106 Amendments of Esther DE LANGE related to 2014/2145(INI)
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 15 a (new)
Citation 15 a (new)
- having regard to the Draft ECOFIN Council Conclusions of 13 February 2015,
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 22 a (new)
Citation 22 a (new)
- having regard to the ECB's Occasional Paper no. 129 of September 2011, The Stability and Growth Pact, Crisis and Reform,
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 23
Citation 23
– having regard to the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis policy brief of July 2014 entitled ‘Structural budget balance: a love at first sight turned sour’, and the 'European Economic Governance' report of the Dutch Court of Auditors published on 9 September 2014;
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 28 a (new)
Citation 28 a (new)
- having regard to the Commission Recommendation of 25 February 2015 which aims at granting highly indebted countries further time to consolidate their budgets,
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital -A (new)
Recital -A (new)
-A. whereas the SGP was initially set up in 1997 to enable the coordination of fiscal policies among Member States aimed at avoiding unsustainable fiscal policies which could lead to sovereign debt crises in Member States with detrimental effects on the EMU as a whole;
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital –A a (new)
Recital –A a (new)
-Aa. whereas a reform of the original SGP took place in 2003-2005 which introduced a number of refinements and increased flexibility, for example through the introduction of escape clauses in the EDP, whereas this reform did not address the problem of weak enforcement provisions, nor reach agreement on the satisfactory pace of debt reduction;
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital –A b (new)
Recital –A b (new)
-Ab. whereas the legislation previous to the 6- and 2-Packs did not provide the necessary instruments to analyse all factors and effectively and timely correct the problems which may lead to a sovereign debt crisis;
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital –A c (new)
Recital –A c (new)
-Ac. whereas before the adoption of the 6- pack there was no formal framework to deal with possible macroeconomic imbalances building up within a Member State, except for the informal discussion within the Eurogroup; whereas no action was taken despite repeated warnings made by ECB President Trichet during the meetings of the Eurogroup thus further jeopardizing the economies' resilience against external shocks such as a financial crisis;
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital –A d (new)
Recital –A d (new)
-Ad. whereas by 1991 public debt averaged almost 60% of GDP in the first twelve euro countries, but almost as soon as the euro had been introduced, consolidation fatigue set in, and a number of Member States went into expansionary expenditure policies, whereas this period can be characterised as wasted good times during which the foundations were laid for the present crisis in the EMU, whereas the decision to stop excessive deficit procedures towards Germany and France fell into that period, triggering a general leniency in the implementation of the SGP;
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital -A e (new)
Recital -A e (new)
-Ae. whereas in view of the current debt dynamics and additional contingent liabilities for the budget, e.g. those stemming from population ageing, will require almost all euro area countries to conduct major fiscal adjustment over a long period of time in order to insure fiscal sustainability;
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital -A f (new)
Recital -A f (new)
-Af. whereas until now every monetary union has failed, whereas one of the main causes of their demise was a strong lack of fiscal discipline;
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital -A g (new)
Recital -A g (new)
-Ag. whereas several countries were only hours away from a default on their debt, which would have resulted in a world- wide spread of the crisis that might have triggered a depression worse than that of 1929, a situation that could be averted by putting in place ad-hoc mechanisms such as the EFSF and the EFSM, whereas conditions were attached to the help in order to make sure the loans could later be paid back, which is necessary in order to avoid an infringement of Art. 125 TFEU (no-bail-out clause);
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital -A h (new)
Recital -A h (new)
-Ah. whereas, in order to avoid a reoccurrence of this kind of crisis, as well as the spreading of the crisis to other countries through the banking sector, a number of measures were taken, which included the creation of the Banking Union, the ESM, an improved economic governance legislation in the form of the 6- and 2-Packs, the TCSG and the European Semester, all of which must be considered as a package;
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital -A i (new)
Recital -A i (new)
-Ai. whereas the primary reason behind the creation of the European Semester was to enhance the ability to identify possible future strains on the finances of a Member State and to correct them through peer pressure before starting the national budgetary procedures (the National Semester);
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital -A j (new)
Recital -A j (new)
-Aj. whereas the main aim of the SGP and the economic governance framework has thus always been and remains the avoidance of a sovereign debt crisis and its detrimental effects on EMU through responsible policies at national level and policy coordination at the EU level;
