthening resilience of European societies as well as of the EU Eastern Partners;
Amendment 357 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f
Paragraph 1 – point f
(f) the EU should establish with the US, Canada and UK a transatlantic alliance to defend democracy globally and propose a democracy defence toolkit, which should include joint actions on sanctions, anti- money laundering policies, rules on the conditionality of economic and financial assistance, international investigations, and support for human rights activists and defenders of democracy;
Amendment 362 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
(fa) the EU should deny recognition of any attempt by President Putin to continue in office beyond the end of his current and final presidential mandate on 7 May 2024, should he attempt to do so on the basis of the 2020 constitutional amendments, which the European Parliament has assessed as “illegally enacted”;
Amendment 371 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g
Paragraph 1 – point g
(g) in line with the ‘democracy first’ principle, the EU should strengthen the requirement of conditionality in its relations with Russia by including in any dialogue or agreement with Russia measures aimed ataimed at the full restoration of the EU Eastern Partners’ territorial integrity and measures protecting human rights and the holding of free elections in Russia; accordingly, the EU and its Member States should revise their investment support and economic cooperation projects, starting with the halting of the Nord Stream 2 project;
Amendment 372 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g
Paragraph 1 – point g
(g) in line with the ‘democracy first’ principle, the EU should strengthen the requirement of conditionality in its relations with Russia by including in any dialogue or agreement with Russia measures aimed at protecting human rights, including in the territories illegally occupied by the Russian Federation, and the holding of free elections; accordingly, the EU and its Member States should revise their investment support and economic cooperation projects, starting with the halting of the Nord Stream 2 project;
Amendment 377 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
(ga) Considers unacceptable the use of false historical arguments to justify the construction of Nord Stream 2; is of the view that such a controversial geopolitical project goes against European solidarity and poses further political, economic, security and environmental risks to Europe, as well as constituting a threat of further direct military action against Ukraine; calls on the German authorities, therefore, to halt their backing of this detrimental project, and appeals to private entities, shareholders and financial investors, in particular Germany’s Uniper and Wintershall, France’s Engie, Austria’s OMV and the Dutch-British Shell, to immediately withdraw from it;
Amendment 378 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
(ga) the EU should apply the ‘democracy first’ principle in its reassessment of the financial support programmes to Russia and investments in Russia, which among other measures should include a revision of the lending mandates of EU’s financial institutions; in the same spirit, the EU should review its cooperation with Russia in various foreign policy platforms;
Amendment 380 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point g b (new)
Amendment 382 #
2021/2042(INI)
(gc) the EU should expand the EU global human rights sanctions regime and apply it to the grave human rights abuses in all territories affected by frozen conflicts or occupied regions of the Eastern Partnership countries to address the human rights violations for which the Russian Federation is accountable in accordance with international law;
Amendment 384 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g d (new)
Paragraph 1 – point g d (new)
Amendment 395 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point h
Paragraph 1 – point h
(h) the EU should increase its ability to prepare and adopt sanctions against the Russian authorities for their systemic repression of democratic forces in Russia and to centralise EU decision-making by making the triggering of sanctions automatic in cases of corruption or violation of human rights, including by updating the EU global sanctions mechanism (EU Magnitsky Act) to address cases of corruption;, possibly by following the example of UK Global Anti- Corruption Sanctions regime
Amendment 405 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i
Paragraph 1 – point i
(i) the EU should establish partnerships on its sanctions policy with EU-based non-governmental organisations such as Bellingcat, so that these organisations can assist it in preparing and investigating cases in a comprehensive way; recommends that the Member States enhance counterintelligence cooperation and information-sharing without delay with a view to exposing and thwarting Russia’s clandestine networks in the EU;
Amendment 408 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
(ia) the EU should deny recognition of any attempt by President Putin to continue in office beyond the end of his current and final presidential mandate on 7 May 2024, should he attempt to do so on the basis of fraudulent 2020 constitutional amendments as concluded by the Venice Commission;
Amendment 409 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
(ia) EU should urge the Russian Federation to address the questions raised by the international community urgently and to provide immediate, full and complete disclosure of its Novichok programme to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;
Amendment 416 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j
Paragraph 1 – point j
(j) the EU should establish a centralised anti-money laundering framework, including an EU authority for financial controls, to be put under Parliament’s supervision and to be entrusted with the protection of the EU and its Member States from illicit financial practices and influterferences from Russia;
Amendment 417 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point j a (new)
(ja) the EU should create as soon as possible effective legal means to counter trans-border corruption and related money laundering, especially when it concerns corruption and illicit financing practices coming from Russia, and apply much more extensively the non- conviction-based confiscation (NCBC) to deal effectively with the Kremlin kleptocracy;
Amendment 418 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point j b (new)
(jb) the EU should penalize the Russian assets used directly and indirectly to interfere in the democratic processes of EU Member States and Eastern Partnership countries;
Amendment 419 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point j c (new)
(jc) the EU should build capacity to expose and stop the flows of dirty money from Russia and Belarus, as well as to expose the hidden treasures and financial assets of Russian and Belarusian regimes’ autocrats and corrupted oligarchs in the EU Member States, as well as to report periodically on these cases to semi-annual hearings of the European Parliament on the state of democracy in Russia in Belarus; these reports should include the names of the most important members of Putin and Lukashenka entourage, as well as should reveal Russia's financial interferences in Belarus, including in strategic sectors like military, energy or transport;
Amendment 420 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j d (new)
Paragraph 1 – point j d (new)
(jd) the EU must include Russia and Belarus into a list of third countries with a high risk of money laundering, which should be instrumental to have a stronger EU control of all financial flows originating from Russia and Belarus;
Amendment 448 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point l
Paragraph 1 – point l
(l) the EU should confront the Russian-language propaganda and disinformation of President Putin’s regime in the EU, the Eastern Partnership and Russia itself and support the establishment of a Free Russia Television with 24/7 airtime;
Amendment 456 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point m
Paragraph 1 – point m
(m) the EU must be prepared not to recognise the parliament of Russia and to ask forurge Russia’s suspension from international organisations with parliamentary assemblies, in particular PACE, if the 2021 parliamentary elections in Russia are recognised as fraudulent and conducted in violation of democratic principles and international law;
Amendment 460 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point m a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point m a (new)
Amendment 463 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point m b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point m b (new)
(mb) the EU Member States should take all possible measures to prevent the participation of their citizens in the capacity of international observers at 2021 parliamentary elections, illegally organized by Russia in the occupied Crimea; in this context recommends that the EP and national parliaments avoid any activities which may falsely pretend to be an international observation;
Amendment 464 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point m c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point m c (new)
(mc) the EU should demand that the Russian authorities release all those unjustly imprisoned for political reasons, including Alexei Navalny, Alexei Pichugin, Yuri Dmitriev, and all the others designated by the Memorial Human Rights Centre as “political prisoners” in accordance with the criteria of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 1900 (2012);
Amendment 465 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point m d (new)
Paragraph 1 – point m d (new)
(md) the EU should demand that the Russian authorities conduct an impartial investigation into the organisers and masterminds of the 2015 assassination of Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov and bring them to justice, in accordance with the recommendations of the OSCE and the Council of Europe;
Amendment 466 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point m e (new)
Paragraph 1 – point m e (new)
(me) Is deeply concerned about the efforts of the current Russian leadership to distort historical facts and whitewash crimes committed by the Soviet totalitarian regime and considers them a dangerous component of the information war waged against democratic Europe that aims to divide Europe, and therefore calls on the EU and Member States to decisively counteract these efforts;
Amendment 467 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n
Paragraph 1 – point n
(n) the EU should adopt and announce a strategic vision for its future relations with a democratic Russiaand peaceful Russia fully committed to the international law, its international obligations and principles of good neighbourhood, which should include a broad offer with conditions and incentives such as visa liberalisation, free trade investment and modernisation programmes, and a strategic partnership; it should also convey the potential benefits that it is willing to offer in return for a democratic transformation of Russia and fundamental change of its current foreign policy and international behaviour; in this regard, reiterates that the EU should show full solidarity and work closely with the Russia’s civil society; calls on the EU and the international community to use all available legal tools to prevent attacks against Russia’s opposition politicians and civil activists;
Amendment 500 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point o
Paragraph 1 – point o
(o) the EU should adopt an ambitious strategy to support the successful development of European oriented EaP countries, which would serve as a good example and would incentivise the Russian people to support democracy; accordingly, the EU should propose to EaP countries that have an association agreement with the EU a new momentum of European integration towards an eventual membership of the EU and recognize their European perspective with a view to keeping their motivation for further reforms;
Amendment 510 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point o a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point o a (new)
(oa) the EU should push for more ambitious strategy for integration of EaP countries that have an association agreement with the EU, especially when they are showing the same level of development and integration as the Western Balkan countries; the EU in such a way will motivate the EU- associated Eastern Partnership countries to enact European inspired reforms;
Amendment 512 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point o b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point o b (new)
(ob) the EU should launch as soon as possible a new momentum of European integration, which could concentrate on Romano Prodi formula to offer EaP countries that have an association agreement with the EU an ‘everything, but the institutions’ model and give them the full benefits of EU integration, such as access to EU common policies, the opening of EU financial resources, access to EU jurisdiction, and a progressive integration into the EU institutions;
Amendment 514 #
2021/2042(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point o c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point o c (new)
(oc) the EU should propose in the forthcoming Conference on the Future of Europe an institutional reform agenda, which would allow the EU to prepare for a new momentum of European integration of the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood;
Amendment 1 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)
Citation 1 a (new)
— – having regard to the EU-China dialogue on human rights, launched in 1995, and the 37th round thereof, held in Brussels on 1 and 2 April 2019,
Amendment 3 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 b (new)
Citation 1 b (new)
— having regard to Article 36 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, which guarantees all citizens the right to freedom of religious belief, and to Article 4 thereof, which upholds the rights of ‘minority nationalities’;
Amendment 4 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 c (new)
Citation 1 c (new)
— having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,
Amendment 5 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)
Citation 2 a (new)
— having regard to the report of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General of 25 November 2020 entitled ‘NATO 2030: United for a New Era’,
Amendment 7 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 3 a (new)
Citation 3 a (new)
— having regard to the G7 Foreign and Development Ministers’ Meeting Communiqué of London, May 5, 2021;
Amendment 8 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 a (new)
Citation 4 a (new)
— having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and other UN human rights treaties and instruments,
Amendment 10 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 c (new)
Citation 5 c (new)
— having regard to its previous resolutions and reports on the situation in China and EU-China relations, in particular those of 21January 2021 on the crackdown on the democratic opposition in Hong Kong and of 17 December 2020 on forced labour and the situation of the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), and having regard to its previous recommendations relating to Hong Kong, in particular that of 13 December 2017 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on Hong Kong, 20 years after handover;
Amendment 16 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 a (new)
Citation 5 a (new)
— having regard to the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Amendment 18 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 b (new)
Citation 5 b (new)
— having regard to the Protocol of 2014 to the International Labour Organization (ILO)Forced Labour Convention of 1930, which has not been signed by China,
Amendment 26 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 d (new)
Citation 5 d (new)
— having regard to the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy of June 2016,
Amendment 28 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 e (new)
Citation 5 e (new)
— having regard to the European Union Maritime Security Strategy,
Amendment 30 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 f (new)
Citation 5 f (new)
— having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concluded on 10 December 1982 and in force since 16 November 1994,
Amendment 31 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital -A a (new)
Recital -A a (new)
-A a whereas in its strategic framework on human rights and democracy, the EU pledges that human rights, democracy, and the rule of law will be promoted ‘in all areas of the EU’s external actions without exception’, and that the EU will ‘place human rights at the centre of its relations with all third countries including strategic partners’;
Amendment 35 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas through its strong economic growth and ambitious hegemonic foreign policy agenda, China is assfirmly detertming a stronger globaled to play a world´s leading power role both as an economic power and as foreign policy actor, which poses serious political, economic, security and technological challedangers to the EU, has significant consequences for the world order and poses threats to liberal democracydemocratic values;
Amendment 40 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
A a. Whereas the Peoples Republic of China is a unitary, one-party communist state, governed by the Communist Party of China (CPC), committed to Marxism– Leninism; whereas as such it does not share democratic values such as individual freedom, freedom of speech and freedom of religion;
Amendment 60 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas China has a wide and extensive track record of human rights violations that eschewcontradict and violate the country’s bilateral and multilateral commitments in these areas;
Amendment 65 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
B a. Whereas in the recent years the Communist Party of China has taken an increasingly aggressive approach to exerting influence in democracies around the world, efforts recently expanded under the cover of COVID-19 responses, by utilizing economic leverage and technological superiority, state-direction of the economy, and export of authoritarianist information operations, and an expanding digital toolkit, in an aim to bolster autocrats and contributing to the erosion of democracy worldwide,
Amendment 71 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the existing EU China Strategy has revealed its limitations in the light of recent developments and the challengethreats posed by China and needs to be updated;
Amendment 80 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a
Paragraph 1 – point a
(a) elaborateconsider a more assertive EU- China strategyapproach that unites all Member States and shapes relations with Beijing in the interest of the Member States and the EU as a whole, while defending our values and promoting a rules-based multilateral order;
Amendment 85 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point b – introductory part
Paragraph 1 – point b – introductory part
(b) propose a new EU-China strategyfuture new approach to the European Union's relations with China based on six pillars:
Amendment 98 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point b – point 5
Paragraph 1 – point b – point 5
5) Fostering open strategic autonomySafeguarding the EU´s interests;
Amendment 99 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point b – point 6
Paragraph 1 – point b – point 6
6) Defence of core European interests and values by transforming the EU into a geopolitical actor while respecting the sovereignty of the Member States;
Amendment 102 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point b – point 6 a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point b – point 6 a (new)
6 a) Calls on the Commission to stop the EU-China Global Investment Agreement as long as China does not guarantee and show respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens as well as does not fulfil international commitments and its own obligations such as Sino-British Joint Declaration and Hong Kong Basic Law;
Amendment 113 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Calls on the VP/HR to ensure that the new EU-China strategy involves China in an open dialogue on global challenges, such as climate changethe environment and the fight against global pandemics;
Amendment 115 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. Calls on the VP / HR to ensure that the new approach to EU-China relations engages China in an open dialogue on global challenges, such as the environment -on the basis that China is the world's most polluting power- and the fight against pandemics on a global scale;
Amendment 119 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Supports greater dialogue and cooperation with China on peace and security, sustainable development, science, technology and innovation, environmental issues, space and aerospace, founded on a shared commitment to openness and working together in a transparent, just and equitable manner as part of a rules-based international system;
Amendment 122 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Supports greater dialogue and cooperation with China on peace and security, sustainable development, science, technology and innovation, environmental issues, space and aerospace;contribution to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and environmental issues, including ocean protection, overfishing, pollution, unchecked resource extraction, animal trafficking,
Amendment 125 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Remind that while at the Davos Forum last January 2021, the European Union urged with its climate agenda and its "leaders" in governments threatened their middle classes with the alleged need for new tax increases and penalties, the leader of China -the most polluting country in the world- resorted to propaganda to misinform with lessons on how to manage the health of the planet and with new promises, like all the previous ones, unfulfilled;
Amendment 128 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Points out that some fields of cooperation such as ITC, space and aerospace, can have a dual use application and can be used against Chinese citizens and against the West;
Amendment 135 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Underscorlines the importance of capitalising on China’s commitment to tackling climate change by reinforcing partnership in this field and emphasises the need to ensure that China commits to peak its emissions before 2030, in line with the Paris Agreement by implementing a carbon border adjustment mechanismforcing China to respect environmental commitments and recalls that according to the European Commission reports, China has the highest polluting emissions in the world for years;
Amendment 144 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Calls for result-oriented Human Rights Dialogues to be held regularly and in a transparent manner and calls for a solid benchmarking of the progress made in bilateral dialogues more generally;
Amendment 154 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Regrets that the open dialogue with China and trust necessary for building a transparent relationship will be difficult bearing in mind the PRC's growing espionage activities, malign influence activities and cyber attacks targeting the EU and EU Member States;
Amendment 155 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5 b. emphasises the universal and unified character of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and reaffirms UNCLOS’s important role in setting out the legal framework that governs all activities in the ocean and the seas. In this regards calls on China to refrain from any unilateral actions that could escalate tensions and undermine regional stability and the international rules-based order and express serious concerns about reports of militarisation, coercion, and intimidation in the region,
Amendment 158 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Calls for the EU to engage in dialogue with China on possible ways to improve, in a transparent manner, initial response capabilities to infectious diseases that have the potential to develop into epidemics or pandemics, including recognition, risk-mapping and early warning systems to ensure better global preparedness to respond to pandemics; calls further on China to cooperate fully in an independent investigation into the origins of COVIDSARS-CoV-2;
Amendment 164 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. Underlines that the virus originated in China and calls for an independent investigation into the Chinese Communist Party's role and responsibility in escalating a local COVID-19 outbreak into a devastating global pandemic; calls for the Chinese Communist Party to pay reparations for the loss of life and economic damage to those affected if found responsible; notes that negligence is not an excuse;
Amendment 179 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Stresses that the promotion of and respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law has to remain at the centre of the relationship between the EU and China, in line with the EU’s commitment to upholding these values in its external action and China’s expressed interest in adhering to them in its own development and international cooperation;
Amendment 188 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 – introductory part
Paragraph 8 – introductory part
8. Underlines the conditions and pre- ratification commitments that must be met and must be checked before Parliament can give its consent to any agreement between the EU- and China CAI, notably:
Amendment 197 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 – point a
Paragraph 8 – point a
(a) having a timetable for China’s ratification and implementationeffective compliance of key International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions on labour rights and a robust monitoring mechanism, as well as concrete measures or steps towards putting an end to other human rights violations against the Uyghur minoritys, Tibetans, Christians and other religious communities and churches, in China;
Amendment 205 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 – point a a (new)
Paragraph 8 – point a a (new)
(a a) having a timetable for China’s ratification and effective compliance of all Human Right International standars and principles (universal framework);
Amendment 212 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 – point b
Paragraph 8 – point b
(b) a recommitment by China to upholdand effective fulfillment by China that it will respect and fulfill its international commitments to Hong Kong under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Hong Kong’s Basic Law;
Amendment 219 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 – point c
Paragraph 8 – point c
(c) the immediate lifting of the counter-sanctions imposed by the Chinese Government on EU entities and individuals;
Amendment 235 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. States its support for UN to carry out legal investigations into alleged genocide and crimes against humanity taking place China, in particular in the Xinjiang region and Tibet;
Amendment 248 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
Amendment 253 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11 a. Stresses that the PRC, as a permanent member of the Security Council of the UN, but also as a signatory of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, is a State part of the international human rights system, within and beyond the UN; while having this in mind, condemns in the strongest possible terms the scale and scope of the human rights violations by the PRC, in particular on the Uighur minority in the Xinjian region, which fulfil the definition of genocide as defined in the 1948 Genocide Convention, and stresses that other State Parties of the 1948 Genocide Convention have the legal obligation to take measures to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide, including by enacting relevant legislation and punishing perpetrators;
Amendment 263 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Believes that the future EU strategy onnew approach to the European Union's relations with China should provide the necessary tools and data to analyse the political, economic, social and technological threats stemming from China, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and 17+1 policies, its investment strategy and their implications for the Union’s strategic autonomy and the liberal ordergeopolitical stance and the multilateral rules-based order; estimates that this analysis will be accompanied by an in-depth study of the economic and social impact on the lives of the 446 million citizens of the 27 EU Member states;
Amendment 276 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Calls on the Commission to commission an EU-wide audit and broken down by Member States of the EU dependency on China in certain strategically important and critical sectors, setting out plans to reduce dependency, while maintaining overall trade relations with China, which should be as open as possible always under the criterion of strict reciprocity;
Amendment 280 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13 a. expresses its serious concerns about China's belligerent attempt to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas by force, unilaterally by repeatedly intruding into the territorial seas, conducting “confrontation exercises”, also jointly with Russian Federation, building and militarizing artificial islands, flouting the international law of the sea with excessive maritime claims, attempting to restrict the freedom of navigation and overflight and using civilian vessels to expand China’s presence in disputed areas,
Amendment 285 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 – point a
Paragraph 14 – point a
(a) preserving the EU’s unity and full respect for the sovereignty of the Member states;;
Amendment 292 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 – point b
Paragraph 14 – point b
(b) building on the EU toolbox for national risk-mitigating measures, to develop joint standardand harmonised risk-mitigating to propose measures for the new generation of technologies, such as 5G networks;
Amendment 298 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 – point c
Paragraph 14 – point c
(c) strengthening the EU’s unique brand ofa responsible European global leadership;
Amendment 299 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 – point c – point i (new)
Paragraph 14 – point c – point i (new)
i) to take into account Beijing’s new strategic intent and capabilities and directly address areas where Beijing’s current objectives—and the levers Beijing deploys to pursue them—either complement or conflict with EU's interests,
Amendment 300 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 – point c a (new)
Paragraph 14 – point c a (new)
(c a) Limit Beijing’s ability to exploit EU's openness for China’s gain,
Amendment 302 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 – point d
Paragraph 14 – point d
Amendment 308 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 – point d
Paragraph 14 – point d
(d) ensuring that the President of the Commission is present atCommission and Council closely observe the BRI annual forum to ensurand encourage that the decisions taken by EU Member States involved in the BRI initiative are in line withdonot undermine common EU policies and interests;
Amendment 309 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 – point d a (new)
Paragraph 14 – point d a (new)
(d a) cooperate closely with like-minded partners to set high standards that promote sustainable finance, environmental preservation, fair business conditions, transparency and high labour standards especially in regions of strategic importance,
Amendment 312 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 – point e
Paragraph 14 – point e
(e) examining all infrastructure contracts in EU Member States and accession countries to ensure their conformity with EU legislation;
Amendment 313 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 – point e – point i (new)
Paragraph 14 – point e – point i (new)
i) to review EU's regional strategic, in particular for Africa and Indo-Pacific region, to bolster the rule of law and human rights in regional countries facing growing influence from China,
Amendment 314 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 – point e a (new)
Paragraph 14 – point e a (new)
(e a) to work collectively to foster global economic resilience in the face of arbitrary, coercive economic policies and practices and to review how the PRC fulfils obligations and responsibilities commensurate with its global economic role and membership in international organizations such as the WTO,
Amendment 316 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14 a. Is deeply concerned at the situation in the East China Sea, where Beijing has escalated tensions by declaring its own air defence identification zone (ADIZ), conducted military exercises in an attempt to intimidate Taipei, and pursue an aggressive and sustained campaign to undermine Taiwan’s democratic process and popular support for the current Taiwanese government through disinformation campaigns and other influence operations and that continuation of such practices makes Beijing an unreliable actor which actions need to be halted in order to save the international rule based order, stability and peace in Indo-Pacific region,
Amendment 317 #
2021/2037(INI)
Amendment 329 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Believes that the future EU-China strategy should berevision of the European Union's relations with China should be the subject of a broad consensus, as well as more coordinated between the EU institutions and the Member States, as well as between the different Commission Directorates General;
Amendment 336 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Encourages the EU to work with all Member States which do not have investment screening mechanisms to urgently bring forward such legislation as a precondition of the ratification of theany EU- China CAIagreement, in line with the EU Framework for Screening of Foreign Direct Investment, and calls for Member States to be issued with special guidance on screening investments and acquisitions from Chinese firms under the influence of the Chinese state;
Amendment 345 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Is concerned by the assertive and, at times, aggressive diplomatic pressure from the Chinese authorities; underlines that EU institutions can in no way bow to pressure, to threats or censorship from Chinese channels, having the obligation to denounce, condemn and sanction such attitudes;
Amendment 346 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Is concerned by the assertive and, at times,unacceptable and aggressive diplomatic pressure from the Chinese authorities; underlines that EU institutions can in no way bow to pressure or censorship from Chinese channels; is concerned by the activities of the Confucius Institutes in the EU;
Amendment 353 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18 a. Is concerned with the close ties between the CCP and industry in China, particularly security companies; recommends that Member States undertake an internal audit of procurement practices to ensure that products integrated into their national networks and defence institutions are free of technologies coming from companies in China;
Amendment 355 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18 a. Expresses its solidarity with the Czech Republic after Chinese Foreign Minister's threats to the Czech Senat Speaker; is of the opinion that threats to Member States or any other country are unacceptable;
Amendment 364 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Calls on the VP/HR to coordinate the Union’s actions with like-minded partners on the protection of human rights and support for civil society in China and for Chinese diaspora around the world living under CCP pressure, as well as the defence of liberal democracy in the worlddemocratic values, notably in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and with a view to engaging China to respect international law, the freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of disputes;
Amendment 366 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19 a. Expresses grave concern over China’s expansionist policies in the South China Sea, East China Sea and Taiwan Strait, especially China’s continued military provocation aimed at Taiwan, with Chinese military aircraft intruding Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone on regular basis; underlines that the status quo across Taiwan Strait, freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region are of critical importance to the EU and its Member States; reiterates strong opposition to any unilateral actions that could escalate tensions and undermine the status quo; encourages that cross- strait relations should be developed constructively, without destabilising initiatives or coercion by either side, and that any change to cross-strait relations must not be made against the will of Taiwan’s citizens;
Amendment 369 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 b (new)
Paragraph 19 b (new)
19 b. Urges the Commission to come up with concrete proposals and action to facilitate Taiwan’s full participation as an observer in the meetings, mechanism and activities of the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC);
