BETA

Activities of Olle SCHMIDT related to 2010/0251(COD)

Plenary speeches (4)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0251(COD)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0251(COD)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0251(COD)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0251(COD)

Amendments (80)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3

(3) It is appropriate and necessary for the provisions to take the legislative form of a Regulation as some provisions impose direct obligations on private parties to notify and disclose net short positions relating to certain instruments and regarding uncovered short selling. This Regulation does not impose notification and disclosure obligations with respect to long positions, as such obligations are the subject matter of Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market1. A regulation is also necessary to confer powers on the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESA (ESMA) established by Regulation (EU) No ~~[…/…]~~1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council16 to coordinate measures taken by competent authorities or to take measures itself. ______________________ 1 OJ L 390, 31.12.2004, p. 38.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Sharon BOWLES, Olle SCHMIDT

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

(4) To set an end to the current fragmented situation in which some Member States have taken divergent measures and to restrict the possibility of divergent measures being taken by competent authorities it is important to address the potential risks arising from short selling and credit default swaps in a harmonised manner. The requirements to be imposed should address the identified risks without ~~unduly detracting from the benefits that short selling provid~~having a detrimental effect on the functioning of financial markets in the Union and taking into account differences toin the ~~quality and efficiency of marke~~Member States and the potential economic impact of the requirements.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6

(6) Enhanced transparency relating to significant net short positions in specific financial instruments is ~~likely to be of benefit to both the~~considered beneficial for the purpose of regulator ~~and to~~y market ~~participants~~oversight. For shares admitted to trading on a trading venue in the Union, a two-tier model should be introduced that provides for greater transparency of significant net short positions in shares at the appropriate level. ~~At a lower threshold n~~Notification of a position above a certain threshold should be made privately to the regulators concerned to enable them to monitor and, where necessary, investigate short selling that may create systemic risks or be abusive; a~~t a hig~~nd the positions above ther threshold, positions should be publicly disclosed to the market in aggregate, anonymous form in order to provide useful information to other market participants about ~~significant individual~~the volume of short selling positions in shares.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8

(8) The notification requirements for sovereign debt should apply to the debt issued by the Union and Member States, including any ministry, department, central bank, agency or instrumentality that issues debt on behalf of a Member State but excluding regional bodies or quasi public bodies that issue debt. This Regulation should not cover debt instruments of corporate issuers in the Union which are not issued on behalf of a Member State.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

(10) To be useful to regulators and the market, any transparency regime should provide ~~complete and accurate~~ information about a natural or legal person's material short positions. In particular, information provided to the regulator or the market in aggregate, anonymous form should take into account both short and long positions so as to provide valuable information about the natural or legal person's net short position in shares, sovereign debt and credit default swaps. Complete and accurate disclosure of material short positions provides supervisory authorities with important information about risks in the market and is considered important for the purpose of market oversight. In contrast, it is not considered necessary for the purpose of market oversight to require the marking of individual short orders, which might be closed within short periods of time.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

(12) In addition to the transparency regime for the disclosure of net short positions in shares, a requirement for the marking of sell orders that are executed on trading venues as short orders should be introduced to provide supplementary information about the volume of short sales of shares executed on trading venues. Information about short orders should be collated by the trading venue and published in summary form at least daily in order to also help competent authorities and market participants to monitor levels of short selling.deleted

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Sharon BOWLES, Olle SCHMIDT

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

(12) ~~In addition to the transparency regime for the disclosure of net short positions in shares,~~The Commission should conduct a full and thorough analysis of the costs and benefits of introducing a requirement for the marking of s~~ell~~hort orders that are executed on trading venues as short orders should be introduced to provide supplementary information about the volume of short sales of shares executed on trading venues. Information about short orders should be collated by the trading venue and published in summary form at least daily in order to also help competent authorities and market participants to monitor levels of short selling. Any decision to introduce such marking should be duly justified, and should not pre-empt the results of the Commission's analysis. The analysis should be made public.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

(13) Buying credit default swaps without having a long position in underlying sovereign debt or another position whose value is likely to be negatively impacted by a decline in the creditworthiness of the relevant sovereign can be, economically speaking, equivalent to taking a short position on the underlying debt instrument. The calculation of a net short position in relation to sovereign debt should therefore include credit default swaps relating to an obligation of a sovereign debt issuer. The credit default swap position should be taken into account both for the purposes of determining whether a natural or legal person has a significant net short position relating to sovereign debt that needs to be notified to a competent authority or a significant uncovered position in a credit default swap relating to an issuer of sovereign debt that needs to be notified to the authority.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