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital -A k (new)
Recital -A k (new)
-Ak. whereas , based on the review clauses in the 6- and 2-Packs and the ensuing Commission Communication of 28 November 2014, the central question of the review is whether the 6- and 2-pack have reached their objectives of avoiding unsustainable fiscal policies, the early detection and if necessary correction of macroeconomic imbalances and strengthened monitoring and surveillance for Member States threatened with or experiencing serious difficulties;
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital -A l (new)
Recital -A l (new)
-Al. whereas the review furthermore analyses to what extent the 6- and 2-pack have contributed to progress in ensuring closer coordination of economic policies of the Member States while ensuring a high level of transparency, credibility and democratic accountability;
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas, according to the Commission’s autumn forecast, after two consecutive years of unanticipated negative growth, gross domestic product (GDP) in the euro area is expected to rise by 0.8 % in 2014 and by 1.1 % in 2015, meaning that the pre-crisis growth rate will not be regained this yeathe first signs of economic recovery are clearly visible and need to be strengthened further;
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas huge differences will continue to prevail between the Member States, also following the Troika’s intervention, with forecasted GDP growth rates in 2014 ranging between -2.8 % in Cyprus and +4.6 % in Ireland reflecting increasingly undermining growing internal divergences differences in the origins of the crises as well as in the national ownership when implementing the measures agreed between the Institutions and the Member States concerned;
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas, according to the Commission’s autumn forecast, investment in the euro area decreased by 3.4 % in 2012, by 2.4 % in 2013 and by 17 % since the pre-crisis period, with the expected rebound rate in 2014 (0.6 %) and that anticipated for 2015 (1.7 %) being very weak; whereas a lack of investment can be just as detrimental to future generations as, especially when combined with excessive public debt;
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas a European investment plan is being put in place to raise EUR 315 billion in new investments over the next three years; whereas this plan is only one element destined to overcome the investment gap, and that it is not meant to replace national efforts and responsibilities to enable growth- enhancing investments in a fiscally responsible manner;
Amendment 148 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 (new)
Paragraph -1 (new)
-1. Welcomes the Commission Communication of 28 November 2014 on the economic governance review and shares its conclusion that the new framework has worked well so far, but that many aspects of the 6- and 2-packs cannot be sufficiently evaluated at this point, as that they are still recent additions and haven't been put to the test yet;
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 a (new)
Paragraph -1 a (new)
-1a. Insists that, based on the review clauses in the 6- and 2-Packs and the ensuing Commission Communication of 28 November 2014, the central question is whether the EMU has been made more resilient by the new Economic Governance framework, especially as far as its ability to avoid a Member State to default on its debt is concerned, while contributing to closer coordination of Member States' economic policies and ensuring a high level of transparency, credibility and democratic accountability;
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 b (new)
Paragraph -1 b (new)
-1b. Welcomes the 6- and 2-Pack's broadening of the scope of the Stability and Growth Pact through the addition of procedures to prevent and correct macroeconomic imbalances inside a Member State, to shift the overreliance on the deficit criterion to that of both the deficit and the overall debt, and to try to identify and correct possible problems at an early stage, thus preventing the emergence of crises at the earliest stage possible;
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 c (new)
Paragraph -1 c (new)
-1c. Encourages the Commission and the Council to pursue an approach that favours an early identification and correction of macroeconomic imbalances and fiscal problems within Member States, so as to avoid a repetition of the very painful adjustments made necessary by years, sometimes decades, of accumulated imbalances, especially those where Member States ended up living above their means at the same time as their competitiveness declined substantially;
Amendment 152 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 d (new)
Paragraph -1 d (new)
-1d. Underlines the importance of the scoreboard, whose carefully chosen indicators help identify macroeconomic imbalances at an early stage; advises to make best use of other indicators, such as social ones, when conducting the in-depth analysis of a Member State;
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 f (new)
Paragraph 1 f (new)
-1e. Stresses the importance given to structural reforms when trying to overcome macroeconomic imbalances; welcomes in this regard the analysis by ECB President Draghi in his Jackson Hole speech, notably his comparison of methods to overcome unemployment;
Amendment 154 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 f (new)
Paragraph -1 f (new)
-1f. Notes President Draghi's clarification, made in the Monetary Dialogues, in the EPs plenary and his Jackson Hole speech, that in the absence of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms the ECB's monetary policy would remain without effects; notes his warning in that same speech, that abandoning fiscal consolidation would be a self- defeating approach;
