34 Amendments of Othmar KARAS related to 2013/2277(INI)
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas there was a broad political agreement to avoid a disorderly default by Member States in the EU, and especially in the euro area, in order to avoid economic and social chaos, with as a consequence the impossibility to pay pensions and civil servant's salaries, as well as dire knock-down effects on the economy, the banking system and social welfare, in addition to the sovereign being completely cut off from the capital markets for a prolonged period;
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is an agreement between the Member State concerned and the Troika, which results from negotiations and whereby a Member State undertakes to carry out a number of actions in exchange for financial assistance; whereas it is stipulated in the ESM Treaty that a Member State requesting assistance from the ESM has also to addressis expected to address, wherever possible, a request for assistance to the IMF;
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas the programmes were not suited to comprehensively correcting macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated sometimes over decades, the latter task being left to the improved economic governance in form of the 6- pack, the 2-pack and the general framework of the European Semester;
Amendment 173 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that the precise triggers for the crises differed in all four Member States; notes however that in all cases the build-up of massive macroeconomic imbalances was at the core of the problem, and public debt had risen to a level which became unsustainable;
Amendment 177 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Notes that Europe's public finances were already in a poor state before the crisis: since the 1970s the level of Member States' public debt has gradually crept upwards under the impact of the various economic downturns the EU has experienced; notes that the cost of recovery plans, falling tax revenues and high welfare expenditure have caused both public debt and the ratio of public debt to GDP to rise in all Member States, although not to a uniform degree across the Union;1 a __________________ 1a Art 15 of the Report on the financial, economic and social crisis (CRIS mid- term report 2009/2182(INI)) as voted in plenary
Amendment 178 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Recalls the triangle of inter-linked vulnerabilities, whereby the unbalanced fiscal policy of some Member States has amplified the pre-crisis public deficits and the financial crisis has contributed significantly to a further ballooning of those deficits, followed by tensions in sovereign debt markets in some Member States;2 a __________________ 2a = Art 1 of the Report on the financial, economic and social crisis (CRIS committee final resolution 2010/2242 (INI)) as voted in plenary
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 c (new)
Paragraph 1 c (new)
1c. Points out that the recent financial, economic and banking crisis is the most severe since World War II; acknowledges that without action being taken on European level, the crisis could have had even more severe consequences; notes in this respect that former ECB President Trichet has pointed out in a public hearing his concern that without swift and forceful action the sovereign debt crisis might have triggered a crisis of the scale of the Great Depression 1929;
Amendment 191 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Notes that, prior to the beginning of the EU-IMF assistance programme initiated in the spring of 2010, there was a dual fear associated with the ‘insolvency’ and ’non- sustainability’ of the public finances of Greece as a result of the constantly declining competitiveness of the Greek economy and decades of imprudent fiscal policy, with the government deficit reaching 15.7% of GDP in 2009, and the debt-to-GDP ratio continuing on an upward trend since 2003 when it stood at 97.4%, reaching 129.7% in 2009 and 156.9% in 2012;
Amendment 229 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme in 2013, speculations about the systemic instability in the Cypriot economy had been ongoing for a long time, owing inter alia to the exposure of Cypriot banks to overleveraged local property companies, the Greek debt crisis, the downgrading of Cypriot government bonds by international rating agencies, the inability to refund public expenditure from the international markets, and the initial reluctance of the government to restructure the troubled financial sector, opting instead to rely on a massive injection of capital by Russia, which was not linked to any conditionality;
Amendment 232 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6a (new)
Paragraph 6a (new)
6a. Deplores that requests for financial assistance were made at a very late stage, when countries were already close to default and had lost access to markets;
Amendment 263 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Notes that the IMF is the global institution tasked with providing states experiencing balance of payment problems with conditional financial assistance; points to the fact that all Member States are members of the IMF and have therefore the right to request its assistance; notes that in view of the magnitude of this crisis, a sole reliance on financial means of the IMF would not have been sufficient to tackle the problems of the countries in need of financial assistance;
