Activities of Morten MESSERSCHMIDT related to 2018/2113(INI)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the implementation of the Treaty provisions on Parliament’s power of political control over the Commission PDF (227 KB) DOC (84 KB)
Amendments (26)
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)
Citation 1 a (new)
- having regard to Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union, which entrusts the European Commission with definition of the general interest of the Union and the monopoly on taking initiatives 'to that end';
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)
Citation 2 a (new)
- having regard to the 55 new fields to which the Lisbon Treaty extended qualified majority voting;
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas this role is even more essential under the current Treaties as they have enshrined an unprecedented rise in the Union's powers, established qualified majority voting as the general rule and placed 'the general interest of the Union' in the Commission's hands, such that the Commission's monopoly on taking initiatives has expanded and been strengthened to an extraordinary extent, while being denied any truly democratic counterparty;
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Recital A b (new)
Ab. whereas a response is needed to the grave state of EU democracy, already described by Jacques Delors almost 20 years ago: 'When all is said and done, this technocratic building project moving forward under the aegis of a kind of gentle and enlightened despotism must be transformed into a meaningful project.' (Evangelical spirit and European construction, Conference at Strasbourg Cathedral, 7 December 1999)
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas a number of these instruments are impracticable (motion of censure) or still only used hesitantly for political purposes (right of inquiry, budgetary discharge, questions) owing to the European Commission continuing to have the monopoly on taking initiatives and on defining what the general interest is, but also because of its mode of composition and the refusal so far by the dominant parliamentary groups to turn their institution into a counterbalance, that is, a genuine European Parliament;
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas, in addition to these instruments, Parliament has an array of tools for steering oversight, thanks to which it can proactivelin theory shape the European political agenda, without however having the right of initiative as has any other parliament in the world;
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the Spitzenkandidaten process has substantially changed the relationship between Parliament and the Commission and hasby strengtheneding the link between the two institutions, thus leading to a greater politicisation of the Commission which shouldand increased subordination of Parliament, instead of resulting in increasedgenuine and unconditional parliamentary scrutiny of itboth the Commission's executive functions and its legislative and judicial powers, and also of how it functions internally;
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas the Treaties give Parliament the right in theory to vote on a motion of censure against the Commission as a whole but not to withdraw its confidence in an individual Commissioner;
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas despite the collective responsibility in theory of the College of Commissioners, Parliament should ensure effective political oversight of the individual work of each Commissioner;
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas the recent appointment ofconditions under which the new Secretary-General of the Commission hwas raised serious concerns over the role andappointed recently have confirmed the serious concerns, which have been expressed ever since the Community began, over the political role and influence exercised by senior Commissionintentionally left in the hands of senior officials;
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas with the adoption of the Framework agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission, Parliament has gained additional leverage in the shaping of the legislative agenda as proposed by the Commission every year in the Commission Work Programme (CWP), while still being the only parliament in the world that does not have the right of legislative initiative;
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital N
Recital N
N. whereas the extent of Parliament’'s scrutiny rights varies greatly between delegated acts and implementing acts; whereas Parliament has, namely 2 500 acts per year, 500 of which are in fact legislative, produced with a lack of transparency by committees and groups of experts whose independence is questionable; whereas Parliament cannot for much longer be content with the right to veto a delegated act and/or to revoke the delegation, bugiven that in the case of implementing acts its involvement is even much less far- reaching;
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital O
Recital O
O. whereas the current institutional structure of the Union, the absence of any separation of powers and the lack of a precise definition of the executive in the Treaties make the concept of EU executive complex and scattered across the European, national and regional levels;
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital P
Recital P
P. whereas stronger cooperation between the European Parliament and national and regional parliaments, in line with their respective constitutional competences on the one hand and enabling them to perform together, through networking, real EU legislative, budgetary and scrutiny functions on the other, is necessary to address the issue of multi-layered executive functions when it comes to the implementation of European legislation and to strengthen their democratic legitimacy;