Amendment 155 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 g (new)
Paragraph -1 g (new)
-1g. Welcomes that an increasing number of Member States are exiting their Excessive Deficit Procedures;
Amendment 156 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 h (new)
Paragraph -1 h (new)
-1h. Welcomes that most Member States under a programme could exit these, often faster than initially forecasted, and are now able to access capital markets at very favourable rates, showing that they have regained the confidence of markets and investors; lauds that the structural reforms carried out in these Member States as well as the subsequent increase in competitiveness has led them to enjoy amongst the highest growth rates in the European Union, setting the grounds for a rebound of employment;
Amendment 157 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 i (new)
Paragraph -1 i (new)
-1i. Is alarmed about the uneven attainment of Medium Term Objectives, with the overall debt still increasing in a number of Member States, especially in those which combine a high private and public debt with declining international competitiveness;
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 j (new)
Paragraph -1 j (new)
-1j. Questions, in view of the extreme efforts that had to be made to save smaller countries, the Union's ability to prevent large Member States from defaulting on their debt; urges to carry out all structural reforms as well as ensuring the sustainability of the debt well before the markets lose confidence;
Amendment 159 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 k (new)
Paragraph -1 k (new)
-1k. Warns that the Pact's Achilles heel still is its weak enforcement provisions and their application by the Commission and the Council;
Amendment 160 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 l (new)
Paragraph -1 l (new)
-1l. Recalls that in the absence of a full- fledged European Political Union a number of safeguards are necessary, recalls that the Treaty centres these on the Stability and Growth Pact, the no-bail-out clause, the prohibition of privileged access to financial institutions by the public sector, and the exclusion of monetary state financing, thus in principle leaving the responsibility of their acts to the Member States; warns that failure to correctly implement these rules might put the survivability of the entire EMU at risk;
Amendment 161 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 l (new)
Paragraph -1 l (new)
-1l. Doesn't expect Treaty changes to be made in the foreseeable future, thus leaving no alternative to apply the present set of rules;
Amendment 162 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 m (new)
Paragraph -1 m (new)
-1m. Notes that current level of inflation is well below the ECB's stated aim of 'under, but close to 2%'; believes that this is mainly due to a number of factors that are either of temporary nature or linked to the dramatic decline of energy prices which took anyone by surprise; understands the forceful actions by the ECB is aimed at increasing prices to the intended inflation levels; notes that the typical effects of deflation such as the combination of massive and prolonged price and wage reductions as well as negative growth only temporarily took place in program countries, but can neither be observed at the euro area level nor at the EU level; understands that most forecasts predict a rebound of inflation, further increase of growth as well as a rebound of employment in the near future;
Amendment 169 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Believes that the current economic situation calls for urgent, comprehensive and decisive measures to facegive additional impetus to the thalreat of deflation or very low inflation, lowdy increasing but still fragile growth and to fight high unemployment;
Amendment 195 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Highlights the fact that the current economic governance framework does not allow for a proper debate on the economic perspective of the euro area or on an aggregate fiscal stance and does not address the different economic and fiscal situations on an equal footinggenerally suffers from a lack of ownership at national level and limited attention to the international economic perspective and challenges of the euro area and the EU;
Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. NoteRecalls that major policy initiatives which included policy recommendations were based on economic forecasts that had not anticipated the low growth and inflation experienced and have not fully taken into account the underestimation of the size of the fiscal multiplier, the importance of spillover effects across countries in a period of synchronised consolidation and the deflationary impact of cumulative structural reformseasures destined to prevent countries from defaulting on their debt included policy recommendations that needed to be revised at regular intervals, as the events took place in an environment of internationally deteriorating growth and due to the cumulative effects of countries experiencing a sovereign debt crisis and the provision of statistics which in at least one case were highly incorrect, (deleted) all taken together resulting in economic forecasts that couldn't possibly anticipate the low growth and inflation experienced, requiring amongst others to repeatedly adjust the fiscal multiplier to these new realities; Warns therefore against measuring the results of the adjustment programmes against the effects initially expected;
