BETA

26 Amendments of Morten MESSERSCHMIDT related to 2014/0020(COD)

Amendment 109 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) Harmonisation at Union level can ensure that Union banking groups, many of which operate in several Member States, are regulated by a common framework of structural requirements thereby avoiding competitive distortions, reducing regulatory complexity, avoiding unwarranted compliance costs for cross- border activities, promoting further integration in the Union market place and contributing to the elimination of regulatory arbitrage opportunities. Systemic risks, where they appear, must be addressed in the same way throughout the Union, with the aim of ensuring that each institution is resolvable without putting the financial stability of the Union at risk.
2015/02/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 165 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24 a (new)
(24 a) On the other hand, market making is a necessary component of a well- functioning market for corporate bonds and other debt instruments, since one of the main advantages for investors of such bonds is that they may be traded on a market at all times and contributes positively to financial stability.
2015/02/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 173 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26
(26) To ensure an effective separation in legal, economic, governance and operational terms, core credit institutions and trading entities should meet capital, liquidity, and large exposure rules on a functional sub-group basis. They should have strong independent governance and separate management bodies. Or. en Justification
2015/02/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 174 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
(27) Groups that qualify as mutuals, cooperatives, savings institutions or similar have a specific ownership and economicBanking groups in the Union have by tradition different ownership structures. Imposing some of the rules related to separation could require far-reaching changes to the structural organisation of those entities the costs of which could be disproportionate to the benefDifferent legal traditions should be respected and the regulation adopts a neutral approach allowing the core credit institution to hold capital instruments and voting rights in the trading entitsy. To the extent that those groups fall within the scope of the Regulation, the competent authority may decide to allow core credit institutions that meet the requirements set out in Article 49(3)(a) or (b) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 to hold capital instruments or voting rights in aAppropriate measures to ensure effective separation between the core credit institution and the trading entity must be taken, e.g. by securing that there are no recourse possibility from the trading entity whereto the competent authority considers that holding such capital instruments or voting rights is indispensable for the functioning of the group and that the core credit institution has taken sufficient measures in order to appropriately mitigate the relevant risksre credit institution leaving creditors and equity in the trading entity to bear possible losses in the trading entity. The trading entity shall on a solo level fulfil own fund requirements and shall have its own management body.
2015/02/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 207 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) to reduce excessive risk taking withinensure the resolvability of the credit institution;
2015/02/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 286 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point 12
12. ‘market making’ means a financial institution's commitment to provide market liquidity on a regular and on-going basis, by posting two-way quotes with regard to a certain financial instrument, or as part of its usual business, by fulfilling orders initiated by clients or in response to clients’ requests to trade, butor in both cases without beanticipation of potential client activity, and by hedging exposed to material market riitions arising from the fulfilment of those tasks;
2015/02/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 392 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
(i a) the selling of interest rate derivatives, foreign exchange derivatives, credit derivatives, emission allowances derivatives and commodity derivatives eligible for central counterparty clearing, and emission allowances, to non-financial clients and to financial entities referred to in the second and third indents of point (19) of Article 5, to insurance undertakings, or to institutions providing occupational retirement benefits where the sole purpose of the sale is to hedge interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, credit risk, commodity risk or emissions allowance risk.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 393 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point i b (new)
(i b) activities for the purpose of prudently managing capital, liquidity, funding and the balance sheet;
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 395 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point i c (new)
(i c) market making activities which do not pose a threat to the financial stability of the core credit institution or to the whole or any part of the Union financial system.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 438 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the relative size of trading assets, as measured by risk weighted trading assets divided by totalhe total risk weighted assets;
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 440 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) the leverage of trading assets as measured by trading assetrading related risk exposures divided by core Tier 1 capital;
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 442 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) the relative importance of counterparty credit risk, as measured by the fair value of stemming from non-centrally cleared derivatives, as measured by the risk weighted assets stemming from non- centrally cleared derivatives divided by total tradingrisk weighted assets;
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 449 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point d
(d) the relative complexity of trading derivatives, as measured by level 2 and 3 trading derivatives assets divided by trading derivatives and by trading assets;deleted
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 453 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point e
(e) the relative profitability of trading income, as measured by trading income divided by total net income;deleted
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 456 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point f