Amendment 417 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal; regrets the lack ofat the progress in Greece is not yet sufficient, despite unprecedented reforms having been undertaken; acknowledges however that according to a recent OECD Survey, Greece has made impressive headway in cutting its fiscal deficit and implementing structural reforms to raise labour market flexibility and improve labour competitiveness, thus having the highest OECD rate of responsiveness to structural reforms recommended in the Going for Growth publication;
Amendment 447 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Underlines that adequate economic models are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programmes; deplores that adequate statistics and information were not always available; points out that in Greece large- scale fraud was happening in this respect in the years preceding the setting up of the programme, which were uncovered bit by bit over a long period, thus repeatedly forcing to readjust the multipliers, forecasts and proposed measures;
Amendment 454 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Notes that the hearings undertaken with representatives of the Commission, the ECB, the ESM and the IMF have shown that the member states under an adjustment programmes had no alternative but to go through the adjustment; further understands from the hearings that the economic and social consequences, although already very high and painful, would have been greater by a magnitude in case of a disorderly default;
Amendment 466 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Notes thatHighly welcomes that the main objectives of financial assistance were achieved in the short run, namely the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; further notesnotes however that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes that the financial assistance and adjustment programme in Greece have not prevented an orderly default nor contagion of the crisis to other Member States; deplores the economic and social downturn which became evident when the fiscal and macroeconomic corrections were put into place;
Amendment 499 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Deplores however the sometimes over- optimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth is concerned, but also the insufficient recognition of political resistance to change in some Member States; deplores the fact that this also affected the Troika’s analysis of the interplay between fiscal consolidation and growth; notes that as a result fiscal targets could not be fulfilled;
Amendment 502 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. Understands from the hearings that a strict relationship exists between the length of the adjustment programme and the help made available through the dedicated funds such as the ESM, meaning that a longer adjustment period would inevitably have meant substantially larger amounts to be made available and guaranteed by the other euro area countries and the IMF, something which was not politically feasible in view of the already very high amounts involved; points out that the length of the adjustment programmes and the reimbursement periods are distinctly longer than in usual IMF financial assistance programmes;
Amendment 511 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Regrets thatWelcomes the reduction of structural deficits in all programme countries since the start of their respective assistance programmes has; notes that these have not yet led to a reduction in the ratios of public debt to GDP; underlinnotes that the ratio of public debt to GDP has instead sharply increased in all programme countries;
Amendment 522 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Considers that fiscal multipliers are difficult to assess with certainty; recalls in this respect that the IMF admitted to underestimating the fiscal multiplier in its growth forecasts prior to October 2012 but that the Commission stated in November 2012 that forecast errors were not due to the underestimation of fiscal multipliers; points out that this expression of public disagreement between the Commission and the IMF was not followed up; understands that many of the models' variables have changed over time, ranging from the re- assessment of the level of national ownership to the world-wide economic slump, so that the original forecasts and multipliers rapidly lost their validity;
Amendment 531 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Points outUnderstands that while the IMF’'s stated objective in its assistance operations within the frame of the Troika is internal devaluation, the Commission has never clearly endorsed this objective; notes that the objective emphasised by the Commission in all four programme countries under enquiry has rather been fiscal consolidationfavoured instrument to regain competiveness is mainly based on internal devaluation, the Commission's foremost preoccupation is fiscal consolidation, and that it was commonly decided to rely on a mix of both instruments as well as structural reforms, with other measures complementing this approach;
Amendment 563 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Stresses that national-level ownership is important, especially in the field of structural reforms and fiscal adjustments, and that failure to implement agreed measures has consequences in terms of the expected results; inducing additional hardship over an even longer period for the country concerned; takes note of the IMF's experience that country ownership could be seen as the single most important factor in the success of any financial assistance programme;