Amendment 373 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Considers it necessary for the EU to promote a balanced and prosperous transatlantic relationship with the BidenU.S. Administration, in the framework of a Transatlantic Dialogue on China, including a parliamentary dimension, in order to maintain and demonstrate the united strength of global liberal democracies in multilateral organisations;
Amendment 383 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Underlines the importance of the EU remaining vigilant about China’s changing role and growing global influence in multilateral organisations and to ensure better coordination among the Member States and towards combining the strength of global liberal democracies in order to respond to this development; like-minded partners in order to respond to this development aimed at replace global governance with a system based on authoritarian governance principles and eroding U.N. mechanisms for human rights accountability; notices that the Chinese government’s greater engagement with international and multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Health Organization, Interpol, Food and Agriculture Organization, International Telecommunication Union or International Civil Aviation Organization aims to reshape norms, standard and practices globally in order to foster China's long-term geopolitical strategy and economic interests; regrets that Chinese domestic censorship, exercised now, among others, at the United Nations forum, aims at manipulating procedures to minimize scrutiny of China's conduct, in particular in the case of the situation of ethnic Uyghur Muslims and other Turkic Muslim minorities,
Amendment 388 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Underlines the importance of the EU remaining vigilant about China’s changing role and growing influence in multilateral organisations and to ensure better coordination among the Member States and towards combining the strength of global liberallike-minded democracies in order to respond to this development;
Amendment 389 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21 a. reviews China's actions aimed at undermining the global trading system by violating the rules and norms of that system, and then using its market size to evade or undermine international enforcement efforts; calls for addressing China's unfair trade practices through better use of the WTO rules and procedures,
Amendment 391 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21 b. Regrets Chinese support to the most oppressive regimes worldwide, in particular in Syria, Iran and North Korea, but also in Venezuela and Cuba,
Amendment 401 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23 a. calls for a stronger cooperation and establishing a system which will end decades long China's pracitces of aggressive and irresponsible acts in cyber space, including refraining from conducting or supporting cyberattacks, forced technology transfers, cyber- espionage and cyber-enabled intellectual property theft,
Amendment 402 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23 a. Is concerned about economic coercion against Member States and third countries; supports the idea of collective economic defence via collaboration with likeminded democracies against China’s economic coercion;
Amendment 409 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5
Subheading 5
Fostering open strategic autonomyresilience and reducing dependence
Amendment 411 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5
Subheading 5
Amendment 412 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Underlines that investment and trade conditionality by itself is not enough to counter Chinese assertiveness; finds that the EU should increase strategic autonomy, predatory technology acquisitions and technonationalist industrial policies; finds that the EU should foster resilience by addressing other dimensions of the EU- China relationship, notably digital and technological sovereignty and supply chain security; in this regard calls to take into account enhanced rules requiring Chinese firms to undergo security screening before investing in certain strategic sectors, including IT, telecommunication, energy, transport, in order to expose the CCP and government ties—such as Huawei and ZTE, which refused to provide similar information in the past and are not willing to abide high transparency standards,
Amendment 415 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Underlines that investment and trade conditionality by itself is not enough to counter Chinese assertiveness; finds that the EU should increase strategic autonomreduce its dependency by addressing other dimensions of the EU- China relationship, notably digital and technological sovereignty and supply chain security;
Amendment 423 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the CAI and other instruments mitigate theunder strict surveillance a potential global investment agreement or other instruments do not have the serious distorting effects caused by Chinese subsidies on state-owned companies when moving to acquire EU companies and bid in EU public procurement procedures;
Amendment 429 #
2021/2037(INI)
28. Calls for increased funding for 5G rollout projectsEuropean projects related to the deployment of 5G technology and research inton 6G, AI and big data technology, in orderartificial intelligence and big data to be encouraged, protected and promoted to ensure future network security and an increased digital sovereignty in the European digital industry, which will be vital for digitalisization and for European economic growth, but also for closing the and to avoid the widening technologicaly gap with China;
Amendment 433 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Considers it necessary to conclude a Bilateral Investment Agreement with Taiwan in parallel with the CAI and in line with the One China policy, which would ensure that stability is safeguarded in the region and the right to Taiwan’s democratic existence is reaffirmed;
Amendment 436 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Considers it necessary to conclude a Bilateral Investment Agreement with Taiwan in parallel with the CAI and in line with the EU's One China policy, which would ensure that stability is safeguarded in the region and the right to Taiwan’s democratic existence is reaffirmed;
Amendment 438 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 a (new)
Paragraph 30 a (new)
30 a. Considers also important the conclusion of negotiations and agreements with Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Malaysia, which would help to ensure the safeguarding of stability in the region and a diversification of investments;
Amendment 439 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 a (new)
Paragraph 30 a (new)
30 a. urges the Commission to move forward with the Bilateral Investment Agreement with Taiwan and start the impact assessment, public consultation and scoping exercise with Taiwan before the end of 2021;
Amendment 448 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Underlines the importance on working on AI regulation and on an ethical and civil liability framework for AI systems and affiliated technologies that boosts citizen-centred and privacy- sensitive innovationdrives innovation focused on respect for the individual and privacy, in partnership with key strategic partners that share the EU’s liberal and democratic values of the EU;
Amendment 461 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Believes that the Union should continue working towards its transformation into athe strengthening of its geopolitical playerrelevance by ensuring a more united geopolitical approach of its Member States, as well as by fostering its strategic autonomy;
Amendment 472 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Points to the need to strengthen the EU’s tools to defend itself, increase its capacity to protect its interests overseas, acquire greater influence in its direct neighbourhood and ensure that the Member States are unicoordinated in their geopolitical approach;
Amendment 473 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
Amendment 482 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)
Paragraph 35 a (new)
35 a. calls on the EU to gather a coalition of states and non-state actors to counter Beijing's attempts to limit a free and open global internet,
Amendment 483 #
2021/2037(INI)
35 b. points out the need to introduce independent from CPC's influence programmes to study Chinese culture, language and politics, for example by closer contacts with Taiwanese academia and society;
Amendment 484 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 c (new)
Paragraph 35 c (new)
35 c. supports NGOs and institutions, including regional infrastructure investment transparency platforms, which asses and control transparency and accountability of the PRC's sponsored projects and investments, especially under its flagship Belt and Road Initiative;
Amendment 488 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Calls for defence cooperation among the Member States to be strengthened and for the Member States to invest in stronger cooperation with other democratic players such as the US, the UK, Canada, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand;
Amendment 489 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Calls for defence cooperation among the Member States to be strengthened and for the Member States to invest in stronger cooperation with other democratic players such as the US, the UK, Canada, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand;
Amendment 493 #
2021/2037(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Calls for defence cooperation among the Member States to be strengthened and for the Member States to invest in stronger cooperation with other democratic players such as Japan, India, South Korea, Australia and, New Zealand and Taiwan;
Amendment 2 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 18 a (new)
Citation 18 a (new)
— having regard to the EU-India High-Level Dialogue on trade and investment that held its first meeting on 5 February 2021,
Amendment 3 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 19 a (new)
Citation 19 a (new)
— having regard to the EU Guidelines on the protection and promotion of freedom of religion or belief, adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council on 24 June 2013,
Amendment 16 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
B a. whereas India has a major place in a complex geostrategic space, and shares the EU’s view on the need of stable, secure, and vibrant maritime space and a rule-based order at sea;
Amendment 20 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Recital B b (new)
B b. whereas the EU and India, that are strategic partners since 2004, both represent unions of diversity and should continue to cooperate in strengthening the unique diversities, including the situation of religious and ethnic minorities;
Amendment 25 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B c (new)
Recital B c (new)
B c. whereas India is one of the world’s largest economies in terms of purchasing power parity and is the fastest growing economy, and is to become the most populous country in the world, whereas the EU is India's first trading partner, while India is the EU’s 9th largest trading partner;
Amendment 45 #
2021/2023(INI)
b) remain committed to and implement fully the EU strategy on India of 2018 and the EU-India Roadmap to 2025 in coordination with Member States’ own engagement with India; establish clear and public criteria for measuring progress on the roadmap; ensure parliamentary oversight of the EU’s India policy through an annual progress report to its Committee on Foreign Affairs;
Amendment 83 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point h a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point h a (new)
h a) recognize the importance of India’s potential contribution to cyber- security and data protection and encourages a more active collaboration in the cyber domain that aims to mutually enhance operational capabilities and raise the ranking of India in the UN’s Global Cybersecurity Index;
Amendment 87 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j
Paragraph 1 – point j
j) take positive note of the six regular EU-India consultations on disarmament and non-proliferation that have taken place; recognize the critical role India plays in countering the A.Q. Khan network and in preventing the potential transfer of nuclear materials and know- how to rogue states and international terrorist organizations; acknowledge that India has joined three major proliferation- related multilateral export control regimes and encourage a closer EU-India partnership within these fora;
Amendment 90 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point j a (new)
j a) emphasize the importance of the EU-India Counter-Terrorism Dialogue and the critical contributions made by India’s national security and foreign intelligence services to global counter- terrorism efforts;
Amendment 105 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point l
Paragraph 1 – point l
l) draw on India’s vision and the EU Member States’ existing approaches for the Indo-Pacific region in order to develop a Europeanmore proactive and strategic European approach to security developments in the Indo-Pacific strategy based on EUshared principles and value, values and interests; seek coordination of EU and Indian policies towards the Indo- Pacific region, and address areas related to non-traditional security cooperation and good governance;
Amendment 111 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point m
Paragraph 1 – point m
m) promote joint action in coordinating development and humanitarian aid based on non-discriminatory access conditions, as well as in strengthening democratic processes and countering authoritarian trends in Asia and beyond;
Amendment 117 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point n
Paragraph 1 – point n
n) underline that preserving peace, stability and the freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region remains of critical importance to the interests of the EU and its Member States; intensify cooperation in maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region;, including with its partners of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), in maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region; promote the valuable role the EU with its Members States could play as a neutral and stabilizing actor in the growing regional power rivalry,
Amendment 131 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point o
Paragraph 1 – point o
o) take note ofshare India’s security concerns as regards the expansive policy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC); support the resolution of disputes and the upholding of international law on the India-PRC border;
Amendment 141 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point p
Paragraph 1 – point p
p) recognise India’s commitment to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda through its contribution to peacekeeping missions; strengthen their mutual commitment to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, including the development of National Action Plans with appropriate budgetary allocations for effective implementation; recognize the double vulnerability of women from religious minority backgrounds, which becomes further compounded in the case of lower caste minority women;
Amendment 146 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point q a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point q a (new)
q a) appreciate India’s contribution to peace, stabilization, reconstruction and development in Afghanistan and recognize India's positive role in education, security, infrastructural and agricultural development aimed at shaping a secure and prosperous Afghan future;
Amendment 166 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point s a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point s a (new)
s a) encourage India to guarantee the right to freely practice and propagate the religion of one’s choice, as enshrined in Article 25 of its Constitution; recognize that Muslims, Christians and other religious minorities are equal in dignity and rights before the law; recognize the link between anti-conversion laws and violence against religious minorities, particularly the Christian and Muslim communities; encourage such laws to be repealed or terms reformed to prevent misuse;
Amendment 185 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point t
Paragraph 1 – point t
t) address the human rights situation and challenges faced by civil society in its dialogue with the Indian authorities, including at summit level; encourage India, as the world’s largest democracy, to demonstrate its commitment to respecting and protecting the freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and, association, to end attacks against - and and freedom of religion or belief, to prelease arbitrarily detained - human rights defendervent attacks against human rights defenders, members of religious minorities and journalists, including in the Indian- administered part of Kashmir,; encourage India to repeal or amend laws that may be misused to silence dissent, including sections 153-A and 295-A of the Indian Penal Code, and to ensure accountability for human rights violations;
Amendment 219 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point v a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point v a (new)
v a) acknowledge that the resumption of negotiations on an ambitious, comprehensive and mutually beneficial trade and investment agreement should also focus on new areas of cooperation, such as digital transformation and deepen the existing cooperation, in particular in areas like space, terrorism, radicalization, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, maritime security and crisis management;
Amendment 256 #
2021/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point af
Paragraph 1 – point af
af) consider people-to-people exchanges as one of the main dimensions of the strategic partnership; call for a deeper partnership in education, research and cultural exchange; call on the EU Member States and India to invest especially in young people’s capacities and leadership and to ensure their meaningful inclusion in political and economic life;
Amendment 14 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 a (new)
Citation 27 a (new)
— having regard to the European Deterrence Initiative which has deployed an additional 4000 - 5 000US troops to Europe and represents one of the largest financial and material contributions to European security in decades, beginning with a budget of $4.8 Billion USD, the US recently requested $6.5 Billion USD for FY 2019,
Amendment 15 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 b (new)
Citation 27 b (new)
— having regard to NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EfP) in the Eastern flank of the Alliance with four multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, led by the U.S., United Kingdom, Canada and Germany respectively,
Amendment 16 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 c (new)
Citation 27 c (new)
— having regard to the EfP's South- East European component ‘Tailored Forward Presence’ which includes both land forces and aerial support as a multinational brigade that coordinates training in Romania and Bulgaria,
Amendment 17 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 d (new)
Citation 27 d (new)
— having regard to the Transatlantic Defence Investment Cooperation (TADIC) formally commissioned in 2000 to address fragmentation of the security and defence industry within Europe and resolve the large differences of investment in defence capability, technology, export controls and technology transfer regimes among Member States,
Amendment 18 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 e (new)
Citation 27 e (new)
— having regard to the studies published by NATO’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence which outline the increasingly capable social media bots, AI-created fake images, video and even automated weapons platforms Russia utilises,
Amendment 19 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 f (new)
Citation 27 f (new)
— having regard to the enormous impact on potential EU defence capabilities of the departure of the UK, one of the most effective European military powers from the EU,
Amendment 20 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 g (new)
Citation 27 g (new)
— having regard to Russia's illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea,
Amendment 21 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 h (new)
Citation 27 h (new)
— having regard to Russia's violation of airspace and maritime borders of member states,
Amendment 22 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 i (new)
Citation 27 i (new)
— having regard to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, Russia's repeated violations including the development and deployment of 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile systems and the resulting US withdrawal from the Treaty,
Amendment 23 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 j (new)
Citation 27 j (new)
— having regard to China's increase in economic and military presence in the Mediterranean and African countries,
Amendment 24 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 k (new)
Citation 27 k (new)
— having regard to the threat of domestic and foreign terrorism, primarily from groups such as ISIS,
Amendment 25 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 l (new)
Citation 27 l (new)
— having regard to new technologies such as artificial intelligence, space capabilities and quantum computing which present new opportunities for mankind, but also create new challenges in defence and foreign policy that require a clear strategy and consensus between EU & NATO,
Amendment 33 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 35 a (new)
Citation 35 a (new)
— having regard to NATO’s role in Rapid Air Movement during the COVID- 19 crisis,
Amendment 92 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Reaffirms its previous commitment to the EU’s ambitions in the field of security and defence, and reiterates the EU’s ambition to be a global actor for peace and security; underlines the fact that NATO remains indispensable and must remain the primary actor for the security and collective defence of its members and the transatlantic community as a whole;
Amendment 113 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Stresses the significance of and exceptional contributions made by NATO’s various Partner countries to Euro-Atlantic security; urges stronger coordination and effective division of labour between the EU and NATO in cooperating with third countries with a particular emphasis on NATO’s Enhanced Opportunities Partner (EoP) countries;
Amendment 117 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4b. Acknowledges that close cooperation should also take place with third countries and through the command and planning structures of NATO; such cooperation will provide vital capabilities, such as strategic lift, essential to operations in the European periphery;
Amendment 133 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Underlines the importance of achieving quantum computing capabilities and stresses the need to enhance EU-NATO cooperation in this area to ensure that quantum computing is first realized among partners sharing warm relations and supporting objectives;
Amendment 134 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5b. Notes the growing importance of space security and satellites, stresses the importance of the European Union Satellite Centre and requests the agency to analyse and provide a report regarding the safety and/or vulnerabilities of the EU and Member State satellites to space debris, cyber attack and direct missile attack;
Amendment 213 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Recognises the important cooperation between the EU and NATO in the Western Balkans, notably through the EUFOR Althea mission and the important role that NATO integration has played in the region by stabilising and preparing these countries for eventual EU integration;
Amendment 247 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Consider that the EU and NATO must coordinate their dual-track approach of deterrence and dialogue with Russia within parameters agreed at the Wales and Warsaw Summits; recognises that NATO should maintain regular contact with Russia in areas of immediate threat to the security of the Euro-Atlantic, including in arms control, military transparency, and maintaining channels of communication to avoid misunderstandings that could escalate into major crises;
Amendment 253 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 c (new)
Paragraph 13 c (new)
13c. Consider that EU & NATO should coordinate their positions in developing an agenda for international arms control in key areas of EDT with military application;
Amendment 255 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 d (new)
Paragraph 13 d (new)
13d. Considers that EU & NATO should work together to ensure Russia’s return to compliance with existing arms control agreements;
Amendment 269 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Recognises that EU & NATO should coordinate on issue’s where China’s actions are contrary to Euro- Atlantic security interests; prioritization should be given to challenges in the cyber, hybrid, EDT, space, arms control, and non-proliferation areas;
Amendment 270 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)
Paragraph 14 b (new)
14b. Recognises that China’s acquisitions of intellectual property and technological advances by leading research centres are often used to propel its military aims and therefore EU & NATO should work together to develop a long-term game plan to counter China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy in Europe;
Amendment 271 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 c (new)
Paragraph 14 c (new)
14c. Urges EU-NATO cooperation in regulating 5G implementation to comply with strict national security standards that secures national and international information networks capable of encrypting communications;
Amendment 272 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 d (new)
Paragraph 14 d (new)
14d. Consider jointly establishing a C4ISRnetwork with a state of the art command and control systems in the Asia Pacific, in cooperation with Allies throughout Asia, to ensure rapid response capability in addressing security crises in the Asia-Pacific;
Amendment 273 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 e (new)
Paragraph 14 e (new)
14e. Recognises that China has thousands of precision warheads tied to a sophisticated command and control system; Considers China’s stockpiling of an enormous and technologically advanced arsenal of ballistic missiles such as the Dong Feng-26have advanced unhindered by the absence of any international Treaty;
Amendment 296 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Recognises the role that NATO’s Capacity Building Initiatives (CBI) play in contributing to Middle East stabilization via training missions to local security forces and the support the EU has provided by assuming civilian responsibilities in certain CBI initiatives;
Amendment 300 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16b. Considers the important role the EU can play in supporting NATO’s Open Door Policy by maintaining close political and operational synergy with its applicant countries, namely Ukraine and Georgia;
Amendment 303 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 c (new)
Paragraph 16 c (new)
16c. Joint Training & Exercises - Summit looks to enhance training, exercises and strategic communications to counter hybrid threats while supporting continued EU & NATO cooperation in maritime operations;
Amendment 304 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 d (new)
Paragraph 16 d (new)
Amendment 305 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 e (new)
Paragraph 16 e (new)
16e. Stresses the significance of military mobility and the EU’s roles in providing the legislative and infrastructural reforms required to ensure speedy movement of Member State forces across Europe; urges resolution to the border crossing &VAT laws authorizing foreign militaries unhindered country access, along with infrastructural redevelopment of bridges, roads and runways;
Amendment 306 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 f (new)
Paragraph 16 f (new)
16f. Supports further modernization of NATO’s Command Structure and commends the new Joint Force Command for the Atlantic, Enabling Command Centre and Cyber Operations Centre;
Amendment 307 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 g (new)
Paragraph 16 g (new)
16g. Encourages joint EU-NATO synergy in supporting Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) via training and education, doctrine and procedures and network environment;
Amendment 320 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Further calls upon the EU & NATO to jointly provide economic, political and operational support with existing regional forces based in Africa such as the African Union, G5 Sahel Force and Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS);
Amendment 321 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)
Paragraph 17 b (new)
17b. Encourages EU-NATO cooperation to cooperate with ASEAN countries in all aspects already agreed upon, further stresses the need to cooperate on economic manners and combatting terrorism;
Amendment 322 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 c (new)
Paragraph 17 c (new)
17c. Recognises the growing political, economic, environmental, security and strategic value of the Arctic Circle, urges EU-NATO cooperation to explore cooperation with the Arctic Council on all issues of common interest and to form a comprehensive strategy for the region;
Amendment 323 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 d (new)
Paragraph 17 d (new)
17d. Takes into consideration that EU & NATO should enhance its situational awareness across the High North and the Arctic and create a new strategy focusing on broader deterrence and defence plans; the strategy should include plans for ensuring freedom of navigation in the High North and adjacent bodies of water, including the North Atlantic, as well as provisions for addressing aggressive moves by state actors;
Amendment 348 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Highlights the role AI can play in providing advanced training and pre- deployment unit-level preparation for EU or NATO-led forces during peacetime to ensure a rapid yet smooth transition into conducting operations.
Amendment 349 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 b (new)
Paragraph 19 b (new)
19b. Urges EDA, CDP, CARD and NDPP to utilize autonomous software to assist with maintenance, logistics management, and targeting of offensive and defensive systems to ensure that a CSDP force is successfully integrated with autonomous, unmanned ground, air and sea vehicles to provide a standardised, and ever increasing, level of operational competence and consistency of execution;
Amendment 350 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 c (new)
Paragraph 19 c (new)
19c. Recognises that machine-learning systems can use sensor data, entire technical libraries and advanced models to accurately predict and prevent equipment failure and should thus be integrated into our procurement plans;
Amendment 351 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 d (new)
Paragraph 19 d (new)
19d. Recognises the emerging threat of Hyper war and the unique requirements this will place on defence architectures and the need for a high-tech industrial base if the EU and NATO are to preserve an adequate deterrence and defence posture or simply maintain a comparative advantage against adversarial actors;
Amendment 352 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 e (new)
Paragraph 19 e (new)
19e. Encourages developing a set of common EU AI capabilities matched to a Member State’s operating concepts to bridge technical gaps to ensure that Member States lacking the relevant technology–industry expertise or the ability to implement AI systems in their defence ministries are not left behind;
Amendment 353 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 f (new)
Paragraph 19 f (new)
19f. Stresses the concern posed by Russia’s harmonisation of highly disruptive propaganda and kinetic operations while committing to investments in military-relevant AI;
Amendment 354 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 g (new)
Paragraph 19 g (new)
19g. Encourages that initiatives such as EDIDP, PESCO and EDF facilitate SME engagement by advancing efforts that support incubation and capital investment;
Amendment 355 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 h (new)
Paragraph 19 h (new)
19h. Considers that EDF should collaborate actively with NATO in order to facilitate transatlantic technological and industrial development in a manner that removes barriers and protectionism and ensures export licensing processes/technological transfer policies are harmonized among Member States; special consideration should be given to the development of a task force between EDA and NSPA/NCIA for developing a roadmap on identifying ideal equipment for procurement and to generate the best value on defence expenditure as well as the formulation of a ‘transatlantic DARPA’;
Amendment 367 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Considers that Member States should isolate part of their 2%-20% contribution goals to include a dedicated minimum expenditure towards research and development within their defence budgets;
Amendment 369 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 b (new)
Paragraph 20 b (new)
20b. Strongly encourages the foundation of an Advisory Group for Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) to the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG)to advise EU & NATO on how to keep pace with technological change; A key objective for these efforts should be to encourage the development of an AI- focused agenda for R&D within the Alliance;
Amendment 387 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22a. Calls on Member States and the Commission to ensure the EDA provides a specific framework to pragmatically and practically drive forward requirement and specification, promote more effective and efficient project management and ensure rigorous delivery regimes and timetables
Amendment 389 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 b (new)
Paragraph 22 b (new)
Amendment 390 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 c (new)
Paragraph 22 c (new)
22c. Recommends Member States incorporate new technology thinking in defence planning and do it constantly and consistently while placing a strong emphasis on systematic, independent and robust ‘red-teaming’;
Amendment 391 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 d (new)
Paragraph 22 d (new)
22d. Urges the EU’s PESCO and promotion of pooling and sharing, as well as NATO’s Smart Defence, Connected Forces Initiative and Defence Investment Pledge be reinforced by an EU-NATO Capability Action Plan that seeks to better forge synergies, harmonisation and efficiencies into the relationship between suppliers and end-users;
Amendment 392 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 e (new)
Paragraph 22 e (new)
22e. Recommends Member States and EU’s various defence agencies implement, as a matter of urgency the prioritization of developments in new technologies, specifically AI, machine learning, military application of nano and bio-technologies and developing counter weights to the threats posed by CBRN weapons and new missile technologies;
Amendment 393 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 f (new)
Paragraph 22 f (new)
22f. Urges future defence plans to meet strategic rather than satisfy political needs;
Amendment 394 #
2020/2257(INI)
22g. Recommends an audit be taken by both the EU and NATO to better understand what European forces need, where the key shortfalls are found and the level of resource-waste caused by redundant fixed assets and duplication of effort;
Amendment 395 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 h (new)
Paragraph 22 h (new)
22h. Recommends the establishment of a Current Assets Framework be established that would purposively focus on the more efficient use of existing assets and capabilities;
Amendment 396 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 i (new)
Paragraph 22 i (new)
22i. Establish a Future Requirements Framework that identified the operational capabilities that Member States need and how best to obtain them by 2030;
Amendment 397 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 j (new)
Paragraph 22 j (new)
22j. Recommends Member State forces establish regular joint exercises and training campaigns to ensure that forces participating in CSDP or NATO Crisis Management operations are properly trained, equipped and rapidly deployable;
Amendment 414 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Calls for regular special summits with the participation of all NATO and EU Heads of State and Government to maintain trust and understanding at the highest levels, and expresses its long-term vision for an EU- NATO Partnership Council; underlines the principle of inclusiveness;
Amendment 430 #
2020/2257(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)
Paragraph 27 a (new)
27a. Underlines that EU& NATO must synergize their efforts to combat terrorism and radicalization and ensure that efforts made are supported by necessary resources and commensurate with the threat that it poses; Both organizations should strive to improve current practices of intelligence-sharing among Member States with particular emphasis on achieving better, common situational awareness in key areas including emerging safe havens and terrorists’ use of EDTs, as well as hybrid tactics.