(f) the relative importance of market risk, as measured by computing the difference between trading assets and liabilities in absolute value and dividing it by the simple average between trading assets and trading liabilitiesthe risk exposure amount for market risk divided by the total risk exposure amount;
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 461 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point h
(h) credit and liquidity risk arising from commitments and guarantees provided by the core credit institution.deleted
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 464 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point h a (new)
(h a) trading related risk exposures divided by eligible liabilities for bail-in requirements as defined in Article 45 of Directive 59/2014/EU [BRRD]
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 483 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 3
3. The competent authority shall have finalised its assessment by [OP – please introduce 18 months from the day of publication of the Regulation], and shall carry out assessments when appropriate and at least every 5 years, taking into account article 19 on a regular basis, at least yearly, thereafter.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 500 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1
1. Where the competent authority concludes that, following the assessment referred to in Article 9(1), the limits and conditions linked to the metrics referred to in points (a) to (h) of Article 9(2) and specified in the delegated act referred to in paragraph 5 are met, and it therefore deems that there is a threat to the financial stresolvability of the core credit institution or to the Union financial system as a whole, taking into account the objectives referred to in Article 1, it shall, no later than two months after the finalisation of that assessment, start the procedure leading to a decision as referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 3.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 523 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
Unless the core credit institution demonstrates, within the time limit referred to in the first subparagraph, to the satisfaction of the competent authority, that the reasons leading to the conclusions are not justified, the competent authority shall adopt a decision addressing the core credit institution and requiring it not to carry out the trading activities specified in those conclusionsto reduce the risk that potential losses stemming from the trading related activities are transferred to the core credit institution, by taking measures in accordance with Article 17 of the Directive 2014/59/EU (BRRD) to restore the resolvability of the credit institution. The core credit institution shall in the first instance propose measures to remove impediments and only in the second instance, should the measures proposed by the core credit institution be regarded as inefficient, shall the consolidating supervisor take alternative measures in accordance with Article 17(5) of Directive 2014/59/EU. The competent authority shall state the reasons for its decision and publicly disclose it.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 560 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 5 – point b – introductory part
(b) specify which type of securitisation is not considered to pose a threat to the financial stresolvability of the core credit institution or to the Union financial system as a whole with regard to each of the following aspects:
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 608 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 a (new)
Article 12 a A core credit institution that has been subject to a decision referred to in Article 10(3) may carry out those market making activities which do not pose a threat to the financial stability of the core credit institution or to the whole or any part of the Union financial system.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 613 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 3
3. The EU parent shall ensure that in a group containing core credit institutions and trading entities shall be structured so that on a sub-consolidated basis two distinct sub-groups are created, only one of which contains core credit institutionsthere are no recourse possibility from the trading entity to the core credit institution leaving creditors and equity in the trading entity to bear possible losses in the trading entity.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 616 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 5
5. The core credit institution shall not hold capital instruments or voting rights in a trading entity. Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, the competent authority may decide to allow core credit institutions that meet the requirements set out in Article 49(3)(a) or (b) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 to hold capital instruments or voting rights in a trading entity where the competent authority considers that holding such capital instruments or voting rights is indispensable for the functioning of the group and that the core credit institution has taken sufficient measures in order to appropriately mitigate the relevant risks. A core credit institution, which is neither a central nor a regional credit institution, shall not, in any case, be allowed to directly hold capital instruments or voting rights in any trading entity. Prior to adopting a decision in accordance with this paragraph, the competent authority shall consult EBA. The competent authority shall notify its decision to EBA.EBA shall publish a list of those institutions to which this paragraph has been applied.deleted
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 672 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1
1. Before taking the decision referred to in Article 10(3), the competent authority shall notifyensure close coordination with the relevant resolution authority designated in accordance with Article 3 of Directive [BRRD] thereof.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 675 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 2
2. When carrying out the assessment in accordance with Article 9 and when requiring the core credit institution not to carry out certain activities in accordance with Article 10, the competent authority shall take into account any ongoing or pre- existing resolvability assessments carried out by any relevant resolution authority pursuant to Article 13 and 13(a) of Directive [BRRD]. A finding by the resolution authority that there are no substantive impediments to resolvability shall be deemed sufficient to demonstrate that the conclusions referred to in article 10(3) cannot justify a separation decision.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON