54 Amendments of Helmut SCHOLZ related to 2012/0242(CNS)
Amendment 43 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
Recital 1
(1) Over the past decades, the Union has made considerable progress in creating an internal market for banking services while deregulating significantly financial markets. Consequently, in many Member States, banking groups with their headquarters established in other Member States hold a significant market share, and credit institutions have geographically diversified their business, especially within the Euro area.
Amendment 44 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 a (new)
Recital 1 a (new)
(1 a) As a consequence of the deregulation of financial markets market actors have fuelled excessive speculation with different kinds of financial products, which often had no added value from a macro-economic perspective. This behaviour can be seen as one of the main reasons for the current financial and sovereign debt crisis. In a number of EU Member States supervisors have either failed to detect these problems or have not reacted appropriately.
Amendment 45 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) Maintaining and deepening the internal market for banking services isSound financial systems that serve the needs of public welfare and the real economy are essential in order to foster economic recovery in the Union. However this proves increasingly challenging. Evidence shows that the integration of banking markets in the Union is coming to a halt.
Amendment 47 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3
Recital 3
(3) At the same time supervisors must step up their supervisory scrutiny to take account of the lessons of the financial crisis in recent years, and be able to oversee highly complex and potentially dangerous inter-connected markets and institutions.
Amendment 48 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) Competence for supervision of individual banks in the Union remains mostly at national level. This limits the effectiveness of supervision and the ability of supervisors to reach a common understanding of the soundness of the banking sector throughout the Union. In order to preserve and increase the positive effects of marketachieve the objectives of sustainable economic growth, increasing welfare and social justice integration on growth and welfare, integration of supervisory responsibilities should therefore be enhanced. The overall objective of this legislation is to improve supervision of the European financial markets aiming to protect Government budgets and taxpayers from the risks of speculation and misconduct of financial market actors.
Amendment 49 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) The solidity of credit institutions is in many instances still closely linked to the Member State in which they are established. Doubts about the sustainability of public debt, economic growth prospects, and the viability of credit institutions have been creating negative, mutually reinforcing market trends. This may lead to risks for the viability of some credit institutions as well as for the stability of the financial system, and may imposes a heavy burden for already strained public finances of the Member States concerned. The problem poses specific risks within the euro area where the single currency increases the likelihood that negative developments in one Member State can create risks for economic development and the stability of the Euro area as a whole.
Amendment 50 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) The European Banking Authority (EBA), established in 2011 by Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), and the European System of Financial Supervision established by Article 2 of that Regulation and of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (EIOPA), and Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (ESMA) have significantly improved cooperation between banking supervisors within the Union. EBA is making important contributions to the creation of a single rulebook for financial services in the Union, and has been crucial in implementing in a consistent way the recapitato become the ultimate guarantor of harmonized implementation of prudential rules for banks in the Union establishing high-quality common regulatory and supervisory standards and practices including related methodologies and metrics, monitoring, assessing and enforcing the consistent appliscation of major Union credit institutions agreed by the European Council in October 2011. legally binding Union acts and mediating and settling disagreements between competent authorities involved in the single supervisory mechanism.
Amendment 52 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
Recital 9
(9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a trueTherefore a single rulebook for financial services for the Single Market as a whole, and composed of a single supervisory mechanism, European supervisory handbook, drawn up by EBA and a common deposit insurance and resolution framework. should be established. In view of the close links and interactions between Member States participating in the common currency, the banking unionsingle supervisory mechanism should apply at least to all Euro area Member States. WHowever with a view to maintaining and deepening the internal market, and to the extent that this is institutionally possible, the banking union should also be open to the participation of other Member Statesreducing possible threats of financial markets for the European integration process and to the extent that this is institutionally possible a single supervisory mechanism needs to be established for the whole European Union in the close future.