(16) Uncovered short selling of shares and sovereign debt is sometimes viewed as increasing the potential risk of settlement failure and volatility. To reduce such risks it is appropriate to place proportionate restrictions on uncovered short selling. The detailed restrictions should take into account the different arrangements currently used for covered short selling. It is also appropriate to include requirements on trading venues relating to buy-in procedures and fines for failed settlement of transactions in those instruments. The buy-in procedures and late settlement requirements should set basic standards relating to settlement discipline. This Regulation should not restrict or prohibit uncovered positions in sovereign credit default swaps.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Sharon BOWLES, Olle SCHMIDT

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

(16) Uncovered short selling of shares and sovereign debt ~~is sometimes viewed as~~may increas~~ing~~e the potential risk of settlement failure and volatility. To ~~reduce such risks it is appropriate to place proportionate rest~~allay such concerns and to maintain a consistent international approach it is appropriate to base short sales on previously borrowed securictiones o~~n uncovered short selling. The detailed rest~~r on securities on which there are reasonable grounds to believe the securicti~~ons shoul~~es can be borrowed takeing into account the different arrangements currently used for covered short selling. It is also appropriate to include requirements ~~on trading venues~~ relating to buy-in procedures and fines for failed settlement of transactions in those instruments. The buy-in procedures and late settlement requirements should set basic standards relating to settlement discipline.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16 a (new)

(16a) A common Union settlement discipline is important in order to create well-functioning Union financial markets. The creation of Union settlement discipline, including harmonised cash- compensation rules, penalty regime and harmonised enforcement rules such as buy-ins should be the subject of separate, wider settlement legislation to be proposed by the Commission during 2011.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Sharon BOWLES, Olle SCHMIDT

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22

(22) In the case of a significant fall in the price of a financial instrument on a trading venue and legitimate concerns regarding a local or Union-wide systemic problem a competent authority should also have the ability to temporarily restrict short selling of the financial instrument ~~on that venue~~within its own jurisdiction or request such restriction in other jurisdictions in order to be able to intervene rapidly where appropriate and for a 24 hour period to prevent a disorderly price fall of the instrument concerned.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 3

(3) debt instruments issued by a Member State or the Union and derivatives set out in Annex I Section C points (4) to (10) of Directive 2004/39/EC that relate to such debt instruments issued by a Member State or the Union or to an obligation of a Member State or the Union.deleted

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point k

(k) "market making activity" means a~~n activity referred to in Article 15(1);~~ctivities of an investment firm or a third- country entity or a local firm that is a member of a trading venue or of a market in a third country, whose legal and supervisory framework has been declared equivalent by the Commission pursuant to Article 15(2), when it deals as principal in a financial instrument whether traded on or outside a trading venue, in any of the following capacities:

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point k – point i (new)

(i) by posting firm, simultaneous two-way quotes of comparable size and at competitive prices, with the result of providing liquidity on a regular and ongoing basis to the market,

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point k – point ii (new)

(ii) as part of its usual business, by fulfilling orders initiated by clients or in response to clients' requests to trade,

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point k – point iii (new)

(iii) by hedging positions arising out of the fulfilment of orders under point (ii),

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) a natural or legal person entering into transaction ~~which creates or relates to~~in a financial instrument other than the instruments referred to in point (a) ~~and~~where the effect or one of the effects of the transaction is to confer a financial advantage on the natural or legal person in the event of a decrease in the price or value of the share or debt instrument.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point b

(b) a natural or legal person entering into a transaction ~~which creates or relates to~~in a financial instrument other than the instruments referred to in point (a) ~~and~~where the effect or one of the effects of the transaction is to confer a financial advantage on the natural or legal person in the event of an increase in the price or value of the share or debt instrument.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 3

3. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the calculation of a short position shall, in respect of any short position held by the relevant person indirectly (including through or by way of any index, basket of securities or any interest in any exchange traded fund or similar entity), be determined by the natural or legal person in question acting reasonably having regard to publicly available information as to the composition of the relevant index or basket of securities, or of the interests held by the relevant exchange traded fund or similar entity (and, for the avoidance of doubt, in calculating such short position, no person shall be required to obtain any real-time information as to such composition from any person). For the purposes of paragraph 2, the calculation of a long position shall, for all purposes, include (as long positions) any interests held by the relevant person in any bond or debt security convertible into a share issued by the relevant company. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, the calculation of a short position and a long position relating to sovereign debt shall include any credit default swap that relates to an obligation or a credit event relating to a Member State or the Union.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

