34 Amendments of Rodi KRATSA-TSAGAROPOULOU related to 2013/2277(INI)
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas the Task Force for Greece was set up to strengthen the capacity of the Greek administration to design and implement structural reforms to improve the functioning of the economy and society and create the conditions for sustained recovery and job creation, as well as to speed up the absorption of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds in Greece and to providutilize critical resources to finance investment;
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas the programmes were not suited to comprehensively correcting macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated sometimes over decades; whereas these programmes were being implemented for the first time in the euro area and errors are now coming to light regarding planning and policy mix;
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L a (new)
Recital L a (new)
La. whereas, according to the latest Commission data (source: Eurostat) the government debt to GDP ratio in the euro area stands currently at 93.4%, compared with 80% in 2009, which confirms that high public debt is a European problem that requires a European solution with particular attention to countries which are affected the most;
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that the precise triggers for the crises differed in all four Member States and hence addressing the crisis and achieving recovery requires different approaches and policies in each case;
Amendment 187 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Notes that, prior to the beginning of the EU-IMF assistance programme initiated in the spring of 2010, there was a dual fear associated with the ‘insolvency’ and ’non- sustainability’ of the public finances of Greece as a result of the constantly declining competitiveness of the Greek economy and decades of imprudent fiscal policylong-run fiscal derailment, with the government deficit reaching 152.7% of GDP in 2009 (15.7% according to other estimates), and the debt-to-GDP ratio continuing on an upward trend since 2003 when it stood at 97.4%, reaching 129.7% in 2009 and 156.9% in 2012;
Amendment 200 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Calls on the EU institutions and Member States to take into account the relationship between cyclical recession and public debt in their proposals for Greek public debt reduction according to the Eurogroup decision of the 12th of November 2012;
Amendment 264 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Notes that the IMF is the global institution tasked with providing states experiencing balance of payment problems with conditional financial assistance; points to the fact that all Member States are members of the IMF and have therefore the right to request its assistance, in cooperation with EU institutions, assessing the interests of the EU and the Member State in question;
Amendment 277 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Deplores the unpreparedness of the EU and international institutions, including the IMF, for a sovereign debt crisis of a large magnitude inside a monetary unithe eurozone;
Amendment 289 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced leading to the crisis was unique as a result of the poor state of regulation of financial services, large macroeconomic imbalances, and the fact that a number of instruments such as external devaluation were not available due to the constraints of monetary union; notes, moreover, that time was running out, legal obstacles had to be cleared, fear of a melt-down of the euro area was palpable, political assessments and agreements had to be reached, the world economy was in a downturn, and a number of countries which were intended to contribute financial support had seen their own public and private debt increase in alarming ways; this is hampering initiatives and developments at national level, necessitating forward planning, solidarity and initiatives in European level;
Amendment 315 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Regrets the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations; nNotes the necessity to evaluate whether formal documents werehave been clearly communicated in due time to the national parliaments and the European Parliament; further notes the possible negative impact of such practices on citizens’' rights and the political situation within the countries concerned;
Amendment 328 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Deplores that recommendations contained in MoUs mark a departure from the thinking initiated by the Lisbon strategy and hamper the goals of the Europe 2020 strategies); points out however that this can be partly explained, even if not fully justified, by the fact that programmes had to be implemented under considerable time pressure in a difficult political environment; at the same time, a review of MoUs and their adaptation to the EU growth objectives and principles is necessary;
Amendment 346 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Regrets that the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal comprise a number of detailed prescriptions for health systems reform and expenditure cuts; regrets that the programmes are not bound by the Charter of Ffundamental Rrights of the European Union and the Treaties, including Art. 168 (7) of TFEU;
Amendment 374 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Deplores that since 2008 the income distribution inequality has grown above average in the four countries and that cuts in social benefits and rising unemployment are raising poverty levels; support the revision of tax frameworks to provide incentives aimed at attracting investments, enhancing entrepreneurship and employment in strategic sectors of the economy and reducing social imbalances, with social and political consequences;
Amendment 386 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Demands that any revision of MoUs should also include any conclusions and orientations offered through the evaluation of automatic stabilizers and their role in national economies, since such critical parameters were not fully investigated by the Troika when guidance was provided for the formulation of the adjustment programmes;
Amendment 395 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Points to the unacceptable, high level of youth unemployment in the four Member States under assistance programmes; points especially to the sharp increase in youth unemployment in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal and calls for enhanced political and economic focus for addressing this issue;
Amendment 423 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal; regrets the lack of progress in Greece despite unprecedentedNotes the unprecedented fiscal adjustment and the large number of reforms having been undertaken in Greece;
Amendment 437 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Stresses that in Greece a primary surplus and a current account surplus are expected to be achieved thanks to the unprecedented reforms having been undertaken, stable governance as well as the large sacrifices of Greek citizens; underlines the necessity to continue reforms, adjustment policies and growth measures with the aim of Greece regaining, as well, access to the financial markets;
