9 Amendments of Philippe LAMBERTS related to 2016/0361(COD)
Amendment 15 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) The implementation of the TLAC standard in the Union needs to take account of the existing institution-specific minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities ('MREL') applicable to all Union credit institutions and investment firms as laid down in Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Union and of the Council12 . As TLAC and MREL pursue the same objective of ensuring that Union institutions have sufficient loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity, the two requirements should be complementary elements of a common framework. Operationally, the harmonised minimum level of the TLAC standard for G-SIIs ('TLAC minimum requirement') should be introduced in Union legislation through amendments to Regulation (EU) No 575/201313 , while the institution- specific add-on for G-SIIs and the institution-specific requirement for non- G-SIIs, referred to as minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities, should be addressed through targeted amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU and Regulation (EU) No 806/201414 . The relevant provisions of this Regulation as regards loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity of institutions should be applied together with those in the aforementioned pieces of legislation and in Directive 2013/36/EU15 in a consistent way. _________________ 12 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190 13 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p.1 14 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1 15 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338
Amendment 17 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3
Recital 3
(3) The absence of harmonised rules in the Member States participating in the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) in respect of the implementation of the TLAC standard would create additional costs and legal uncertainty for institutions and make the application of the bail-in tool for cross- border institutions more difficult. The absence of harmonised Union rules also results in competitive distortions on the internal market given that the costs for institutions to comply with the existing requirements and the TLAC standard may differ considerably across the participating Member States. It is therefore necessary to remove those obstacles to the functioning of the internal market and to avoid distortions of competition resulting from the absence of harmonised rules in respect of the implementation of the TLAC standard. Consequently, the appropriate legal basis for this Regulation is Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as interpreted in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Amendment 21 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
Recital 9
(9) The MREL should allow institutions to absorb losses expected in resolution and recapitalise the institution post-resolution. The Board should, on the basis of the resolution strategy chosen by them, duly justify the imposed level of the MREL, in particular as regards the need and the level of the requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU in the recapitalisation amount. As such, that level should be composed of the sum of the amount of losses expected in resolution that correspond to the institution's own funds requirements and the recapitalisation amount that allows the institution post- resolution to meet its own funds requirements necessary for being authorised to pursue its activities under the chosen resolution strategy. The MREL should be expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure and leverage ratio measures, and institutions should meet the levels resulting from the two measurements simultaneously. The Board should be able to adjust the recapitalisation amounts in cases duly justified to adequately reflect also increased risks that affect resolvabiliupwards the recapitalisation amounts in order to add a safety marisging from the resolution group’s business model, funding profile and overall risk profile and therefore in such limited circumstances require that oreseen for covering costs that may arise from implementing either recapitalisation amounts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 12d(3) and (4) are exceededsolution actions or a business reorganisation plan.
Amendment 22 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) To enhance their resolvability, the Board should be able to impose an institution-specific MREL on G-SIIs, on G-SIIs and institutions not considered as less significant in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/20131 in addition to the TLAC minimum requirement provided in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. That institution-specific MREL may only be imposed where the TLAC minimum requirement ideemed by competent authorities as not sufficient to absorb losses and recapitalise a G-SII under the chosen resolution strategy. ________________ 1a Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).
Amendment 24 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) When setting the level of MREL, the Board should consider the degree of systemic relevance of an institution and the potential adverse impact of its failure on the financial stability. The Board should take into account the need for a level playing field between G-SIIs and other comparable institutions with systemic relevance within the participating Member States such as O-SIIs and institutions not considered as less significant in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/20131 . Thus MREL of institutions that are not identified as G-SIIs but the systemic relevance within participating Member States of which is comparable to the systemic relevance of G- SIIs should not diverge disproportionately from the level and composition of MREL generally set for G- SIIs. ________________ 1a Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).
Amendment 27 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
Recital 12
(12) Similarly to powers conferred to competent authorities by Directive 2013/36/EU, the Board should be allowed to impose higher levels of MREL while addressing in a more flexible manner any breaches of those levels, in particular by alleviating the automatic effects of those breaches in the form of limitations to the Maximum Distributable Amounts ('MDAs'). The Board should be able to give guidance to institutions to meet additional amounts to cover losses in resolution that are above the level of the own funds requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU, and/or to ensure sufficient market confidence in the institution post-resolution. To ensure consistency Directive 2013/36/EU, guidance to cover additional losses may only be given where the 'capital guidance' has been requested by the competent supervisory authorities in accordance with Directive 2013/36/EU and should not exceed the level requested in that guidance. For the recapitalisation amount, the level requested in the guidance to ensure market confidence should enable the institution to continue to meet the conditions for authorisation for an appropriate period of time including by allowing the institution to cover the costs related to the restructuring of its activities following resolution. The market confidence buffer should not exceed the combined capital buffer requirement under Directive 2013/36/EU unless a higher level is necessary to ensure that, following the event of resolution, the entity continues to meet the conditions for its authorisation for an appropriate period. Where an entity consistently failsFor the recapitalisation amount, the level requested in the guidance to ensure market confidence should enable the institution to continue to meet the conditions for authorisation for an appropriate period of time. Where an entity consistently fails to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance, it should be subject to partial limitations of the MDAs. Whenever the failure of an entity to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance, the Board should be able to require that the a lasts longer than six mount ofhs, the MREL be increased to cover the amount of the guidance. For the purposes of considering whether there is a consistent failure, the Board should take into account the entity's reporting on the MREL as required by Directive 2014/59/EUrelevant authorities should exercise their powers to address breaches of the MREL.
Amendment 29 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
Recital 16
(16) Any breaches of the TLAC minimum requirement and of the MREL should be appropriately addressed and remedied by competent authorities, resolution authorities and the Board. Given that a breach of those requirements cshould constitute an impediment to institution or group resolvability, the existing procedures to remove impediments to resolvability should be shortened to address any breaches of those requirements expediently. The Board should also be able to require institutions to modify the maturity profiles of eligible instruments and items and to prepare and implement plans to restore the level of those requirements within a pre-specified timeframe.
Amendment 43 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 4 – point c b (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 4 – point c b (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 10 – paragraph 11 – point i
Article 10 – paragraph 11 – point i
(i) to require an entity to issue eligible liabilities to meet the requirements of Article 12; (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0806&from=EN)cb) in paragraph 11, point i is replaced by the following: "(i) to require within a specified timeframe an entity to issue eligible liabilities to meet the requirements of Article 12g and Article 12h; Or. en
Amendment 44 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 4 – point c c (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 4 – point c c (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 10 – paragraph 11 – point j
Article 10 – paragraph 11 – point j
(cc) in paragraph 11, point j is replaced by the following: (j) to require an entity to take other steps to meet the requirements referred to in Article 12g and Article 12h, including in particular to attempt to renegotiate any eligible liability, Additional Tier 1 instrument or Tier 2 instrument it has issued, with a view to ensuring that any decision of the Board to write down or convert that liability or instrument would be effected under the law of the jurisdiction governing that liability or instrument. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0806&from=EN)" Or. en