In the case of fund management activities, where different investment strategies are pursued in relation to a particular issuer through separate funds managed by the same fund manager, the calculation of net short and net long positions for the purposes of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 shall take place at the level of each fund. Where the same investment strategy is pursued in relation to a particular issuer through more than one fund, the net short and net long positions in each of those funds shall be aggregated. Where two or more portfolios within the same entity are managed on a discretionary basis pursuing the same investment strategy in relation to a particular issuer those positions should be aggregated for the calculation of net short positions and net long positions.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 b (new)

The calculation of a net short position and a net long position for the purposes of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 shall include any financial instrument giving rise to an economic exposure, whether direct or indirect, to the issued share capital of a company or sovereign debt of a Member State or the Union, provided that: (a) any economic interest held as part of a basket, index or exchange traded fund is determined on the basis of the information as to the composition of the relevant index or basket of securities or of the holdings of the exchange traded fund publicly available at the time of making the calculation and the natural or legal person making the calculation is not required to obtain up-to-date information with respect to such composition from any person; and (b) the calculation of a long position includes any interest in debt securities convertible into shares of the relevant issuer.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1

1. For the purposes of this Regulation, a natural or legal person shall be considered to have an uncovered position in a credit default swap relating to an obligation of a Member State or the Union, to the extent that the credit default swap is not serving to hedge against the risk of ~~default~~a decline of the creditworthiness of the issuer where the natural or legal person has a long position in the sovereign debt of that issuer or any long position in the debt of an issuer for which the price of its debt has a high correlation with the price of the obligation of a Member State or the Unionanother position whose value is likely to be negatively impacted by such a decline. The party under a credit default swap that is obliged to make the payment or pay the compensation in the event of a default or a credit event relating to the reference entity does not by reason of that obligation have an uncovered position for the purposes of this paragraph.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1

1. A natural or legal person who has a net short position in relation to the issued share capital of a company that has shares admitted to trading on a trading venue shall notify ~~the relevant competent authority~~ESA (ESMA) whenever the position reaches or falls below a relevant notification threshold referred to in paragraph 2.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6

Marking of short orders on trading venue A trading venue that has shares admitted to trading shall establish procedures that ensure that natural or legal persons executing orders on the trading venue mark sell orders as short orders if the seller is entering into a short sale of the share. The trading venue shall publish at least daily a summary of the volume of orders marked as short orders.Article 6 deleted

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

When a natural or legal person has notified that a short position for a share in a company has reached or exceeded the thresholds referred to in Article 7(2) for public disclosure, ESA (ESMA) shall make public a report of the short positions on a daily basis. Disclosure shall be made in aggregated form and shall not contain information on who holds the position.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

The disclosure shall not identify the holder of the net short position.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. A natural or legal person who has any of the following positions shall notify ~~the relevant competent authority whenever any such position reaches or falls below a relevant notification threshold for the Member State concerned or the Union~~ESA (ESMA):

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 2

2. The relevant notification thresholds shall consist of an initial amount and then additional incremental levels in relation to each Member State and the Union, as specified in the measures taken by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 3.deleted

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 3

~~3. The Commission shall, by means of~~ delegated acts in accordance with Article 36 and subject to the conditions of Articles 37 and 38, specify the amounts and incremental levels referred to in paragraph 2. It shall take into account all of the following elements: (a) that the thresholds shall not be set at such a level as to require notification of positions which are of minimal value; (b) the total value of outstanding issued sovereign debt for each Member State and the Union and the average size of positions held by market participants relating to the sovereign debt of that Member State or the Union.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1

1. Any notification or disclosure under Articles 5~~, 7~~ or 8 shall set out details of the identity of the natural or legal person who has the relevant position, the size of the relevant position, the issuer in relation to which the relevant position is held and the date on which the relevant position was created, changed or ceased to be held. Disclosure under Article 7 shall include details, in anonymous form, of the natural or legal person who has the relevant position, the size of the relevant position, the issuer in relation to which the relevant position is held and the date on which the relevant position was created, changed or ceased to be held.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2

