34 Amendments of Bas EICKHOUT related to 2024/2054(INI)
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 13 a (new)
Citation 13 a (new)
– having regard to the CJEU judgement of 11 December 2018, case C- 493/17, Weiss and Others,
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 13 b (new)
Citation 13 b (new)
– having regard to the CJEU judgement of 16 June 2015, case C-62/14, Peter Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag,
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 23 a (new)
Citation 23 a (new)
– having regard to the ECB’s Climate and Nature Plan 2024-2025,
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas political independence requires the ECB to refrain from taking political decisionactions, including instructing national governments to specific fiscal and structural policy measures;
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB prohibit the monetary financing ofECB from directly purchasing debt instruments from governments;
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
F a. whereas the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) introduced in 2021 a Carbon Emission Reduction Facility (CERF) enabling banks to borrow at a preferential rate of 1.75% for an amount corresponding to 60% of their volume of loans issued to support to the low-carbon transition;
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)
Recital F b (new)
F b. whereas the Bank of Japan launched in 2022 the “Transactions for Climate Response Financing Operations” programme under which Japanese banks were able to borrow at a 0% rate 11,963 billion yen;
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
G a. whereas bank reserves held by credit institutions at the ECB amounted to EUR 4.3 trillion in June 2023;
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G b (new)
Recital G b (new)
G b. whereas the ECB, like major central banks, pays interest on commercial banks’ holdings of bank reserves making under its current policy stance large interest payments to commercial banks; whereas most central banks have only started remunerating commercial banks’ reserves in the last twenty years;
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Underlines that the statutory independence of the ECB, as laid down in the Treaties, is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate;
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Highlights the importance of the ECB’s political independence, which should remain untouched; stresses that this independence requires the ECB to in turn refrain from taking political decisionpolitical actions, including instructing national governments to specific fiscal and structural policy measures;
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Invites the ECB and the European Parliament to make full use of the accountability and transparency arrangements and, where possible, further enhance these arrangements, without prejudice to the ECB’s independence; calls on the ECB to strengthen dialogue with national parliaments;
Amendment 59 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. Recognises that while a tight monetary policy may be effective when inflation is predominantly stemming from demand factors such as excessive wage growth, consumption or public budgets spending, its impact may be more limited when addressing supply shocks;
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4 b. Underlines that geopolitical tensions and the climate and environmental crisis affect the price formation mechanism by disrupting supply in systemically significant sectors like energy, food, commercial infrastructure; is concerned that as response to more frequent supply shocks, firms coordinate price hikes to protect and even increase profit margins propagating and amplifying sectoral shocks; calls in this respect for a new inflation governance framework that would coordinate a broad range of stakeholders and policy areas including competition, fiscal, monetary policy and statistical authorities to prevent and mitigate such disruptions;
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Underlines that the impact of higher rates is not homogenous across sectors, as some economic sectors are more sensitive to such increases due to their higher reliance on debt financing costs; is concerned that renewable energy, energy efficiency, storage and grid projects due to high upfront capital costs to build and install the required infrastructure are particularly affected by interest rate increases leading to a slowdown of investments required for the green transition; calls on the ECB to evaluate to what extent higher interest rates have slowed down green investments;
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7 b. Calls on the ECB to reassess the feasibility of applying differentiated interest rates to support investments clearly geared towards energy efficiency and renewable energies; considers that this approach would enable the ECB to act simultaneously on demand and supply factors by raising rates to reduce aggregate demand, while at the same time lowering the green interest rate to preserve specific supply side factors from undue tightening;
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Recalls that the Economic and Monetary Union requires solid fiscal policiesspace in the Member States in order to be able to respond to external shocks;
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls that prudent fiscal policies by the Member States can complement the ECB’s efforts to keep inflation low; highlights that addressing excessive public deficit and debt levels is crucial to maintaining a stable economy and sustainable growth when driven by demand factors; highlights that rendering public debt sustainable is crucial to maintaining a stable economy and sustainable growth; stresses that debt sustainability depends not only on the quantity but also on the quality of public spending;
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
Amendment 161 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16 a. Notes that the Federal Reserve acknowledged that the ongoing contraction in its balance sheet size will be constrained by the need to ensure the supply of “ample reserves” in the foreseeable future for financial stability purposes and provided estimations of what it considers to be the lowest comfortable level of central bank reserves; underlines that the recent review of the ECB operational framework seems to also endorse an “ample reserves” doctrine; asks the ECB to clarify whether it operates on the basis of a specific estimation or range estimation of what it considers to be the lowest comfortable level of reserves for the euro area;
Amendment 162 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16 b. Underlines that interest on commercial banks’ holdings of bank reserves resulted only in 2023 in the Eurosystem paying EUR 152 billion interest to credit institutions amounting to 1.13 % of Eurozone GDP; stresses that such interest transfers to commercial banks imply reduction of profit transfers to national governments leading to increases in the budget deficits that may require in the future additional fiscal austerity measures to be addressed; considers this is an exorbitant and unsustainable subsidy to the banking sector that escapes the remit of democratic deliberation and scrutiny; asks the ECB to mitigate this issue and consider imposing non-interest-bearing minimum reserve requirements on part of the bank reserves, while only remunerating the reserves in excess of these minimum requirements;