Amendment 5 #
2020/2202(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. RegretNotes that despite the mutual interest in cooperation in the areas of foreign policy and security, which would be based on shared values and would contribute to promoting peace and strengthening the rules-based global order, the parties were not able to take advantage of this possibility as the UK considers the leading role of NATO and individual Member States in this area; underlines, that the UK's contributions to Euro- Atlantic security have increased vis-a-vis their political, financial, operational and logistical commitments to ongoing NATO missions and the role of the UK in UN, G7 and other international organizations and foras; applauds UK's leading position in supporting Ukraine's self defence and territorial integrity;
Amendment 8 #
2020/2202(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Recognises the historical and indispensable role of the UK to Europe's security and defence, being the world's third largest defence spender in 2022 while maintaining the most operationally sophisticated and capable armed force and intelligence services in Europe along with its UN Security Council veto power and leading role in NATO and the G7, as bringing a critical added value to Europe's wider strategic deterrence;
Amendment 9 #
2020/2202(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Underlines that the need for a tighter and more closely coordinated relationship between the EU and the UK on security issues has been thrown into sharp relief by the Russian war of aggression against Ukraineexacerbated since Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine; recognises the substantial contributions the UK has made to Ukraine’s defence and intelligence capabilities before and since Russia's war of aggression began, setting an example for the EU and most of the Member States, in particular the largest and stronger ones, to follow, including but not limited to the UK's military support and investment projects for Ukraine, emergency aid, capacity building, provision of military equipment to Ukraine and the UK's launch of a major training programme for Ukrainian forces;
Amendment 14 #
2020/2202(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses that although the political declaration has not been honoured and there is no agreement on foreign policy and defence, both sides should core is no current agreement on foreign policy and defence, both sides should step up cooperation in these fields in a complementary manner that facilitates coordination and cooperation mechanisms, including intelligence sharing, joint capability building initiatives with Member States and joint force projection for NATO missions and joint training and provision of military aid while maintainue to cooperate in these fieldsing a prioritization for jointly supporting Ukraine in a complementary and comprehensive manner;
Amendment 13 #
2020/2136(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. RegretNotes that the legally non-binding nature of the Political Declaration gave the UK legal grounds not to engage with crucialimportant parts of its content, in particular those relating to foreign and security policy, which therefore formed no part of the negotiations;
Amendment 19 #
2020/2136(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Believes that for the frameworkwhile a political declaration on the future relationship between a withdrawing Member State and the Union to inform theand a withdrawal agreement, its nature must in future be unequivocal, irrevocable and binding on remain different in nature, the future aim should be to keep the framework as convergent as possible during the negotiations on the future relationship upon the entry into force of the relevant withdrawal agreement.
Amendment 30 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the US continues to play a relevant role in the region, including through a direct military presence; whereas Israel, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt all have major non- NATO ally status; whereas NATO plays an important role in the broader Middle East while at the same time the security situation on Europe's southern periphery remains challenging due to threats to ranging from regional conflicts, to state fragility, terrorism, human trafficking and transnational organised crime;
Amendment 38 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the summit of 27 to 28 March 2022 between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt and Morocco aiming to create a security alliance, which was also attended by the US Secretary of State, paved the way for a new regional approach to security and confirme; welcomes the signing of the Abraham Accords and their countries’ intention to divide the region into blocksmmitment to strengthening peace in the Middle East and around the world through dialogue and cooperation based on mutual understanding and co-existence, as well as respect for human dignity and freedom;
Amendment 55 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
Amendment 79 #
2020/2113(INI)
G. whereas in particular Iranian interference, corruption, violent extremism and problems associated with governance and breaches of the rule of law in the region are a significant source of instability; whereas the imprisonment orand torture of peaceful political opposition figures and social activists across the region is paving the way for further conflicthuman rights defenders remain concerns;
Amendment 83 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas, according to UNICEF, children and young people (aged 0-24 years) in the Middle East and North Africa region currently account for nearly half of the region’s population; whereas according to the 2021 Arab Youth Survey rising cost of living and other 'kitchen table' issues are seen as top obstacles, as over a third of young Arabs struggle to make ends meet; whereas due to difficulties in accessing quality education and getting jobs, more young Arabs are turning to entrepreneurship; whereas fewer young Arabs see religion as central to their identity while over two-thirds are looking for reform of religious institutions;
Amendment 89 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas the EU guidelines on violence against women and girls and the promotion of women’s rights and gender equality should be at the core of its strategy forought to be strengthened in the region; whereas women’s human rights are being systematically violated and women’s rights activists continue to be detained and imprisoned in the region; whereas honour killings remain prevalent in many countries in the broader Middle East, as well as women who continue to live in marital captivity;
Amendment 93 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas minorities, including religious minorities such as Christians, and LGBTI people continue to be victims of repression and violence throughoutin many countries in the region; whereas same-sex relations are punished by imprisonment in many countries in the region and by the death penalty in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Yemen;
Amendment 100 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Highlights that the current situation in the broader Middle East region is characterised by ongoing conflicts with a regional dimension; stresses that the presence of foreign forces in these conflicts, isn particular Russian, contributinge to maintaining them and conflicts and leading to further regional instability; notes that as well as ongoing conflicts, there are latent ones which the EU must take into consideration when defining its long-term strategy to tackle the underlying causes of instability in the region;
Amendment 110 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Underlines that the EU has its own interests in the region, as EU security is interdependent with security in the Middle East; highlights that EU funding instruments directed at the region make an important contribution to stability and prosperityseek to contribute to stability and prosperity of the region; stresses the responsibility of the relevant EU authorities in continuing to ensure that no EU funding can be directly or indirectly diverted to terrorist organisation or activities;
Amendment 119 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes thatStrongly condemns Iran's growing interference in the region, is becoming increasingly polarised into blocks; considers this counterproductive for the EU’s goals in the area of stability and security; calls on the EU to enhance its bilateral discussions with all the different stakeholdersncluding through its support to proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza; condemns the increasing attacks by Iran's proxies against bases housing US forces in Iraq and Syria and targeted killings by Iran's proxies in Iraq, as well as their failed attempts, including against Iraq's Prime Minister; calls on the EU to proscribe Hezbollah in its entirety on the EU terror list;
Amendment 144 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 c (new)
Paragraph 4 c (new)
4 c. Reiterates its grave concern of Iranian and Russian interference in the region; strongly condemns the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the growing global food and energy insecurity as an impact of the war, which also has a great impact on the security and stability of the broader Middle East;
Amendment 153 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. Notes that during the start of the civil war none of the main drivers of the conflict have been resolved, while regional tensions have increased and Syria's economic crisis has further deteriorated, causing terrible civilian suffering; rejects any role for President Bashar al-Assad in post conflict Syria with reference to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254 (2015) and condemns any country legitimising President Assad by strengthening diplomatic contacts with this cruel and barbaric dictator; in this regard, welcomes and supports criminal inquiries that target al-Assad and his associates over the use of chemical weapons and hold them accountable for numerous war crimes; recommends that the Member States expand the list of those subject to targeted sanctions, including civilian and military officials within the Assad regime who are credibly implicated in war crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious violations;
Amendment 154 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4 b. Expresses grave concern about the situation in Lebanon and deeply urges the Lebanese leadership to keep their promises to create a functional government that is mission-driven, credible and accountable and that is free from foreign influence; stresses the particular responsibility of Hezbollah and other factions in repressing Lebanon’s 2019 popular movement and in Lebanon’s political and economic crisis; calls on Iran to refrain from meddling in Lebanon’s internal affairs and calls for Lebanon's sovereignty and political independence to be respected; expresses grave concern about statements by Hezbollah leader Nasrallah that Hezbollah has over 100,000 fighters in Lebanon; strongly condemns the firing of rockets by Hezbollah from southern Lebanon towards civilian areas in Israel and expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress made towards the establishment of a permanent ceasefire and other key provisions of UN Security Council resolution 1701(2006) in view of on-going tensions along Lebanon’s southern border;
Amendment 165 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Calls on the Member States to align their arms export policies with the provisions of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and to adopt a strictn application of allits criteria, however, notes that arms export policies remain a Member State competence;
Amendment 173 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
Amendment 195 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Expresses deep concern about a potential nuclear race in the region and calls on the EU to activate all diplomatic efforts to avoid it; calls on Israel to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
Amendment 204 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. WelcomesNotes that the negotiations on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as a necessary step towards achieving regional stability; calls on the US and Iran to pursue meaningful negotiations with a view to returning to compliance with the Johave come to a stalemate; expresses grave concern about the IAEA finding traces of uranium in Iran's sites, Iran's instalment of advanced IR-6 centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear site and strongly condemns Iran's continued efforts to pressure the IAEA through provocations; stresses that any agreement with Iran needs to include sufficient safeguards that Iran will not be able to acquire nuclear weapons; condemns Iran's human rights violations against Comprehensive Plan of Actionits own people, its ballistic missile programme and terror activities in the region and in Europe;
Amendment 212 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9 b. Welcomes the Abraham Accords and stresses their importance for peace and cooperation in the region; acknowledges the important role the US played in the public diplomatic normalisation of relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco; recalls the EU's commitment to a negotiated and viable two-state solution, based on international parameters and on the 1967 lines, with land swaps as may be agreed between the parties, with a secure Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in peace, security and mutual recognition;
Amendment 226 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Highlights the need to combat the funding of terrorist organisations and activities; stresses that the EU must help to stop money laundering and stem illicit financial flows by adopting a clear strategy to address the shortcomings in controlling these kind of funds by several statesterrorist organisations and certain countries, notably Iran, in the region;
Amendment 228 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11 a. Underlines that the EU and the US must synergize their efforts to combat terrorism and radicalization and ensure that efforts made are supported by the necessary resources and commensurate with the threat that it poses; notes that both partners should strive to improve current practices of intelligence-sharing among Member States with particular emphasis on achieving better, common situational awareness in key areas including emerging safe havens and terrorists’ use of EDTs, as well as hybrid tactics;
Amendment 231 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)
Paragraph 11 b (new)
11 b. Welcomes the adoption of the Magnitsky Act by the Council as an important EU instrument to sanction violators of human rights; calls for the preparation of restrictive measures against Iranian officials involved in the grave human rights violations against Iranian human rights defenders, prisoners of conscience and those peacefully protesting in the country;
Amendment 240 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12 a. Strongly condemns that millions of Christians have been uprooted from their homes, and that many have been killed, kidnapped, imprisoned, discriminated against and restrictions have been placed on their freedom of worship; notes with particular concern that forms of persecution also exist in all aspects of their social lives, including in employment and education; welcomes at the same time the enormous contribution of Christian communities in their respective countries;
Amendment 246 #
2020/2113(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Expresses deep concern regarding the human rights impact of the EU’s military cooperation policy, in particular sales of arms and cooperation in the field of security, which has enabled states to take part in regional conflicts or engage in repressive activities against their own populationssituation in the region, including that of religious minorities; stresses the need to ensure a safe and enabling environment where it is possible to defend and promote human rights without fear of reprisal, punishment or intimidation; stresses, furthermore, that fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and assembly must always be respected; calls for clear transparency criteria concerning these forms of cooperation ensuring that no EU resources are being used to fuel further regional instability;
Amendment 9 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 19 a (new)
Citation 19 a (new)
— having regard to the Ilulissat Declaration adopted on 28 May 2008 by the five coastal states at the Arctic Ocean Conference,
Amendment 15 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 25
Citation 25
— having regard to the statements adopted at the Northern Dimension Parliamentary Forum in in Bodø, Norway, in November 2019, Reykjavik, Iceland, in May 2015, in Archangelsk, Russia, in November 2013, in Tromsø, Norway, in February 2011 and in Brussels in September 2009,
Amendment 21 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 25 a (new)
Citation 25 a (new)
— having regards to the Commission’s Communication on Critical Raw Materials Resilience of September 2020,
Amendment 26 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 26 a (new)
Citation 26 a (new)
— having regard to the statement from the 14th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region of 13-14 April 2021,
Amendment 38 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas three Member States and additionally two members of the European Economic Area are part of the Arctic Council and six others Members States hold the status of observers;
Amendment 40 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the future of the Arctic requires a broader understanding and actions reaching beyond the regional level and littoral Arctic states owing to the direct link between the geopolitics and security of the Arctic and its environmental situation, which is in turn strongly influenced by the consequences of human behaviour in other areas of the planet;
Amendment 54 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas the Arctic sea ice is melting at an unprecedented speed, with estimates that around 70% permafrost areas are prone to thawing, which poses a serious risk for infrastructure as well as for biodiversity and ecosystems;
Amendment 75 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas the region’s geo- economic importance is quickly growing due to the enhanced interest and competition for its natural resources and for the new maritime routes: the North West Passage, the Northern Sea Route and the future Transpolar Sea Route that are opening up as a consequence of the ice-melting;
Amendment 78 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas, at the same time, some of the changes in the Arctic’s natural landscape are translating into economic opportunities available in the area, including shipping, exploitation of mineral resources, fishing and tourism, which offer enormous potential for a technologically advanced, environmentally friendly and sustainable economic development but also open a new theatre for military activities;
Amendment 80 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H b (new)
Recital H b (new)
Hb. whereas the primary responsibility for the preservation and sustainable development of the Arctic should continue to be borne by the Arctic states, while ensuring the maximum possible involvement in decision making of the population living in those territories, with particular regard to indigenous peoples;
Amendment 82 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas the remit of the Arctic Council is limited, giving as it is based on voluntary action and entails no binding authority the flexibility to adapt to new challenges but also making it less able to respond to all the issues affecting the Arctico handle disputes or other controversies, it gives the Arctic Council flexibility to adapt to new challenges, take on new responsibilities and pursue a peaceful and constructive cooperation that so far led to several binding agreements between the Arctic states. However, that remit is also making it less able to respond to all the issues affecting the region and may be insufficient to answer all the potential challenges, such as environmental disasters or heightened tensions; whereas, if such issues are not appropriately addressed, they may end the era of the Arctic as a low-tension area of peaceful cooperation;
Amendment 88 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)
Recital I a (new)
Ia. whereas the Arctic Council’s commitment to the well-being of the inhabitants of the Arctic, sustainable development of the region, and the protection of the Arctic environment, including the health of ecosystems, maintenance of biodiversity and conservation and sensible use of natural resources should be fully supported by the EU;
Amendment 91 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas, the essential role of international law, in particular the UNCLOS and the conventions of the IMO, which provide a framework for international cooperation and action on issues related to the Arctic Ocean, should be reaffirmed and reinforced;
Amendment 94 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Recital J a (new)
Ja. whereas the EU is committed to work towards an open and secure global maritime domain, in accordance with EU Global Strategy and EU Maritime Security Strategy;
Amendment 100 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital K a (new)
Recital K a (new)
Ka. whereas the Arctic coastal states have confirmed in 2008 and 2018, in the Ilulissat declaration, that they will follow international law, most notably the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in governing the Arctic Ocean;
Amendment 102 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital K b (new)
Recital K b (new)
Kb. whereas the Arctic security and politics have become ever more linked to global issues, with developments outside of the Arctic being likely to have consequences for Arctic states and vice versa;
Amendment 103 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital K c (new)
Recital K c (new)
Kc. whereas no single institutional framework appears to be able to accommodate the diverse interests of Arctic and non-Arctic stakeholders and the many rapidly evolving challenges they face;
Amendment 104 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital K d (new)
Recital K d (new)
Kd. whereas the existing governance model should remain transparent and inclusive and could be upgraded in order to enlarge the scope of the stakeholders bearing a direct responsibility for the conservation of the Arctic as an area of peace and cooperation as well as for its environmental preservation;
Amendment 105 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital K e (new)
Recital K e (new)
Ke. whereas the EU’s engagement with the Arctic is decades old, based on history, geography, economy and research; whereas the EU has consistently demonstrated its commitment towards a peaceful, environmentally clean and cooperative Arctic, including in the context of its Northern Dimension policy and in the framework of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and has clearly indicated its readiness to play an even more prominent role in order to realize the full potential and value that the EU can add;
Amendment 111 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital L a (new)
Recital L a (new)
La. whereas the EU has the ability to contribute in various ways to solve potential emerging challenges and prevent conflicts in the Arctic; whereas the EU should, together with its Member States, facilitate the formation of Arctic civil security mechanisms, foster capabilities for managing crises and catastrophes and develop infrastructure for rescue operations;
Amendment 121 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital M
Recital M
M. whereas the military importance of the Arctic is rapidly increasing due to the progressive and steady re-militarisation of the Russian Federation, which represents a very worrying development of significantly increasing the likelihood of military confrontation in the region;
Amendment 125 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital M a (new)
Recital M a (new)
Ma. whereas Russia has been expanding its military capacities to the Arctic region and reopened abandoned Cold War military installations, significantly boosting the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability in the strategic Northern Sea Route (NSR), which Russia falsely claims as an internal waterway;
Amendment 129 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital M b (new)
Recital M b (new)
Mb. whereas the Barents Sea region has been the main testbed for both ballistic and cruise missile systems, while the area east of Noveya Zemlya has been the main area for nuclear tests;
Amendment 131 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital M c (new)
Recital M c (new)
Mc. whereas Russia violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its peaceful neighbours, blocking freedom of navigation in the Azov, Black and Baltic seas, all of which cannot be disregarded when assessing the future scenarios for maintaining current peaceful coexistence in the Arctic;
Amendment 132 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital M d (new)
Recital M d (new)
Md. whereas ambitious, highly impactful and far-reaching projects and initiatives of non-Arctic global powers, such as China, are a cause of great concern;
Amendment 133 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital M e (new)
Recital M e (new)
Me. whereas Russian posture in the Arctic should be viewed as integral to its overall confrontation with the West, in which Europe is the principal theatre;
Amendment 134 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital M f (new)
Recital M f (new)
Mf. whereas the Kremlin has launched an information campaign to highlight its accomplishments in the Arctic and promote its ambitions there, further illustrated by a Russian expedition which planted its flag on the seabed of the North Pole;
Amendment 137 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital N
Recital N
N. whereas China has engaged in a long-term effort to enhance its position in the Arctic, declaring itself a ‘near-Arctic state’, with the ambition of becoming a ‘polar power’ and enhancing collaboration with Russia in the Arctic;
Amendment 139 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital N a (new)
Recital N a (new)
Na. whereas most strategies of Arctic players have been updated taking into account the rapidly changing situation in the region and the growing economic and geostrategic significance of the Arctic;
Amendment 142 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital N b (new)
Recital N b (new)
Nb. Whereas the current Arctic governance framework, centred on the Arctic Council, has for the last 25 years provided significant contribution to the stability of the region, congratulates the Arctic Council on its 25th anniversary as the primary forum for Arctic cooperation which has proven its ability to maintain a constructive and positive spirit of cooperation;
Amendment 148 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that the Arctic plays a crucial role in keeping the environmental balance of the planet and aims to maintainis satisfied that the region has been for a zlong time a place of peace and fruitful international cooperation. Stresses that all stakeholders, including the EU and its Member States, need to act to keep it as such in the future;
Amendment 166 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Notes, however, that interest in the Arctic and its resources is growing because of the negative effects of climate change, first and foremost the rapidly melting ice, and resource scarcity, creating new opportunities for economic development but also increasing the risk of confrontation;
Amendment 170 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Emphasises that the Arctic states hold the primary responsibility for tackling issues within their territories; reiterates that international law is the cornerstone of the legal framework regulating inter-state relations in the Arctic and underlines the importance of the UNCLOS with regard to all ocean-related activities and particularly for the delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf and for peacefully settling intra-Arctic sovereignty issues as regards territorial seas; in this respect, repeats its call on the EU and the Member States to play a stronger role in the effective implementation of international conventions;
Amendment 176 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. While fully recognizing the status of Arctic States’ sovereignty and their sovereign rights in accordance with international law, believes that safeguarding achievements of three decades of peaceful cooperation may need further sensible governance responses to make it more effective and inclusive, for example by involving in it all actors that share the responsibility for the conservation of the Arctic and have an interest to support its sustainable development. In this respect, strongly pleads for the approval of the EU’s application to obtain the status of Arctic Council observer and stresses that the EU’s capacity to provide solutions to potential security challenges should be fully exploited;
Amendment 183 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. Recognises the importance of the Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region and the Northern Dimension Parliamentary Forum, and is committed to a strong and active participation in the parliamentary cooperation in the North;
Amendment 187 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Highlights that the prospect of Arctic militarisation carries substantial security risks in and beyond the region; recognizes the strategic importance of the Arctic and notes that the Arctic plays a crucial role in the security of Europe as whole;
Amendment 192 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Notes that strategic competition in the region is re-emerging after a 35 year hiatus and believes that, in order for the Arctic to remain an area of peace and cooperation, a strong commitment of all international actors is vital, particularly with regard to the respect of international law and conventions as well as the exercise of restraint in the military sphere;
Amendment 193 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4b. Notes the particular geographical situation of the Russian Federation, whose territorial waters and economic zones exceed by far those of all other Arctic states, whose GDP and exports are closely linked to the Arctic. Stresses, in this respect, that Russia’s specific geographic features make it an unavoidable interlocutor, but also give it increased responsibility, which it should take seriously. Urges therefore the Russian Federation to enact its Arctic policies in full respect of international law and by being mindful of the consequences of its actions for the stability and sustainability of the region and of the planet as a whole;
Amendment 194 #
2020/2112(INI)
4c. Takes into account, considering the long-term nature of Russia’s confrontation with the West, that the return to the relatively benign geopolitical environment in the Arctic that existed there in the 1990s is unlikely;
Amendment 199 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Is gravely concerned with the progressive and massive military build-up pursued by the Russian Federation, including the development of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities; notes, in particular, Russia’s programs aimed at reactivating and rebuilding its sea-based nuclear forces based in the Arctic as well as Russia’s project to expand and upgrade its fleet of icebreakers, some of which are nuclear- powered and will soon be equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles and electronic warfare systems, which associated them rather with military vessels; is also aware that huge investments have been made in Russia’s missile defence systems and the Russian Ministry of Defence has announced over 100 military facilities in the region; six new military bases have been established since 2015 and an additional Air Defence division has been created to ensure that the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is under steady protection; is of the opinion that decision of President Vladimir Putin to upgrade the Northern Fleet into its own military district shows the real intentions of the Kremlin to use the Arctic as a theatre of military confrontation; considers that such a substantial military reinforcement is not justified by the military situation on the ground and significantly exceeds legitimate defensive purposes, thus reflects Russia’s will to achieve strategic military superiority in the region, which is an upsetting factor undermining cooperation and leading to instability and increased risk of confrontation;
Amendment 200 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5b. Stresses that Russia’s extension of its A2/AD capabilities into the strategic North Atlantic chokepoint at the GIUK (Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom) Gap, combined with the dramatic increase in air and naval patrols and submarine activity in the North Atlantic, as well as the use of electronic warfare tools, which are part of a broader Russian aggressive posture, may lead to the era of the Arctic as a region of low tensions. Recognizes that the Arctic may be used by the Russian Federation to endanger security elsewhere as it happened in the case of the Caspian Sea, which was used to serve Russian operations in Syria and in the case of the Black Sea to project Russia’s power to the Mediterranean region;
Amendment 201 #
2020/2112(INI)
5c. Regrets therefore that the Kremlin’s increasing military presence in the region deviates from the 1987 Murmansk Initiative, which aimed at transforming the Arctic in to an international “zone of peace”;
Amendment 202 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 d (new)
Paragraph 5 d (new)
5d. Regrets that Russia, instead of emphasizing the benefits of cooperative engagement, has adopted a much more competitive, even confrontational, perspective on the Arctic, taking the view of the Arctic as a sphere of military, territorial and economic expansion, and an arena for their great-power ambition;
Amendment 203 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Underlines that cooperation with Russia in the Arctic should be consistent with the principle of selective engagement and should not jeopardise the goals of sanctions against Russian actions elsewhereCalls on the Russian Federation to engage in a constructive and mutually beneficial dialogue with all other Arctic states on all issues ranging from the protection of the environment to economic development and military operations. Underlines that cooperation with Russia in the Arctic should be consistent with the principle of selective engagement and should not jeopardise the goals of sanctions and restrictive measures adopted as a result of the Russian government’s actions in other parts of the world and should be coherent with the EU strategy towards the Russian Federation;
Amendment 209 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Considers that the inclusion of the Arctic by China in its economic development programmes, with the aspiration to integrate the Arctic’s northern sea route into its Belt and Road Initiative (as a ‘Polar Silk Road’), as well as the Arctic’s prominent place in the military strategy of the Russian Federation, are cause for concern in order to maintain the Arctic as a peaceful land stable region and challenge any idea that the Arctic could be dealt with as a self- contained region, shielded from global geopolitics. In this regard, while Beijing is advancing its interest in the Arctic and projecting power abroad, calls on the EU to take into account China’s aggressive stance on territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas and monitor China’s activities in the region;