2. The relevant time for calculation of a net short position shall be at 12~~.00 pm~~ midnight of the trading day on which the natural or legal person has the relevant position. The notification or disclosure shall be made not later than 3.30 pm on the next trading day.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11

Information to be provided to ESMA 1. Competent authorities shall provide information in summary form to ESMA on a quarterly basis on net short positions relating to shares or sovereign debt, and uncovered positions relating to credit default swaps, for which it is the relevant competent authority and receives notifications under Articles 5 to 8. 2. ESMA may request at any time, in order to carry out its duties under this Regulation, additional information from a relevant competent authority of a Member State about net short positions relating to shares or sovereign debt or uncovered positions relating to credit default swaps. The competent authority shall provide the requested information to ESMA at the latest within seven calendar days.Article 11 deleted

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. A natural or legal person may only enter into a short sale of a share admitted to trading on a trading venue ~~or a short sale of a sovereign debt instrument~~ where one of the following conditions is fulfilled:

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) the natural or legal person has borrowed the share or ~~sovereign debt instrument~~has repurchased the share;

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) the natural or legal person has entered into an agreement to borrow the share or ~~sovereign debt instrument~~has another absolutely enforceable claim under contract or property law to be transferred ownership of a corresponding number of securities of the same class so that settlement can be effected when it is due;

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) the natural or legal person has ~~an arrangement with a third party under which that third party has confirmed that the share or sovereign debt instrument has been located and reserved for lending for the natural or legal person so~~reasonable grounds to believe that the share is available for lending that settlement can be effected when it is due.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

The conditions in this Article shall apply to transactions carried out on the spot markets.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

2. In order to ensure uniform conditions of application of paragraph 1 powers are conferred to the Commission to adopt implementing technical standards identifying ~~the types of agreements or arrangements that adequately ensure that the share or sovereign debt instrument will be available for settlement~~what would constitute reasonable grounds believing that the share will be available for lending so that settlement can be effected when it is due.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. A trading venue that has shares or sovereign debt admitted to trading shall ~~ensure that it, or the central counterparty that provides clearing services for the trading venue, has procedures in place which comply with all of the following requirements:~~have in place rules to ensure that settlement can take place when it is due. Those rules, which should include buy-in facilities, shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive to abuse.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) where a natural or legal person who sells shares or sovereign debt instruments on the venue is not able to deliver the shares or sovereign debt instrument for settlement within four trading days after the day on which the trade takes place, or six trading days after the day on which the trade takes place in the case of market making activities, then procedures are automatically triggered for the trading venue or central counterparty to buy-in the shares or sovereign debt instrument to ensure delivery for settlement;deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) where the trading venue or central counterparty is not able to buy-in the shares or the sovereign debt instrument for delivery then cash compensation is paid by the trading venue or the central counterparty to the buyer based on the value of the shares or the debt to be delivered at the delivery date plus an amount for any losses incurred by the buyer;deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) the natural or legal person who fails to settle pays an amount to the trading venue or central counterparty to reimburse the trading venue or central counterparty for all amounts paid pursuant to points (a) and (b).deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

2. A trading venue that has shares or sovereign debt instruments admitted to trading shall ensure that it has procedures in place, or that the settlement system that provides settlement services for the shares or sovereign debt instrument has procedures in place, which ensure that where a natural or legal person who sells shares or sovereign debt instrument on the venue fails to deliver the shares or sovereign debt instrument for settlement by the date on which settlement is due, then such natural or legal person is subject to the obligation to make daily payments to the trading venue or settlement system for each day that the failure continues.deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

~~The daily payments shall be sufficiently high not to allow the seller to make a profit from the settlement failure and to act as a deterrent to natural or legal persons failing to settle.~~deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 3

3. A trading venue that has shares or sovereign debt admitted to trading shall have in place rules that enable it to prohibit a natural or legal person that is a member of the trading venue from entering into further short sales of shares or sovereign debt instruments on the trading venue as long as that person fails to settle a transaction resulting from a short sale on that trading venue.deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 a (new)

