2 Amendments of Bas BELDER related to 2013/0253(COD)
Amendment 84 #
Draft legislative resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set outRejects the Commission proposal;
Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
Recital 7
(7) Ensuring effective uniform resolution decisions for failing banks within the Union, including on the use of funding raised at Union level, is essentiMeasures to tackle bad loans on bank balance sheets in crisis-affected countries are insufficiently guaranteed, given that, at neither national fnor the completion of the internal market in financial services. Within the internal market, the failure ofEuropean level, are emergency funding provisions sufficient to meet capital requirements. The absence of a public bancks in one Member State may affect the stability of the financial markets of the whole Union. Ensuring effective and uniform resolution rules and equal conditop is problematic, particularly in view of the failure to adopt sufficient agreements regarding a fair distributions of resolution financing acrossburdens between the Member States is ion the best interest not only of one hand and between the eurozone and other Member States ion which banks operate, but also of all Member States in general as a means to preserve competition and improve the functioning of the internal market. Banking systems in the internal market are highly interconnected, bank groups are international and banks have a large percentage of foreign assets. In the absence of a single resolution mechanism, bank crises in Member States participating in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) would have stronger negative systemic impact also in non- participating Member States. The establishment of the single resolution mechanism will increase stability of the banks of the participating Member States and prevent the spill-over of crises into non-participating Member States and will thus facilitate the functioning of the whole of the internal marketthe other. Furthermore, sound agreements must be adopted to prevent any possible recurrence of such debt imbalances in the eurozone. Given that, in this connection, no effective arrangements have been agreed, a banking union incorporating a single resolution mechanism and a single bank resolution fund is inadvisable.