Amendment 215 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Notes that the High North falls within SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility, and cooperation with NATO is necessary in order to consult an overarching security concept for the Arctic. With that in mind, welcomes the conclusions of the Reflection Group tasked by NATO Secretary General to undertake a forward-looking reflection process to assess ways to strengthen the political dimension of the NATO Alliance, whereby NATO should enhance its situational awareness across the High North and the Arctic and should develop a strategy that takes into account broader deterrence and defence plans including provisions for addressing aggressive moves by state actors;
Amendment 220 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7b. Notes that the 2018 Trident Juncture exercise, which demonstrated that NATO is operationally active in the Arctic, especially in the High North (the Norwegian and Barents seas), ensured the highest level of transparency. Calls on all parties who conduct military activities in the Artic to follow such practice in line with international obligations, including the OSCE Vienna Document, thus reducing risks, clarifying possible misunderstandings and building transparency of intentions;
Amendment 221 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Welcomes the IMO’s Polar Code and calls for an assessment of its implementation, as well as of that of the standards and obligations under the SOLAS and MARPOL conventions, to ascertain whether they are fully implemented by the entities operating in the Arctic and identify gaps and weaknesses to be further addressed;
Amendment 223 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Urges a shared responsibility to ensure that polar shipping grows in volume and diversifies in nature over the coming years without compromising either safety of life at sea or the sustainability of the polar environments. In this respect, in addition to the Polar Code, welcomes ships' routing measures aimed at reducing the risks of incidents as well as no-go zones to improve safety of navigation and protect the fragile and unique environment;
Amendment 225 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Insists that it is crucial that the right of innocent passage of foreign ships through territorial seas be preserved and r. Regrets all efforattempts made by the Russian Federation aimed at closing its navigable Arctic routes; ing at the closure of its Arctic navigation straits to international navigation by designating them as internal waters under its complete sovereign control, by creating regulatory and administrative barriers to foreign navigation along the route and imposing the requirement to obtain Russia’s permission to enter and transit its exclusive economic zone and territorial sea and by failing to set out any express exemption for sovereign immune vessels. Stresses that any measure restricting navigational freedoms should be consistent with UNCLOS and with customary international law. Calls on the Russian Federation and China to comply with the rules codified in UNCLOS, be it in the Arctic or elsewhere, and respect the commitments made by joining in annual calls by the UN General Assembly for States Parties to conform their maritime claims to the UNCLOS;
Amendment 230 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Amendment 238 #
Amendment 239 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Underlines that the peoples of the Arctic are dramatically experiencing the effects of climate change, and need support and resources to adapt to these profound changes;
Amendment 241 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 c (new)
Paragraph 9 c (new)
9c. Notes with grave concern that the Arctic is warming at a rate three times of the global average, which has dire social, environmental, and economic impact, not only in the region but worldwide;
Amendment 243 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 c (new)
Paragraph 9 c (new)
9c. Recognises Russia’s large numerical advantage in, and China’s build-up of icebreaker programs and encourages Member States and other partner countries to build their own capacities in this regard. Considers that the EU should promote the construction and deployment of more ice-breakers and ice-strengthened ships under an EU flag;
Amendment 245 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 d (new)
Paragraph 9 d (new)
9d. Underlines the need to promote and exchange best practices in terms of search and rescue (SAR) and contribute to the interoperability of SAR units through joint exercises;
Amendment 247 #
2020/2112(INI)
9e. Notes that climate change and melting permafrost are having deleterious impacts on the ability to live and work in the region, both have led to the loss or degradation of existing infrastructure, roads, and buildings, as well as a spate of industrial and transportation accidents and also threaten cultural and heritage sites and the way of life of the indigenous peoples;
Amendment 254 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Calls for an increase in the accessibility of digital infrastructure in the Arctic, thereby promoting entrepreneurship, innovation and diversifying economic development in the Arctic;
Amendment 256 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)
Paragraph 10 b (new)
10b. Underscores the importance of promoting the use of renewable energy in remote Arctic communities and encourages further work on innovative energy solutions and related capacity construction in the Arctic aimed at climate change prevention, taking into account the needs of an increasingly electrifying society;
Amendment 261 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Notes that the Arctic is rich with mineral resources, including vast reserves of rare earth elements –central to the ongoing global digital and low-carbon economic transition as well as new generations of weapon systems. Takes into account that 90% of global rare earth production currently stems from China, which claims its reserves could run out in the next twenty years due to over extraction and assesses it as one of the factors driving Beijing to gain control over the Arctic’s reserves as a way to maintain a domination over rare-earth elements and a dominant position in supply chains of vital resources and key components of emerging technologies. Is of the opinion that the Arctic should play a central role in the European Raw Materials Alliance, boosting Europe’s output of critical minerals and cutting dependence on China for rare earth metals which is a key for further development of green technology and the fight against climate change, which constitutes the main threat to the region. Is of the opinion that decisions of local authorities on excavation of mineral resources should be done transparently, without external pressures and illegal actions, in particular free of corruption, election interference or disinformation campaigns, as those that took place in Greenland in April 2021;
Amendment 263 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Is of the opinion that Arctic economic development should adhere to international law as well as relevant international conventions and rules, to ensure that all goods are excavated in compliance with the highest environmental standards. In this regard, is highly concerned with the recent environmental catastrophe caused by Norilsk Nickel resulting in the largest ever oil spill in the polar Arctic but also toxic wastewater being pumped from a settling basin into the tundra and other spills that are regularly occurring and yet remain absent from official statistics. Welcomes the court decisions to fine the company but at the same time expresses its concern about restricted access of journalists and experts to the crash sites and calls on the Russian authorities to build transparent and effective procedures to report and track such environmental disasters. Regrets that such accidents often occur on the lands of Indigenous People, which leads to the loss of ability to continue their traditional way of live. Calls on the EU to support environmentalists and journalists investigating such cases and to use its own resources, such as Copernicus, to track such pollutions in the Arctic and conduct a thorough assessment about ecological and human consequences of only profit-oriented exploitation;
Amendment 276 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Notes the signing and entry into force of the CAOF agreement, which represents an ambitious and innovative step towardsto achieve sustainable development and tackle the problems of the Arctic;
Amendment 280 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Calls for the establishment of a special Investment Platform which would facilitate closer economic cooperation between EU and Arctic economies;
Amendment 287 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. As a general rule, welcomes the approach taken by the 2018 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, according to which the exploitation of natural resources should take place only where there is reasonable certainty not to cause any harm to the environment;
Amendment 288 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)
Paragraph 13 b (new)
13b. Notes that the EU receives a large share of its fish imports from the Arctic and is aware of the ongoing geo-economic rivalry around fisheries, which is increasing inter alia because of the depletion of fish stocks in some areas and their migration to other areas, partially driven by climate change;
Amendment 289 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 c (new)
Paragraph 13 c (new)
13c. Underlines the importance to implement a precautionary approach at all stages of Arctic fisheries and encourages a sustainable, scientific based approach instead of a profit-driven competition between countries;
Amendment 290 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. IStresses that the exploration and exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic should comply with stringent environmental standards and calls for the establishment of strict requirements for exploring and exploiting new hydrocarbon reserves in the region. In this respect, is concerned by the persistent intention of the Russian Federation and China to pursue far-reaching and highly impactful exploitation projects without appropriate assessment of their environmental impacts;
Amendment 298 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Regrets that Russian companies continue to cut back their investment in environmental protection and production facilities to a bare minimum to obtain the maximum profit in the shortest term possible, resulting in persistent emission of toxic substances into the atmosphere that has devastated not only the environment but also most of the Arctic towns, such as Norilsk, making them among the world’s most polluted cities;
Amendment 302 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Reiterates its call to actively involve all the inhabitants of the Arctic, and particularly indigenous peoples, in decision-making processes concerning development choices; the importance of consulting indigenous communities on policies concerning the Arctic. Notes that human life in the Arctic has been long characterized by poverty, low life expectancy and very limited human and economic development. Welcomes the improvements brought by modernization, however reminds that in most Nordic countries Arctic averages remain worse than national averages. Is aware of the impact of modernization on the traditional lifestyle and habits of indigenous peoples and consequently; reiterates its call to actively involve all the inhabitants of the Arctic, and particularly indigenous peoples, in decision-making processes concerning development choices; In this respect, strongly supports the full and effective implementation of Article 19 UNDRIP, especially as regards the need to obtain the indigenous peoples’ free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them;
Amendment 309 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Emphasises the role the Arctic plays with climatological as well as a geographical competitive advantage in digital connectivity between North America, Europe and Asia as well as location centres for data storage. New digital highways through extended fibre optic cable system and infrastructure should also enable better digital connectivity for Arctic communities as well as healthcare support and social services (e.g. telehealth services), online education, and an overall easier access to the global economy;
Amendment 311 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)
Paragraph 15 b (new)
15b. Notes that increasing human activity in the region, including growing tourism, raises serious concerns relating to human security, particularly in the context of harsh weather conditions and limited search and rescue (SAR) capabilities; is of the opinion that international cooperation as well as close partnership between the military, public and non-governmental sectors are essential in order to provide adequate civilian protection in the region;
Amendment 315 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 c (new)
Paragraph 15 c (new)
15c. Regrets the Kremlin’s efforts to subordinate civil society, which is having a very negative impact on indigenous peoples, by limiting the autonomy of their representations and partnerships on international foras, blocking access to external funds. Similar problems affects other NGOs, including environmental activists;
Amendment 316 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 d (new)
Paragraph 15 d (new)
15d. Regrets that while the region’s vast stores of natural resources already account for about one-fifth of Russia’s GDP, the current policy of the Russian Federation uses the Arctic as the primary source of financing for its aggressive policies, transferring money to occupied Crimea instead of improving environmental standards or living conditions of Arctic inhabitants;
Amendment 318 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. States that all activities in the Arctic Region including the exploitation of the Arctic’s resources, should respect the rights of Indigenous peoples and benefit local inhabitants; advocates, in this regard, for a stronger link between businesses operating in the Arctic and local communities and supports the implementation of standards such as the Arctic Investment Protocol and the UN Global Compact Initiative;
Amendment 325 #
Amendment 326 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Underlines the important contributions from EU and its member states in Polar science and the importance of knowledge as a fundament for political decisions and sustainable development in the Arctic;
Amendment 328 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16b. Reiterates the call from the 14th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region to strengthen the knowledge base and improve scientific cooperation with a new International Polar Year Initiative;
Amendment 329 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 c (new)
Paragraph 16 c (new)
16c. Notes that the Arctic offers huge potential for innovation and sustainable use of resources, which can be thereafter implemented globally, being a test-bed for geothermal, wind and hydro projects, the carbon-free production of steel, greener battery production and others;
Amendment 330 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 d (new)
Paragraph 16 d (new)
16d. Is worried by reports that bacteria released by thawing permafrost release climate damaging carbon but also together with viruses may poses a serious health threat to animals and also humans;
Amendment 331 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 e (new)
Paragraph 16 e (new)
16e. Calls for more visibility and coordination of Arctic-oriented research and innovation, including in Horizon Europe;
Amendment 332 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Recognises the validity of the three founding pillars of the integrated EU policy for the Arctic, namely climate change, sustainable development and international cooperation; is of the opinion that the EU is uniquely well-placed to help coordinate and complement Member States’ Arctic policies and therefore stresses the need for more coherence between the EU’s internal and external policies as regards Arctic matters and urges the EU to include an Arctic dimension wherever appropriate in its sectoral policies;
Amendment 349 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Welcomes the updating of the EU’s Arctic policy, which should also reflect new security realities; is of the opinion that the EU should engage with and new actors such as China; such an updated comprehensive policy, based on consensus among all EU Member states, will both increase EU’s position as a global actor but will also serve the interests of EU citizens, predominantly those living in the Arctic, and of the indigenous people in particular; is of the opinion that the EU as a global actor should react to the growing strategic importance of the Arctic and continue to play its role as an accepted and credible actor in the Arctic, respecting the unique set of existing Arctic consultative fora and successful governance framework mechanisms. Believes that the EU may serve as a bridge between the security community and an array of longstanding Arctic stakeholders which have a vested interest in promoting regional stability and prosperity;
Amendment 359 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Is of the opinion that the process of consultation of the new EU Arctic policy should be used to assess the effectiveness of the EU current policies;
Amendment 373 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Strongly believes that the European Green Deal provides a much- needed long-term response to the growing challenges of climate change through an amplified investment agenda for sustainable growth and will contribute significantly to the solution of the EU’s strategic energy dependence. With that in mind, calls for the integration of the EU Arctic policy dimension into the European Green Deal and the EU Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024;
Amendment 375 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 b (new)
Paragraph 20 b (new)
20b. Stresses the need for the EU and its Member States to entertain constructive relations with Arctic states in the framework of the Arctic Council, the Northern Dimension, the Barents Euro- Arctic Council and other bodies involved in cooperation in the High North. In addition, underlines the need for the EU to keep engaging with the indigenous peoples of the Arctic, who are at the forefront of the climatic and economic changes affecting the region, and supports their enhanced involvement in the works of the Arctic Council. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to pursue its Annual Arctic Indigenous Peoples’ Dialogue and its support for the UNDRIP and, in particular, Article 19 thereof;
Amendment 377 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 c (new)
Paragraph 20 c (new)
20c. Is of the opinion that greater coordination at EU level, as well as consultations with EEA countries, U.S., Canada and also U.K., Japan, Republic of Korea, India, and other partners committed to securing peaceful cooperation and freedom of navigation in the Arctic and to make the most of possible synergies, serves as the best reply to growing Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic. Takes note of the US’s Arctic Security Initiative (ASI) and Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework and encourages the EU to partner with its like-minded allies where appropriate to ensure proper coordination in the region; in this regard calls for a robust EU-Arctic Dialogue in support of implementation of the EU policy towards the Arctic;
Amendment 384 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Supports the efforts to strengthen resilience from potential pressure coming from China or other actors who do not prioritize extraction of minerals in environmentally friendly and sustainable way respecting international norms and United Nations Conventions. Calls on Stratcom Task Force to monitor campaigns aimed at influencing decision making processes on extractions of minerals undertaken in the region;
Amendment 391 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22a. Calls for more regular exchanges of view on Arctic issues at the level of Political and Security Committee and during Council meetings and as an important area of EU-NATO consultations;
Amendment 392 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 b (new)
Paragraph 22 b (new)
22b. Calls for more visibility of the EU in the Arctic, considering together with Danish authorities possibility of establishment of EU offices in Greenland and the Faroe Islands;
Amendment 398 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. Urges the EU to implement an ambitious, forward-looking and environmentally sustainable investment plan for the Arctic, by increasing funding in key areas such as scientific research and by allocating more Horizon 2020 funding to Arctic research, development and innovation (RDI), space, digital and transport infrastructure, space technologies, sustainable shipping, sustainable extraction and processing of raw materials, renewable energy and other low-carbon activities and tourism;
Amendment 402 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 b (new)
Paragraph 23 b (new)
23b. Recommends that Member States consider to create new Permanent Structured Cooperation projects, for example concentrated on search and rescue or environmental response, that aim to enhance the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) capabilities in the Arctic; encourage the EU and Member States to perform exercises simulating how the Civil Protection Mechanism may be broadly implemented in the Arctic;
Amendment 405 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 c (new)
Paragraph 23 c (new)
23c. Is of the opinion that more visible, strategic and integrated EU policy is needed, in this regard welcomes appointment in September 2017, an ‘EU Ambassador at Large for the Arctic’; however, calls for more coordination in Arctic policies at the level of the Commission in close cooperation with EEAS, and advises to create an Arctic portfolio in the hands of one of the Vice Presidents of the Commission;
Amendment 408 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 d (new)
Paragraph 23 d (new)
23d. Takes the view that the EU Maritime Strategy should be updated to reflect new opportunities and challenges. Similar assessments and reviews should be carried out as regards other EU policies, including the EU space policy, to asses expanding existing satellite programmes to cover the Arctic region’s specific needs, including the use Copernicus to track pollution;
Amendment 409 #
2020/2112(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 e (new)
Paragraph 23 e (new)
23e. Is of the opinion that the new EU Arctic policy should be used more broadly as an opportunity to increase awareness and engagement among EU citizens, academia and businesses on Arctic issues; calls for the creation of a single-Arctic portal covering all Arctic initiatives and activities of EU institutions;
Amendment 7 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)
Citation 6 a (new)
— having regard to a joint statement on Belarus of EPP, S&D, Renew Europe, Greens/EFA and ECR groups in the European Parliament of 17 August 2020,
Amendment 29 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas despite the fundamental restrictions on basic freedoms and human rights that remain in Belarus, the EU policy of critical engagement with Belarus has produced some results in the form of signed agreements and increased cooperation; whereas future relations between the EU and Belarus will be defined in the Partnership Priorities to be agreed by both sideEU and new legitimate, democratically elected authorities in Belarus;
Amendment 32 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the people of Belarus share common European heritage and culture, while directly neighbouring three EU Member States; whereas situation in Belarus may have direct impact on the EU;
Amendment 45 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the OSCE ODIHR International Election Observation Mission noted an overallnone of either the parliamentary or presidential elections held in Belarus from 1994 to date have been free and fair, but despite these harsh undemocratic conditions the people of Belarus clearly voted for a change, after more than two decades of oppression; whereas recent presidential elections were neither free nor fair and even more than the previous ones were marred with disregard for the fundamental freedoms of assembly, association and expression during the 2019 parliamentary elections, whichand took place after a limited amount of campaigning and within an extremely restrictive environment that did not provide for a meaningful or competitive political contest overall;
Amendment 52 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the 2020 presidential elections have thus far followed the same pattern as the parliamentary electionssimilar pattern as previous elections; whereas after publication of falsified results, Belarusian people immediately organised peaceful protests, which were suppressed by brutal force, which resulted in thousands of protestors being arrested, tortured, wounded, and some even killed; whereas the United Nations human rights investigators alarmed on 01/09 that they had received reports of hundreds of cases of torture, beatings and mistreatment of anti-government protesters by police in Belarus and urged the authorities to stop any such abuse;
Amendment 88 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas human rights and democracy in Belarus have been deliberately and brutally restricted by the Belarusian authorities over the past decades, while representatives of the opposition, civil society and media in the country have been regularly arrested or otherwise persecuted;
Amendment 94 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)
Recital E b (new)
Eb. whereas the Belarusian regime seeks to intimidate and to disperse the Coordination Council of Belarus by targeting its members and launching a criminal case against them;
Amendment 96 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E d (new)
Recital E d (new)
Ed. whereas Belsat TV channel, which is officially registered in Poland, so far has not been registered in Belarus, while its activities are under constant pressure and attacks, including brutal detentions of its journalists and fines imposed to its contributors amounting to USD 101,791 as of 18 June 2020;
Amendment 109 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas 26 years in power or Lukashenka had been marked by policies of undermining sovereignty and independence of the country and weakening of Belarusian identity, heritage and culture;
Amendment 162 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a
Paragraph 1 – point a
(a) acknowledge territorial integrity of Belarus and support the sovereignty of Belarus against pressure from the Russian Federation for deeper integration and remind Belarus that the European Union is open to further development of relations with the country both bilaterally and within the Eastern Partnership framework if Belarus meets conditions linked to democracy, the rule of law, international law, human rights and fundamental freedoms;
Amendment 165 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
Amendment 221 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e
Paragraph 1 – point e
(e) pay close attention to the presidential election campaign and insist that a lack of progress in conducting elections according to international standards and further crackdowns against the opposition will have direct adverse effects on relations wicall for holding new and transparent Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Belarus that would meet the democratic standards and call on the EU, OSCE, CoE to engage in dialogue with the Belarusian civil society with a view to launch a new electoral process, under the supervision of a new Electoral Commission, a body that can be trusted by all the parties including international observers, under the the EUight international scrutiny;
Amendment 226 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
(ea) deny recognition of the results of the elections held in Belarus on 9 August 2020 and Alexander Lukashenko as a legitimate leader President of Belarus; accordingly, call on him to respect the decision of the people of Belarus and peacefully step down;
Amendment 231 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e b (new)
(eb) applaud the Belarusian people for their courage and determination and to strongly support their desire for democratic change and freedom and basing their country’s future on principles of democracy, rule of law and human rights, so as to ensure freedom, independence, sovereignty and prosperity of the Republic of Belarus;
Amendment 233 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e c (new)
Amendment 236 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e d (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e d (new)
(ed) deplore persecution of the members of the opposition Coordination Council and call the authorities to enter into the dialogue with the protestors in order to end the violence and repressions and prepare a new elections;
Amendment 248 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
(fa) condemn efforts of the Belarusian regime to deny entrance to the country for Belarusians critical towards it, as well as independent journalists, human rights workers, as well as representatives of international community, including Members of the European Parliament;
Amendment 254 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
Amendment 264 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point g b (new)
(gb) uphold the decision of EU’s foreign affairs ministers and the European Council to blacklist those responsible for violence and fake presidential elections and impose individual sanctions against Belarusian officials who are liable for or have contributed to the falsification of the results of the presidential elections in Belarus and are responsible or have contributed to violations of civil and human rights; this list should be constantly updated and extended according to the level of crimes committed by Lukashenko regime;
Amendment 270 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point g c (new)
(gc) note that China's president was the first to congratulate Lukashenka after the elections; to express concerns over increasing Chinese investments in strategic infrastructure and warn about the effect of dependency it might create for Belarus;
Amendment 289 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i
Paragraph 1 – point i
(i) condemn the ongoing intimidation and persecution of opposition figures, including presidential hopefuls, civil society activists and independent journalists; strongly condemn the suppression of internet and media, road blockades, and intimidation of journalists in order to stop the flow of information about the situation in the country as well as denial of access to Belarus for international media, members of parliament or government of democratic community;
Amendment 297 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
(ia) commend actions taken by workers of numerous factories and institutions throughout the country that joined the protests in various ways, including strikes and provide necessary support for those of them who were punished by the regime for exercising their democratic rights;
Amendment 300 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point i b (new)
(ib) welcome numerous acts of solidarity with the people of Belarus, including fundraising, charity and humanitarian assistance; in this regard condemn stopping of humanitarian aid transport organised by "NSZZ Solidarnosc";
Amendment 304 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point j a (new)
(ja) approve the European universal human rights sanctions (European Magnitsky Act) as a regime providing, at the EU level, for restrictive measures, including entry bans and freezing of funds, against individuals liable for violations of human rights and freedoms and responsible for other crimes;
Amendment 325 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point l a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point l a (new)
Amendment 361 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point o a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point o a (new)
(oa) offer the alternative of strengthened and much closer cooperation with Belarus in case democratic changes, including new elections, become reality;
Amendment 362 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point o b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point o b (new)
(ob) work together with the European Commission in order to develop a comprehensive programme for Belarus after the new presidential elections are held, which would allow Belarus to transition towards a free market economy and an open democratic state;
Amendment 382 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point r a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point r a (new)
(ra) provide active and direct support to Belarusian non-governmental organisations and communities, grant all necessary assistance to Belarusian citizens and human right defenders, and limit any financial or other support to the state institutions of Belarus;
Amendment 384 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point r b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point r b (new)
(rb) strengthen the support programs for civil society, NGOs, journalists, European scholarship program for Belarusians, loans for specific reform programs, unlocking partnership priorities and full cooperation within the Eastern Partnership;
Amendment 387 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point r c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point r c (new)
(rc) commend the actions of the journalists and employees of public media outlets, who despite oppression and threats against them remained true to the journalist ethos and continued to support the democratic opposition and were subsequently fired; recognise the work of independent media, including Charter 97, Bielsat, Radio Svoboda and others; to use European Endowment for Democracy and other instruments in order to support these outlets and journalists who are subject to repression by the regime;
Amendment 388 #
2020/2081(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point r d (new)
Paragraph 1 – point r d (new)
(rd) urge Russian Federation not to engage into any actions that would threaten sovereignty and territorial integrity of Belarus and notice the valued solidarity expressed by Russian pro- democratic civil society with Belarusian activists; to warn against any attempts to militarize the situation and provoke tensions with the neighbouring countries;
Amendment 4 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Underlines that Europe and Africa are in close geographical proximity, have strong historical and cultural ties and are being brought ever closer by the increase in trade and shared challenges, from terrorism and migration to environment, health and climate change, which call for a continental-African approach and result- oriented use of EU resources;
Amendment 23 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Underlines that the process of development on the African continent is of key importance for the prosperity, stability and security of both the EU and Africa;, along with the transition to a closer and mutually beneficial strategic partnership
Amendment 48 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Recalls that Africa is our closest neighbour, home to over 1 billion people and more than half of the world’s population growth by 2050 is expected to take place in Africa, while six out of the ten fastest growing economies in the world are African.
