Activities of Ioannis KASOULIDES related to 2009/2217(INI)
Plenary speeches (1)
A new strategy for Afghanistan (debate)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT Report on a new strategy for Afghanistan PDF (273 KB) DOC (185 KB)
Amendments (32)
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the international community has implicitly recognised that nine years of war and international involvement have not succeeded in eliminating the Taliban insurgency and bringing peace and stability to the country, and whereas a new counterinsurgency policy has been introduced from last year and around 45 000 troops dispatched as reinforcements,
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas an impasse has been reached in Afghanistan:it is difficult to see an obvious end in sight with a coalition of occupying powers in place but unable to defeat the Taliban only through military means, and an insurgency movement unable to prevail against these military forces; and whereas there is no obvious end in sight,
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital N
Recital N
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Is aware however of the set of factors hampering progress in Afghanistan but, given space constraints, has chosen to focus in this report on four main elements where, it believes, efforts expended will result in very significant improvements that could turn the course of events: international aid; implications of the peace process; impact of police training; elimination of opium cultivation through alternative development;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Expresses support for the new concept of a counter insurgency strategy, which aims at the protection of the local population and the rebuilding of areas whose security has been assured, and support for the EU’s Action Plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan;
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Believes, therefore, that a newthe EU strategy for Afghanistan will have to take as its starting point two premises: an acknowledgement of the continuing deterioration in security and socio- economic indicators in Afghanistan despite almost a decade of international involvement and investment; and the need to encourage a profound shift in the mindset of the international community, which has all too often in the past, in particular prior to the counter insurgency strategy, shaped plans and decisions with scant regard for Afghan involvement;
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Stresses that these disappointing indicators are not compensated for byNotes however the limited progress made in infrastructure, telecommunications and basic education usually cited as achievements by donors and the Afghan Government;
Amendment 136 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
Amendment 144 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Points out that, contrary to the widespread perception that Afghan Government corruption is responsible for the lack of provision of essential services to its citizens, the majority of resources for socio-economic development have been channelled through international organisations, regional development banks, NGOs, international contractors etc,, and not through the central government;
Amendment 160 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Is appalled by the absence ofCalls for coordination among international donors and of, for detailed evaluations on the impact of the international civilian and military intervention, by the lack offor transparency and by the limited mechanisms for donor accountability;
Amendment 173 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Calls, too, on all the main humanitarian and development bodies active in Afghanistan (from EU Member States and the US to the UNDP and UNOPS, and from the World Bank to the main NGOs) to drastically prune their operating expenses by allocating funds (at least 80% more than at present) directly to Afghan institutions; notes that, among Afghan institutions preference should be given to local and regional governments provided that at this level allegiance, the rule of law and democracy have been properly ascertained; points out that the allocation of funds at local and regional level shall require the approval of the central Government to enhance its role and responsibility;
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Recognises the potential for local corruption but believes that this will be outweighed by the strengthened legitimacy the Afghan State will gain by begiving responsible for implementing aidapproval for the allocation of the funding and by ensuring that aid effectiveness indicators and effective monitoring mechanisms, agreed upon by both donors and the Afghan Government, are in place;
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
Amendment 213 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Believes that much of the blame for the present impassesituation in Afghanistan rests with early miscalculations prior to the new counter-insurgency strategy by coalition forces who foresaw a speedy military victory over the Taliban and an easy transition to a stable country run by a legitimate government with strong Western backing;
Amendment 234 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Recognises that the final stage would be a political solution; considers that in order to achieve this and for the Taliban to realize that they should sit at the negotiating table, the new counter insurgency policy must be given time to succeed according to the time table announced by President Obama; recognizes that once the conditions have been met, so that the Taliban do not negotiate under conditions of strength, then the only possible solution is a political one, and; strongly believes that negotiations with the Talibanall the Afghan sides engaged in the conflict – which should take place against the backdrop of a ceasefire – lie at the heart of thisa political process, with the aim of forming a government of national unity which can put an end to the civil war that has raged in the country for almost three decades;