Amendment 444 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Underlines that adequate economic models are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programmes; deplores that adequate statistics and information were not always available; points out that in Greece large- scale fraud was happening in this respect in the years preceding the setting up of the programme;
Amendment 455 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20α. Notes in the case of Greece the lack of suitable monitoring mechanisms and clearly defined instruments for calculating the deficit at both European and national level in the years before the programme was drawn up, as well as disagreements between governments regarding methods of calculating financial data;
Amendment 468 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; further notes that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes that the financial assistance and adjustment programme in Greece have not prevented an orderly default nor contagion of the crisis to other Member States; deplores the economic and social downturn which became evident when the fiscal and macroeconomic corrections were put into place and calls for taking into account such consequences in revised policies;
Amendment 491 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Notes that from the onset the Troika published comprehensive documents on the diagnosis, the strategy to overcome the problems, a set of policy measures elaborated together with the national government concerned, and economic forecasts, all of which are updated on a regular basis and should take into account the economy's and the society's actual conditions;
Amendment 498 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Deplores however the sometimes over- optimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth is concerned, but also the insufficient recognition of political resistance to change in some Member States; deplores the fact that this also affected the Troika’s analysis of the interplay between fiscal consolidation and growth; notes that as a result not all fiscal targets could not be fulfilled within the time frame foreseen;
Amendment 509 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Regrets that the reduction of structural deficits in all programme countries since the start of their respective assistance programmes has not yet led to a reduction in the ratios of public debt to GDP; underlines that the ratio of public debt to GDP has instead sharply increased in all programme countries; believes that the accurate estimation of fiscal multipliers is of crucial importance for fiscal adjustment to be successful in reducing the debt to GDP ratio; calls the Commission and the ECB to take into account the larger values of multipliers in times of crisis while designing the adjustment programmes and recommended policies;
Amendment 526 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Considers that fiscal multipliers are difficult to assess with certainty; recalls in this respect that the IMF admitted to underestimating the fiscal multiplier in its growth forecasts prior to October 2012 but that the Commission stated in November 2012 that forecast errors were not due to the underestimation of fiscal multipliers; points out that this expression of public disagreement between the Commission and the IMF was not followed up and calls for an assessment of this issue and for information to be provided to the European Parliament;
Amendment 533 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Points out that while the IMF’s stated objective in its assistance operations within the frame of the Troika is internal devaluation, the Commission has never clearly endorsed this objective; notes that the objective emphasised by the Commission in all four programme countries under enquiry has rather been fiscal consolidation; calls for cooperation and agreement between the EU and the IMF to conclude the programmes for achieving Greek debt sustainability and for the country to regain access to the financial markets;
Amendment 555 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Considers that too little attention has been given to alleviating the negative social and political impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries;
Amendment 588 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Notes that the Troika’s mandate has been perceived as being unclear and lacking transparency and should adjust to the actual economic situation;
Amendment 598 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)
Paragraph 29 a (new)
29a. Stresses that the European Commission, as the executive body of the E.U. and because of its special role regarding Troika, should provide information and be accountable to the European Parliament regarding not only the conclusion but also the implementation of fiscal adjustment programmes as well as the relevant policies. Stresses also that providing information regarding the decisions and conducting reviews of adjustment programmes should be included within the context of Eurogroup's inter- institutional dialogue with the European Parliament;
Amendment 641 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Takes note of the dual role of the Commission in the Troika as both an agent of Member States and an EU institution; warns that conflicts of interests may therefore exist within the Commission between its role in the Troika and its responsibility as a guardian of the Treaties, especially in policies such as competition and state aid as well as the objectives of social cohesion, convergence, respect to the acquis communautaire;
Amendment 649 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Points equally to a possible conflict of interest between the current role of the ECB in the Troika as ‘technical advisor’ and its position as creditor of the four Member States as well as its mandate under the Treaty; hence, welcomes its contribution in addressing the crisis;
Amendment 681 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Points to the generally weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level; notes however that this democratic accountability varies between countries, depending on the will of national executives;
Amendment 692 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Notes that formal decisions are made by both the Eurogroup and the IMF, with a crucial role now given to the ESM as it is the organisation responsible for deciding on financial assistance, thus putting governments, including those of the Member States directly concerned, at the centre of any decisions taken;
Amendment 702 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Points to the fact that the ESM is intergovernmental by nature, is bound by the unanimity rule, and is subject to political influence exerted by finance ministers, heads of state and government as well as national parliaments; for this reason, a spirit of mutual commitment and solidarity is required;
Amendment 820 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Demands that the Troika take stock of the current debate on fiscal multipliers and consider the revision of MoUs on the basis of the latest empirical results regarding the consequences of fiscal adjustment on the real economy, society and recovery efforts;