36 Amendments of Dariusz ROSATI related to 2015/2344(INI)
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro; whereas the Europeconomic and Monetary Union of the European Union currently consists of 19 m28 Members, two of whom States, out of these only 19 Member States shavre opt-out clauses, the remaining seven EU Member States having yet to join; whereasthe common currency and form part of the euro area; whereas of the nine Member States whose currency is not the euro, one Member has an opt-out and one Member has an opt-in from joining the common currency and no financial liability will be incurred by the twose countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area; whereas the remaining seven EU Member States are bound by their Treaties of Accession to the European Union to join the common currency once they fulfil the necessary criteria;
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas contrary to the budgetary arrangements in all otherfederations and understanding that the EU is not a federations per se, the EU budget, is dependent on contributions from Member State level to EU level;
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas keeping the Balance of Payments Facility for non-euroArticle 123 and 125 TFEU were put in place to avoid and prevent moral hazard and ensure fiscal sustainability and prudency of euro area Member States; while depriving euro area Member States of this instrument as a consequence of the no-bail-out clause reflects one of the original flaws of EMUereas the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) constitutes the crisis resolution mechanism for countries of the euro area and has the function of a shock absorbent; whereas non-euro area Member States are not covered by the ESM but by the Balance of Payment Facility which supports non- euro countries in difficulties or when seriously threatened with difficulties as regards its balance of payments, as laid down in Article 143 TFEU, as non-euro countries experience higher risks due to exchange rate fluctuations;
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas it became apparent during the sovereign debt crisis that the European Treaties do not provide the euro area with the instruments to deal effectively with shocks; countries which did not comply with the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which did not budget responsibly but triggered large budget deficits through high spending and had postponed relevant reforms of their labour markets and public administration, were more vulnerable and could not effectively handle economic shocks; whereas it became apparent that the lack of responsibility of one Member of the euro area is a risk for the euro area as a whole, meaning that one country not adhering to the rules can affect the economy of all Member States of the Union; whereas the currency union is only as strong as its Members, which requires all participating countries to respect economic and financial rules at national level and at the same time to strengthen their economies in their own interest and in that of the whole euro area, thus guaranteeing the well-being of all citizens in the long-term, as the consequences of irresponsible policies at national level have to be borne by the Union as a whole;
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas, following real convergence in the run-up to the introduction of the common currency, the euro area witnessed structural divergence between 1999 and 2009, which made the euro area as a whole less resilient to shock the lack of necessary fiscal discipline, weak compliance with, and weak enforcement of, EU fiscal rules have led to excessive borrowing and sovereign debt crisis in some Member States; whereas regulatory adjustments and structural reforms aimed at reducing risks and improvimproving compliance and enhancing convergence have been introduced since 2009 at both European and national level, but some euro area Member States still require solidarity and sustainable reforms in their catching- up process;
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas some Member States dramatically lack the willingness to implement the Country Specific Recommendations, given on the yearly basis by the Commission, and, hence, undermine the economic growth that the EU currently strives for;
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas Member States that failed to adhere to the SGP and enforce fiscal rules at national level have lost credibility of financial markets and herewith the possibility to finance themselves and a great deal of trust has been lost in the process, both between Member States and on the part of citizens and the markets in the EU institutions and the Union as a whole;
Amendment 155 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty, with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while and budgetary policyies remainsing within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policie, including weak enforcement of the provisions of Stability and Growth, lack of effective banking regulation at European level, lack of euro area-wide stability mechanism and absence of strong incentives to implement necessary structural reforms;
Amendment 165 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix; emphasises however that the three percent deficit rule under the enhanced Stability and Growth Pact provides sufficient fiscal space to cope with asymmetric shocks, under condition that EU Member States strictly observe the structural budgetary balance rule in the medium term;
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalancthe causes of the sovereign debt crisis were mainly unsustainable levels of public and private debt, lack of competitiveness and proper regulation in the banking and financial sectors; underlines, triggered by capital flows fhat high levels of debt limited the space of manoeuvre for eurom core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated and led to a sovereuntries and led to an increase in financing costs, which impeded the repayment of debt at maturity; stresses that high costs of servicing debt due to high interest rates were too big of a burden given the overall debt level of some euro countries; whereas too hignh debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the merelevels entail high interest rates which have to be served instead of being able to invest in growth enhancing measures, social spending, healthcare and education; whereas the causes of the crises differed in existence of thet among euro area Member States;