Amendment 240 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Draws attention to the fact that the strongest negative spill-over effects, including on non-European countries, are those resulting from belated correction of macroeconomic imbalances and fiscal problems;
Amendment 241 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. Invites to compare the results of the adjustment programmes to the catastrophic situation that would have arisen if Member States had defaulted on their debt;
Amendment 246 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses that the current situation calls for closer and inclusive economic coordination (to increase aggregate demand, improve fiscal sustainability and allow for fair and sustainableproper implementation of the current economic governance framework and the necessary improvement of the national ownership of the measures agreed; supports the Commission's three pillar approach consisting of fiscal adjustment, growth-enhancing structural reforms and related investments), and for swift reactions so as to correct the most obvious fault lines in the economic governance frameworkll aimed at enhancing growth and creating jobs;
Amendment 274 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Warns that the accumulation of procedures, the proliferation of escape clauses and the shift in emphasis on conditional (as opposed to unconditional) compliance makes the economic governance framework complex, less predictable and not transparent enough, which is detrimental to its effectiveness and the ownership and acceptance by parliaments, social partners and citizens of guidelines, recommendations and reforms stemming from this framework;
Amendment 291 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Acknowledges that progress has been made with a debate on the Medium-Term Objective (MTO) and a better ownership of the national debate in euro area Member States, also thanks to the contribution of the national fiscal councils; Calls on the Commission to present an overview on the structure and the workings of national fiscal councils in the different Member States and how better cooperation between these councils can improve ownership in Member States;
Amendment 304 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2
Subheading 2
Amendment 305 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -7 (new)
Paragraph -7 (new)
-7. Recalls that the Stability and Growth Pact aims at a balanced budget over the medium term, allowing for budget deficits during downturns and expecting surpluses to be achieved during economic good times, thus compensating for the deficits;
Amendment 309 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Underlines all the existing provisions underthat the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which haves been put in place to ensure an anti-cyclical policy; finds it regrettable that these provisions were not put to full use in previous years, in the context of low inflation, low growth and high unemploymentthe fiscal sustainability of the Member States participating in the Economic and Monetary Union, thus specifically allows Member States to conduct an anti-cyclical policy when necessary, and allowing for the necessary fiscal room for the automatic stabilisers to work properly; finds it regrettable that these provisions were not put to full use, as most Member States failed to achieve a surplus while their economy was booming;
Amendment 321 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Regrets that the historically low interest rates which followed the introduction of the Economic and Monetary Union were only rarely used to decrease the sovereign debt, and in some cases even misused to increase the debt on the false grounds that borrowing would cost nearly nothing;
Amendment 326 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Welcomes the fact that in its interpretative communication on flexibility, the Commission acknowledges that the way in which the current fiscal rules are interpreted is crucialcan be one element in bridging the investment gap in the EU and implementing growth-enhancing structural reforms; notes that the Communication makes no changes as far as the calculation of the deficit is concerned, as no investment is exempted from the deficit calculation; instead, certain investments can justify a temporary deviation from the Medium Term Objective (MTO) of the concerned Member State or from the adjustment path towards it; notes that the investment clause cannot be activated if the investment would lead to an excess over the 3% of GDP reference value for the deficit;
Amendment 335 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Underlines that it is possible to increase investments even in an environment of an overall reduction of public spending, as called for by ECB President Draghi in his Jackson Hole speech; urges to follow his appeal to shift expenditures towards growth enhancing investments; underlines that this was successfully done in EU countries in their struggle to escape the crisis;
Amendment 344 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Supports all the incentives proposed by the European Commission to finance the new European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), mainly by making national contributions to the fund fiscally neutral as regards the SGP; calls for further clarification regarding the concrete treo the attainment of the Medium Term Objective, thus not modifying the required fiscal adjustments; Draws the atmtent of these contributions in accordance with the new paradigm set out in the communicationion to the SGP's vital contribution to confidence building when attracting foreign investments;
