6 Amendments of Helmut SCHOLZ related to 2023/2104(INL)
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Calls on the European Council to also consult COSAC before deciding on a new seat allocation system; underlines the importance of ensuring full transparency as well as compatibility with the Member states' constitutional frameworks;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Calls on the European Council to also consult COSAC before deciding on a new seat allocation system; underlines the importance of ensuring full transparency as well as compatibility with the Member states' constitutional frameworks;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Underlines that any method chosen should be transparentmake use of transparent and reliable data that is publicly accessible; continues., therefore., to support using Eurostat data as the official source of population figures for the calculations, which is publicly available; fully supports that the same population figures are used as basis for the calculations on the EP composition and the qualified majority in Council;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Underlines that any method chosen should be transparentmake use of transparent and reliable data that is publicly accessible; continues., therefore., to support using Eurostat data as the official source of population figures for the calculations, which is publicly available; fully supports that the same population figures are used as basis for the calculations on the EP composition and the qualified majority in Council;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; believes that this principle is justified given the current EU institutional framework; stresses that under the current EU institutional framework the risk of increased electoral inequality could increase with enlargement; stresses that such a development could undermine the Parliament's democratic legitimacy; points out that decoupling the representation of Member states from the representation of European political parties through the introduction of an additional Union-wide constituency could provide a solution to this dilemma; notes that such a solution could include calculating the total seat entitlement of each European political party based on its EU-wide vote share and subsequently allocating overhang mandates so that the total seat number of each European political party equals the calculated entitlement; notes that ensuring full proportional completion would require a substantive share of Parliament's seats to be reserved for the Union-wide constituency; notes that such an overhaul of the electoral framework would require changes to the Treaties and therefore urges the Member states to consider such a solution during the upcoming Convention for the revision of the Treaties in accordance with Article 48 TEU;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; believes that this principle is justified given the current EU institutional framework; stresses that under the current EU institutional framework the risk of increased electoral inequality could increase with enlargement; stresses that such a development could undermine the Parliament's democratic legitimacy; points out that decoupling the representation of Member states from the representation of European political parties through the introduction of an additional Union-wide constituency could provide a solution to this dilemma; notes that such a solution could include calculating the total seat entitlement of each European political party based on its EU-wide vote share and subsequently allocating overhang mandates so that the total seat number of each European political party equals the calculated entitlement; notes that ensuring full proportional completion would require a substantive share of Parliament's seats to be reserved for the Union-wide constituency; notes that such an overhaul of the electoral framework would require changes to the Treaties and therefore urges the Member states to consider such a solution during the upcoming Convention for the revision of the Treaties in accordance with Article 48 TEU;