7 Amendments of Sari ESSAYAH related to 2013/2076(INI)
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Considers that the three-year LTRO settled on March 2012 contributed to stabilising the banking system, but that this should be a temporary measure; notes that, despite the liquidity injected into the banking system by the LTRO, the credit available to the real economy is still below pre-crisis levels; suggests that it would be appropriate for the ECB to reduce its deposit facility rate to negative values in order to encourage banking lending to the real economy;
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Welcomes the setting-up of the OMTs, with no ex ante quantitative limits, in order to safeguard monetary policy transmission, but deplores the decision to link the activation of the OMT to strict conditionalities attached to an EFSF/ESM programme; calls on the ECB to activate OMTs independently from strict conditionality;
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Considers that the monetary policy tools that the ECB has used since the beginning of the crisis, while providing a welcome relief in distressed financial markets, have revealed their limits as regards stimulating growth and improving the situation on the labour market; considers, therefore, that the ECB could investigate the possibilities of implementing new unconventional measures aimed at participating in a large, EU-wide pro-growth programme, including the use of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance facility to undertake an ‘overt money financing’ of government debt in order to finance tax cuts targeted on low-income households and/or new spending programmes focused on the Europe 2020 objectives;
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
Amendment 148 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
Amendment 169 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
Amendment 207 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Considers that transparency in the field of banking supervision is ressential and that the ECB should take all possible measures to improve its transparency such as, inter alia, the publication of the minutes of the Supervisory Boardtricted to a certain extent because of possible negative market reactions, but that nevertheless political decision-makers in particular need a reliable overall picture of the banks’ real situation, and that therefore the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs should be given a comprehensive analysis;