Amendment 204 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a commonin the monetary union is generally able to deal with symmetric shocks; insists that it is up to national fiscal policy cannot addressd flexible national labour markets to accommodate asymmetric shocks to the euro area Member States; reiterates that mereweak coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorbled to large fiscal deficits and growing public debt, thus depriving Member States of the necessary fiscal space and structural flexibility required to absorb asymmetric economic shocks;
Amendment 235 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Acknowledges the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and, the Two- Pack and the Fiscal Compact Regulations; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lackneed more democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership;
Amendment 243 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. RecallNotes that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States, whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro area’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach; however, points out in this context to the serious risk of moral hazard and to potentially distorted incentives, in fact encouraging Member States to wait with necessary reforms until financial support from the EU is secured; therefore, if this idea is to be implemented, strong safeguards against potential moral hazard need to be included;
Amendment 277 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity aenhanced fiscal sustainability and structural reforms as vital elements in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria;
Amendment 300 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in be an instrument of last resort, and be activated only in case of large asymmetric shocks theat case of absorbing shocksnnot be fully absorbed by responsible national fiscal policy;
Amendment 315 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Stresses that if a fiscal capacity mustis to be created, it should be in addition and on top of the existing EU funding insbudget and without any detruiments, to it, and within its legal framework, in order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro Member States; Emphasizes that the planned EU funding instruments should be addressed to all EU Member States so that they are consistent with the fundamental values of the European integration such as the Single Market and should not undermine the competitiveness of the EU Member States as well as the EU as a whole;
Amendment 346 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Considers that three different functions have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’' structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in thmore efforts have to be made to stabilise business cycle movements of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a wholeover time, since business cycle fluctuations across euro countries are highly correlated, but differ in variance, which explains why shocks in the euro area are of a more symmetric nature with differences in the boom-bust dynamics of growth rates in individual Member States, especially experienced by euro countries of the periphery; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed at national level, while respecting the SGP and maintaining budgetary discipline, by making economies more competitive so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole; adds that in the reform of the SGP in 2005, the European Council asked EU Member States to strengthen their domestic fiscal governance through fiscal rules and institutions at national level and further reinforced national fiscal frameworks following the adoption of the Budgetary Frameworks Directive, the Fiscal Compact and the Two-Pack;
Amendment 362 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Insists that if a fiscal capacity is to be created, it could be activated to address symmetric shocks only when national fiscal policies have been used to its full potential and only when Member States observe the EU fiscal rules, including the Medium Term Objective;
Amendment 392 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Demands that the ESM be integrated into the Union’s legal framework and evolve towards a Community mechanism, as provided for in the ESM Treaty and as constantly requested by the European Parliament and foreseen in the Five Presidents’ report; underlines that the ECJ Pringle case-law and jurisprudence open up the possibility of bringing the ESM within the Union’s framework, within the existing Treaties, on the basis of Article 352 TFEU; calls, therefore, on the Commission to bring forward as a matter of urgencyfirstly conduct a complex study on that issue as well as start a deep and fact-based political discussion on the matter, and only then bring forward a legislative proposal to that end; demands that the ESM be made fully accountable to the European Parliament;
Amendment 402 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
Amendment 457 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Believes that compliance with a convergence code should be the condition for access to funding from the ESM/EMF; reiterates its call on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to this end;
Amendment 479 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Stresses that significant progress in convergence and sustainable structural reforms is needed in order to reconcile fiscal consolidation, growth, jobs, productivity, competitiveness and the European social model so as to effectively prevent asymmetric shock; considers that financial support from the European level for the implementation of agreed structural reforms in the Member States, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, is therefore indispensable;
