Activities of Sharon BOWLES related to 2010/2074(INI)
Plenary speeches (1)
Basel II and revision of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD 4) (debate)
Amendments (21)
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas Europe applies the CRD to a wider range of financial institutions than other countries which should be addressed to ensure compatibility, at least by proportionate implementation,
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas there are important European specificities, such as the fact that the corporate sector in Europe is predominantly financed through bank lending which should be more targeted to specialised fields such as SME lending with larger companies encouraged to issue bonds directly to investors; whereas the revised Basel rules must take due account of such specificities,
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas the CRD assumes that there is no nominal credit risk for Eurozone state debt, even though the Eurozone can not create a currency in which they borrow (i.e. states can not print currency),
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas convergence between reporting for accounting purposes and reporting for regulatory purposes is essential in order to ensure that supervisors and investors are provided with the same transparent and clear information, and; whereas dual reporting must be avoidedthis does not preclude prudential filters providing they are presented in all accounts,
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas banks should focus more on the core businesses of banking, namely lending tothat serve the real economy; whereas the Basel Committee and the Commission have to find ways to promote this core business,
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Recalls its concern about the limitations of assumptions concerning correlations made by banks that underlie aspects of the methodology for calculating regulatory capital; notes that care must be taken not to introduce perverse incentives such as reclassification of assets or excessive concentration;
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Calls on the Commission to continue to further integrate EU supervision of the banking sector and to bring forward proposals to ensure a level-playing field in the Single Market by removing and harmonising the national exemptions in the CRD;
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Calls on the Commission to create incentives for the banking sector to manage risk and profit with a view to long-term outcomes and to encourage banks to keep loans on their own books without excessive securitisation and to fully consolidate somean active and ongoing interest in loans on their own books; notes that retention of loans on the bank's books reduces the capacity for lending; any securisation or off- balance sheets items like SPVs; activity must be transparent and reported;
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Notes that long term investments, such as energy distribution infrastructure, rely on securitisation;
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Supports the initiative to increase the quality and level of capital in response to the crisis; underlines that the primary purpose of capital is to absorb unexpected losses, particularly in times of stress, and tier 1 capital definitions must exclude instruments that are not truly loss absorbing (for example where they may not be realised or are transient);
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Urges the Basel Committee and the Commission, when defining eligible capital instruments, to take proper account of the needs and particularities of non-joint stock companies (i.e. cooperatives, mutuals and savings banks), which account for a large portion of the European banking industry;
Amendment 138 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Considers developing higher quality liquidity standards to be a key part of the crisis response;
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Notes that maturity transformation inherently exposes banks to long/short liquidity risk;
Amendment 147 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Is of the view that a "‘liquidity coverage ratio"’ should take greater account of the risk of concentration of eligible assets in any liquidity buffer, encourage diversification and discourage excessive concentration into one particular asset class including government debt issued by a euro area member where credit risk is judged to be emerging; considers that diversification should be appropriately applied and that eligible asset classes should be sufficiently liquid in times of market stress;
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Is concerned about the pro-cyclical natureunintended consequences of a fixed bank-specific capital conservation buffer;
Amendment 187 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Calls for convergence between reporting for accounting and reporting for regulatory purposes, in particular as regards an expected loss approach in disclosed profit, to take account of the lessons learned from the crisis and ensure that the same set of clear and transparent rules are used when generating information for supervisors and investors; cautions about the negative impact of dual reportinged to minimise dual reporting; considers that such efforts should build upon and further investigate innovations such as a regulatory page or prudential filters in accounts;
Amendment 194 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Notes the concept of a "crude" LR as a possible backstop against building excessive leverage, but has strong concerns about its added value; ; cautions that a single, flat-rate leverage ratio would need to be effective for capturing the differences in credit institutions' business models and considers that setting the ratio too low could adversely limit investment banking while setting the limit too high could lead to it being ineffectual for capturing the risk of many smaller institutions such as mortgage lenders, which have significant leveraged exposures;
Amendment 225 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Asks the Basel Committee and the Commission to explore alternatives to a crude LR, such as the possibility of setting backstop limits for business lines, RWAs and portfolios providing that due care and supervision are given to their classification; believes that the measurement of assets as either net or gross amounts should be considered in this context;
Amendment 227 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 a (new)
Paragraph 30 a (new)
30a. Further asks the Basel Committee and the Commission to explore proportionality within a crude LR through the use of threshold triggers for regulatory intervention;
Amendment 232 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. Urges the Commission to ensure that a leverage ratio does not lead to excessivinappropriate securitisation and less creditor substitutes and less credit, especially for lending in the real economy (these being likely ways for banks to reduce their leverage ratio);
Amendment 246 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Calls for different capital treatment for an OTCcounterparty credit risk treatment to be risk proportionate and for capital charges to be higher for non- centrally cleared transaction and as than transactions through a central counterparty (CCP), provided that thesuch CCPs meets high- level requirements to be defined in European legislation while taking into account standards agreed at international level, with due and having regard forto the potential costs for the corporate sector of using derivatives to hedge itstheir commercial activities. Calls for reductions in counterparty credit risk achieved through high standards of bilateral clearing (daily portfolio reconciliations, variation margins, initial margins, automated collateral transfers) to be proportionately recognised in the capital treatment of non-centrally cleared transactions;