Amendment 356 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. notes that the national contributions will be fully calculated as expenditures and thus count towards the deficit, but that the Commission proposes that non- respect of the 3% deficit rule, or the 60% debt rule, would not lead to an Excessive Deficit Procedure to be launched if this is solely due to the EFSI contribution, as long as the excess over the reference value is small and is expected to be temporary;
Amendment 377 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. BelievNotes that the communication rightly broadens the scope of the investment clause, allowing for flexibility in the preventive arm of the SGP to accommodate investment programmes by the Member Statesin the form of a temporary deviation from the MTO, provided the deviation does not lead to an excess over the 3% deficit reference value and an appropriate safety margin, in particular as regards expenditure on projects under structural and cohesion policy, including the Youth Employment Initiative, trans- European networks and the Connecting Europe Facility, and co-financing under the EFSI; believes that this approach must be urgently reassessed to be symmetrically applied to the corrective arm of the SGP;
Amendment 390 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Believes that the structural reform clause under the preventive arm and the means of considering structural reform plans under the corrective arm constitutes a step forward as regards ensuring the more efficient implementation of reforms by Member States; calls for further clarification as to the types of structural reforms eligible under this new scheme; believes that a direct link to the cost, timeframe impact and value of structural reforms should also be explicit in the corrective arm of the SGP;
Amendment 392 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Urges that it isn't merely the announcement of structural reforms that should constitute a relevant factor, but that a regular check of their implementation is necessary and that the Commission should not refrain from taking measures in case the reforms are not on track;
Amendment 393 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)
Paragraph 11 b (new)
11b. Recalls that some structural reforms lead to additional costs, but not all do so; questions the inclusion of structural reforms not associated with costs into the categories that trigger flexibility;
Amendment 401 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Believes that structural reforms should in the medium and long term have a positive socioeconomic return and contribute to increased administrative capacitefficiency and efficacy;
Amendment 414 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Deplores, however,Supports the fact that the communication does not touch upon the nature of ‘'unusual events’' falling outside the control of a Member State which could allow it to temporarily depart from the adjustment path towards achieving its MTO, as this would have led to a rather futile exercise of defining all kinds of hypothetical unusual events, with the danger of leaving out the one that will actually happen;
Amendment 422 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3
Subheading 3
Amendment 428 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Believes that more room for flexibility and soft laws exists under the SGP andthe Commission communication clarifies where room for flexibility exists under the existing legislation; welcomes the attempt to shed more clarity into the European Semester; invites the Commission to build on this flexibility and to propose rule changes where neededis complicated field, especially by helping governments to avoid nurturing false expectations concerning flexibility when drafting their budgets; stresses however that too much flexibility will hamper the predictability, transparency and effectiveness of the economic governance framework;
Amendment 439 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Draws in that regard attention to the possible contradiction between the SGP's aim to achieve budgetary surpluses in good times, and a very generous application of flexibility as now foreseen; fears that, if this flexibility would always be applied fully, it might cement the deficit-making attitude of some governments; urges the Commission to clarify how it will make sure that the deficits and the surpluses will be balanced over time, in line with the Pact's requirements;
Amendment 440 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)
Paragraph 14 b (new)
14b. Strongly regrets that the Commission's Communication of flexibility does not clearly state if the various methods to apply flexibility are mutually exclusive, or if they can be applied in a cumulative way; urges the Commission to clarify this;
Amendment 441 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 c (new)
Paragraph 14 c (new)
14c. Understands that the Council took note of the Commission's Communication on flexibility and underlined the need to maintain credibility and effectiveness in the implementation of the SGP;
Amendment 442 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 d (new)
Paragraph 14 d (new)
14d. Recalls that in 2003 two large countries avoided being subjected to an Excessive Deficit Procedure; draws the attention to the fact that several small countries couldn't benefit from this kind of leniency and had to go through painful adjustment programmes; urges the Commission and the Council to evaluate small and big countries in the same manner; fervently hopes that there is no de facto 'too-big-to-be-blamed-country' principle;