Article 13a Settlement discipline A common Union settlement discipline is important in order to create well- functioning Union financial markets. The creation of Union settlement discipline, including harmonised cash-compensation rules, penalty regime as well as harmonised enforcement rules such as buy-ins should be the scope of a separate wider settlement legislation that the Commission should propose during 2011.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Articles 5, to 8 and 12 and any restrictions or requirements imposed under Articles 16, 17, 18 ~~and 12~~or 24 shall not apply to the activities of an investment firm or a third country entity or a local firm that is a member of a trading venue or of a market in a third country, whose legal and supervisory framework has been declared equivalent pursuant to paragraph 2, when it deals ~~as principal~~ in a financial instrument, whether traded on or outside a trading venue, in either ~~or both~~ of the following capacities by:

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) by posting firm, simultaneous two way quotes of comparable size and at competitive prices, with the result of providing liquidity on a regular and ongoing basis to the market;

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 3

3. Articles 8 and 12 and any restrictions or requirements imposed in relation to sovereign debt under Article 16, 17, 18 or 24 shall not apply to the activities of a natural or legal person wh~~en, acting a~~ich is an authorised primary dealer pursuant to an agreement with an issuer of sovereign debt~~, it~~ and which is dealing as principal in a financial instrument in relation to primary or secondary market operations relating to the sovereign debt of a Member State.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. The competent authority of a Member State may require natural or legal persons who have net short positions in ~~relation to a specific financial instrument or class of financial instruments to notify it or to disclose to the public details of the position~~a share admitted to trading on a trading venue to notify it whenever the position reaches or falls below a notification threshold fixed by the competent authority, where all the following conditions are fulfilled:

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

(ba) the measure will not have a detrimental effect on the efficiency of financial markets, including reducing liquidity on those markets or creating uncertainty for market participants, which is disproportionate to its benefits.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 2

~~2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to financial instruments in respect of which transparency is already required under Articles 5 to 8 Chapter II.~~deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. The competent authority of athe Member State where the principal trading venue of a financial instrument is may take the measure referred to in paragraphs 2 or 3, where all of the following conditions are fulfilled:

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. The competent authority of the Member State may prohibit or impose conditions relating to natural or legal persons e~~ntering into:~~stablishing or increasing net short positions in relation to shares admitted to trading on a trading venue in the Member State.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – point a

~~(a) a short sale;~~deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – point b

(b) a transaction other than a short sale which creates, or relates to, a financial instrument and the effect or one of the effects of that transaction is to confer a financial advantage on the natural or legal person in the event of a decrease in the price or value of another financial instrument.deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

The measure shall not have a detrimental effect on the efficiency of financial markets, including reducing liquidity in those markets or creating uncertainty for market participants, which is disproportionate to its benefits.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 3

3. The competent authority of the Member State may prevent natural or legal persons from entering into transactions relating to financial instruments or limit the value of transactions in the financial instrument that may be entered into.deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

(ba) the measure will not have a detrimental effect on the efficiency of financial markets, including reducing liquidity in those markets or creating uncertainty for market participants, which is disproportionate to its benefits.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 2

2. A measure under paragraph 1 may apply to credit default swap transactions of a specific class or to specific credit default swap transactions. The measure may apply in circumstances or be subject to exceptions specified by the competent authority. Exceptions may in particular be specified to apply to market making activities and primParagraph 1 shall not apply unless the competent authority of the Member State which has issued the relevant sovereign debt has taken a similary m~~arket activities~~easure.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

1. Where the price of a financial instrument on a trading venue has during a single trading day fallen by the value referred to in paragraph 4 from the closing price on that venue on the previous trading day, the competent authority of the home Member State for that venue ~~shall~~may consider whether it is appropriate to prohibit or restrict natural or legal persons from engaging in short selling of the financial instrument on the trading venue or otherwise limit transactions in that financial instrument on that trading venue in order to prevent a disorderly decline in the price of the financial instrument.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Where the competent authority is satisfied under the first subparagraph that it is appropriate to do so, it ~~shall~~may in the case of a share or debt prohibit or restrict persons from entering into a short sale on the trading venue or in the case of another type of financial instrument, limit transactions in that financial instrument on that trading venue.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 2

~~2. The measure shall apply for a period not exceeding the end of the trading day following the trading day on which the fall in price occurs.~~deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3

3. The measure shall apply in circumstances or be subject to exceptions specified by the competent authority. Exceptions may in particular be specified to apply to market making activities and primary market activities.deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 4

4. The fall in value shall be 10% or more in the case of a share and for other classes of financial instruments an amount to be specified by the Commission. The Commission shall, by means of delegated acts in accordance with Article 36 and subject to the conditions of Articles 37 and 38, specify the fall in value for financial instruments other than shares, taking into account the specificities of each class of financial instrument.deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 5