Amendment 607 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Points out that due to its ad hoc nature there was no appropriate legal basis for setting up the Troika on the basis of Union primary law, which led to the establishment of inter-governmental mechanisms such as the ESM; demands that any future solution shall be based on Union primary law; acknowledges that this might lead to the necessity of a Treaty change;
Amendment 655 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB’s role to that of a provider of expertise; further notes that the ECB mandate is limited by the TFEU to monetary policy and that the involvement of the ECB in any matter related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies is therefore on uncertain legal ground; notes, however, that the ECJ has ruled in its Case C-370/12 ("Pringle vs Ireland") that the tasks allocated to the ECB by the ESM Treaty are in line with the various tasks which the TFEU and the Statute of the ESCB [and the ECB] confer on the ECB;
Amendment 672 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Points to the generally weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level; notes however that this democratic accountability varies between countries, depending on the will of national executives, as demonstrated in the case of the refusal of the original MoU by the Cypriot parliament;
Amendment 730 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 a (new)
Paragraph 38 a (new)
38a. Welcomes the adoption of the 6-pack and the 2-pack, with the ability to correcting imbalances at an early stage, as well as the establishment of a sound banking supervision; Urges all Member States to increase their national ownership in the European Semester's workings and decisions and to carry out all measures and reforms they have agreed to in the context of the Country Specific Recommendations; Reminds that the Commission has identified a significant degree of progress in comparison with previous years in only 15 % of the around 400 country-specific recommendations;
Amendment 731 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 b (new)
Paragraph 38 b (new)
38b. Advocates a request for assistance to be made at the earliest possible moment in order to reduce uncertainties and costs, including the social costs that go hand in hand with a belated request;
Amendment 732 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 c (new)
Paragraph 38 c (new)
38c. Welcomes the willingness of the Commission, the ECB, the President of the Eurogroup and the IMF as well as of the national governments and central banks of Cyprus, Ireland, Greece and Portugal to cooperate and participate in the evaluation of the European Parliament on the role and operations of the Troika, including by answering the detailed questionnaire and/or participating in formal and informal hearings;
Amendment 779 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Stresses that the ESM should evolve towards Community-method management as provided for in the ESM Treaty and demands that the ESM be made accountable to the European Parliament including with respect to decisions to grant financial assistance, in order to exert democratic accountability over the ESM at the European level as well;
Amendment 799 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Calls for the involvement of social partners in the design and implementation of adjustment programmes, current and future; calls, where possible, for the involvement of the EIB in the design and the implementation of investment related measures;
Amendment 849 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43 a (new)
Paragraph 43 a (new)
43a. calls for the establishment of clear, transparent and binding rules of procedure for the interaction between the institutions within the Troika and the allocation of tasks therein; strongly believes that a clear definition and division of tasks is needed in order to enhance transparency, enable a stronger democratic control over and to underpin the credibility of the work of the Troika;
Amendment 879 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45
Paragraph 45
45. Is of the opinion that the option of a Treaty change allowing for the extension of the scope of the present Art. 143 TFEU to all Member States, instead of being restricted to non-euro Member States, should be explored ; similarly, takes the view that the option of a Treaty change to create a European Monetary Fund within the Community framework as an alternative to the IMF should also be explored; further considers that other issues to be evaluated include the current institutional framework of the Troika, the involvement of the ECB in the review of the programmes and the mandatoryrecommended involvement of the IMF in euro area financial assistance programmes as enshrined in the ESM treaty;
Amendment 882 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 a (new)
Paragraph 45 a (new)
45a. Calls for the creation of a European Monetary Fund on the basis of Union law, which shall act according to the Community method; points out that such a EMF should combine the financial means of the ESM geared to support countries experiencing balance of payments problems or facing state insolvency with the expertise that the Commission (DG ECFIN) has gained over the last few years in this field;
Amendment 883 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 b (new)
Paragraph 45 b (new)
45b. Is of the opinion that the option of developing a mechanism with clear procedural steps for states, which are in danger of insolvency, should be explored, accompanying the rules of the 6-pack and the 2-pack;
Amendment 914 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 46
Paragraph 46
46. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the European Central Bank. and the IMF;