Amendment 54 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) As a first step towards the banking union, a single supervisory mechanism should ensure that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions is implemented in a coherent and effective way, that the single rulebook for financial services is applied equally to credit institutions in all Member States concerned, and that those credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations. Involvement of existing national supervisory authorities ensures the availability of resources and knowledge of national legal and tax systems and specific market conditions and structures within the Member States. A single supervisory mechanism iscould be the basis for the next steps towards the banking union. This reflects the principle that any introduction of common intervention mechanisms in case of crises should be preceded by common controls to reduce the likelihood that intervention mechanisms will have to be used.
Amendment 55 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB is well placed to carry out specific supervisory tasks with a focus on protecting the stability of Europe's financial system. Indeed in many Member States Central Banks are already responsible for banking supervision. T in a sensible division of tasks with the existing national supervisory authorities. For a transitional phase and until all legal aspects have been thoroughly examined the ECB should therefore be conferred in accordance with this regulation specific tasks concerning policies relating to the supervision of certain credit institutions within the Euro area. Within the framework of the single supervisory mechanism national competent authorities have to carry out all functions falling outside the scope of direct ECB supervision.
Amendment 58 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
Recital 12
(12) The ECB should be conferred those specific supervisory tasks which are crucial to ensure a coherent and effective implementation of the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, while other tasks should remain with national authorities. For this tasks and credit institutions which fall outside the scope of direct ECB supervision Member States have to ensure an effective and coherent supervision by national competent authorities within the framework of the single supervisory mechanism. The ECB's tasks should include measures taken in pursuance of macro-prudential stability.
Amendment 60 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) Safety and soundness of large banks is essential to ensure the stability of the financial system. However, recent experience shows that smaller banks can also pose a threat to financial stability. Therefore, the ECB should be able to exercise supervisory tasks in relation to all banks of participating Member Statystemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) pose particular threats to Europe's economies. The ECB shall ensure that these institutions apply business models which serve the people and the real economy rather than their shareholders. For this reason the ECB should supervise these institutions in close cooperation with national supervisory authorities.
Amendment 61 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
Recital 14
(14) Prior authorisation for taking up the business of credit institutions is a key prudential technique to ensure that only operators with a sound economic basis, an organisation capable of dealing with the specific risks inherent to deposit taking and credit provision, and suitable directors carry out those activities. TWithin the scope of Article 4 of this regulation the ECB should therefore have the task to authorise credit institutions and should be responsible for the withdrawal of authorisations.
Amendment 62 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
Recital 16
(16) An assessment of the suitability of any new owner prior to the purchase of a significant stake in a credit institution is an indispensable tool to ensure the continuous suitability and financial soundness of credit institutions' owners. The ECB as a Union institution is well-placed to carry out such an assessment without imposing undue restrictions to the internal market. TWithin the scope of Article 4 of this regulation the ECB should therefore have the task to assess the acquisition and disposal of significant holdings in credit institutions except those executed by public authorities of Member States or by their regional branches.
Amendment 63 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
Recital 17
(17) Compliance with Union rules requiring credit institutions to hold certain levels of capital against risks inherent to the business of credit institutions, to limit the size of exposures to individual counterparties, to publicly disclose information on a credit institutions' financial situation, to dispose of sufficient liquid assets to withstand situations of market stress, and to limit leverage is a prerequisite for credit institutions' prudential soundness. TWithin the scope of Article 4 of this regulation the ECB should therefore have the task to ensure compliance with those rules and to set higher prudential requirements and apply additional measures to credit institutions in the cases specifically set out in Union acts.
Amendment 64 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
Recital 18
(18) Additional capital buffers, including a capital conservation buffer and, a countercyclical capital buffer and a SIFI buffer as agreed in CRD IV to ensure that credit institutions accumulate during periods of economic growth a sufficient capital base to absorb losses in stressed periods, are key prudential tools to ensure the availability of adequate loss absorbency. TWithin the scope of Article 4 of this regulation the ECB should therefore have the task to impose such buffers and ensure credit institutions comply with them.