~~5. Powers are~~ delegated to the Commission to adopt regulatory technical standards specifying the method of calculation of the 10% fall for shares and of the fall in value specified by the Commission as referred to in paragraph 4. The regulatory standards referred to in the first subparagraph shall be adopted in accordance with Articles [7 to 7d] of Regulation (EU) No …/….[ESMA Regulation]. ESMA shall submit drafts for those regulatory technical standards to the Commission by [31 December 2011] at the latest.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 1

Any measure ~~imposed under Article 16 to 18 shall be valid for an initial~~may be renewed for further periods not exceeding three months ~~from the date of publication of the notice referred to in Article 21~~if the grounds for taking the measure continue to be applicable. If the measure is not renewed after that three-month period, it shall automatically expire.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a

(a) require natural or legal persons who have net short positions in relation to a s~~pecific financial instrument or class of financial instruments~~hare admitted to trading on a trading venue to notify a competent authority or to disclose to the public details of any such position above the threshold referred to in Article 7(2);

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point d

~~(d) prevent natural or legal persons from entering into transactions relating to a financial instruments or limit the value of transactions in the financial instrument that may be entered into.~~deleted

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

A measure may apply in circumstances or be subject to exceptions specified by the ~~relevant~~ competent authorityies. Exceptions may in particular be specified to apply to market making activities and primary market activities.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 1

1. The obligation of professional secrecy shall apply to all natural or legal persons who work or who have worked for the competent authority or for any authority or natural or legal person to whom the competent authority has delegated tasks, including auditors and experts contracted by the competent authority. IConfidential information covered by professional secrecy may not be disclosed to any other natural or legal person or authority except when such disclosure is necessary for legal proceedings.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 2

2. All the information exchanged between competent authorities under this Regulation ~~shall be considered confidential~~that concerns business or operational conditions and other economical or personal affairs shall for not more than 20 years be considered confidential and be the object of professional secrecy, except when the competent authority states at the time of communication that such information may be disclosed ~~or when such disclosure is necessary for legal proceedings~~.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

The competent authority shall inform ESA (ESMA) of any request referred to in the first subparagraph. In case of an investigation or an inspection with cross- border effect, ESA (ESMA) shall upon the request of a competent authority, coordinate the investigation or inspection.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

The competent authorities shall use their best efforts to conclude cooperation agreements with competent authorities of third countries concerning the exchange of information with competent authorities in third countries, the enforcement of obligations arising under this Regulation in third countries and the taking of similar measures by the competent authority to complement measures taken under Chapter V.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

ESA (ESMA) shall coordinate the development of cooperation a~~gre~~rrangements between the competent authorities of Member States and the relevant competent authorities of third countries. For that purpose, ESA (ESMA) shall prepare a template agreement that may be used by competent authorities.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 3

3. The competent authorities shall ~~conclude~~not enter into cooperation a~~gre~~rrangements ~~on exchange of information with the competent authorities of third countries~~with third countries which result in obligations for Member States other than the provision of information. Cooperation arrangements on exchange of information shall be entered into only where the information disclosed is subject to guarantees of professional secrecy which are at least equivalent to those set out in Article 29. Such exchange of information must be intended for the performance of the tasks of those competent authorities.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 34 – paragraph 1

The competent authority of a Member State may transfer to a third country data and the analysis of data when the conditions laid down in Article 25 or 26 of Directive 95/46/EC are fulfilled and only on a case-by-case basis. The competent authority of the Member State shall be satisfied that the transfer is necessary for the purpose of this Regulation. The t~~hird country sha~~ransfer of data shall be made only if the third country guarantees that the data will not be transfer ~~the data~~red to another third country without the express written authorisation of the competent authority of the Member State.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 34 – paragraph 2

The competent authority of a Member State shall only disclose information which is confidential pursuant to Article 29 and which is received from a competent authority of another Member State to a competent authority of a third country where the competent authority of the Member State concerned has obtained express agreement of the competent authority which transmitted the information and, where applicable, the information is disclosed solely for the purposes for which that competent authority gave its agreement.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 35 – paragraph 1

Member States shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles in their national legislation, establish rules on administrative measures, sanctions and pecuniary penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The measures, sanctions and penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

2011/01/26
Committee: ECON