Amendment 49 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 b (new)
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. Notes that thirty-six of the world’s most fragile countries are located in Africa, often weakened by conflicts, while the continent hosts 390 million people living below the poverty line. Stresses that the population growth in some of the poorest and most underdeveloped countries, together with the effects of climate change and factors as radicalization and proliferation of organized crime will inevitably lead to a series of new challenges, which, if not addressed immediately, may result in uncontrolled migration waves, widespread terrorist activity and destabilization across borders, what would lead to extremely challenging scenarios for the African countries the European Union and its Member States;
Amendment 67 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Supports the view that the EU must maintain flexible country-to-country and sub-regional approaches that tailor its engagement and support to the specific needs and circumstances of each country within the five regions of Africa;
Amendment 72 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4b. Stresses that the EU and its Member States constitute Africa’s biggest partner on all accounts: investment, trade, development aid, humanitarian assistance and security; however this increasingly close cooperation is yet to result in a shared understanding or viable strategic partnership, in line with shared interests, growth potential, geographical proximity and centuries-old links between two continents;
Amendment 74 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 c (new)
Paragraph 4 c (new)
4c. Highlights that European interests in Africa range from trade, security, counter-terrorism, fighting organized crime, illegal migration and human trafficking, health, promotion of democracy and human rights, strengthening trade and investment relations, which demand a continental African approach that can reconcile these divergent strands into a comprehensive coherent strategy, which will be measured in its output, evaluated continuously and protect from overstretching the EU’s limited resources.
Amendment 75 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 d (new)
Paragraph 4 d (new)
4d. Is of the opinion that a stronger long-term and multi-faceted partnership between the EU and Africa is urgent and must be reliable and should also translate into stronger political co-operation. Welcomes that the very first visit of the new President of the European Commission was to Africa and calls for more frequent high level meetings and contacts; Stresses that the EU must be confident in creating a fresh and modern approach to its Africa policy, thus creating a strong relationship built on equality, honest dialogue, trust and shared values;
Amendment 79 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 March 2020 entitled ‘Towards a comprehensive strategy with Africa’ (JOIN(2020)0004); c, striving for a closer and more comprehensive partnership between the EU and Africa. Calls for strong and constant EU engagement in the security, stability and development of Africa; Expresses however, its disappointment that, according to our African neighbours, the communication “Towards a comprehensive strategy with Africa” has not been thoroughly discussed and developed with African partners before its publication;
Amendment 89 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Regrets that the Communication lacks clear proposals for coordinated approaches between the EU and the AU to tackle common challenges which could be addressed jointly in multilateral systems (e.g. UN); stresses that HRVP and EU Missions in capitals throughout the African continent should be more active in presenting EU policy objectives. Encourages European think tanks and academia in this regard to cooperate more actively with their African counterparts;
Amendment 98 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5b. Regrets the limited consultation process and public debate during the process of drafting the EU-Africa Strategy; underlines the importance of future relations with Africa requires a broad involvement of civil societies of both continents; calls for a stronger engagement on all levels, including business, academia, think tanks, cultural and religious institutions and others;
Amendment 101 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 c (new)
Paragraph 5 c (new)
5c. Notes that Africa’s potential attracts increased interest from many players on the world scene, and expresses concern that in many areas Africa has become a new arena of great power competition;
Amendment 130 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Stresses that the EU and its Member States need to become a source of stability and reliability in the region. Believes that the European Union needs to play a bigger geopolitical role in Africa and establish relations that account for the good of all;
Amendment 132 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 b (new)
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. Regrets that other actors not always contribute to peace, stability and prosperity of African nations, with their policies of maximizing influences and subservience by increasing financial indebtedness, use of bribes, opaque agreements, lack of environmental or ethical standards and exchanging political and military support for e voting support at international forums including the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Health Organization, Interpol; Food and Agriculture Organization, International Telecommunication Union or International Civil Aviation Organization.
Amendment 134 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 c (new)
Paragraph 6 c (new)
6c. Regrets that China and Russia continue to threaten the financial independence of African nations, support military dictatorships, pillage natural resources and undermine national labour markets as a means to increase their power at the expense of the sovereignty of African nations; is of the opinion that Europe cannot risk to become reactive to Sino-Africa dynamics and Russian engagement in fragile states;
Amendment 135 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 d (new)
Paragraph 6 d (new)
6d. Reiterates that engaging together on the global scene to strengthen the multilateral rules-based order requires shared values and respect of international law and fundamental rights;
Amendment 136 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 e (new)
Paragraph 6 e (new)
6e. Calls on the Commission and Member States to advise and assist African nations in sharing best practices and European integration experiences, so to deepen cooperation and reconciliation, especially in implementation of the African Union’s Agenda 2063, the African Continental Free Trade Area, the African Visa-Free Area, Single African Digital Market, the Single African Air Transport Market, and achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals
Amendment 137 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 f (new)
Paragraph 6 f (new)
6f. Notes that Africa, in a rapidly changing world, has an immense potential that is not yet fully realized. Believes that whether or not African countries achieve this potential depends greatly on their follow through with their stated strategic objectives and how they foster relationships with nations who share similar experiences, particularly those in Europe.
Amendment 138 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 g (new)
Paragraph 6 g (new)
6g. Calls for closer cooperation on implementation EU-Africa strategy with the UN, NATO, OSCE, and key allies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.
Amendment 139 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 h (new)
Paragraph 6 h (new)
6h. Welcomes that the EU considers peace and security in Africa as key conditions for sustainable development and that the Union is committed to “markedly step up its support to Africa in cooperation with the international community”;
Amendment 156 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Stresses that a lack of economic progress in the region, weak governance, instability, violation of human rights, corruption, lack of rule of law and impunity, inequality, unemployment or underemployment, climate change and water shortage; accompanied by conflicts and proliferation of radical Islamic terrorism and other forms of violent conflict, creates an increasingly fertile ground for uncontrolled mass migration, both within the continent and overseas, mainly to Europe;
Amendment 165 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 b (new)
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7b. Is of the opinion that as stated in the EU global strategy migration constitutes a priority topic in the EU’s external relations, including its relations with Africa, and more political efforts should be put into the fight against human trafficking and smuggling; Is however of the opinion that both partners should also focus more on roots of migration as well as the effective use of development cooperation instruments;
Amendment 168 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 c (new)
Paragraph 7 c (new)
7c. Takes note that the Communication aims at deepening EU support to African peace efforts through a more structured and strategic form of cooperation focussing on regions in Africa where tensions are the highest and calls for specific strategies in conflict regions to be considered a priority; encourages the EU and its Member States to continue burden-sharing with international organizations and partners, including allies and African states that serve a reliable ally against terrorism such as Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Ghana and Ethiopia; calls to strengthen EU’s relationships with these pivotal states; calls on the EU to continue to assist African partners in building the capacity of their forces and security institutions to provide effective and sustainable security and law enforcement services to their citizens, including through the European Peace Facility and its CSDP missions, and focuses on an integrated approach to conflict and crises, acting at all stages of the conflict cycle, from conflict prevention, through response to management and resolution;
Amendment 172 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 d (new)
Paragraph 7 d (new)
7d. Supports increasingly proactive approach taken by cooperative regional security organizations towards the full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); commends in particular initiatives such as G-5 Sahel given its increasingly pivotal role in taking decisive action to ensure peace and security by African nations in their own neighbourhood and calls on the Commission and Member States to increase political, financial, operational and logistical support to G-5 Sahel;
Amendment 174 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 e (new)
Paragraph 7 e (new)
7e. Stresses the increasing importance of regional security actors such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) and the African Union’s African Standby Force in assisting struggling countries in providing peace and prosperity for their citizens;
Amendment 176 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 f (new)
Paragraph 7 f (new)
7f. Welcomes the decisive drop in piracy off the coasts of both Eastern and Western Africa as a result of international maritime security efforts that serve as a precedent for European, African and transatlantic security cooperation;
Amendment 178 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 g (new)
Paragraph 7 g (new)
7g. Considers it important that the EU continue efforts to build more resilient states and societies through capacity building and security sector reforms, including through the European Peace Facility and its CSDP missions, and focuses on an integrated approach to conflict and crises, acting at all stages of the conflict cycle,
Amendment 180 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 h (new)
Paragraph 7 h (new)
7h. Regrets that the African continent remains home to a variety of active terrorist organizations that openly and continuously threaten African and European citizens and interests alike, including, but not limited to: ISIS, al- Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab and Boko Haram;
Amendment 182 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 i (new)
Paragraph 7 i (new)
7i. Expresses concern that a significant rise in casualties due to terrorist activity and jihadi recruitment have made the African continent on the major theatre of warfare in the 21st century; is deeply concerned that all major radical Islamic terrorist groups operate and recruit on the African continent, causing untold suffering against innocent civilians, peacekeepers, partner forces, but also serving as a ground for establishing control and command centres engaged in plotting attacks against European citizens and various targets across the international community;
Amendment 184 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 j (new)
Paragraph 7 j (new)
7j. Regrets that the fight against terrorism seems to be less prominent in the Communication compared to the demands by the European Parliament, although it was identified as a priority area by the AU and the EU and calls for the EU-Africa strategy to address this serious threat in a comprehensive way.
Amendment 186 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 k (new)
Paragraph 7 k (new)
7k. Continues to support regional capability building to combat terrorism, transnational organized crime, human trafficking, illegal extortion of natural resources, wild animal trade and looting of cultural heritage which are often a primary source of income for terror and criminal organisations in the region
Amendment 188 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 l (new)
Paragraph 7 l (new)
7l. Calls for the EU to address the consistent and growing threats to the protection and preservation of Africa’s cultural heritage and clamp down on the smuggling of cultural artefacts, especially in conflict zones; Notes that depriving societies of their cultural heritage and historical roots makes them more vulnerable to radicalization and more susceptible to global jihadist ideologies; calls for the EU to develop a broad strategy to counteract such threats;
Amendment 190 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 m (new)
Paragraph 7 m (new)
7m. Highlights the special role of religious entities in Africa that regularly play a mediating role in conflicts , with whom dialogue and cooperation is needed, especially in the conflict areas as the interreligious dialogue between may contribute to peace and reconciliation;
Amendment 192 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 n (new)
Paragraph 7 n (new)
7n. Notes that the information sphere in Africa is more and more influenced by our global adversaries; calls in this regard on the EEAS and EC to actively tackle the problem of lack of presence of European voice within the African societies and to counter false narratives and better promote the European approach and democratic values to the African people, which requires better strategic communication focused on key regions and countries, through establishing a special unit responsible for such actions in close cooperation with the EU Delegations;
Amendment 194 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 o (new)
Paragraph 7 o (new)
7o. Stresses the need to provide more visibility of actions carried out within the framework of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), and ensure coordination
Amendment 195 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 p (new)
Paragraph 7 p (new)
7p. Urges the continuation of Annual Joint Consultative Meetings of the Political and Security Committee of the European Union and of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union with the objective to expand the scope of cooperation to include joint field visits, joint sessions, developing shared understandings and analyses on crisis situations, as well as investigating avenues for joint early action as the best means of establishing viable strategic partnership;
Amendment 198 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 q (new)
Paragraph 7 q (new)
7q. Calls on to ensure that CSDP missions are planned in an effective, accountable, robust way with efficient operations and stronger mandates tied to substantive political will aimed at resolving conflicts instead of freezing them,
Amendment 200 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 r (new)
Paragraph 7 r (new)
7r. Calls on to work closely with African partners to ensure security, resilience and deterrence against cybercrime and to prevent the exploitation of the Internet for terrorism and violent extremism.
Amendment 202 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 s (new)
Paragraph 7 s (new)
7s. Calls to ensure that EU aid does not prolong conflicts or facilitate the predatory behaviour of autocratic regimes; which lies at the root of many of Africa’s socio-economic problems and political conflicts; Stresses that the pursuit of common interests and cooperation must be consistent with international law, the EU’s fundamental values and the objectives of supporting democracy, good governance and human rights;
Amendment 203 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 t (new)
Paragraph 7 t (new)
7t. Appreciates efforts to strengthen African-owned mechanisms and regulations of human rights protection such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and its protocols, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights; continue to assist African partners in adaptation of their own human rights instruments and mechanism to internationally recognized principles, laws, and standards;
Amendment 205 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 u (new)
Paragraph 7 u (new)
7u. Believes that more participation of women in politics will provide a platform to support empowering marginalized groups improve policies on issues such as access to education for girls, ending FGM and child marriage, combatting security challenges for young girls, and encouraging women entrepreneurship; Notes that the presence of increased female representation in some African nations is widely viewed as a very positive step forward; Observes however that women remain poorly represented in many other countries on the African continent.
Amendment 208 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 v (new)
Paragraph 7 v (new)
7v. Calls on the EU to more actively engage with Africa in support of freedom of expression, media pluralism and safety of journalists;
Amendment 210 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 w (new)
Paragraph 7 w (new)
7w. Considers that the challenges posed by the refugee crisis have had a significant impact and placed considerable strains on countries in both Africa and the EU. Stresses the EU must be bold infighting against human trafficking and put forward a sustainable approach to deal with the refugee crises;
Amendment 212 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 x (new)
Paragraph 7 x (new)
7x. Recalls that the high amount of young talent in Africa can only reach its potential when Africa and its partners invest in education and innovation; Stresses that under good governance and successful development are an indispensable prerequisite to achieve this goal, and calls on to link development aid with anti-corruption measures, higher education standards and women empowerment;
Amendment 213 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 y (new)
Paragraph 7 y (new)
7y. Recalls the importance of the role of the International Criminal Court in upholding the values of peace, security, equality, fairness, justice and compensation; stresses that the ICC serves as a vehicle for tackling the impunity of war criminals; calls for the European Union and African states to continue supporting the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court;
Amendment 216 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 z (new)
Paragraph 7 z (new)
7z. encourages the EU, European NGOs, political parties and civil societies to cooperate closely with African counterparts, including public officials to generate substantive political dialogue through the development of issue-based policies, promote strong practices of democratic governance, enhance representation and inclusion of marginalized populations; and promote meaningful participation by civil society and citizens in public life at all levels.
Amendment 217 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph null (new)
Paragraph null (new)
Is of the opinion that more efforts should be made to promote multi-party political systems and democratic governance in Africa, especially in fragile states, by facilitating citizen-government working groups, utilizing technology platforms to collect citizen input on policy issues and promoting best practices through peer-to- peer exchanges to enhance government accountability and responsiveness.
Amendment 220 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph null (new)
Paragraph null (new)
Continues support for strengthening the electoral process, both by improving the African Union (AU) capacity in conducting long-term election observation up to international standards and bilateral cooperation with respective countries and their civil societies, with the aim to deliver inclusive, transparent and credible elections in Africa.
Amendment 221 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph null (new)
Paragraph null (new)
Stresses that EU-Africa relations should transition from a development-orientated relationship to one which aims to put African nations on an equal footing, characterized by ambitious trade relations to raise African standards while EU should assist African nations move toward self-reliance; believes that enhancing economic ties with Africa is vital to safeguarding the economic independence of African states;
Amendment 224 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph null (new)
Paragraph null (new)
Highlights that the digital economy in Africa provides not only opportunities for increased job creation and data for actionable insights, but also the basis for recognizing human rights, accelerating access to quality basic services, improving transparency and accountability of governments, and enhancing democracy;
Amendment 225 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph null (new)
Paragraph null (new)
Recalls that open, inclusive, accountable governance is fundamental to delivering sustainable development, tackling global challenges and reduces the risk of spreading instability. Stresses that accountable institutions help to promote more equitable, sustained economic growth which helps tackle illicit financial flows, serious organized crime, and a culture of impunity; underlines importance of safeguarding for food security, notably in small-scale farming, climate change adaptation, the creation of more and better jobs, especially for young people, the empowerment of women and the support of education;
Amendment 226 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph null (new)
Paragraph null (new)
Is of the opinion that the EU should put more efforts on good governance, strengthening rule of law; reforming judicial systems and public financial management;
Amendment 227 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph null (new)
Paragraph null (new)
Stresses the importance of increased Foreign Direct Investment from the EU and its Member States as Africa has become a market of global competition, both economic and political. Is of the opinion that economic links are the best way to strengthen meaningful political cooperation and shared approaches to address common challenges. Insists that the EU develop a competitive approach for the investment and development of Smart city projects, the mining industry, connectivity and building national infrastructure; underlines that strategic relations whether in terms of trade, security or people- to people contacts need a certain level of connectivity by ports, harbours or airport sand calls to invest in these critical infrastructures which will serve to enable the very needed avenues for closer cooperation in terms of trade, tourism, people-to-people contacts, business and academic cooperation and security, without each meaning full political strategic partnership cannot be fully reached. Is of the opinion that investment via FDI in critical infrastructure must be implemented with a local labour force to ensure adequate transfer of best practices and cross community collaboration is maintained and to clearly differentiate between the value of European investment and Chinese or Russian investment.
