12 Amendments of Olle SCHMIDT related to 2013/2047(INI)
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas while EMIR and CSDR aim to reduce systemic risk through well- regulated market infrastructure, there is a strong possibility of unintended consequences; (Legislators and supervisors are doing their utmost to avoid unintended consequences of theOr. en reform. Without any hard evidence the word “strong” should be deleted.)
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital M
Recital M
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Calls on the Commission to prioritise recovery and resolution first of CCPs and those CSDs, second of CSDs, including those which are exposed to credit risk, and when consideringif appropriate of other financial institutions, and to differentiate appropriately between each type;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Calls upon the Commission to ensure that CCPs have a default management strategy for all products that are mandated for central clearingcleared by the CCP as part of a wider recovery plan approved by the supervisor; (The recovery plan should cover all products cleared by the CCP, and not only those that areOr. en mandated.)
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Calls on the Commission to ensure that sound principles are established governing contractual arrangements between a CCP and its clearing members and how clearing members pass on losses to their clients as part of the default waterfall, in such a way that the clearing member's default fund contribution will have to be exhausted before any losses from a defaulting clearing member can be passed on to the client; (The process of using resolution tools should be transparent and clear for all members.) as part of a transparent loss allocation process; Or. en
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Asserts that the dividing-line between recovery and resolution in the case of CCPs is when the default waterfall isncluding the loss allocation arrangements described in its recovery plan are exhausted, necessitating the option for the supervisor to remove the CCP's management board; (Is of the opinion that the resolution begins once the CPP has exhausted the default waterfallOr. en and its loss allocation arrangements in its recovery plan.)
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Underlines that any voluntamandatory participation of clearing members in loss allocation before removal of the CCP's management should not involve client money, while the resolution authority, once responsibleCCP's default waterfall, may employ loss allocation tools such as variation margin cutting or refilling of the default fund by the non-defaulting clearing members; (Depending of the organization of the participation in the clearing it should be possible to involve also other participant than direct clearing member in a loss allocation scheme.)Or. en
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Believes that if the resolution authority had the ability to impose a stay on early termination rights, alongside the lifting of the clearing obligation which would pause the CCP for a maximum period of two days, this could allow the market to correctly re-price the contracts, thus allowing for a more orderly diffusion of risk; (The consequences of lifting of the clearing obligation are unclear and untested and shouldthe availability and exercise of such a power should be carefully considered so that it is, at a minimum, conditional on the resolution authority determining that imposition of a stay is necessary in the interests of financial stability, having regard to the resolution objectives, interplay with relevant bank or other resolution regimes applicable to clearing members, default and risk management of the CCP and the impact on each of the CCP's markets, clearing participants and financial markets generally; Or. en therefore be removed.)
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Establishes that it is the responsibility of a CSD to ensure that its recovery plan clearly provides for operational continuity in reasonable crisis scenarios so that, even if other parts of its business can be disposed of, its pcrimary settlementtical functions can continue; (Not only the settlement function but also the access to the book-entry system and theOr. en financial instruments in such systems could be critical in a crisis scenario.)
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Calls, if no separate legislative proposal is imminent, for inclusion in the CSDR of references to the articles of the BRRD that should apply to those CSDs operating under a banking licence; (In the short run it is important with recovery and resolution plans for all CSDs and ina requirement for national competent authorities to ensure the establishment of appropriate recovery and resolution plans in line with international standards for all CSDs, such plans are very important for those CSDs operating under a banking licence; Or. en particular for those CSDs operating under a banking license.)
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Calls on the Member States, in the absence of Securities Law Legislation, to to develop and coordinate their existing special administration regimes for CSDs in order to improve certainty as to how operational continuity will be maintained in a crisis, in particular by ensuring access to registries f. The competent authorities should aim at developing a solution ensuring no disruption of the access to records [registries, accounts or othe resolution authority so as to identify the owners of assets; (SLL will probably not solve the problem with different rules in the Member States regarding CSDs. Such regime should ensure the access to the book-entry system and the informationr] evidencing rights of participants or third parties to securities; Or. en the treatment of client assets regimes in a bankruptcy situation and in absent of a full harmonization of insolvency law it is important with a special administration regime for about the financial instruments in those systems.)
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the proposal for a recovery and resolution framework for CSDs ensures – as far as possible – the continuity of the CSDs during the recovery and resolution;