Amendment 254 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Recognises that the Taliban are not one single uniform entity: there are at least 33 top leaders, 820 mid-level/junior leaders, and 25 000 - 36 000 "foot soldiers" distributed among 220 communities, some fighting for ideological, others for monetary, reasons; believes therefore, that negotiations should be encouraged from now on at local level between the democratically elected local government and members of the armed opposition "who renounce violence, have no links to international terrorist organizations, respect the Constitution and are willing to join in building a peaceful Afghanistan", according to paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Kabul communiqué of 20 July 2010;
Amendment 286 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Urges the EU to encourage the USallied forces to move away from itsthe policy of circumventing domestic institutions in the delivery of international aid and the privatisation of security, as well as its parallel and seemingly contradictory (to the peace process) attempt to "decapitate" the insurgency leadership usnd acknowledges the new orders by General Petraeus that due regard should be given to all military and security operations in avoiding civilian casualties as this is one of the factors alienating the local population against ISAF; pays tribute to the servicemen and women of all the Allied Forces who have lost their lives ing drones and US Special forces, which is of questionable legal status and results in frequent civilian casualefending freedom, and expresses its condolences to their families, as well as to the families of all innocent Afghan victiems;
Amendment 296 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Points out that the EU Member States and their allies' military presence in Afghanistan has the objective of combating the threat of international terrorism and tackling the fight against drug cultivation and trafficking;
Amendment 307 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 46
Paragraph 46
46. Notes that there can be no stability or peace in Afghanistan without guaranteeing security for its citizens, and that part of the Taliban's early success in establishing themselves was due to an ability to maintain order and security;
Amendment 315 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 47 a (new)
Paragraph 47 a (new)
47 a. Gives merit to the idea of General Petraeus that local, democratically elected authorities could be accorded with a local gendarmerie to maintain law and order and protect the local population;
Amendment 329 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50
Paragraph 50
50. Notes from ISAF sources that of the 94 000 men in the Afghan National Police almost 90%of them are illiterate, 20% and a substantial number are drug users, and over 30% or go missing after a year, not to mention the 1 000 or so killed in service every year;
Amendment 335 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 51
Paragraph 51
51. Believes that one of the main factors behind the ineffectiveness of overall training has been the practice, predominantly by the US, of relying on private contractors to train the police;
Amendment 338 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52
Paragraph 52
52. Notes that, while the EU and its Member States do not share the US approach, their commitment to the creation of a professional Afghan police force risks being compromised by the prevalence of practices such as the "fast- track" approach (poor vetting of recruits, six weeks of training with no textbooks because of trainee illiteracy, minimal field training, recruits then given a badge, uniform and gun and sent out on patrol) implemented by a few big US security companies;
Amendment 341 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 53
Paragraph 53
53. Is equally disturbed to learn of the poor financial controls being applied to these private companies, and cites a 2006 joint US Defense and State Department report, whose findings are still valid today, which found that the police force in Afghanistan was incapable of carrying out routine law enforcement work and that no effective field training programme existed; acknowledges General McChrystal's attempts, during his tenure,the attempts by the general command and under the counterinsurgency policy to exercise some degree of control over the private foreign militias operating with impunity in Afghanistan;
Amendment 344 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 54
Paragraph 54
54. Recommends unequivocally, therefore, that responsibility for police training no longerthat police training should as soon as possible cease to be carried out by private contractors;
Amendment 358 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56
Paragraph 56
56. Recommends that salaries for the Afghan police be increased and that the whole recruitment process be reviewed, only admittinggive preference to recruits with a basic standard of literacy, who are not drug users and are better qualified psychologically and physically than the present cohort;
Amendment 362 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57
Paragraph 57
57. Recalls that Afghanistan is the source of 90% of the world's illicit opium, and yet that when coalition forces entered Kabul in 2001, no opium poppies were being grown in Afghanistan owing to the UN's success in getting the Taliban to impose a ban on their cultivation in the 90% of the country under their controlcultivation has not diminished in recent years;
Amendment 368 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59
Paragraph 59
59. Notes, however, that the opium problem was not considered a priority by the Bush AdministrationGeneral Command prior to the counter insurgency policy, which preferred to cooperate with the warlords in the name of the war on terror;
Amendment 370 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62
Paragraph 62
62. Draws attention, however, to the findings of a recent UNODC report, whereby the Taliban only capture 4% of the annual narcotics trade, and local farmers 21%, with 75% going to government officials, the police, local and regional brokers, and traffickers; in short, notes that NATO allies are in fact getting the lion's share of the profits from the drugs trade;
Amendment 385 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 70
Paragraph 70