Amendment 228 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph null (new)
Paragraph null (new)
Considers it of utmost importance to make sure that European financial aid is used efficiently and effectively in a transparent way to ensure that EU assistance does not amplify inefficient, unsuccessful, unaccountable, misgoverned or corrupted systems
Amendment 229 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph null (new)
Paragraph null (new)
Stresses the importance of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AFCFTA) as a tool for African nations to fully develop their own potential which would add to their autonomy and resilience from external pressures. Acknowledges the ambitions of African nations to overcome the existing challenges to AFCFTA and calls on the EU to share its experience; Is of the opinion that a single market and a single digital market would be a net value add in both economic, political and cultural terms
Amendment 230 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph null (new)
Paragraph null (new)
Recalls that a more holistic and integrated approach to address the specific problems of fragile states was also one of the key demands of the European Parliament in its 2017 report on the “ EU-Africa strategy: a boost for development”
Amendment 231 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph null (new)
Paragraph null (new)
Is of the idea that the EU-Africa strategy should also include assisting African countries in converting their mineral resource wealth into real development and calls for the review of effectiveness of existing measures, also with regard to questionable exploitation by China and Russia; Calls on the Commission and African partners for a smooth implementation of measures for the Conflict Minerals Regulation, and publish without delay including the list of companies outside the EU that do not fulfil requirements set out by Regulation2017/821,. Emphasizes Europe’s strengths — transparency, high quality goods and services, democratic governance — and trusts that the appeal of those fundamental values are a compelling alternative to authoritarian models;
Amendment 232 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph null (new)
Paragraph null (new)
Encourages African leaders to choose high-quality, transparent, inclusive, and sustainable foreign investment projects and supports access to financing opportunities that provide strong alternatives to external state-directed initiatives;
Amendment 233 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph null (new)
Paragraph null (new)
Is concerned at the widespread lack of medical devices in the health care sector in Africa that puts the health of health care workers and patients at risk, particularly in the case of virus outbreaks. Calls on the EU and its Member States to discover ways to assist African countries with medical supplies whenever possible
Amendment 234 #
2020/2041(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph null (new)
Paragraph null (new)
Calls for increased EU support for Africa in the area of debt reduction and debt sustainability as a clear message of solidarity in terms of Covid-19 pandemic crisis and underlines the need for international legislation and the creation of debt auditing commissions on cases of odious debt;
Amendment 10 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the EU is seeking to establish an ambitious and comprehensive new partnership with the UK that covers the areas of interest outlined in the Political Declaration: trade and economic cooperation, law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, foreign policy, security and defence, andcounter- terrorism, cyber security and other thematic areas of cooperation;
Amendment 15 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas as a third country, the UK cannot have the same rights and enjoy the same benefits as a member and the situation in both the EU and the UK will therefore change significantly as of January 2021;
Amendment 19 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
D a. whereas the UK is an important player and ally in the field of foreign affairs, security and defence, characterized by its large defence budget, its far-reaching diplomatic network, high- class security and intelligence services and permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and a founding member of NATO
Amendment 20 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
D a. Whereas the EU is the UK’s largest trading partner; in 2018 UK exports to the European Union represented 45% of all UK exports while UK imports from the EU went up 53% of all UK imports; whereas a surplus in trade in services was outweighed by deficit in trade of goods;
Amendment 30 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)
Recital I a (new)
I a. whereas the future relationship must be based on a balance of rights and obligations, taking into account the principles of each Party
Amendment 38 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the fact that there is a high level of convergence between the negotiating objectives expressed in its resolution of 12 February 2020 and the negotiating directivesose adopted by the Council on 25 February 2020; emphasises that the Commission has Parliament’s full support in negotiating with the UK in accordance with the established directives, as all three institutions broadly share the objectives thato be achieved through these negotiations should achieve;
Amendment 44 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
Amendment 57 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 – introductory part
Paragraph 4 – introductory part
4. Recalls that any future association agreement concluded between the EU and the UK pursuant to Article 217 of the TFEU (‘the Agreement’) must be in strict concordance with the following principles:
Amendment 58 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 – point i
Paragraph 4 – point i
Amendment 85 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines the fact that from the EU’s perspective, the aim of the negotiations is to establish a new partnership with the UK that is comprehensive and covers the areas outlined in the Political Declaration: trade and economic cooperation, law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, foreign policy, security and defence, and thematic areas of cooperation; calls for pragmatism and flexible approach on both sides;
Amendment 87 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines the fact that from the EU’s perspective,at the aim of the negotiations is to establish a new, ambitious and comprehensive partnership with the UK that is comprehensive and covers the areas outlined in the Political Declaration: trade and economic cooperation, law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, foreign policy, security and defence, andcounter-terrorism, cyber security and wider thematic areas of cooperation;
Amendment 100 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Emphasises the importance of being ready for the UK’s withdrawal from the internal market and the customs union at the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020, regardless of the outcome of the negotiations; stresses that the consequences will be even more significant should no agreement be reached; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s sector-specific ‘readiness notices’, which seek to ensure that EU industry is ready for the inevitable shock that the UK’s withdrawal from the single market will cause;
Amendment 123 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Recalls that the Withdrawal Agreement is the instrument for implementing the arrangements for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and that the only purpose of the EU-UK Joint Committee is to oversee its applicunder the Withdrawal Agreement is to oversee its implementation, application and interpretation; underlines the importance of the effective implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement as a litmus test for the good faith that the UK brings to the negotiating process and recalls that the outcome of the negotiations would be linked to itrust between the parties to the Agreement;
Amendment 143 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls that under the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, after the end of the transition period the UK, while being a third country, will have the task ofo implementing parts of the Union Customs Code, which will require unprecedentednew structures to be set up even before the end of the transition period, necessitating due consideration for the issue of proper implementation and enforcement; calls on the Commission to carry out efficient checks and controls; notes that the term goods ‘at risk of subsequently being moved into the Union’ used in Article 5 of that Protocol is unclear and depends on subsequent decisions of the Joint Committee which are exempt from formal European Parliament scrutiny; requests to be kept fully informed on the application of that Article and any proposals for decisions of the Joint Committee in that regard;
Amendment 151 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Recalls that until 31 December 2020the end of the transition period, the United Kingdom is obliged to contribute to the financing of the European Defence Agency, the European Union Institute for Security Studies, and the European Union Satellite Centre, and to the costs of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations;
Amendment 156 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Underlines the fact thatat during the transition period the UK must implement all pre-nd upheld all new and existing EU restrictive measures and sanctions and any decided during the transition period, must support EU statements and positions in third countries and international organisations, and participate on a case-by- case basis in EU military operations and civilian missions established under the CSDP, yet without any leading capacity within a new Framework Participation Agreement, while respecting the EU’s decision-making autonomy and the relevant EU decisions and legislation, including on procurement and transfers in the field of defence; asserts that such cooperation is conditional on full compliance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law and EU fundamental rights;
Amendment 190 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 – point iii
Paragraph 13 – point iii
(iii) while striving for the widest possible trade in goods, the Commission should evaluate possible quotas and tariffs for the most sensitive sectors as well as the need for safeguard clauses to protect the integrity of the EU single market; reiterates, moreover, that for instance with respect to food and agricultural products, access to the single market is conditional on strict compliance with all EU laws and standards, particularly in the fields of food safety, genetically modified organisms (GMOs), pesticides, geographical indications, animal welfare, labelling and traceability, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards, and human, animal and plant health;
Amendment 193 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 – point iii
Paragraph 13 – point iii
(iii) while striving for the widest possible trade in goods, tThe Commission should evaluate possiblensure zero quotas and tariffs, for the most sensitive sectorsees or charges across all sectors as outlined in the Political Declaration as well as the need for safeguard clauses to protect the integrity of the EU single market; reiterates, moreover, that for instance with respect to food and agricultural products, access to the single market is conditional on strict compliance with all EU laws and standards, particularly in the fields of food safety, genetically modified organisms (GMOs), pesticides, geographical indications, animal welfare, labelling and traceability, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards, and human, animal and plant health;
Amendment 237 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Regrets the UK’s negotiating position with the EU of hitherto not engaging in detailed negotiations on the level playing field; points out that this position does not reflect paragraph 77 of the Political Declaration signed by both sides where was stated that the precise nature of the commitments ensuring a level playing field should be commensurate with the scope and depth of the future relationship and the economic connectedness of both sides;
Amendment 294 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Recalls that this is contrary to the provisions of the Political Declaration, which contains a part dedicated specifically to the EU-UK futurealls for the establishment of a future broad, comprehensive and balanced EU-UK security partnership, and to which the UK has agreed;
Amendment 296 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Recalls the importance of the UK's military, intelligence and diplomatic sources and its commitment to European security; calls, with a view to international peace and stability, Europe's security and the safety of their respective citizens, on the UK and the EU and its Member States to maintain a strong and close relationship, including through NATO, in terms of security and defence in order to address issues of shared concern;
Amendment 326 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Underlines the fact that the EU is anand its Member States are important partners for the UK in foreign and security policy, as the need for common responses to address foreign, security and defence policy challenges is crucial to both sides; encourages the exchange of information and intelligence as well as close cooperation in the areas of counter- terrorism, space policy, cyberwarfare and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence;
Amendment 332 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Emphasises that as of 1 January 2021, if there is nothe absence of a timely agreement on cooperation ion foreign and security policy, the UK will be considered a third country, which will have an unwelcome impact on existing cooperation in foreign and security policythis field as of 1 January 2021;
Amendment 345 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. ConsiderStresses that it is in the commonmutual interest of the UK and the EU to cooperate on the development of effective and genuinely interoperable defence capabilities, including within the European Defence Agency, and to continue the highly valuable partnerships within NATO and EU programmes on defence and external security, such as the European Defence Fund, Galileo and cyber-security programmes;
Amendment 349 #
2020/2023(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Recalls that a number of restrictive measures (sanctions regimes) are currently in force in the UK under EU legislation; underlines the fact that the UK will still be bound to apply UN sanctions regimes following its withdrawal; cCalls for the establishment of a proper coordination mechanism for sanctions between both parties in order to maximise their impact and to ensure convergence and that mutual interests are pursued and met in the promotion of common values;
Amendment 1 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Highlights that the security and defence policies of the European Union and its Member States are guided by the principles of the United Nations Charter, and by a common understanding of the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, of freedom, of democracy, of equality and of the rule of law; highlights that all defence- related efforts within the Union framework respect these universal values whilst promoting peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world; recognises that the primary guarantor of Euro-Atlantic security is NATO and that decision making related to AI regulations must be made in close cooperation with Member States, the North Atlantic Council and likeminded partners as the U.S., U.K. Canada or Japan; Is of the opinion that the use of AI should be based on common set of ethical principles: responsible, equitable, traceable, reliable, and governable;
Amendment 8 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Stresses that a Union framework regulating the use of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled systems in defence, both in combat and noncombat situations, must respect all applicable legal regimes, in particular the international humanitarian law and the international human rights law, and be in compliance with Union law, principles and values; calls on the Union to assess the inherent AI-related risks with regard to the application of Union law, and foreseesuggest necessary adjustment and enforcement where neededand when needed; keeping in mind the discrepancies in terms of technical and security infrastructures throughout the European Union;
Amendment 13 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Recognises that unlike defence industrial bases, critical AI innovations could come from small Member States, thus a CSDP-standardized approach should ensure that smaller Member States and SME’s are not crowded out. Stresses that a set of common EU AI capabilities matched to a Member States operating concepts can bridge the technical gaps that could leave out states lacking the relevant technology, industry expertise or the ability to implement AI systems in their defence ministries;
Amendment 18 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers that current and future defence-related activities withinAI, deep learning, quantum computing, machine learning, computer vision, neuro-linguistic programming, virtual reality and augmented reality are all part of the future battlespace that the Union framework willmust draw on AI, on robotics and autonomy, and on related technologies andand prepare for; Thus considers that the Union mustcould assume a leading role in research and development of AI systems in the defence field; believes that the use of AI-enabled applications in defence offer a number of direct benefits such as higher quality collected data, greater situational awareness, increased speed for decision- making, as well as greater reliability of military equipment; recalls that AI systems are also becoming key elements in countering emerging security threats; encourages the European Defence Agency (EDA) to continue its developments in this space;
Amendment 30 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Is of the opinion that reliable, robust and trustworthy AI is a foundational requirement for modern and effective military of XXI century;
Amendment 35 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Highlights that, based on a human- centric approach, the Union follows a path of responsibility, of protecting our citizens, and of defending our values, whilst seizing the opportunities that those technologies offer; calls on Member States to combine the analytical efforts of CSDP, NATO and individual command structures to ascertain how, and when, a scenario will develop; such machine-learning crisis simulation systems could offer improved visibility into the causes and drivers of a crisis that might otherwise be overlooked by conventional analysis, which can be too narrow to capture the true complexity of a situation;
Amendment 44 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Stresses that not all members of the international community will follow the regulatory human-centric approach devised by the Union and that authoritarian states will devise a counter framework that will pursue, at the expense of Member States, to deliver military advantages and superiority within the AI domain;
Amendment 45 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4b. Urges Member States to track and assess the development of AI technologies, particularly military and surveillance, within authoritarian states that avoid compliance with EU led regulations, to avoid a scenario in which our societies, militaries and institutions, fall vulnerable to hybrid warfare;
Amendment 50 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines that the Union must be at the forefront of mastering those technologies by establishing well defined processes for their use, for understanding the related ethical aspects and for fostering an effective international regulatory framework that consults with military, industry, law enforcement, academia and civil society stakeholders to ensure that any framework contains the inherent risks and advantages of these technologies and prevents use for malicious purposes; those include in particular unintended harm to persons, be it material or immaterial, such as breach of fundamental rights;
Amendment 53 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Underlines that in an era of decentralised innovation and software- driven warfare, accessible data provides strategic advantage, making AI particularly significant when combined with virtual- and augmented-reality visualisation, allowing it to play a significant role in providing advanced training and pre-deployment unit-level preparation for EU or NATO-led forces during peacetime, to ensure a rapid yet smooth transition into conducting operations; encourages therefore the development of European data, generated within the European Union’s borders, in particular with a view to developing industrial technology using machine- generated data;
Amendment 64 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Stresses that defence applications of AI during operations means that autonomous software in compliance with future EU regulations, can be used to assist with maintenance, logistics management, and targeting of offensive and defensive systems; this could serve to ensure that a CSDP force is successfully integrated with autonomous, unmanned ground, air and sea vehicles to provide a standardised level of operational competence and consistency of execution;
Amendment 71 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Stresses that a digitally shared view of an operational environment, can be developed in seconds to aid overloaded human analysts, and that data sources can be expanded beyond conventional defence-related sources to include open- source and commercially available imagery, metadata, and social media, providing decision makers with a full ‘operating picture’ of a combat or crisis environment;
Amendment 76 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Stressed that all AI-systems in defence must have a concrete and well- defined domain of use and must be endowed with the ability to detect and disengage or diseactivate deployed systems should they move from their domain of use or engage in any escalatory or unintended action; recognises that during operations, machine-learning systems can use sensor data and advanced models to accurately predict and then prevent equipment failure, aiding the ability to prevent and withstand operational failures or logistical shortfalls;
Amendment 95 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Stresses that in tactical scenarios, AI techniques such as reinforcement learning, which allows machines to share their experiences and optimal solutions among themselves, have proven to be a critical asset in military campaigns, leading to the evolution of a highly optimised, robust mission intelligence that is effective at fulfilling objectives set by military command;
Amendment 102 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Underlines that the Union must promote understanding the military implications of AI, of robotics and of autonomy by working alongside military officials; considers that the Union needs to promote the acquisition of the necessary skills and knowledge on technology development processes and operational methods throughout the supply chain and over the full lifecycle of AI-enabled military capabilities;
Amendment 106 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Recognises in the hybrid and advanced warfare context of today, the volume and velocity of information during the early phases of a crisis might be overwhelming for human analysts and that an AI system could process the information to ensure that human decision-makers are tracking the full spectrum of information within an appropriate time frame for a speedy response;
Amendment 112 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 10 b (new)
Paragraph 10 b (new)
10b. Stresses that quantum computing could represent the most revolutionary change in conflict since the advent of atomic weaponry and thus urges that the advancement of quantum computing technologies be a priority for the Union and Member States; recognises that acts of aggression, including attacks on critical infrastructure, aided by quantum computing will create a conflict environment in which the time to make decisions will be compressed dramatically from days and hours to minutes and seconds, forcing Member States to develop capabilities that protect themselves and train both its decision makers and military personnel to respond effectively within such timeframes;
Amendment 117 #
2020/2012(INL)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Stresses the need to overcome the current fragmentation within the Union as regards national AI-related law, research, innovation and expertise in the area of AI, which puts in jeopardy the internal market and the objective to ensure trustworthy and secure development of AI in Europe; in this respect welcomes the inclusion of AI- related projects under the European Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP); believes that the future European Defence Fund (EDF) and the Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) also offer well adapted frameworks for future AI- related projects that would help to better streamline Union efforts in this field; stresses that this cooperation should be open to the most advanced and trustworthy partners outside the EU, such as the UK, US and Canada;
Amendment 10 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 a (new)
Citation 5 a (new)
- having regard to its report on Peace Support Operations – EU engagementwith the UN and the African Union of 7 June 2016,
Amendment 14 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)
Citation 6 a (new)
- having regard to the EU Conflict Minerals Regulations 2017/821,
Amendment 54 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean in the east, Africa is struggling to contend with challenges, such as historical underdevelopment compounded by the destruction of the traditional agro-pastoral economy as a result of climate change, population growth and deforestation; whereas another major challenge is the emergence of new forms of mafia economy, including human and drug trafficking, cultural and wildlife smuggling and the uncontrolled export of goldmineral deposits, which, combined with the abandonment, inefficiency and corruption of the administration, is producing a hybridisation between terrorist groups, traffickers and traditional community and regional conflicts, with the phenomenon of jihadist religious extremism appearing as a false response for the societies concerned;
Amendment 86 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
D a. whereas the threat from militant Islamist groups in Africa is not monolithic but comprises activity from a constantly shifting mix of roughly two dozen groups actively operating in 14 countries;
Amendment 88 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Recital D b (new)
D b. whereas there were 3,471 reported violent events linked to these groups last year, a 1,105 percent increase since 2009, whereas reported fatalities resulting from African militant Islamist group activity also increased by 7 percent over last year, to an estimated 10,460 deaths;
Amendment 89 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D c (new)
Recital D c (new)
D c. whereas terrorist activities are largely concentrated in five main theaters, including Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, the Sahel—with lesser but persistent threats in North Africa and Mozambique; whereas the Sahel has seen the most rapid increase in violent extremist activity of any region in 2019; whereas each theater faces unique dynamics and requires a unique regional approach;
Amendment 90 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the European Union has conducted four military common security and defence policy missions and operations to train and advise the Armed Forces of Somalia (EU training mission (EUTM) Somalia – 2010), Mali (EUTM Mali – 2013) and the Central African Republic (EUTM CAR – 2016), one naval military operation (EU naval force operation (NAVFOR) ATALANTA – 2009), and three civilian missions to train and advise the internal security forces of Mali (EU capacity-building mission (EUCAP) Sahel Mali – 2012), Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger – 2014) and Somalia (EUCAP Somalia – 2014), and will soon conduct an advisory mission (EUAM) in the Central African Republic; whereas EU efforts in Africa have been successfully supported by hundreds of military personel from EaP countries, mostly Georgians;
Amendment 92 #
2020/2002(INI)
E a. whereas there are a number of military outposts of individual countries such a France, U.S., providing billions of dollars in security assistance to local partners, conducting persistent counter- terrorism operations and missions with much broader mandates, more numerous in terms of numbers deployed, more efficient and with better results and outcomes delivered than CSDP mission; whereas there are 6,000 or more U.S. personnel deployed in Africa which conducts genuine counterterrorist operations which in parallel to political solutions, state building efforts and development initiatives are crucial to defeat terrorist group and stabilize whole regions;
Amendment 95 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)
Recital E b (new)
E b. whereas sustained pressure on terrorists is needed to stop proliferation of this threat to other regions and continents, including Europe;
Amendment 96 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E c (new)
Recital E c (new)
E c. whereas over the past decade African security institutions have deployed tens of thousands of personnel in peace operations on African soil, demonstrating a genuine will to contribute to security governance on their own continent;
Amendment 98 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the EU is also supporting the establishment and operationalisation of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, a key counter- terrorism instrument designed to address the ongoing threat of jihadist activity throughout the Sahel;
Amendment 101 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
F a. whereas the continued operationalisation of key regional security actors such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) and the African Union’s African Standby Force overlap with the EU’s interest in assisting struggling countries to provide peace and prosperity for their citizens;
Amendment 107 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas after years of training, the above-mentioned EU as well as UN missions have been hampered in their sustainability and effectiveness due to restrictions on their mandate, training programmes, and a lack of basic equipment, including weapons, ammunition and vehicles;
Amendment 116 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas these restrictionshortfalls have allowed third countries, notably Russia, China and Turkey, to fill the void left by the European Union by supplying such equipment, mercenaries and building their own military facilities within several of the most despotic African countries;
Amendment 125 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas neither the Somali army, nor the Malian army nor the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) have been able to contribute effectively to the fight against jihadists or hold and secure the ground cleared with the aid of friendly international forces, the result being that the local populations feel abandoned and fear being accused of collaborating with the government by the jihadists or the armed groups in the CAR once they return and reoccupy the space from which they were expelled;
Amendment 129 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)
Recital I a (new)
I a. whereas there has been a decisive drop in piracy off the coasts of both Eastern and Western Africa as a result of international maritime security efforts from both the EU and NATO that serve as a precedent for European, African and transatlantic security cooperation;
Amendment 134 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas after years of involvement in the above-mentioned civil and military missions, the general situation has become worse and worsfailed to improve and a new and comprehensive strategy therefore needs to be implemented that ultimately transfers the responsibility of security into the hands of Africans;
Amendment 142 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas Russia has sent hundreds of instructors to train and arm FACA soldiers and has deployed on African continent mercenaries accused of potential war crimes in Syria and Ukraine; whereas intentions of such moves are to support dictatorship regimes, secure control over extraction of mineral resources and gain political support on the level of international organizations;
Amendment 152 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the European Development Fund, European Peace Facility (EPF) and the African Peace Facility (APF) provide support to the African Union, financing, among other things, the operational cost of military peacekeeping operations in Africa;
Amendment 175 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that the European Union must coordinateion of the development and security initiatives in which it is involved as part ofof the EU, involved Member States, like-minded partner countries such as the U.S, UK and Canada as well as organizations such as the AU and NATO needs an integrated strategy;
Amendment 178 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. In this regard welcomes the new communication “Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa’ and expects that security cooperation will be an important part of the upcoming EU- Africa Summit. Is of the opinion that the overly militarized approach to fighting terrorism in Africa is not working in the long term and a future EU-Africa strategy should tackle this problem in a comprehensive way;
Amendment 185 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that the European Union’s development and security missions and programmes should be coordinated by the VP/HR under the authority of the Council in accordance with Article 43(2) of the TEU and that a centralised doctrine centre should be established coveringdoctrine that integrates the Military Planning and Conduct Capability and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability training missions, and projects supporting or reforming the security sector is needed. All these efforts to ensure coordination should be introduced under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee;
Amendment 211 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Calls for the revisionew of Article 3a(4)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 in the light of the grave and profound degradation in the security conditions in the region and in order to fill any gaps in EU missions and projects with a view to supporting the capacity-building of partners in the security sector, including through funding for military spending and the provision of weapons, ammunition or lethal equipment, transport and training essential for improving the combat capability of African armed forces fighting against jihadism; supports the Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 28 April 2015 entitled ‘Capacity building in support of security and development – Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises’4 ; _________________ 4 JOIN(2015)0017. 4
Amendment 216 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. CallIs onf the VP/HR to propose a Council decision on the establishment of a specific service to oversee the supply and use of such equipment and training; calls for funding from the EU budget to be provided for the administrative expenditure arising from that Council decision, including for personnel; calls on the Council to charge the Member States for the expenditure arising from the supply and use of such equipment and training; calls on the Member States that do not participate in funding the supply and use of such material to abstain from the vote in the Councilopinion that the supply and use of such equipment and training should be monitored by Member States, scrutinized by the EP and audited by the ECA;
Amendment 247 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 – point b
Paragraph 5 – point b
b) to adapt the APF and the EPF in order to overcome the current limitations on the acquisition of arms and munitions;
Amendment 248 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 – point b a (new)
Paragraph 5 – point b a (new)
b a) to coordinate such support with like-minded countries and organizations involved and representing the same strategic goals;
Amendment 259 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Recommends that the EU considers contributing to the operational and logistical costs of theSupports operations against jihadist terrorism conducted by the national armed forces of Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, within the framework of peacekeeping operations in the Sahel- Saharan area and by taking a similar approach, as well as other reliable partner countries conducting counterrorism activities, in particular Morocco, and calls for establishing similar framework of cooperation to the one it takes to financing the G5 Joint Forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISON);
Amendment 265 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Agrees to apply toRecommends to consider whether existing training programmes may apply to the same facilities for the procurement of military equipment, including weapons, as those currently provided for the deployment and training of the G5 Sahel force, including financial support if needed;
Amendment 283 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 – point a
Paragraph 10 – point a
a) harmonising training methods and rules of procedure and engagement and ensuringe they are uniqueffective;
Amendment 309 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Considers that the Government of Somalia is unable to perform its duties and that the Somali army is also unable to counter al-Shabab’s terrorist activities and is not yet ready to take over from AMISOM; recalls that the Somali army was supposed to take over from AMISOM in December 2021; underlines that the achievement of that objective requires a new and comprehensive assistance programme; calls for a closer cooperation with U.S. Special Operations Forces in common effort to train an elite Somali army unit capable of defeating al Qaeda- linked militants on the ground;
Amendment 346 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18 a. Calls for the EU to address the consistent and growing threats to the protection and preservation of cultural heritage and clamp down on the smuggling of cultural artefacts, especially in conflict zones; notes that depriving societies of their cultural heritage and historical roots makes them more vulnerable to radicalisation and more susceptible to global jihadist ideologies; calls for the EU to develop a broad strategy to counteract such threats;
Amendment 359 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19 a. Commends the various initiatives taken by Morocco to enhance security and stability in North and West Africa, including its dismantling of terror cells, joining NATO’s Interoperability Platform, enhancement of special forces training with Egypt,Tunisia and Mauritania, financial support for G5 Sahel, the preservation of the cultural identity of locals, openinig its universities and training centers, including in the military field, to G5 countries as well as a wide set of countering extremism initiatives as training Imams from neighbouring countries to counter extremist propaganda and signing economic partnership conventions with at risk countries such as Mali, Coite de Voire, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea;
Amendment 362 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Encourages the Member States to support and cooperate with the Barkhane and Takuba operations; Encourages Member States to support NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian, US AFRICOM and the ongoing US and French led counter-terrorism and counter-trafficking operations taking place in the continent which are critical in combatting the ever-increasing number of violent extremist groups throughout the continent;
Amendment 367 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Regrets that the African continent remains home to a variety of active terrorist organizations that openly and continuously threaten African and European citizens and interests alike, including, but notlimited to: ISIS, al- Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab and Boko Haram; Calls for the EU to pay particular attention to the spread of jihadism in areas such as the Indian Ocean and West Africa and to lend cooperation and establish aid programmes when required;
Amendment 376 #
2020/2002(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21 a. Cautions against China and Russia’s continuous efforts to support military dictatorships, sell or donate non- interoperable military hardware, uses mercenaries accused of war crimes in Ukraine and Syria and undermine regional security efforts; is oft he opinion that Europe cannot risk becoming reactive to Sino-Africa dynamics and Russian engagement in fragile states and expanding military influences across the continent;
Amendment 13 #
2019/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 12
Citation 12
– having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014, with further summits taking place in Vienna (2015),Paris (2016), Trieste (2017), London (2018) and Poznan (2019);
Amendment 15 #
2019/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 14 a (new)
Citation 14 a (new)
– having regard to Joint Statement of 13 EU MS of 11th June 2019 on the EU commitment to the Western Balkans’ European integration
Amendment 42 #
2019/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas the Western Balkans are geographically, historically and culturally part of Europe and the process of integrating the Western Balkans into European Union is of key importance for the stability and security of the continent as a whole, free and at peace;
Amendment 60 #
2019/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas the enlargement process fosters and strengthens capacities to resolve bilateral disputes and strives for reconciliation between societies in the region;
Amendment 111 #
2019/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
(ea) to support initiatives based on the Multi-annual Action Plan for a Regional Economic Area (MAP REA) adopted by prime ministers of Western Balkans at the 2017 Trieste summit, which e four pillars – trade, investment, mobility and digital integration - are crucial for the economic development of the region and accelerate convergence with the EU;
Amendment 116 #
2019/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
(fa) to recognise that the Berlin Process supports and supplements the EU enlargement policy and cannot be treated as either an alternative to accession or replicating efforts undertaken as part of the enlargement;
Amendment 135 #
2019/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j
Paragraph 1 – point j
Amendment 207 #
2019/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point q
Paragraph 1 – point q
(q) to increase the involvement of rule of law experts from the Member States on the ground and to improve the measuring of progress in this area; to prioritize and fully support implementation of the commitments to counter corruption and organized crime, which Western Balkans countries undertook at the London summit
Amendment 230 #
2019/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point s a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point s a (new)
(sa) to support cooperation of Western Balkans with regional and international organizations (such as RCC, RYCO, OECD) and international financial institutions (EBRD, EIB);
Amendment 234 #
2019/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point t
Paragraph 1 – point t
(t) to strengthen civil society in its role as an indispensable actor in the process of democratic consolidation; to reinforce the role of civil society as a valuable factor in the enlargement process, as proved by the activity of the Civil Society Forum of the Western Balkans (CSF WB),
Amendment 302 #
2019/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point ad b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point ad b (new)
(adb) to invest in the youth of the region, who need to be better equipped with a wide range of skills, from basic skills to entrepreneurship, via Erasmus + and other programmes;
Amendment 303 #
2019/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point ad a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point ad a (new)
(ada) to strengthen cooperation in the fields of science, research and innovation via dedicated European Commission programming ;
Amendment 320 #
2019/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a h
Paragraph 1 – point a h
(ah) to bring the people and economies closer together within the region and with the EU through embed the Western Balkan countries in the TEN-T network, providing quality and safe transport services and improving connectivity within the region, as well as between the region and the EU;
Amendment 325 #
2019/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point ai a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point ai a (new)
(aia) to prioritise the energy diversification projects and support enhancing connectivity of the energy infrastructures and digital networks;
Amendment 338 #
2019/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point ak a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point ak a (new)
(aka) to use experience of recent enlargements, including lessons learnt of Central European countries;
Amendment 369 #
2019/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point ap a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point ap a (new)
(apa) to continue cooperation in the field of countering hybrid threats, including combating Russian propaganda;
Amendment 373 #
2019/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point aq a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point aq a (new)
(aqa) to sustain cooperation with the United Kingdom in the Western Balkans, taking into account the British ties with the region, and common objectives, from the advancement of the rule of law, fighting organized crime to counterterrorism and other objectives and goals of CSDP missions;
Amendment 12 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8
Citation 8
– having regard to its resolutions of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide4 , of 9 July 2015 on the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy5 , of 21 January 2016 on Association Agreements / Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine6 , of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties7 , of 13 December 2016 on rights of women in the Eastern Partnership States8 , of 19 April 2018 on Belarus9 , of 14 June 2018 on Georgian occupied territories 10 years after the Russian invasion10 , of 4 July 2018 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part11 , of 4 October 2018 on the deterioration of media freedom in Belarus, notably the case of Charter 9712 , of 14 November 2018 on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Moldova13 , of 14 November 2018 on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Georgia14 and of 12 December 2018 on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement withprevious resolutions on Eastern Partnership as a whole and on Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine15 , __________________ 4 OJ C 328, 6.9.2016, p. 2. 5 OJ C 265, 11.8.2017, p. 110. 6 OJ C 11, 12.1.2018, p. 82. 7 OJ C 224, 27.6.2018, p. 58. 8 OJ C 238, 6.7.2018, p. 42. 9 OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 100. 10 OJ C 28, 27.1.2020, p. 97. 11 Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0284. 12 Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0375. 13 Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0458. 14 Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0457. 15 Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0518.