Amendment 485 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24a. Suggests that reforms advocated in the CSRs can be incentivised through financial and technical assistance facilitated by a fiscal capacity without Treaty change and therefore be realisable in the short-term; considers that fundamental attention should be given to the CSRs, which already emphasize thoroughly the areas in need of reform, however, since the implementation rate of these measures is not satisfactory and recent reflections have not yielded to any significant tools able to improve it, the fiscal capacity could leverage the transposition of CSRs by providing positive incentives in form of financial assistance for Member States to implement reforms, especially in years of economic growth; stresses that no compensation should be granted to countries that did not pursue budgetary discipline and postponed necessary reforms; emphasizes that convergence towards the level of the most competitive countries in the euro area should be fostered through reforms that are conducive to more investment, profitable projects, productivity enhancing and have the objective of reaching full employment;
Amendment 491 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
Amendment 503 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
Amendment 520 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1
Paragraph 26 – indent 1
Amendment 530 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2
Paragraph 26 – indent 2
Amendment 545 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3
Paragraph 26 – indent 3
Amendment 580 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Considers that a financial instrument is needed to work as an incentive-based mechanism for convergence and sustainable structural reforms with clear conditionality; believes that the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP) proposed by the Commission, which is designed to provide technical support to national authorities in all member states for measures aimed at reforming institutions, governance, administration, and economic and social sectors with a view to enhancing growth and jobs, can be further developed asould possibly provide a contribution to this function of the fiscal capacity;
Amendment 599 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Is convinced that increased convergence within the euro area will significantly increase the capacity of its Member States to absreduce the scope forb asymmetric shocks within the euro area; believes, however, that no matter how great the efforts regarding convergence and sustainable structural reforms, asymmetric shocks with an impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member States; stresses, therefore, the need to have an instrument availablmaintain fiscal position close to balance for this emergency which provides an immediate stabilisation effectin surplus in the medium term, in order to ensure the necessary fiscal buffers are available to address this emergency;
Amendment 635 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Points out that the Rainy Day Fund should be funded by all thethe euro area Member States on the basis of a cyclically sensitive economic indicator and used for payments to all Member States suffering from economic downturns;
Amendment 668 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Considers that the EMF should provide the financial resources fNotes that if a fiscal capacity is created, it could support either of these models, which cwould, however, require increasing the amount of capital; points out that the fund should avoid long-term redistribution effects by ensuringinsists that in any case long-term redistribution effects between Member States should be avoided, and Member States’' contributions arshould be balanced over the cycle;
Amendment 687 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. WarnsIs convinced that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resourcehave to be addressed by a combination of common monetary policy and national fiscal policies; is confident that recent reforms of the economic governance in the EU together with increased national ownership of EU fiscal rules provide strong safeguards against irresponsible fiscal policies;
Amendment 748 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Points out that if the fiscal capacity has to be of significant size in orderis to be able to address these euro-area-wide shocks and to finance its functions, it has to be of significant size; insists that in order to provide sufficient financial resources, the euro area fiscal capacity, including the EMF, should be able to increase the issuance of equitiesdebt via a rise in guarantees; considers that these commonly issued equitiesdebt should have the highest credit rate;
Amendment 785 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
Amendment 807 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Considers that those non-euro countries that do not have an opt-out will eventually become part of the EMU and therefore may join the governance framework on a voluntary basis with a special statuEmphasizes that the seven EU Member States that do not have an opt-out or opt-in from joining the common currency, but are bound to join the euro area by their Treaties of Accession to the European Union, should have full rights of participating in the governance structure of any fiscal capacity, be able to contribute and benefit financially, receive technical and financial assistance in transposing needed structural reforms in their countries, thereby making their economies more competitive especially vis-à-vis current euro area Member States, increasing resilience, thus ensuring the sound transition into the euro area and avoid economic and financial crises in the future by fostering a stronger euro area with stronger Member States;