Activities of Bas BELDER related to 2017/2274(INI)
Plenary speeches (2)
State of EU-China relations (debate) NL
State of EU-China relations (debate) NL
Reports (1)
REPORT on the state of EU-China relations PDF (466 KB) DOC (107 KB)
Amendments (32)
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 10 a (new)
Citation 10 a (new)
– having regard to the Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council - Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Annual Report 2017 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission, of 24 April 2018,
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the 19th EU-China Summit in 2017 advanced a bilateral strategic partnership, which has a global impact, and highlighted joint commitments to addressing common security threats and promoting multilateralism; whereas the EU and China confirmed their intention to intensify cooperation in the implementation of the 2015 Paris Agreement in combating climate change and promoting clean energy;
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas on 11 March 2018 the National People’s Congress (NPC) voted with an overwhelming majoritalmost unanimously in favour of abrogating the limit of two consecutive terms for the posts of President and Vice- President of the country;
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas during the closing ceremony of the annual plenary meeting of the NPC, the newly elected President of the NPC hailed Xi Jinping as the helmsman of the nation and the guide of the people, using a vocabulary that had been avoided in China since the end of the Cultural Revolution;
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)
Recital E b (new)
Eb. whereas the Chinese top leadership while claiming non- interference in other countries' internal affairs, is regularly calling into question western countries' political system in its official communications;
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas on 11 March 2018 the NPC adopted the establishment of a National Supervisory Commission, a new government body designed to institutionalise and expand Xi Jinping’sthe ongoing anti-corruption campaign to civil servants, listing it as a sState body within China’s Constitution;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas since Xi’s ascension to power, absolute control of Xinjiang has been elevated to a top priority, driven by both periodic terrorist attacks in or allegedly connected to Xinjiang by Uyghurs and the strategic location of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in Xi’s signature “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI);
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)
Recital F b (new)
Fb. whereas Xi Jinping's first term saw an unprecedented campaign against officials' corruption and lack of Party discipline; whereas many observers believe that the anti-corruption drive has provided Xi and his allies with tools to eliminate potential rivals, erase competing power centres, and enforce through fear the absolute loyalty of the political elite to the Party and to himself;
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F c (new)
Recital F c (new)
Fc. whereas as of late 2017, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) had punished almost 1.4 million Party members including Central Committee members, Politburo members, an ex-member of the Politburo Standing Committee;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F d (new)
Recital F d (new)
Fd. whereas China has since President Xi Jinping’s first term driven forward an ambitious overhaul of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to modernise and expand its navy and air force, create integrated joint operations (IJO) through theatre commands and IJO command structures, create the Strategic Support Force to focus on cyber and space capabilities, improve combat readiness through increasingly global joint exercises and large-scale complex training exercises, and downsize the Central Military Commission in order to centralise military decision-making and reform in the hands of Xi and his allies;
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas in 2014, the State Council of China announced detailed plans to create a Social Credit System with the aim of rewarding behaviour that the governmentParty considers financially, economically and socio-politically responsible, while sanctioning non- compliance with its policies; whereas the project of social credit scoring will likely also impact on foreigners living and working in China, including EU citizens, and entail consequences for EU and other foreign companies operating in the country;
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas China’s diplomacy has increasingly emerged as a stronger player from the 19th Party Congress and this year’s NPC, with at least five high-ranking officials in charge of the country’s foreign policy and a substantial boost to the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; whereas a newly created State International Development Cooperation Agency will be in charge of coordinating China’s growing budget for foreign aid;
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas after over three years of talks China and ASEAN agreed in August 2017 on a one-page framework as a basis for future discussions on a Code of Conduct (CoC) for all parties in the South China Sea; whereas the disputed Chinese land reclamation has largely been completed in the Spratly Islands, but has continued last year in the Paracels Islands further North;
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H b (new)
Recital H b (new)
Hb. whereas also China is becoming a more active and important external player in the Middle East due to its obvious economic, security and geopolitical interests;
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H c (new)
Recital H c (new)
Hc. whereas PEN America issued at 13 March 2018 the research report “Forbidden Feeds: Government Control on Social Media in China” which examines the development of the CCP’s system of censorship and surveillance of online expression, in particular on social media platforms;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H d (new)
Recital H d (new)
Hd. whereas the Overseas NGO Management Law (ONGO Law), which came into force on January 1, 2017, is one of the largest challenges to international NGOs (INGOs) because this law regulates all activities in China funded by INGOs and provincial security officers are primarily responsible for implementing the ONGO Law;
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Calls on the EU Member States to urgently and decisively step up collaboration and unity on their China policies, with a view to speaking with one voice, andin view of the EU’s failure, for the first time ever, to make a statement on China’s human rights records at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva in June 2017, blocked by Greece’s —major beneficiary of Chinese investment— opposition to the statement; strongly suggests taking advantage of Europe’s much greater collective bargaining power with China, and that Europe defends its free democracies so as to better face up to China’s systematic efforts to influence its politicians and civil society, in order to shape an opinion more conducive to China’s strategic interests; is concerned that China is also attempting to influence educational and academic institutions and their curricula; proposes that the EU and the Member States foster high-quality European think tanks on China in order to ensure the availability of independent expert advice for strategic orientations and decision-making;