Amendment 454 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Invites the Commission and the Council to better articulate the fiscal and macroeconomic frameworks, notably in the corrective arm of the SGP, to allow for earlier debate among stakeholders, taking into account the need to increase convergence between euro area Member States and the role of national parliaments and social partners regarding the design and implementation of structural reforms;
Amendment 471 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Insists that the Annual Growth Survey (AGS) and euro area recommendation, as well as the country-specific recommendations (CSR), must be better designimplemented and put to better use to allow for a global economic debate, notably as regards convergence in the euro area; proposessuggests that Member States ensure that the country-specific recommendations (CSRs) should be establishare debated oin the basis of striking a better balance between the AGS and the macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP),ir national Parliament and suggests that the euro area recommendation should be made compulsory followingthe subject of a proper debate within the European Parliament, with incentives being offered so as to encourage the implementation thereof; requests that the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) recommendation be joined together with the CSRs (deleted);
Amendment 489 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Asks the Commission to verify whether, considering the very slow pace of the reduction of the overall debt in the euro area to levels below the 60% threshold requested by the Treaty, to study if this is due to an insufficient implementation of existing legislation and if the current 1/20 rule on debt reduction is still enough to make public finances sustainable and whether it needs to be reconsidered;
Amendment 497 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Is alarmed by the rate of debt increase in countries which already have a very high level of debt; notes this is in stark contradiction with the 1/20 rule on debt reduction; requests the Commission to explain how it intends to remove this contradiction and in what time-frame;
Amendment 498 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)
Paragraph 17 b (new)
17b. Recalls that the 3% deficit limit was chosen to reflect the 3% annual economic growth which was prevalent in the EU when the legislation was first set; wonders if this 3% limit isn't too high now that growth is substantially and consistently lower than that; asks the Commission to study if the sometimes unremarkable consolidation results might be due to this discrepancy;
Amendment 508 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Asks the Commission to make the three-pillar strategy (investment, fiscal rules and structural reforms), presented in the AGS 2015, more concrete under the euro area recommendation and in the CSRs and to strengthen its approach by building a fourth pillar on taxationcountry-specific recommendations (CSRs);
Amendment 526 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Believes that national fiscal councils could play a useful role at EU level; requests the set-up of a European network allowing forRecognises the need for independent analysis of the economic perspective to be established as a basis for a proper political discussion among stakeholders; urges to further develop the Commission's unit known as Chief Economist Analyst, which provides an additional and independent analysis of the economic perspective to be established as a basis for a proper political discussion among stakeholderevaluation inside the Commission of all measures concerning the economic governance, advises to increase its capacity and to formally allocate it to the Vice-President in charge of the euro and the social dialogue; demands that the Chief Economist Analyst be transmitted all relevant documents in time to carry out its tasks;
Amendment 538 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Believes that the MIP must be used in a more balanced manner between deficit and surplus countries, also to address countries with significant room forRecalls that macroeconomic surveillance is destined to identify countries that are likely to experience a crisis in the future and that the MIP is meant to avoid crises to happen, by launching the necessary structural reforms at a moment when it is still easy to do so, rather than when a country is in deep trouble; acknowledges that countries which have a significant room for action have begun to use this; recalls that in an open economy analysing bilateral trade balances is a meaningless exercise; considers that trade surpluses are mainly due to the activity of private firms, whilst persistent trade deficits can generally be corrected by government action;
Amendment 547 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Stresses the detrimental impact of an inverse age pyramid on the pension system and the ensuing need for those Member States affected by demographic change to achieve substantial trade surpluses over a long period of time in order to be able to afford a sufficient level of pensions in the future; requests the Commission to explain how this will be taken into account in its macroeconomic surveillance procedure;
Amendment 563 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Calls onSupports the Commission to explore ways in which to better alig's approach, in line with the 6-pack, to make a clear differentiation between the preventive and corrective arms of the SGP, in particular regarding investment allowing temporary deviation from the MTO, or the adjustment path towards it, within the existence of a safety margin under the preventive arm, considering that countries that are under the preventive arm have more room for action;
