13 Amendments of Sharon BOWLES related to 2010/2009(INI)
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Stresses that every financial institution and listed company that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities should have a remuneration committee which should determine the remuneration policy, which must be independent and accountable to shareholders and supervisors and should work closely with the firm's risk committee in the evaluation of the incentives created by the compensation system as well as with the trade unions' representatives;
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Believes that compensation systems should be proportionate to the size, internal organisation and complexity of financial institutions and should reflect the diversity between different financial sectors such as banking, insurance and fund management;
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Stresses that the operational risk managementsenior management, risk- takers and control functions should therefore be pre- approved by the supervisor and be subject to thorough and intrusive checks by the supervisor; considers that such procedures should also apply to staff whose total remuneration, including pension provisions, takes them into the same bracket as these categories as staff;
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Considers that amounts of variable remuneration should only be exceptionally awarded and should be determined according to the achievement of long-term objectives which should be clearly defined in advance;
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Stresses that compensation systems should link the size of the bonus pool to the overall performance and capital base of the firm, while an employee's incentives should be linked to his/her contribution to such performance, while quantitative and qualitative criteria, as well as human judgment, should play a role in determining this link;
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Believes that negative performance by a firm should lead to a considerable reduction of total variable remuneration payouts, in terms both of current compensation and of payouts of amounts previously earned, including through malus or clawback arrangements; supervisors should be notified whenever a credit institution initiates any malus or clawback in order to inform supervisory interviews;
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Considers that guaranteed variable bonuses should not be part of the compensation plans;
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Underlines the need to extend these principles to the remuneration of all employees whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of the company they work for, including senior management, risk-takers, control functions and those staff whose total remuneration, including pension provisions, takes them into the same bracket;
Amendment 59 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Suggests that variable remuneration should be paid only if it is sustainable in the light of the financial situation of the institution, the capital base of the institution and justified in the light of the long-term performance of the firm;
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Believes that a substantial proportion, i.e. more than 50%, of variable compensation should be awarded in non- cash instruments such as subordinated debt, contingent capital, shares or share- linked instruments, as long as these instruments create incentives aligned with long-term value creation and the time horizons of risk;
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Considers that the remuneration policies should apply to total remuneration including pensions and salaries to avoid 'bonus arbitrage'; furthermore, believes that 'pension bonuses' should be awarded in non-cash instruments such as subordinated debt, contingent capital, shares or share-linked instruments to align long-term incentives;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Calls on the Commission to adopt strong binding principles on remuneration policies in the financial sector as suggestedbuilding on the proposals for banking in the draft report on the CRD and a naming and shaming procedure for listed companies which do not respect these principles;
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24a. Calls on the Commission and Member States to promote a common international structure for disclosure of the number of individuals in pay brackets from €1 million upwards including the main elements of salary, bonus, long-term award and pension contribution;