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Concludes that the Chinese Government has in the BRI found a very effective narrative framework for elements of its foreign policy and that EU public diplomacy efforts need to be strengthened in the light of this development; calls on all EU Member States to support EU public diplomacy responses; suggests that data on all Chinese infrastructure investments in EU Member States be shared with the EU and other Member States; recalls that such investments are part of an overall strategy to have Chinese state-controlled or -funded companies take control of supply chains; underlines five overarching challenges of the BRI: very little local labour employed, receiving country and third country contractor involvement extremely limited —about 86 percent of BRI projects involve Chinese contractors, construction materials and equipment imported from China, lack of transparency on tenders and the potential use of Chinese standards instead of international standards;
Amendment 174 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that the NPC19th Party Congress held in October 2017 and during itsthe last session cementeof the NPC, General Secretary and pPresident Xi Jinping’s position of power and his affiliates cemented their position of power within the party, and increased the control of the party organs over the state apparatus;
Amendment 180 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Stresses that the creation of the National Supervisory Commission is probably the most drastic step towards morphing party and state functions, as it will merge the leadership and functions of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Internal Central Disciplinary Commission with those of supervisory bodies at state levelestablishes a State supervisory body, that takes its orders from and shares offices and staff with the Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI); is concerned about the far-ranging consequences of this merger forextension of the party supervision to a large number of people, as it means that the CCP’s anti-corruption campaign can be expanded to prosecute not just party members but all state officials, and all suspects under investigation will be subject to the so civil servants, from managers of state ownewd commission’s legal proceedings, without having access to civil lawyers and civil courtpanies to university professors and directors at village schools;
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Remarks that Xi’s declaration about the vital importance of “long term stability” in Xinjiang to the success of BRI has resulted in the intensification of long-standing strategies of control augmented by a variety of technological innovations and a rapid increase in expenditure on domestic security; is concerned by the state’s implementation of measures to ensure the “comprehensive supervision” of the region via installation of China’s “Skynet” electronic surveillance in major urban areas, installations of GPS trackers in all motor vehicles, use of facial recognition scanners at checkpoints, train and petrol stations and a blood-collecting effort by Xinjiang’s police to further expand China’s DNA database; condemns the sending of thousands of Uyghurs to political “re-education camps” based on analysis of the data harvested through a system of “predictive policing”; judges that Xi’s proclamation that BRI will “benefit people across the whole world” as it will be based on the “Silk Road spirit” of “peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness” is far removed from the “neo-totalitarian” reality confronting Uyghurs in Xinjiang;
Amendment 184 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. Notes that the National Supervision Law adopted on 6 March 2018 does not guarantee detainees access to lawyers or family members, and utilises legal provisions allowing 'residential surveillance at a designated location', which authorises to detain certain categories of individuals at a secret location for periods of up to six months; regrets that this new law while abolishing the intra-party disciplinary practice known as 'Shuanggui', by which a party members under investigation could be held without due trial to be interrogated, but instead establishes the practice of 'Liuzhi', or detention for interrogation, by which detainees are subjected to incommunicado detention, without access to lawyers, in a secretive location for up to 6 months;
Amendment 187 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. OConcludes that Chinese media reports assign three wide-ranging goals to the Social Credit System: creating a ‘culture of integrity’, solving economic problems and improving governance; observes that while the Social Credit System is still under construction, blacklists of non-compliant individuals and legal entities, as well as ‘red lists’ for outstanding individuals and companies, form the core of the current stage of implementation, whereby the main focus is on punishing offenders on the blacklists and rewarding those on the red lists; firmly rejects the public naming and shaming of blacklisted persons through the wide publication of their names, photos, state ID numbers and in some cases even house addresses as an integral part of the Social Credit System; underlines the importance and necessity of a dialogue between the EU Institutions and their Chinese counterparts on all serious societal consequences of the present central planning and local experiments with the Social Credit System;
Amendment 192 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Stresses that the institutional and financial strengthening of China’s diplomacy reflects the high priority given by Xi Jinping to foreign policy as part of his vision to turn China into a global power by 2049; underlinesnotes that during the last session of the NPC, Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi was promoted to the position of state councillor with responsibility for foreign affairs, a ranking above the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and that state councillor Yang Jiechi now plays a leading role as the Party's Politburo member in charge of foreign affairs, which evidences the growing role of foreign policy in the Party's decision- making process, and underlines as well the fact that the establishment of the State International Development Cooperation Agency expresses the great importance that Xi’s leadership attaches to bolstering its global security interests through economic means, for example by " better serving" BRI; concludes, therefore, that over the next five years China will be more present and more engaged overseas, with diplomatic initiatives and hard cash;