Amendment 65 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
Recital 19
(19) The safety and soundness of a credit institution depend also on the allocation of adequate internal capital, having regard to the risks to which it may be exposed, and on the availability of appropriate internal organisation structures and corporate governance arrangements. TWithin the scope of Article 4 of this regulation the ECB should therefore have the task to apply requirements ensuring that credit institutions have in place robust governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms, including strategies and processes for assessing and maintaining the adequacy of their internal capital. In case of deficiencies it should also have the task to impose appropriate measures including specific additional own funds requirements, specific publication requirements, and specific liquidity requirements.
Amendment 66 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
Recital 21
(21) In order to preserve financial stability, the deterioration of an institution's financial and economic situation must be remedied before that institution reaches a point at which authorities have no other alternative than to resolve it. TWithin the scope of Article 4 of this regulation the ECB should therefore have the task to carry out early intervention actions as defined in relevant Union law. It should however coordinate its early intervention action with the relevant resolution authorities. Pending the conferral of resolution powers on a European body, the ECB should moreover coordinate appropriately with the national authorities concerned to ensure a common understanding about respective responsibilities in case of crises, in particular in the context of the cross border crisis management groups and the future resolution colleges established for these purposes.
Amendment 71 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28
Recital 28
(28) National supervisors have important and long-established expertise in the supervision of credit institutions within their territory and their economic, organisational and cultural specificities. They have established a large body of dedicated and highly qualified staff for these purposes. However, in the past some national supervisors have failed to detect risks in their financial systems. Therefore, in order to ensure high quality European supervision national supervisors should assistclosely cooperate with the ECB in the preparation and implementation of any acts relating to the exercise of the ECB supervisory tasks. This should include in particular the ongoing day-to- day assessment of a bank's situation and related on site verificationsuntil after a thorough legal analysis has been undertaken these tasks are transferred to an independent dedicated European body that is responsible for supervising all institutions in Europe.
Amendment 79 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36
Recital 36
(36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should therefore be chaired by a Chair and a Vice-Chair elecappointed by the ECB Governing Council on the basis of an open application procedure and a professional assessment and confirmation by the European Parliament and composed, in addition, of representatives from the ECB and from, national authorities, EBA and Members of the European Parliament. In order to allow for an appropriate rotation while ensuring the full independence of the Chair and the Vice- Chair, their term should not exceed five years and should not be renewable. The gender balance should be respected. In order to ensure full coordination with the activities of the EBA and with the prudential policies of the Union, the EBA and the European Commission should be observers in the supervisory board. The performance of the supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB requires the adoption of a large number of technically complex acts and decisions, including decisions on individual credit institutions. In order to effectively carry out those tasks in accordance with the principle of separation from tasks relating to monetary policy, the ECB Governing Council of the ECB should be able to delegates certain clearly defined supervisory tasks and related decisions to the supervisory board, therefore not being any longer subject to the oversight and responsibility of the Governing Council, which can give instructions and directions to that body. The supervisory board may be supported by a steering committee with a more limited composition. The steering committee will perform its duties in the interest of the Union as a whole and act without any decision-making power.
Amendment 83 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 38
Recital 38
(38) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should exercise the supervisory tasks conferred on it in full independence, in particular from undue political influence and from industry interference which would affect its operational independence.
Amendment 84 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 39
Recital 39
(39) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should dispose of adequate resources. Those resources should be obtained in a way that ensures the ECB's independence from undue influences by national competent authorities and market participants, and separation between monetary policy and supervisory tasks. The costs of supervision should be primarily borne by the entities subject to it. Therefore, the exercise of supervisory tasks by the ECB should be financed at least partsolely by fees charged to credit institutions. In view of the transfer of significant supervisory tasks from national authorities to the ECB it is expected that any supervisory fees due at national level can be reduced as appropriate.