Amendment 15 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
Citation 8 a (new)
- having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia, especially those related to Russia's actions in the territories of the EaP countries, violations of rights of Crimean Tatars, occupation of parts of territory of Georgia and borderization, as well as hostile propaganda and disinformation against the EU and Partner countries,
Amendment 16 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 b (new)
Citation 8 b (new)
- having regard to the EU Global Strategy and revised European Neighbourhood Policy,
Amendment 27 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the Eastern Partnership (EaP) is based on a shared commitment between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and the European Union to deepen their relations and adhere to international law and core values such as democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, and a social market economy, sustainable development and good governance with regard to the increase of stability and prosperity;
Amendment 28 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the EaP countries are geographically, historically and culturally part of Europe and the process of integrating them with European Union is of key importance for the stability, prosperity and security of the continent as a whole, free and at peace; whereas such process cannot exclude merit-based perspectives of fully-fledged EU membership in accordance with Art. 49 TEU;
Amendment 43 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas certain EaP countries chose todeclared the strategic goal of the membership in the EU, pursue a closer political, human and economic integration with the EU byand concludinged ambitious Association Agreements (AAs) with DCFTAs, as well as visa-free regimes, while public support in their societies for European integration remains at a very high level;
Amendment 72 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the EU’s Eastern European Partners are still imperilled by unresolved regional conflicts; whereas in majority of these conflicts Russia is playing an active role as either an aggressor or occupying force;
Amendment 78 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas European prosperity and security is closely linked to the situation of our neighbours, EaP countries in particular; whereas the revised ENP Policy should foster and strengthen capacities to resolve bilateral disputes and strive for reconciliation between societies in the region;
Amendment 149 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
(ba) confirm sovereign right of the Eastern Partners to freely choose their individual level of cooperation or integration with the EU and to reject regard any external pressure on their choice;
Amendment 188 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f
Paragraph 1 – point f
(f) devise and launch additional measures for deeper sectoral integration such asof the Partner countries with the EU and their participation in selected EU agencies, intra-EU programmes and initiatives, in full compliance with existing conditionalities and pursuant to the more for more principle;
Amendment 194 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
(fa) underline the added value of tailor-made approach, "more for more" approach and principle of differentiation, allowing each partner to engage with the EU in accordance with its own capabilities, ambitions and interests;
Amendment 206 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
(ga) consider establishing the EU+ Three Associated Partners dialogue, including meetings in the margins of the European Council with leaders of Associated Countries on structured basis, regular participation of their representatives in the meetings of the European Council working groups and committees to establish dialogue in the areas including, but not limited to, transport, energy, justice and digital economy;
Amendment 226 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i
Paragraph 1 – point i
(i) while keeping the inclusive nature of the Partnership, acknowledge the associated partnership status of advanced EaP countries, notably the signatories of AAs with DCFTAs, in order to accommodate the mutual need for more venues for political dialogue, further economic cooperation and legislative harmonisation;
Amendment 231 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
(ia) encourage future Presidencies of the Council of the EU to prepare detailed and ambitious agendas of cooperation with EaP countries, which would help to shape relations with EaP countries in a mutually desired direction in the decades to come; ensure that the 2020 EaP Summit will evaluate, reassess and inject new dynamism in the relationship between the EU and the EaP countries;
Amendment 243 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point j
Paragraph 1 – point j
(j) engage further with all EaP partners in State building and in strengthening institutions, by making instruments similar to the Support Group for Ukraine available to the associated partners first and foremost; strong, independent and efficient institutions at a central and local level are key to democratic accountability, deoligarchisation, and the fight against corruption and State capture;
Amendment 268 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point k a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point k a (new)
(ka) support the principle of inclusiveness as a guarantee that all six Partners remain engaged with the EU leaving open the future opportunities for each Partner if they wish to engage more;
Amendment 273 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point l
Paragraph 1 – point l
(l) foster electoral reforms in order to ensure free, fair, competitive and transparent elections and encourage full compliance of election processes with international standards, the recommendations of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the opinions of the Venice Commission;
Amendment 319 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point p
Paragraph 1 – point p
(p) adopt a comprehensive infrastructure-building plan with the aim of improving connectivity between the EU and its Eastern European Partners, and among the EaP countries themselves; focus also on telecommunications and assist EaP countries in further decreasing tariffs for communications with the EU;
Amendment 339 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point q a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point q a (new)
(qa) continue to support energy security by supporting gas interconnectors between EaP countries and Member States, as well as investments into existing infrastructure in reverse flow in order to fulfil regional gas needs as well as diversifying oil or gas imports routes and sources; in this regard note the important role of Azerbaijan in the diversification of energy supply towards the EU and welcome the completion of the Southern Gas Corridor which is expected to bring the first gas from Azerbaijan to the EU this year;
Amendment 348 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point q b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point q b (new)
(qb) ensure that unsafe energy projects such as Ostrovets nuclear plant won't be part of the European electricity network;
Amendment 351 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point q c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point q c (new)
(qc) acknowledge the strategic geographical location of EaP countries as a link between the European Union, Asia and the wider neighbourhood, which could bring increased value for EU foreign policy engagements;
Amendment 352 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point q d (new)
Paragraph 1 – point q d (new)
(qd) support projects such as the Anaklia deep sea port, which are crucial for increasing connectivity with the region and even further with Central Asia;
Amendment 358 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point r
Paragraph 1 – point r
(r) address the EU’s qualified labour shortages by increasing labour mobility from the EaP countries and providing social guarantees; in this regard, welcome the successful implementation of Visa free regimes and the full implementation of readmission agreements, which - coupled with the positive experience of some Member States that opened their labour markets - brought very positive results;
Amendment 371 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point s
Paragraph 1 – point s
(s) enhance education and employment prospects of the EaP countries, with an aim to prevent brain drain, as well as to increase EaP citizens competences and awareness; with this regard expand funding for and the participation of the EaP countries in educational, professional skills-boosting and exchange programmes such as Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020;
Amendment 396 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point u a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point u a (new)
(ua) strengthen good governance and develop an European quality public administration in the associated EaP countries by opening job-shadowing schemes, allowing EaP civil servants to temporarily work in the relevant services of the EU institutions and Member States in specific areas;
Amendment 399 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point u b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point u b (new)
(ub) ensure that EU assistance and programmes reach local levels, including in the remote parts of the partner countries, in particular rural areas, to enable them to push for positive changes in their communities, more vulnerable to post-Soviet sentiments and Russian manipulations;
Amendment 417 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point v a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point v a (new)
(va) strongly condemn Russia’s continued violations of fundamental principles and norms of international law, particularly its refusal to comply with the decisions of international tribunals and courts; in this regard support the EaP countries in their efforts to exercise full sovereignty, territorial integrity and effective control over each country’s internationally recognized borders;
Amendment 428 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point v b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point v b (new)
(vb) reconfirm the EU's non- recognition of any forceful change of internationally recognized borders of the Eastern Partner countries, including the illegal occupation by the Russian Federation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol;
Amendment 429 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point v c (new)
Paragraph 1 – point v c (new)
(vc) fully support the work of EUMM Georgia and call for more financial and human resources, as well as increased visibility both in Georgia and Members States, in order to raise awareness of the situation on territories illegally occupied or controlled by the Russian Federation;
Amendment 437 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point w
Paragraph 1 – point w
(w) acknowledge the unique experience and expertise of EaP countries; recognise the contribution of the associated partnerpartner countries to common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions; deepen cooperation in EU-related defence policies, particularly in the area of cybersecurity;
Amendment 441 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point w a (new)
Paragraph 1 – point w a (new)
(wa) strengthen societal and institutional resilience of the Eastern Partners with a stronger focus on countering hybrid and cyber threats, disinformation, propaganda, manipulation and hostile influencing; to engage in this regard the interested Eastern Partners into all activities taken at the EU level to tackle hostile propaganda and work of all institutions and bodies responsible for fighting disinformation and propaganda; assist in the implementation of good practices and solutions, such as the “Action Plan against disinformation” and solutions as the "EU Code of Practice on Disinformation";
Amendment 455 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point w b (new)
Paragraph 1 – point w b (new)
(wb) support freedom of navigation and strongly oppose the blockade of the Azov Sea and the continued, creeping annexation of the Black Sea;
Amendment 499 #
2019/2209(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point z
Paragraph 1 – point z
(z) increase the visibility of the support provided by the EU in the recipient EaP countries and boost EU citizens’ awareness about the EaP; in this regard, ensure a more active role of EU liaison offices in Member States in promoting importance of EaP countries for the European project;
Amendment 11 #
2019/2201(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 15 a (new)
Citation 15 a (new)
— having regard to the European Parliament’s recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice- President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the June 2020 Summit,
Amendment 23 #
2019/2201(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 19 a (new)
Citation 19 a (new)
— having regard to the final statements and recommendations of the meetings of the Parliamentary Association Committees with Ukraine and Moldova of 19 December 2019,
Amendment 25 #
2019/2201(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 20
Citation 20
Amendment 66 #
2019/2201(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Welcomes the Republic of Moldova’s constructive contribution to the cooperation within the Eastern Partnership, especially in the framework of the associated countries, and expresses hope that the statements as regards the country’s ambitious agenda and sectoral integration in transport, energy and other fields will turn into concrete decisions and actions, both from the side of Moldovan authorities and of the Union;
Amendment 133 #
2019/2201(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Is concerned by the high level of concentration and politicisation of the media and advertising sectors, leading to a low level of public confidence in the media; urges the Moldovan authorities to refrain from exploiting the COVID-19 pandemicis of the opinion that the pandemic cannot be exploited by the authorities to adopt measures curtailing freedom of speech and limiting the media’s ability to report facts in an independent and unbiased way;
Amendment 136 #
2019/2201(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Is of the opinion that the disbursement of the second instalment of the EU Macro Financial Assistance Program for 2017-2020 should be followed by the efforts of the Moldovan authorities in order to fulfil the relevant conditions in the areas related to strengthening the anti-money-laundering framework and should deliver tangible and lasting results;
Amendment 139 #
2019/2201(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7b. Welcomes the fact that due to a smooth implementation of the visa-free regime more than 2,3 million Moldovan citizens benefited since 2014; acknowledges the efforts undertaken by the authorities in implementing the recommendations outlined in the annual visa suspension mechanism reports; calls on the continuation of the implementation of the benchmarks related to the visa liberalisation policy;
Amendment 147 #
2019/2201(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Calls on the Moldovan authorities to put more efforts in order to ensure that the AA/DCFTA opportunities and EU assistance and programmes reach the local level, including in the remote parts of the country, in particular rural areas, so as to enable inhabitants to push for positive changes in their communities, in particular those more vulnerable to post- Soviet sentiments and Russian manipulation;
Amendment 181 #
2019/2201(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Encourages the extension of the mandate of the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and Moldova (EUBAM) and strengthen support customs and border guard authorities of both States on the central level and alongside the common border;
Amendment 187 #
2019/2201(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Calls for the EU and Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities to speed up the process of blocking illegal trade and shutting down contraband channels in Transnistria as a safe haven for smugglers which has been exploited by criminals and oligarchs and served to strengthen Russian influence and has been one of the major factors protracting the conflict;
Amendment 190 #
2019/2201(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)
Paragraph 11 b (new)
11b. Is of the opinion, that, by guaranteeing tariff-free access to EU markets for Transnistrian businesses registered on the west bank of the Dniester and submitted to customs checks by Moldovan officials, the DCFTA resulted in a massive swing in the direction of trade from the Eurasian Economic Union to the EU; encourages the Moldovan authorities to further advance towards trade and engagement with EU markets in order to enhance market access, transparency, good business practices and reduce the capacity for market manipulation and monopolization by oligarchs;
Amendment 228 #
2019/2201(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Calls on all interested parties to maintain consistent efforts in combating smuggling, money laundering, dismantling criminal networks and reducing the influence of oligarchs; calls for enhanced cooperation with Europol, Interpol, and customs organizations such as WCO and OECD's Anti-corruption Networks;
Amendment 257 #
2019/2201(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Urges more efforts to strengthen and establish legal and institutional guarantees for a pluralistic media landscape in the Republic of Moldova;
Amendment 262 #
2019/2201(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 b (new)
Paragraph 19 b (new)
19b. Calls to continue efforts to build a genuine digital market economy, including progress with open data development, broadening access to conditional access systems for digital television and virtual network services, increasing the number of electronic communication services for citizens and public registers; highlights that further work must be done to ensure that the rights and needs of Moldovan citizens using the internet are protected and to fully implement the Digital Single Market requirements;
Amendment 301 #
2019/2201(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. Invites the European Commission to include the Republic of Moldova in the stress tests conducted for the internal energy market;
Amendment 302 #
2019/2201(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 b (new)
Paragraph 23 b (new)
23b. Welcomes the steps undertaken to asynchronously interconnect the electricity system of Moldova with the EU via Romania, being a significant milestone on the way to strengthening and diversifying Moldova’s energy infrastructure. Calls on all the authorities to fulfil the objective of connecting Moldova with Romania’s power grid by 2024 with the support of the EU;
Amendment 19 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Reiterates its full support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and commitment to continue contributing to the peaceful resolution of the Russia-Georgia conflict, including through the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, the Co-Chairmanship of the Geneva International Discussions, the actions of EUMM and the policy of non-recognition and engagement; strongly condemns the illegal occupation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia by the Russian Federation and the ongoing borderisation process; emphasises that the AA covers the entire territory of Georgia, including its occupied regions, and aims to benefit its whole population; calls on the Russian Federation to fulfil its obligations under the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008, notably to withdraw all its military forces from Georgia’s occupied territories and allow the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia; asks the Commission and the EEAS to enhance their efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully, including through the EUMM and the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia;
Amendment 28 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Asks the Commission and the EEAS to keep the peaceful resolution of the Russia-Georgia conflict high on their agenda, including with Russia, and enhance their efforts to promote the implementation of the 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement by Russia, which EU mediated; in this regard calls on the EEAS to perform an impartial and thorough assessment of all key parts of this agreement and clear information which are still not fulfilled by the Russian Federation;
Amendment 30 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Amendment 31 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 c (new)
Paragraph 2 c (new)
2c. Commends efforts of Georgian healthcare workers, the government and other people involved in fight against the coronavirus; recognizes vital contribution of the Tbilisi-based Lugar biomedical lab, which is funded by the US government and has been the target of Russian disinformation campaigns and conspiracy theories since it opened;
Amendment 36 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Welcomes the fact that Georgian citizens have made 900 000 visa-free visits to Schengen and Schengen-associated countries since March 2017; is concerned by the increasing number of unfounded asylum requests by Georgian citizens; calls on all the Member States that have not already done so to recognise Georgia as a safe country of origin in order to speed up the processing of such requests; stresses the importance of continuous implementation of the visa liberalisation benchmarks by Georgia; takes note however of the increasing number of unfounded asylum requests by Georgian citizens;
Amendment 37 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Underlines Georgia's role as a reliable partner of the European Union and a significant contributor to the CSDP and NATO missions and operations; calls on the Council and the EEAS to further engage with Georgia in the area of CSDP, in particular considering Georgia’s interest to discuss the possibility of its participation in PESCO projects, as well as develop cooperation with the relevant EU agencies, when it is of mutual interest for both the EU and Georgia.