Amendment 570 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Asks the Commission to take into account all relevanalyse all important factors, including real growth and inflation, when evaluating the economic and fiscal situations of Member States under the EDP;
Amendment 574 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
Amendment 581 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Insists that the focus on structural deficits since the 2005 reform of the SGP, together with the introduction of an expenditure rule with the 2011 reform, as well as the concept of output gap which is extremely difficult to quantify correctly, and therefore creates margins for the discretionary implementation of the SGP, as; fears that the calculation of potential growth, which underpinnings the assessment of structural deficits, and that of the expenditure rule, are subject to several questionable assumptions and can force to substantial revisions between the Commission’'s autumn and spring forecasts, thereby leading to various calculations and diverging assessments as regards the implementation of the SGP;
Amendment 599 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Calls on the Commission, when evaluating the fiscal position of Members States, to include a better balance between the impact of the agreed fiscal measures and the fiscal figures based on estimated potential growth for GDP, output gaps and structural deficits that may introduce unexpected radical change at a later stagebase their analysis on hard and proven facts and to adapt required measures where necessary;
Amendment 605 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4
Subheading 4
Democratic accountability and challenges ahead in deepenimproving economic governance
Amendment 611 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Believes there is a strong need for less complexity, better ownership, more transparency and democracy in economic governance; believes that looking forward towardsit is difficult to achieve deeper integration cannot be achieved by adding a new layers of rules to the already existing ones;
Amendment 625 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Acknowledges, based on the current situation, that the economic governance framework must be corrected andsimplified, better enforced and, where necessary, completed in both the medium and long term to allow for the EU and the euro area to meet the challenges of convergence, long-lasting investment and reliance;
Amendment 635 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Calls for the annual sustainable growth guidelinesConvergence Guidelines, which contain four to five targeted priorities and are valid for five years, to be made subject to a codecision procedure that should be introduced in the next Treaty change; instructssuggests foreseeing its President to present the annual sustainable growth guidelines as amended by Parliament at the springse during a European Council;
Amendment 640 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Recalls that legislation implementthe part of the legislation that was introduced during the crisis on the basis of intergovernmental agreements lacks democratic accountability at EU level, as for this part the democratic accountability is limited to the national level;
Amendment 652 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Recalls the European Parliament’'s requestopinion specifying that the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) outside of the structure of the institutions of the Union represents a setback to the political integration of the Union and, therefore, demands that the ESM be fully integrated into the community framework and made formally accountable to Parliament; understands that in its present form the Treaty doesn't allow for such a mechanisms to be established under Community law;
Amendment 661 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. Calls for a new legal framework for future assistance programmes to be studied in order to ensure that all decisions are taken under the main responsibility of the Commission with full involvement of Parliament, acting on behalf of the Council, with full democratic accountability enacted to the European Parliament; recalls that, as long as the financial assistance is directly granted by the Member States of the euro area, these will need to have the final say in the programmes;
Amendment 672 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Requests, as perTakes note of the opinion of the ECJ’'s Advocate-General, that the ECB not form part of any assistance programmes in those cases where an OMT has already been granted to the country concerned; understands it is his opinion that there is no limitation to the ECB's involvement in assistance programmes as long as no OMT was granted; reminds that the ECJ hasn't ruled in this case yet;
Amendment 684 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Requests that a reassessment of the Eurogroup’'s decision-making process be conducted so as to provide for appropriate democratic accountability; bwelievcomes that in the long term the Commissioner for Economic Affairs should assume the role of President of the Eurogroupe readiness by the Eurogroup President to regularly participate in the meetings of the ECON committee in the same way as the chair of the Ecofin Council, thus insuring a similar level of democratic accountability; urges to keep a clear distinction between the Council and the Commission as far as the organisation of their respective meetings is concerned;