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 44
Recital 44
(44) In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments concerns banks and Member States is addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECB should start carrying out specific supervisory tasks as soon as possible. However, the transfer of supervisory tasks from national supervisors to the ECB requires a certain amount of preparation. Therefore, an appropriate phasing-in period should be provided for. The number of banks subject to the supervision of the ECB should increase progressively, taking into account the relevance of the supervision of those banks to ensure financial stability. As a first step the ECB should be able to apply its supervisory tasks to any banks, in particular to banks which have received or requested public financial assistance. As a second step, banks of European systemic importance as reflected in their total exposures and their cross- jurisdictional activities shouldhave to be covered. Total exposures should be calculated in light of the methodologies defined in the Basel III accord of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervisors on the calculation of the leverage ratio and on the definition of common equity tier 1 capital. The phasing- in process should be completed within one year from the entry into force of this Regulation at the latest.
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)
(3 a) "Systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs)" means institutions as defined in CRD IV/CRR;
Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law, be exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the following tasks in relation to allcertain credit institutions established in the participating Member States:
Amendment 94 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. The ECB shall carry out the tasks under paragraph 1 for credit institutions, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies and financial conglomerates which: (a) have received public funds under a re- capitalisation programme or (b) are of systemic importance as defined in CRD IV.
Amendment 95 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) To assess acquisitions and disposals of holdings in credit institutions except those executed by public authorities of Member States or by their regional branches;
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
(c a) To assess business models of SIFIs and to ensure that they do not pose a systemic threat to the functioning of European economies;
Amendment 99 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point e
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) To impose capital buffers to be held by credit institutions in addition to own funds requirements referred to in (c), including setting countercyclical buffer rates, a SIFI buffer as agreed in CRD IV and any other measures aimed at addressing systemic or macro-prudential risks in the cases specifically set out in Union acts;
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point h
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point h
(h) To carry out in close cooperation with EBA supervisory stress-tests on credit institutions to support the supervisory review;
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1
Article 5 – paragraph 1
1. The ECB shall carry out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism composed of EBA, the ECB and national competent authorities.
Amendment 103 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 4
Article 5 – paragraph 4
4. National competent authorities shall follow the instructions given by the ECBclosely cooperate with the ECB. This is without prejudice to the accountability of the competent supervisory authorities of the participating Member States to their national parliaments.
Amendment 105 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 4 a (new)
Article 5 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. National competent authorities shall continue to be responsible for supervisions of institutions that fall outside the scope of Art 4. (1a) until a single supervisory body has been set-up for the whole European Union.
Amendment 106 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 4 b (new)
Article 5 – paragraph 4 b (new)
Amendment 107 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 4 c (new)
Article 5 – paragraph 4 c (new)
4 c. The ECB may take a decision to take over the supervision of a credit institution falling outside the scope of Article 4(1a) in the following cases: (a) where the national competent authorities fail to perform their duties under this Regulation; (b) where there is evidence that the credit institution, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, may pose or is likely to pose a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of the Union financial market and/or to the stability of the financial system, or may exacerbate or is likely to exacerbate such a situation; (c) where a credit institution falls or will fall within the scope of Article 4(1a).
Amendment 108 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 4 d (new)
Article 5 – paragraph 4 d (new)
4 d. In case of conflicts between the ECB and the national competent authorities under the cases of Article 4 (1a) and Article 5 paragraph 2, 3, 4b and 4c a Conciliation Committee has to been set up by EBA. Details shall be specified in separate Rules of procedure.
Amendment 115 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 2
Article 18 – paragraph 2
2. The ECB shall carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and from any other tasks. The tasks conferred upon the ECB by this regulation shall not interfere with the ECB's tasks relating to monetary policy and any other tasks. The staff involved in carrying out the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation shall be organizationally and disciplinary separated and subject to separate decision and reporting lines.
Amendment 118 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1
Article 19 – paragraph 1
1. The planning and execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECB, shall be undertaken by an internal body composed of four representatives of the ECB appointed by the Executive Board of the ECB and one representative of the national authority competent for the supervision of credit institutions in each participating Member State two representatives of EBA and six members of the European Parliament (hereinafter ‘"supervisory board’"). The four ECB representatives shall neither be part of the governing council nor of the executive committee of the ECB.