Amendment 195 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Points to the substantial Chinese financial involvement in the plans for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq and Syria with presumably no governance or human rights strings attached for the Iraqi and Syrian regimes, directly linked to the realisation of the BRI; notes the cooperation between China and Syria on counter-terrorism due to the claimed presence on Syrian soil of thousands of Uighur Muslim jihadists from Xinjiang; warns for the destabilizing effects in the Middle East from the close military cooperation between China and Iran;
Amendment 198 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)
Paragraph 8 b (new)
8b. Notes that structures completed over the last year on land features in both the Spratlys and Paracels in the South China Sea include large hangars along 3km long airstrips, hardened shelters for missile platforms, large underground storage areas, many administrative buildings, military jamming equipment, large networks of high-frequency and over the horizon radar and sensor arrays and that this points to a phase of consolidation and further build-up of far- reaching surveillance and military capabilities, while further militarisation of the islands through placement of even more advanced military platforms might be reserved as potential retaliation to fresh legal actions or expanded US naval presence;
Amendment 199 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 c (new)
Paragraph 8 c (new)
8c. Warns that any underestimation of China’s determination to reach its 2035 goals of completing full military modernisation and its 2049 goal for the PLA to have become a global top-tier fighting force capable of winning wars as well as underestimation of China’s astonishing speed of defence innovation in the air and sea domain as well as future technologies in the cyber, space and electronic warfare domains, will lead to the erosion of the West’s long-held superiority in many military domains, while possibly facing an increasingly capable PLA ready to defend China’s global ambitions;
Amendment 201 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Is seriously worried about the findings of the FCCC’s 2017 report that the Chinese Government has intensified its attempts to deny or restrict the access of foreign journalists to large parts of the country while increasing the use of the visa renewal process to pressure unwanted correspondents and news organisations; is outrightly shocked by the fact that local security agents and thugs stepped up intimidation of foreign journalists in Xinjiang, in border areas such as those near North Korea and at the trials of human rights activists; deplores that the working conditions of foreign media in the PRC are additionally burdened while news sources were too afraid to talk because they feared reprisal from authorities or that these working conditions confront even the willingness of Chinese authorities to use interactions with foreign journalists as evidence of criminal activity; urges the EU and its Member States to demand from the Chinese authorities reciprocity in press freedom and warns against the pressure foreign correspondents are experiencing at home as Chinese diplomats reach out to media headquarters to criticise the work of reporters in the field;
Amendment 203 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Concludes that under the leadership of General Secretary Xi Jinping, the Party has expanded its grip over Chinese social media in a technological, legal and ideological way resulting inter alia in state’s interference with and surveillance of private communications on social media platforms; notes that control of social media is an essential part of China’s “cyber sovereignty” model, a vision that rejects the universalism of the internet in favour of the idea that each country has the right to shape and control the internet within its own borders, however stresses that this Chinese “cyber sovereignty” is wholly incompatible with the international human rights of free expression, access to information, press freedom and privacy; deplores that many writers, artists, and especially journalists are disproportionately affected by social media censorship and that those who dare to test the undefined limits of China’s online censorship can face intimidation, job loss, years-long prison sentences, or find themselves forced into exile; underlines also that online debates of vital public interest on topics ranging from labour rights to environmental issues are constrained either by user’s inclination to self-censor or by overt government’s efforts to block further discussion of such issues; urges European and other foreign technology and social companies to support and collaborate with non- governmental organizations and research groups that monitor and provide information on the mechanics of social media censorship in China, as well as groups that help develop technological solutions to Chinese censorship;
Amendment 210 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Is strongly concerned about the shrinking space for civil society since Xi Jinping rose to power in 2012, especially in view of the Overseas NGO Management Law which entered into force on 1 January 2017, putting all foreign NGO’s, including think tanks and academic institutions, under an increased administrative burden and economic pressure and under the strict control of a Supervisory Unit affiliated with the Ministry of Public Security, with a strongly negative impact on the above- mentioned entities’ operations and funding;
Amendment 221 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Is strongly concerned that the main content of the new religious regulations will result in all religions, whether authorised or unauthorised, being given certain labels by the Chinese Government e.g. for Islam separatism/radicalism/terrorism, for Tibetan Buddhism separatism, for Christianity infiltration, for Buddhism/Daoism commercialization; underlines the fact that there are many congregations of the house churches in China who refuse to join the party-state- sanctioned Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee and the Christian Council for theological reasons; calls on the Chinese Government to allow the many house churches which are willing to register to do so directly with the government Department of Civil Affairs, so that their rights and interests as social organisations will be protected;
Amendment 228 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Notes that the Annual Report 2017 on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission concludes that despite some challenges, overall the ‘one country, two systems’ principle worked well, that the rule of law prevailed and free speech and freedom of information are generally respected, however this report also shares its concerns about the gradual erosion of the ‘one country, two systems’ principle which gives rise to legitimate questions about its implementation and Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy in the long term; underlines that the Annual Report observes that two negative trends regarding free speech and freedom of information became more pronounced: self-censorship when reporting on China’s domestic and foreign policy developments and pressure on journalists; fully supports the encouragement of the EU to the Hong Kong SAR and the Central Government authorities to resume electoral reform in line with the Basic Law, to reach agreement on an electoral system that is democratic, fair, open and transparent;