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Recalls that the stronger political link created between Parliament and the Commission as a result of the Spitzenkandidaten process should not make the Commission subject to less stringent parliamentary oversight nor exempt the European Parliament from henceforth acting as a counterbalance to the Commission ;
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Points out that the Treaties do not separate properly powers and functions in the Union, do not set out clearly and definitively how federal and sovereign competences are to be shared out, do not ensure that the indissociable principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality are respected in practice and do not provide a clear definition of the EU executive, and that the institutions responsible differ across the various policy areas, depending on whether they are considered to belong to the shared or to the exclusive competences of the Union;
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Considers it necessary to establish a genuinely bicameral legislative system involving the Council and Parliament, with the Commission acting as the executiv, Parliament and national parliaments acting as a network, with the Commission acting as an executive body at the service of the political authorities and not the reverse;
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Recalls that the Treaties do not confer any legislative functions or right of legislative initiative on the European Council; is concerned that in recent years the European Council has, against the spirit of the Treaties, taken a number of important political decisions outside of the Treaty framework, thereby de facto excluding those decisions from the oversight of Precalls that only the European Council, each representative of which remains subject to the will of its national parliament and its people expressing themselves through referenda, can say what the 'spirit of the Treaties' is, that is to say, the intention of the states signatory to it; points out that parliamentary oversight by national parliaments and undermining the democratic accountability which is essential withthe European Parliament of a number of important political decisions taken in an attempt to address successive crises was too limited as regards to such European policieshe requirements of democratic accountability;
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Suggests that the instruments for calling the Commission to account and those for steering scrutiny should be combined, and that the national parliaments be closely associated with this, in order to maximise the effectiveness of both;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Insists that Parliament’s and the national parliaments' legislative powers and rights of oversight must be guaranteed, consolidated and strengthened, including through interinstitutional agreements and through the use of the corresponding legal basis by the Commission;
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Calls onDemands that the Commission to take more serious account ofconsider the legislative initiativeproposals launched by Parliament under Article 225 TFEU, and wishes to see more initiatives result in legislative proposalthe reasoned opinions adopted by national parliaments, as binding political instructions; at the same time, commends the Commission for its positive follow-up to Parliament’s recommendations expressed in its resolution of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty;
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Proposes that, in line with common constitutional practice as existing in all parliamentary democracies, the European Parliament, as the only institution directly elected by the citizens, and national parliaments in accordance with arrangements to be established, should be given the right of legislative initiative, without prejudice to the legislative prerogatives of the Commission;
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Encourages the exchange of best practices in parliamentary scrutiny among national parliaments, such as the holding of regular debates between the respective ministers and the specialised committees in national parliaments before and after Council meetings, and with Commissioners in an appropriate setting and timeframe, as well as meetings between the European Parliament and national parliaments; encourages the establishment of regular exchanges of officials of institutions and political group staff between the administrations of the European Parliament and national parliaments, the European Committee of the Regions and the Member State regions having legislative competences; calls on all national parliaments to draw inspiration from the Nordic negotiating mandate practice in which the parliamentary committee on EU affairs gives its government, well ahead of the EU legislative procedure, a proper mandate at the end of which ministers report back;
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Calls on the Commission to take note of reasoned opinions issued by the parliaments of the Member States which state that all or part of a draft legislative act or a judgment by the Court is not compatible with 'their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and self-government' nor with their 'essential state functions' (Article 4(2) TEU) ; only an internal assessment by the competent legal and political bodies of the Member States may justify any such review of constitutional identity;
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21b. Calls on the Commission to consider reasoned opinions from national parliaments on the principle of subsidiarity to be politically binding once the threshold laid down in the Treaties of one third of the votes allocated to Member State parliaments is reached; calls furthermore for Member State parliaments to have the right to exercise proper subsidiarity and proportionality checks on delegated acts and implementing acts, to recall them and where appropriate revise them;