30 Amendments of Philippe LAMBERTS related to 2013/2021(INI)
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 10 a (new)
Citation 10 a (new)
- Having regard to the Eurogroup Statement of 25 March 2013 regarding the crisis in Cyprus2 __________________ 2 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/c ms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/136487. pdf
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas the OECD in its 2012 report estimates the value of implicit state guarantees, in terms of cost savings to EU banks, at around 100 Billion USD for 2012 with wide variations between banks and Member States and the greatest benefit accruing to the banks of greatest size, particularly if they are perceived to be weak, and to banks based in the Member States with the highest sovereign credit rating. Furthermore the report finds that such guarantees extend beyond those banks classified as SIFIs under the FSB's methodology;
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas, in relation to the crisis in Cyprus, the Eurogroup has confirmed the principle that the size of the banking sector relative to [a Member State's] GDP should be limited in order to address banking sector imbalances and promote financial stability, from which it follows that, in the absence of substantial EU- level funds for resolution, limits on the size, complexity and interconnectedness of banks will be beneficial to systemic stability;
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the Commission proposal should provide for a strong, stable, competitive, transparent and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity of the Member States' banking sectors;
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)
Recital I a (new)
Ia. whereas, with regard to ending the implicit guarantee that many banks enjoy, one of the most important tools in the recovery and resolution regime proposed by the Commission is the power for authorities to intervene early, well before the point of non-viability, to require banks to change their business strategy, size or risk profile so that they can be resolvable without recourse to extraordinary public financial support;
Amendment 135 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Maintains that structural reform, particularly if it results in a simpler and more modular banking system, is a more effective approach to achieving financial stability, competitivity and market discipline than a regulatory arms race in which ever more complex banking products, activities and structures are countered ex-post with increasingly unwieldy and equally complex sectoral legislation;
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Underscores that while, for a bank with a given business model, prudential requirements aim at reducing the probability of failure and recovery and resolution requirements aim at limiting the cost of such a failure, the most effective way to prevent future systemic instability is to directly address the size, complexity, interconnectedness, degree of maturity mismatch and other factors that lead to market-distorting implicit subsidies for many banks in the first place, and are inherent in their business models;
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the value of implicit guarantees provided by Member States to banks, including a methodology for regularly monitoring that value at Member State and Union level as an essential prerequisite for being able to assess the effectiveness of legislation at reducing the value of those guarantees, as well as the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU- based bank during the current crisis, together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail and investmentbanking and proprietary market risk taking activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country;
Amendment 162 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Invites the Commission to consider legislation applicable to the whole EU financial sector that explicitly prohibits activities and transactions whose primary purpose is deemed by the relevant authorities to be regulatory arbitrage or any other circumvention of sectoral legislation;
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable, competitive, transparent and efficient banking system, where ultimately no bank benefits from implicit public subsidies and all banks that reach the point of non-viability can be wound up or resolved without the need for extraordinary public support, that serves the needs of the real economy through the economic cycle, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;
Amendment 192 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, improved accountability for product design and marketing, quality of service to customers and enhance the personal liability for irresponsible risk taking for senior managers, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;
Amendment 203 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Considers that structural reform must be complemented by legislation setting out simple, clear and enforceable rules that ensure that activities not permitted for certain banks do not end up being carried out by under regulated shadow banking entities, especially those to which regulated banks are directly or indirectly exposed;
Amendment 207 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7b. Considers that it is essential to establish regulatory regimes for activities, such as securitisation and repo funding, which can provide a benefit to the real economy but entail potentially large systemic risks. Such regimes could consist of specific limited purpose banking licences for such entities and rules governing their permitted activities and related prudential requirements as well as their interactions with other components of the financial system;
Amendment 230 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and investmentproprietary market risk taking activities;
Amendment 233 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Urges the Commission, rather than attempting to exhaustively define what retail banks are not permitted to do, to base the key definition of what should be inside a "ring-fence" on a positive definition of the core financial services provided by banks to the real economy that cannot be allowed to be interrupted, and therefore will continue to receive an implicit government guarantee; Believes that only such an approach can serve as a basis for a clear and enforceable way of preventing disruption to these services by problems other banking activities. Such a definition should take account of which activities constitute services of general economic interest as referred to in Article 14 TFEU;
Amendment 238 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)
Paragraph 8 b (new)
8b. Recommends that any definition of proprietary market risk taking cover at least any activity resulting in a marginal increase in net exposure of the bank to market risk where either a) the activities are not undertaken as a service requested by a client in relation to the prudent management of the client's financial needs in the clients best interest or b) it is possible to transfer the resulting market risk to a legally separate entity, but this is not, in fact, done;
Amendment 239 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 c (new)
Paragraph 8 c (new)
8c. Stresses that, where core banking services provided by retail banks to the real economy unavoidably result in proprietary market risk taking, that this risk be required to be fully hedged where possible or subject to strict limits on the level and duration of such exposure for particular activities;
Amendment 258 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entityan entity engaged in proprietary market risk taking;
Amendment 274 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Urges the Commission to ensure that tradproprietary market risk taking activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail services;
Amendment 287 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake tradproprietary market risk taking activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their tradproprietary market risk taking arm and not by their ring-fenced retail arm;
Amendment 309 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point a
Paragraph 12 – point a
(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and investmentproprietary market risk taking entities;
Amendment 320 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point b a (new)
Paragraph 12 – point b a (new)
(ba) Limits on the extent to which securitisation results in the expansion of unsustainable lending or investment in higher risk areas whether within or outside the group containing the originator;
Amendment 322 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point c
Paragraph 12 – point c
(c) the application of adequate, thorough and separate capital, leverage and liquidity rules to each entity appropriately calibrated to the business models of those entities, including separate balance sheets;
Amendment 326 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point d
Paragraph 12 – point d
(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ring- fenced and non-ring-fenced activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, includingas well as strict limits on the exposure of ring-fenced activities to the investment entity's riskier activitiesbanks and shadow banks inside or outside the same group that are permitted to engage in proprietary market risk taking;
Amendment 352 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Underlines the necessity of assessing the systemic risk presented by both the retail and investmentproprietary market risk taking entities, as well as by the group as a whole, with a view to the application of appropriate capital buffers and liquidity requirements for each entity taking off balance sheet exposures fully into account;
Amendment 367 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Urges the Commission to ensure that the retail entity has sufficient capital, bail- inable liabilities and liquid assets to enable it, in the event of the bank's failure, to maintain depositors' access to funds, to protect the essential services of the ring- fenced arm from the risk of disorderly failure and to prioritise paying out depositors in a timely fashion;
Amendment 379 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Urges the Commission to ensure that adequate differentiation exists in terms of capital, leverage, bail-inable liabilities and liquidity requirements between the investmentproprietary market risk taking and retail entities, with an emphasis on higher capital requirements for the investment entityentity engaged in proprietary market risk taking;
Amendment 414 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Calls on the Commission to include provisions establishing an obligation for all board members of the retail entity, both executive and non-executive, and all levels of management and risk-takers to originate from, and only have responsibility for, the retail entity and not the investmentproprietary market risk taking entity;
Amendment 431 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. Urges the Commission to ensure that the banks' compensation and remuneration policy are transparent to investors and the public. Not all Member States have audit legislation that makes public the remuneration and compensation scheme in their annual reports. This is valuable information to the banks' investors as well as current and future customers;
Amendment 475 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. Asks the Commission to bring forward measures to facilitatepromote accessible websites allowing consumers to compare both prices and financial strength among banks thus enhancing discipline through informed consumer switching between banks and assist in improving consumer choice in the banking sector by reducing the barriers to entry and exit and applying proportionate rules to new entrants to the market;