Amendment 39 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. Condemns Russia’s hybrid warfare against Georgia and frequent attempts to use Georgia as a testing ground for its disinformation activities as well as malicious cyber capabilities, as recently revealed by the massive cyber- attack on Georgia’s infrastructure in October 2019; calls to the Council and the EEAS to step up cooperation in cyber security with Georgia as a matter of mutual interest;
Amendment 46 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Commends the Georgian authorities for completing the constitutional reform process and the major political parties for signing the Memorandum of Understanding of 8 March 2020, which established the key features of the electoral system to be used for the upcoming parliamentary elections; calls on all parties to ensure that the agreement is translated into law and fully implemented as soon as possible and elimination of political interference into justice system; welcomes the pardoning of Gigi Ugulava and Irakli Okruashvili by the President of Georgia as an important step towards the full implementation of Memorandum; looks forward to seeing the agreed-upon changes made to the electoral system when the Georgian parliament returns to work in the next weeks, as well as the release of Giorgi Rurua, a media owner who was detained in November;
Amendment 53 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Following the agreement reached by the political parties on 8 March, expresses strengthened hope for normalization of political climate in the run up to the elections and that the campaign will be free of violence and abuse of justice system for political purposes; underlines, however, that any further misuse of administrative resources and acts of violence against leaders of legitimate opposition may lead to personal sanctions on perpetrators of such acts and officials responsible for instigating them;
Amendment 60 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Calls on the Georgian authorities to implement swiftly and fully the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations and review relevant legislation to address the identified shortcomings and concerns enumerated in the OSCE/ODIHR and other legitimate election observation reports, particularly those related to impunity of violence, vote-buying as well as the ability of voters, especially civil servants, “to vote free from pressure and fear of retribution”;
Amendment 68 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Underlines the importance of media freedom, which should entail equal access for all political parties to the media during the upcoming electoral campaign, pluralistic and non-discriminatory coverage of political views in programmes by public and private broadcasters, clear provisions regulating free and paid advertisements, and improved transparency through strengthened media monitoring; taking into account previous criticism by ODIHR and Reporters Without Borders, urges the Georgian Dream party and the government to ensure effective handling of information environment in the run up to the 2020 elections and to work with the civil society and the private sector to limit and prevent information manipulations, including disinformation and propaganda campaigns against any political group or the country;
Amendment 70 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Acknowledges that the media landscape in Georgia is dynamic and pluralistic, but also polarised; expresses deep concern that media outlets critical towards the government often become subject of pressure in the form of court cases against the founders (Nika Gvaramia of TV Mtavari), arrest of the shareholders (Giorgi Rurua and TV Mtavari), financial and tax related charges (Avtandil Tsereteli and TV Pirveli) and firing or resignation of critical TV journalists and editors (Public Broadcaster of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara);
Amendment 83 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Expresses its concern about recent court cases against opposition politicians, which contributed to a climate of increased mistrust and heightened tensions between the ruling party and the opposition, and led to a polarisation of politics and society; calls on Georgia to respect the highest standards of judicial independence and fair trial as committed to under the AAexpresses concern that violent incidents against opposition leaders and peaceful demonstrators often remain unpunished, despite clear evidence linking such attacks with ruling party sympathisers and officials;
Amendment 150 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Encourages Georgian government to take full advantage of existing mechanisms to foster diversification of trade and encourage internal entrepreneurship and foreign direct investments, as well as additional transparent measures of security screening of the FDIs;
Amendment 162 #
2019/2200(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Calls to move forward with infrastructural projects of strategic importance for developing regional transportation and trade; in this regard expresses its hope that Georgia will accelerate construction of the Anaklia Deep Sea Port, in line with Georgia’s strategic Euro-Atlantic objectives; is concerned, however, about the numerous obstacles of administrative and political nature that continue to hinder the project, as well as with signs of Russian interference;
Amendment 45 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas the EU’s security environment is vulnerable to external pressure that prevents the EU from exercising its sovereigntywhich already is taking place in the form of hybrid warfare, including hostile propaganda from Russia and other actors, as well as increasing threat from radical terrorist groups;
Amendment 80 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that at a moment when competing powers are increasingly challenging the rules-based global order, we, as Europeans,the EU and its Member States must defend multilateralism, international law, democracy and human rights;
Amendment 121 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Believes that the European Union needs to take on a global leadership role and unlock its political potential to think and act like a geopolitical powera more prominent role in international sphere and unlock its political potential to act while defending and promoting its common values and interests in the world; reaffirms the need to secure ‘EU strategic autonomy’; fully supportnotes the Commission President’s decision to transform the EU’s executive branch into a ‘geopolitical commission’, underlining however the leading role of the Council and Member States in defining foreign policy of the EU;
Amendment 141 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Stresses that the European Union has to switch from a responsive to an anticipatory approach and team up with like-minded partners, especially NATO, in order to defend the global rule-based order founded on international law; recalls that the EU’s CFSP is based on partnership and multilateralism, which help to unite the relevant regional and global powers; underlines the urgent need to explore new forms of alliances and find innovative mechanisms for cooperation;
Amendment 151 #
2019/2136(INI)
8. Promotes an EU foreign policy that will unite the EU institutions and all foreign ministries behind a common and strong EU-level foreign policy that should be based on consensus among the Member States; emphasises the need to build where necessary ad hoc coalitions to strengthen EU cohesion and democratic legitimacy;
Amendment 164 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Stresses its commitment to enlargement, which remains a key policy of the EU and for the European perspective of the Western Balkans; reiterates that pursuant to Article 49 TEU, any state in Europe may apply to become a member of the European Union provided that it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, respects fundamental freedoms and human and minority rights, and upholds the rule of law;
Amendment 176 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Underlines that the European Union can only deliver its full potential when speaking with one voice and when decision-making is shifted step by step from the national to the supranational level, taking full advantage of the possibilities offered by the EU institutions and their procedures, especially the Council; stresses that the European Union should use all available means to achieve this goal, including those offered by parliamentary diplomacy;
Amendment 261 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Underlines the unconditional EU support for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all Eastern Partnership countries within their internationally recognized borders and strongly underlines the importance of the proactive stance based on international law against protracted conflicts in the Eastern Neighbourhood;
Amendment 262 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)
Paragraph 17 b (new)
Amendment 263 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 c (new)
Paragraph 17 c (new)
17c. Reiterates its support for the Eastern Partnership, which celebrated its 10-year anniversary in 2019; stresses however that in order to be more successful it needs new initiatives and commitments from both sides, the EU and our partners;
Amendment 270 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 d (new)
Paragraph 17 d (new)
17d. Underlines, that more than a decade after the end of the Russian aggression in Georgia and subsequent ceasefire brokered by the EU, the Russians are still in blatant violation of some of its provisions and the borderisation process is ongoing; in light of recent unlawful detention of monitors of EUMM (European Union Monitoring Mission) by armed South Ossetian de facto security forces, calls for strengthening of EUMM mandate and visibility and urges Russian Federation as the occupying power to honour its international obligations and grant EUMM unhindered access to the occupied regions;
Amendment 274 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Calls for the strengthening of the EU’s capacity to act autonomously in the area of security and defence; stresses that , however, the leading role of NATO as a guarantor of European security and underlines the need of maintaining closest possible cooperation with the Alliance on all defence-related matters, as well as efficient cooperation with other partner organisations such as the UN or NATO is more vital than ever;
Amendment 291 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
Amendment 315 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. WelcomNotes the decision of the President of the Commission to build, within five years, a genuine European Defence Union;
Amendment 343 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24a. Stresses that strengthening substantial relations with East and Southeast Asia is essential to the EU's rules-based, comprehensive and sustainable Connectivity Strategy; takes note of the military build-up in the region and calls for all parties involved to respect the freedom of navigation, to solve differences through peaceful means and to refrain from taking unilateral actions to change the status quo, including in the East and South China Seas and the Taiwan Strait; expresses concern that foreign interferences from autocratic regimes through disinformation and cyber-attacks on the upcoming general elections threaten Asian democracies and regional stability; reiterates its support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organisations, mechanisms and activities;
Amendment 355 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Calls on the VP/HR, the Commission and the Member States to continue and step up their efforts to increase their ability to confront hybrid threats by strengthening the EU’s cyber defences and resilience against hybrid threats; calls, in this regard, for the development of comprehensive joint capacities and methods to analyse risk and vulnerability;
Amendment 365 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Promotes the boosting of the European Union’s strategic communication capabilities; calls, in that connection, for further support for the EEAS Strategic Communications Division by turning it into a fully-fledged unit within the EEAS, responsible for the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, with proper staffing and adequate budgetary resources, possibly by means of an additional dedicated budget line;
Amendment 387 #
2019/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Recognises the important role of the civil and military missions that form part of the CSDP in maintaining peace, avoiding conflicts and strengthening international security; underlines, however, the leading role of NATO as important pillar of European security and welcomes the ongoing process of NATO enlargement which contributes to the stability and well-being of Europe;
Amendment 2 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)
Citation 6 a (new)
- having regard to the enormous impact on potential EU defence capabilities of the departure of the UK, one of the most effective European military powers from the EU,
Amendment 5 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 21 a (new)
Citation 21 a (new)
- having regard to Russia's illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea,
Amendment 6 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 21 b (new)
Citation 21 b (new)
- having regard to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, Russia's repeated violations including the development and deployment of 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile systems and the US and Russian withdrawal from the Treaty,
Amendment 7 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 21 c (new)
Citation 21 c (new)
- having regard to Russia's violation of airspace and maritime borders of member states,
Amendment 8 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 21 d (new)
Citation 21 d (new)
- having regard to China's increase in economic and military presence in the Mediterranean and African countries,
Amendment 9 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 21 e (new)
Citation 21 e (new)
- having regard to the threat of domestic and foreign terrorism, primarily from groups such as ISIS and Al Qaeda,
Amendment 10 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 21 f (new)
Citation 21 f (new)
- having regard to new technologies such as artificial intelligence, space capabilities and quantum computing which present new opportunities for mankind, but also create new challenges in defence and foreign policy that require a clear strategy and consensus among allies,
Amendment 39 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
Amendment 49 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
Amendment 58 #
2019/2135(INI)
4 a. Stresses that strengthening substantial relations with East and Southeast Asia is essential to the EU's rules-based, comprehensive and sustainable Connectivity Strategy; takes note of the military build-up in the region and calls for all parties involved to respect the freedom of navigation, to solve differences through peaceful means and to refrain from taking unilateral actions to change the status quo, including in the East and South China Seas and the Taiwan Strait; expresses concern that foreign interferences from autocratic regimes through disinformation and cyber-attacks on the upcoming general elections threaten Asian democracies and regional stability; reiterates its support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organisations, mechanisms and activities;
Amendment 68 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that the Union has been slow to react and adapt – politically, diplomatically and militarily – to new crises and to this new international context; considers that, in the specific area of defence, there has been insufficient investment, differences in capabilities and a lack of interoperability, but also, and above all, a political reluctance to implement the robust provisions provided for in the European treaties and the numerous cooperation arrangements between Member States have weakened the Union’s ability to play a decisive role in external crises; recognises, further, that no country is able by itself to address the security challenges on the European continent and in its immediate environment;
Amendment 74 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Welcomes, in this adverse and volatile context, the belated but real recognition of shared security interests and the growing political will on the part of European countries and the European institutions to act collectively for their security by endowing themselves with greater means to act autonomouslydecisively; welcomes also the great increase in US commitment to European security, not least through its enhanced $6 billion European Deterrence Initiative and the increase in its Forward Military Presence in Europe;
Amendment 94 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Is convinced that the response to the Union’s security challengesdefence and security of the Union lies primarily in strengthening its strategic autonomythe Atlantic Alliance;
Amendment 97 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Welcomes and supports Operation Atlantic Resolve and NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence on the European continent and recognises the importance of NATO troops in the effort to deter further Russian aggression and provide crucial support in the event of a conflict;
Amendment 98 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7 b. Recognizes European involvement and support for Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan; further recognizes the importance of this mission to the stability and security of Afghanistan and the region;
Amendment 99 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 c (new)
Paragraph 7 c (new)
Amendment 108 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Considers that the principle of European strategic autonomy is based on the ability of the Union to strengmistaken idea that the EU is better able thean its freedomNATO or our nations to assess, take decisions and take action where circumstances so require in order to defend its interests and valuesto defend the interests and values of our citizens while some European countries might well embark on low intensity military operations, it is difficult to imagine circumstances where European countries would engage in major combat operations without the support of NATO Allies and therefore urges renewed commitment to the revitalisation of the Alliance;
Amendment 134 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
Amendment 145 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Stresses that strategic autonomy can only be genuinely achieved if Member States demonstrate solidarity, which is reflected in particular in the need to prioritise the procurement of European capabilities where equipment is available and competitive with the primary objective being to ensure interoperability with major Allies and avoid duplication among European forces to facilitate rapid deployment in as seamless a manner as possible;
Amendment 154 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
Amendment 162 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Maintains that European strategic autonomy must take practical form in the areas of industry, capability (joint programmes, investment in defence technologies) and operations (financing of operations, capacity building for partners, capacity to plan and conduct missions) and can be based upon the successes of the NATO Industrial Advisory group and be complementary to the existing commitments of Member States who are part of the Transatlantic Defence Technological and Industrial Cooperation (TADIC);
Amendment 173 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Considers that Europe’s defence is based largely on the Union’s capacity to intervAcknowledges that CSDP activities are small-scale operations within the European periphery and have limited manpower and objectives recognizes that the EU cannot replicate or replace the command and defence militarily, in a credible manner, in external theatres of operationsplanning structures of NATO and its role as the cornerstone of European defence;
Amendment 191 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Calls on the Member States and European bodies to prioritise and maintain a high level of commitment in Africa; welcomes, therefore, the Council’s decision of July 2018 to extend the mandate of the EUTM RCA military training mission for two years and its intention to launch a civilian mission to complement the military component; notes that these recent developments are a positive sign of re-engagement on the part of the Member States; acknowledges that closer cooperation with existing regional forces such as the African Union, G5 Sahel Force and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as the US, are essential to successful operations in Africa;
Amendment 225 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Deplores the lengthy decision- making and implementation processes; points out that very few recent military operations have been given an executive mandate because of the different speeds at which commitment decisions are made, and calls, in this connection, for changes to CSDP structures and procedures so that missions can be deployed in a more rapid, flexible and coherent manner; notes the use of a new crisis management tool – the launching of mini-missions under Article 28 TEU – with a view to responding to crises more quickly and flexibly; calls for mission construction to be complementary to NATO's Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VTJF) to avoid duplication and better support joint mission objectives;
Amendment 230 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Stresses the need to assess missions and operations on a regular basis in order to make them more effective; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to draw up mandates and budgets which are appropriate to the operations concerned and to provide for an exit strategy; calls, in that connection, for more regular consultations with the relevant parliamentary committees, and calls on the latter to focus their missions and delegations on areas where CSDP missions and operations are deployed; calls for the European Court of Auditors to conduct a review of all ongoing CSDP missions to ensure that their budgets and forces are being deployed in the most effective way; further calls for all ongoing CSDP missions to have a formal end date, which is subject to a full and comprehensive review before consideration of any extension is given;
Amendment 238 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Recalls the importance of organising joint training and exercises between European and US armed forces, thereby promoting interoperability, with a view to maximising mission preparedness and addressing a broad range of threats, both conventional and non-conventional;
Amendment 283 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Believes that the implementation of CSDP missions and operations must be backed up by flexible instruments in order to make it easier for the Union and its Member States to commit to ensuring European strategic autonomyoperational successes on the ground, in the service of the stability of the European continent; stresses, in this connection, the effectiveness of modular, multipurpose and genuinely operational command structures, such as the European Corps (Eurocorps); notes that the missions of this command structure have been successfully extended and diversified: between 2015 and 2018 the European Corps was deployed four times as part of the EU training missions in Mali and the Central African Republic (EUTM Mali and EUTM RCA); calls on the Member States and the Commission to follow this example of flexible and operational cooperation, which has already proved valuable and effective;
Amendment 289 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Expects the Union to make effective use of all existing CSDP policy instruments in the areas of diplomacy, cooperation, development, conflict management and peacekeeping; stresses that CSDP military and civilian instruments cannot, under any circumstances, be the only solution to security issues and that a ‘comprehensive approach’ should always be adopted; considers that only the use of all these instruments on the basis of a ‘comprehensive approach’ will provide the flexibility needed to effectively achieve the most ambitious security objectives;
Amendment 310 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Welcomes the significant reversal of the trend of cutting defence budgets as a result of the Defence Investment Pledge made at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014; is of the opinion that this should be supported and encouraged at Union level;
Amendment 344 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Welcomes the effective implementation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) as an important step towards closer cooperation in security and defence among Member States; stresses that this provision, introduced in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (Article 46 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), is legally binding and includes a set of ambitious commitments to enable European countries wishing to do so to move ahead faster on common defence projects; recognises the role that PESCO can play in structuring European demand; notes that a significant number of EDIDP- eligible projects are being developed within the PESCO framework and may also benefit from higher rates of subsidy; supports full consistency between PESCO projects and the EDF; calls for the closest possible access to PESCO for third countries, acknowledging that such countries' defence industries have expertise, related instruments and capabilities that EU Member's industries could benefit from;
Amendment 364 #
2019/2135(INI)
45. Questions the slow start-up of the 34 projects and the delays to the launch of a third wave of 13 projects, given that none are as yet up and running; notes that only four projects will reach their initial operational capacity in 2019; highlights the lack of ambition and scale of some projects, which do not address the most obvious capability gaps, particularly those in the first wave, which are primarily capability projects involving as many Member States as possible; notes that the desired inclusion of participation in PESCO projects should not jeopardise a high level of ambition on the part of the participating Member States; considers that third countries’ involvement should be subject to stringent conditions and based on established and effective reciprocity; calls on the Member States to submit projects with a strategic European dimension, thereby strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), which is an essential part of the strategic autonomisation process and relates more to the operational side in order to respond directly to the operational needs of European armed forces while avoiding any duplication of existing capability initiatives;
Amendment 368 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 46
Paragraph 46
46. Stresses the still virtual nature of the European Defence Fund; points out that that this instrument has not yet been finally approved, with only partial and political agreement having been given in April 2019; stresses the importance of maintaining Parliament’s position concerning the amount of the EDF, the involvement of third countries and the establishment of an appropriate intellectual property policy in relation to security and defence in order to protect research results; draws attention, in that connection, to the highly sensitive and strategic nature of defence research, both for industrial competitiveness and for the strategic autonomy of the Union; calls for the initial lessons learned from the implementation of the EDIDP (in particular concerning the application of derogations for eligible entities), the pilot project and the preparatory action on defence research to be properly taken into account; calls on the Member States to be fully involved in the decision-making process in order to avoid bureaucratic excesses and to ensure that the programmes included address the strategic needs of the CSDP and the Member States; considers that the success of the EDF will depend on its ability to cater for the specific defence needs of the participating states and to guarantee the availability of sufficient budgetary resources, whilst ensuring that industrial know-how is not duplicated, national defence investment is not crowded out and cooperation does not become over-complicated; considers that developing the European defence industry by regulating access for entities controlled by non-EU third parties to projects financed by the Fund is fully consistent with the European ambition of strategic autonomy; , SME engagement is supported by incubation and capital investment and cooperation does not become over-complicated; considers that 22 Member States are committed under their NATO membership to commit 20% of their defence expenditure on investment in new capabilities and therefore should isolate part of this budget specifically towards research and development to guarantee a minimum expenditure in R+D; EDF should collaborate actively with NATO in order to facilitate transatlantic technological and industrial development in a manner that removes barriers and protectionism and ensures export licensing processes/technological transfer policies are harmonized among Member States; special consideration should be given to the development of a task force between EDA and NSPA/NCIA for developing a roadmap on identifying ideal equipment for procurement and to generate the best value on defence expenditure;
Amendment 378 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 47
Paragraph 47
47. Hopes that decisions on the participation of third parties in PESCO projects will under no circumstances undermine the conditions agreed in the negotiations on the EDF and the EDIDP, given the purely European and that cooperation with a post-Brexit UK and our transatlantic partners is encouraged regardless of the nature of the financing of these programmes;
Amendment 385 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 48
Paragraph 48
48. Stresses the strategic dimension for Europe of the space sector, and emphasises the need to make progress in developing technologies with both civilian and military uses which are capable of ensuring European strategic autonomysupporting CSDP operations and objectives; welcomes the inclusion in the next MFF of the Commission’s EUR 16 billion space programme proposal to boost EU space leadership; welcomes the progress made on EU satellite services (Galileo, Copernicus, EGNOS); emphasises that, if it is to enjoy decision-making and operational autonomy, the Union must have adequate satellite resources in the fields of space imagery, intelligence-gathering, communications and space surveillance; considers that space-based services should be fully operationalised in order to provide high-resolution satellite imaging in support of CSDP missions and operations; stresses the need to finance, through the EDF, industrial projects with a space dimension where the Union can generate real added value;
Amendment 398 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50
Paragraph 50
50. Believes that the Union and its Member States face an unprecedented threat in the form of cyber attacks as well as cyber crime and terrorism; believes that the nature of cyber attacks makes them a threat that requires a Union-level response; supports NATO's decision to include cyber attacks under Art. 5; encourages the Member States to mimic this by provideing mutual assistance in the event of a cyber attack against any one of them as 22 Member States are likewise committed for their fellow NATO Allies;
Amendment 410 #
2019/2135(INI)
51a. Recognizes the growing importance of cyber and automated intelligence capabilities, stresses that these provide threats to all the Member States and EU institutions, urges all EU institutions and Member States to continue to improve upon their cyber and automated technologies, further encourages cooperation on these technological advances;
Amendment 413 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52
Paragraph 52
52. Recognises the increasingly prominent role of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning in European defence; notes, in particular, the many military applications stemming from AI for managing and simulating operational environments, assisting the decision- making process, detecting threats and processing intelligence; stresses that the development of reliable AI in the field of defence is essential for ensuring European strategic autonomy in capability and operational areasoperational objectives are accomplished; calls on the Union to keep up its investment in this area and in particular in disruptive technologies through existing instruments (European Defence Fund, European Innovation Council, future Horizon Europe, Digital Europe programme); encourages transatlantic cooperation in this space to ensure partnering on development and application are used to maximize added value to joint operations and commitments;
Amendment 421 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52 a (new)
Paragraph 52 a (new)
52a. Underlines the importance of achieving quantum computing capabilities and stresses the need to enhance EU-US cooperation in this area to ensure that quantum computing is first realized among partners sharing warm relations and supporting objectives;
Amendment 424 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 53 a (new)
Paragraph 53 a (new)
53a. Notes the growing importance of space security and satellites, stresses the importance of the European Union Satellite Centre and commissions the agency to analyse and provide a report regarding the safety and/or vulnerabilities of the EU and Member State satellites to space debris, cyber attack and direct missile attack;
Amendment 425 #
2019/2135(INI)
54. Stresses that the ambition of European strategic autonomy is based on the ability of Europeans to take action to defend their interests, either independently or within an institutional cooperation framework (NATO, UN)recognising that this must ensure complementarity to NATO and UN missions and operations;
Amendment 436 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55
Paragraph 55
55. Considers that European strategic autonomyactions must be based on sustainable cooperation and strategic partnerships with countries and organisations sharing the Union’s values; welcomes, further, the contributions made by CSDP partners to Union missions and operations;
Amendment 438 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55 a (new)
Paragraph 55 a (new)
55a. Acknowledges and welcomes the continued US military presence in Europe and welcomes the $1.75 billion increase in the budget for the European Deterrence Initiative, rising to $6.531 billion for 2019;
Amendment 440 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56
Paragraph 56
56. Considers it essential to maintain strong, close and special defence and security cooperation between the Union and the United Kingdom after Brexit; stresses that working in cooperation with the United Kingdom will enable the Union to maximise its capabilities and operational capacitiesthe UK is Europe's most capable and committed military power; considers that defence cooperation which systematically excludes the United Kingdom should be ruled out; proposes the conclusion of a defence and security treatyarrangement with the United Kingdom which enables that country to participate, as far as possible, in Union instrument in Union missions on a case-by-case basis, guaranteeing command of its own forces in any CSDP operation and ensuring an ambitious relationship with the EDA beyond that of other third countries;
Amendment 462 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60
Paragraph 60
60. Supports, in parallel with institutional cooperation and partnerships, the combining of different forms of flexible, multifaceted, open and, at the same time, operational, ambitious and demanding cooperation, both within and outside EU, NATO and UN structures, which could facilitate joint commitments in operations, thereby strengthening the Union’s operational strategic autonomyobjectives; stresses, in this connection, that examples of cooperation such as the European Intervention Initiative, the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), Visegrad 4 Group and the increasing integration of the German and Dutch armed forces refelect this drive for closer military cooperation between Member States;
Amendment 466 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60 a (new)
Paragraph 60 a (new)
60a. Recognizes that political and economic stability along with military capabilities and cooperation in the Sub- Saharan Africa is key to mitigating the growth of jihadist activity, migrant crises and combatting the spread and influence of extremism;
Amendment 467 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60 b (new)
Paragraph 60 b (new)
60b. Recognizes and supports the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to Libya, that has been assisting with the transition to democracy and works to train, advise, and develop Libyan border security in land, air and sea;
Amendment 468 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60 c (new)
Paragraph 60 c (new)
60c. Further calls upon the EU to keep its commitments in the Fourth EU- African Summit to support economic and political stability and to further support the capabilities of the African Standby Force;
Amendment 469 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60 d (new)
Paragraph 60 d (new)
60d. Recommends that Member States adopt weapon systems and munitions in accordance with NATO standards in order to maintain interoperability among allies;
Amendment 470 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60 e (new)
Paragraph 60 e (new)
60e. Encourages the Member States to continue cooperation with the AU and continue to fulfil commitments already made;
Amendment 471 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60 f (new)
Paragraph 60 f (new)
60f. Encourages the Member States to continue to work with ASEAN countries in all aspects already agreed upon, further stresses the need to cooperate on economic manners and combatting terrorism;
Amendment 472 #
2019/2135(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60 g (new)
Paragraph 60 g (new)
Amendment 46 #
2019/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 23 a (new)
Citation 23 a (new)
– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties (2016/2030(INI)) and its recommendation of 13 March 2019 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning taking stock of the follow-up taken by the EEAS two years after the EP report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties (2018/2115(INI)),
Amendment 87 #
2019/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas, according to the recent report commissioned by UK government, Christians are the most persecuted religious group in the world, constituting 80% of persecuted religious believers in the world; whereas this persecution range from routine discrimination in education, employment and social life, through limitations on all forms of expression up to physical attacks against Christian communities, which come close to meeting the international definition of genocide, according to that adopted by the UN;
Amendment 173 #
2019/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Stresses that freedom of speech and expression, as well as media pluralism, are at the heart of resilient democratic societies; urges that the best possible safeguards against ongoing disinformation campaigns and hostile propaganda originating from authoritarian states and non-state actors, such as terrorist groups be put in place by developing a legal framework both at EU and international level for tackling hybrid threats, including cyber and information warfare;
Amendment 269 #
2019/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Calls on the VP/HR and the Council to pay special attention to the human rights situation in the illegally- occupied territories in the Eastern Partnership countries, and take effective measures with the aim to prevent grave human rights abuses on the ground, including the violation of right to life, restriction of freedom of movement, and discrimination on the ground of ethnicity;
Amendment 270 #
2019/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 b (new)
Paragraph 19 b (new)
19b. In this regard recalls its resolution of 14 June 2018 on Georgian occupied territories 10 years after the Russian invasion (2018/2741(RSP)) and reiterates the necessity of imposing the restrictive measures by the EU and its Member States on the persons included in the “Otkhozoria-Tatunashvili List”, the individuals responsible for grave human rights violations in Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia;
Amendment 392 #
2019/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Urges the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to step up advocacy in relation to FoRB, and to launch interreligious dialogue with states and representatives of civil society and faith groups in order to prevent acts of violence and discrimination against persons on the grounds of thought, conscience, religion or belief; calls for the EU to continue to forge alliances and to enhance cooperation with a broad range of countries and regional organisations, in order to deliver positive change in relation to FoRB; reminds the Council and Commission of the need to adequately support the institutional mandate, capacity and duties of the Special Envoy for the promotion of FoRB outside the EU; underlines the need to pay special attention to the situation of the persecuted Christians around the world, who make up the vast majority of the religious groups facing discrimination, violence and death;
Amendment 480 #
2019/2125(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Stresses that the EU should continue to actively support democratic and effective human rights institutions and civil society in their efforts to promote democratisation; positively notes, in this context, the European Endowment for Democracy’s consistent engagement in the eastern and southern neighbourhoods of the EU to promote democracy and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms; calls on the Council to consider expanding the EED’s mandate also to the countries of Central and Latin America and making sufficient funds available to do so; recalls that the experience gained and the lessons learned from transitions to democracy in the framework of the enlargement and neighbourhood policies could make a positive contribution to the identification of best practices that could be used to support and consolidate other democratisation processes worldwide;
Amendment 5 #
2019/2028(BUD)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Notes with concern the decrease of over EUR 1 billion in commitment appropriations for Heading 4 (Global Europe), which would result in a budget for external action lower than during any of the three preceding years; believes that in the current international context, the EU in cooperation with Member States needs to assume more, not less responsibility and that it must be endowed with the necessary financial resources in order to be able to do so; calls for the margin of over EUR 200 million in Heading 4 to be allocated;
Amendment 42 #
2019/2028(BUD)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Strongly supports the need for CFSP support expenditure to include maritime safety as over 90% of the world’s trade is carried out by sea and any obstruction carries direct and indirect security challenges to Europe; calls for further EU engagement to ensure global freedom of navigation, the protection of the main routes of global trade and the security of EU financial interests.
Amendment 54 #
2019/2028(BUD)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5 b. Supports a strengthened and more visible role for the EU’s Monitoring Mission in Georgia, in light of increased Russian aggression towards Georgia, exacerbating existing tensions.
Amendment 55 #
2019/2028(BUD)
5 c. Believes that funding to UNRWA shall be scrutinised by the European Court of Auditors in light of the leaked internal UN ethics report which highlighted serious mismanagement and abuses of authority at the highest levels of UNRWA, including by its Commissioner- General; any cuts should not impact the provision of aid and services to those in need but instead encourage increased budget efficiency and allow for increased international ownership to funding provisions.