Amendment 698 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Recalls that a ‘'genuine Economic and Monetary Union’' (EMU) cannot simply be limitbe based ton a system of rules but also requires an increased euro area fiscal capacitywhich are only enforced in a lax way; rejects the idea of a euro area fiscal capacity; reminds that the EU already has a powerful anti-cyclical mechanism in the form of the SGP;
Amendment 718 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Recalls that the banking union was the result of the political will to avoid the renewal of a financial crisis and that the same will is needed as regards a fiscal unions well as a way to minimise the negative spill-overs emanating from a sovereign debt crisis, and that it was meant as a necessary addition to the SGP; urges to fully implement and enforce these mechanisms in order to avoid a political crisis;
Amendment 721 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)
Paragraph 35 a (new)
35a. Reminds of the main findings of the Expert Group on the feasibility of Eurobonds, created by the Commission and led by Mrs Tumpel-Gugerell, which concluded that the issuing of debt under joint and several liability is not compatible with the Treaty, and that in the present situation of Member States still struggling with over-indebtedness a mutualisation of debt is economically unsound as well as politically not feasible;
Amendment 722 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 b (new)
Paragraph 35 b (new)
35b. Warns all Member States to stick to their engagements concerning the reimbursement of the debt they have contracted; draws the attention to the highly disruptive effects emanating from announcements by governments that they do not feel bound by their obligations to pay back the debt which was contracted in a generous gesture of solidarity by the other countries of the euro area; warns that such an attitude might spell a cast on any future plan to mutualise debt;
Amendment 742 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 – introductory part
Paragraph 37 – introductory part
37. Invites the stakeholders in this necessary next step of the EMU to avoid left-over and to explore all options which have been well discussed and documented over a long period of time as ways of achieving a deepening of the EMUexplore all options to deepen the EMU and to make it more resilient, such as:
Amendment 745 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 – indent 1
Paragraph 37 – indent 1
Amendment 768 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 – indent 2
Paragraph 37 – indent 2
– a social dimension, including a minimum wage mechanism and a minimum unemployment benefit scheme for theproper to each euro area country, and in- depth reforms to favour mobilityflexibility and mobility between professions and between Member States,
Amendment 779 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 – indent 3
Paragraph 37 – indent 3
– the inclusion of the ESM in Union law and a new approach towards Eurobonds,
Amendment 783 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 – indent 3 a (new)
Paragraph 37 – indent 3 a (new)
- - the inclusion of the TCSG in Union law,
Amendment 784 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 – indent 3 b (new)
Paragraph 37 – indent 3 b (new)
- the creation of a European Monetary Fund, taking over the functions of the ESM as well as those associated with the elaboration and implementation of programmes;
Amendment 786 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 – indent 3 c (new)
Paragraph 37 – indent 3 c (new)
- a broad return to the no-bail-out clause, thus restoring the responsibility of Member States for their own actions, as it is explicitly foreseen in the Treaty,
Amendment 787 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 – indent 3 d (new)
Paragraph 37 – indent 3 d (new)
- to increase the automaticity in the SGP by shifting the decision power inside the Commission from the political to the administrative level on the basis of independent economic analysis,
Amendment 788 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 – indent 3 e (new)
Paragraph 37 – indent 3 e (new)
- a greater role given to the markets in order to achieve fiscal discipline,
Amendment 789 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 – indent 3 f (new)
Paragraph 37 – indent 3 f (new)
- the implementation of fiscal breaks at the national level, as foreseen by the TCSG,
Amendment 790 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 – indent 3 g (new)
Paragraph 37 – indent 3 g (new)
- the setting of a legal framework for state defaults,
Amendment 791 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 – indent 4
Paragraph 37 – indent 4
Amendment 810 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Requests that itpossible further steps in the EMU be elaborated on the basis of a ‘'4+1 Presidents’' approach, including the EP President, who should be invited to all meetings, provided with full information, and given the right to participate in the debates;
Amendment 815 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Asks its President to represent, in close cooperation with the chairmen of the political groups or those Members specifically appointed by their groups or Parliament, to represent the European Parliament in this upcoming task on the basis of the mandate given by thisits voted resolutions;
Amendment 818 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39 a (new)
Paragraph 39 a (new)
39 a. Advises its President, in order to further strengthen his mandate, to undertake an ex-ante coordination with the chairmen of the political groups concerning his presentation of this resolution to the European Council, a practice that should be extended to all other resolutions presented there, including those concerning the AGS and the CSRs;