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses that the ECB’s purchase programmes are unconventional policies that amou; recalls that in its consecutive judgements, in economic terms, to monetary financing, which is prohibited underthe Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) clarified that the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), the PSPP Public Sector Purchase (PSPP) and the Pandemic emergency purchase (PEPP) programmes do not effectively circumvent Article 123(1) TFEU, if the ECB does not shrink back its balance sheeand that the purchase by the ECB of government bonds in secondary markets does not amount to monetary financing of Member State budgets, a thesis upheld by the German Federal Constitutional Court; calls on the ECB to therefore gradually reduce the size of its balance sheet;
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. RegreSupports the establishment of the transmission protection instrument (TPI) in July 2022; calls on the ECB to respect not just the legal prohibition of monetary financing but also its economic meaning; stresses in this regard that selectively purchasing government debt amounts to monetarily financing an EU Member State;
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Stresses that diverging interest rates in the euro area are generally the result of different risk premia on government bonds; stresses that purchases under the TPI would merely conceal the symptoms of loose fiscal policy; calls on Member States to conduct responsible fiscal policies andby ensure sustainable debt leveling the necessary investments that build their resilience against current and future shocks;
Amendment 208 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Welcomes the ECB’s progress on the digital euro project and its ongoing dialogue with Parliament; highlights the expected benefits, such as enhanced strategic autonomy, a higher level of competition in the retail payment market, potential to foster innovation in payments and finance, improved financial inclusion and the availability of an offline back-up payment system;
Amendment 211 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20 a. Stresses the need that the digital euro becomes universally accessible and not reduced to a simple “payment scheme”; asks therefore, that digital euro services are provided by a broad range of commercial, public and non-profit intermediaries, beyond the traditional remit of commercial banks”;
Amendment 225 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Stresses the need for a cost-based compensation model for the banking sector, which is tasked with the practical implem, excluding low-value payments in the computation; recalls that the compentsation of the digital euro project;model must guarantee a euro free of charge for its users
Amendment 239 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Calls on the ECB to refrain from taking politically motivated decisions and to stick to its mandate of maintaining pr actions; underlines that Article 127 of the TFEU calls on the ECB to support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article stability3 of the TEU; stresses that oversteppbserving this mandate touches on the central bank’s political independence“supportive mandate” is in the words of ECB Executive Board Member Frank Elderson “a duty, not an option” for the ECB;
Amendment 256 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Stresses that the ECB’s secondary objectives are best achieved when the free market operates in a stable macroeconomic environment, based on predictable price levels, that encourages investment; underlines, however, that market mechanisms alone will not lead to a significant enough reduction in the cost of capital for green investments;
Amendment 259 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Stresses that the ECB should prevent distortions in the signalling function of prices given this function’s role in ensuring an efficient allocation of resources; recalls that studies previously conducted by the ECB have shown that “macroeconomic and financial market disruptions linked to climate change and transition policies could affect the conduct of monetary policy and the ability of the ECB to deliver on its price stability mandate through various channels”; invites the ECB to further assess to what extent climate change affects its ability to maintain price stability;
Amendment 267 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Insists that the ECB respect the market neutrality principle in all of its monetary operations; regrets that the ECB’s actions to decarbonise its corporate bond holdings have not followed a market neutral approach by its very definitions not a legal requirement; underlines that the ECB itself has confirmed that market neutrality “is not mentioned in primary EU law and the meaning given to such a notion in the doctrine is extremely heterogeneous”; stresses that intrinsically, any central bank intervention is at odds with the notion of market neutrality as by adjusting their balance sheet central banks constantly intervene to influence market outcomes; supports therefore, that such notion cannot create legal obligations for the ECB;
Amendment 300 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Welcomes the finalisation of the Basel III framework, as it will strengthen the resilience of the banking sector; agrees with the ECB that postponements of Basel III provisions, including the fundamental review of the trading book, are unnecessary while the swift implementation of Basel III rules would not harm the competitiveness of EU banks;
Amendment 307 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32 a (new)
Paragraph 32 a (new)
32 a. Calls for the further enhancement of the ECB’s internal whistleblowing framework, bringing it in line with the EU Whistleblower Directive;
Amendment 310 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 a (new)
Paragraph 33 a (new)
33 a. Regrets that only two members of the ECB’s Executive Board and Governing Council are women; reiterates that the nominations to the Executive Board should be gender-balanced, with shortlists submitted to Parliament; strongly regrets that instead of providing shortlists of candidates, Member States have recently nominated a number of candidates equal to the number of vacant positions; recalls that Parliament has previously committed not to consider shortlists that do not respect the gender- balance principle, in accordance with its resolution on gender balance in EU economic and monetary affairs nominations; calls on the euro area’s Member States to do their part and fully incorporate the principle of gender equality in their appointment processes;