Amendment 120 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 2
Article 19 – paragraph 2
2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair elecappointed by the members of the Governing Council from the members, with the exception of the President, of the Executive Board, and a Vice- Chair elected by and from the members of the Governing Council of the ECB. Both positions shall be approved by the European Parliament after a hearing in the responsible committee.
Amendment 123 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3
Article 19 – paragraph 3
3. The Governing Council of the ECB may delegates clearly defined supervisory tasks and related decisions regarding individual or a set of identifiable credit institutions, financial holding companies or mixed financial holding companies to the supervisory board, therefore not being any longer subject to the oversight and responsibility of the Governing Council.
Amendment 125 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 4
Article 19 – paragraph 4
4. The supervisory board may appoint from among its members a steering committee with a more limited composition which supports its activities, including prepar. The steering committee has to perform its duties without any decision-making power and ing the meetingsinterest of the Union as a whole.
Amendment 127 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 6
Article 19 – paragraph 6
6. The Chair of the European Banking Authority and awo members of the European Commission mayshall participate as observers in the meetings of the supervisory board.
Amendment 130 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 7 a (new)
Article 19 – paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. The supervisory board publishes a set of minutes including a record of votes taken after every meeting.
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1
Article 21 – paragraph 1
1. The ECB shall submit each yearmonth to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Eurogroup and upon request a report on the execution of the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation.
Amendment 133 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 3
Article 21 – paragraph 3
3. The Chair of the supervisory board may, at the request of the European Parliamentor a national Parliament of a participating Member State, be heard on the execution of its supervisory tasks by the competent committees of the European Parliamentor national Parliament concerned.
Amendment 134 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 4
Article 21 – paragraph 4
4. The ECB shall reply orally or in writing to questions put to it by the European Parliament or by the Eurogroup, the Eurogroup or by a national parliament of a participating country..
Amendment 135 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 4 a (new)
Article 21 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. The European Parliament possesses control, inquiry and file inspection rights regarding issues related to the execution of supervisory tasks under this regulation.
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 24 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. With respect to the receipt of any regulatory fees under this regulation the European Parliament exercises a right of budgetary control.
Amendment 138 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 a (new)
Article 25 a (new)
Article 25 a Conflict of interest 1. The ECB shall create a standing ethics committee to assess possible conflicts of interest resulting from post-office employment of ECB staff members engaged in supervisory duties. The committee will be responsible for elaborating comprehensive and formal procedures for assessment. The results of such assessments shall be publicly disclosed. 2. Former ECB staff members who have been engaged in supervisory duties, and who intend to engage in an occupation during the two years after they have ceased to hold office, shall inform the ethics committee in good time. The committee will make a decision on the compatibility of the employment offer with the need to ensure the integrity and independence of staff. 3. Members of the supervisory board shall be prohibited from taking paid work in institutions for which the ECB has supervisory responsibility during the two years after they have ceased to hold office. .
Amendment 141 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
By 31 December 20153, the Commission shall publish a report on the application of this Regulation. That report shall evaluatcomprise, inter alia:
Amendment 142 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(a a) a detailed legal analysis how a single supervisory mechanism can be implemented for the EU as a whole;
Amendment 143 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point a b (new)
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point a b (new)
(a b) an analysis if for this single supervisory mechanism a new body needs to be created or if existing institutions or agencies can fulfil the tasks currently assigned to the ECB under Art 4 of this regulation;
Amendment 144 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)
(d a) the division of responsibilities between the ECB and the national competent authorities of participating Member States;
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 2
Article 26 – paragraph 2
The report shall be forwarded to the European Parliament and to the Council. The Commission shall make accompanying proposals, as appropriatOn the basis of this report the Commission shall until 01 July 2014 a legislative proposal on a single supervisory mechanism for the EU as a whole.