39 Amendments of Sven GIEGOLD related to 2011/2156(INI)
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas in 2010 the euro area recovered with GDP growth of 1.7% and is expected to stagnate at a similar or lower levels throughout 2011, after the slump in 2009 of -4.2% growth, whereas behind these aggregated figure some euro-area Member States remained in recession during the same period,
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas on 10 May 2010, the ECB announced it would intervene directlyin secondary markets but temporarily in the euro area public and private debt securities markets through the Securities Markets Programme, purchases of which amounted to EUR 77.5129 billion in June 2011at the beginning of September 2011; whereas these securities have been bought with a discount,
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas the ECB decided the 4th June of 2009 to launch a purchase programme of covered bonds in primary and secondary markets for EUR 60 billion which was expected to be fully implemented by the end of June 2010
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Recital D b (new)
Db. whereas by the end of 2010 the ECB held €480 billion of asset-backed securities and €360 billion of non- marketable financial instruments, both categories amounting to a total of 44% of its total assets,
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas most of the long-term government debt of Greece and Portugal is on the ECB balance sheet and the persistent rumours of Greek debt restructuring may again delay the ECB's exit from non-standard measures,
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Underlines that, while month-on-month HICP inflation has mostly been above 2% since the beginning of 2010, what matters for monetary policy are future expectations, the low level of which are a testimony of high ECB credibility; underlines that core HIPC in September 2011 is only 1%,
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Takes the view that besides HIPC, assets prices developments and credit growth in the EU and in Member States are crucial indicators for an effective monitoring of financial stability within the EMU and more broadly the EU,
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Recalls that the singleprimary objective of ECB is price stability; notes that de facto financial stability is becoming a second objective;a second objective which is particularly crucial in the current context of financial turmoil and instability ; underlines that article 127.6 the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may unanimously, and after consulting the European Parliament and the European Central Bank, confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings also notes the work of the ESRB under the auspices of the ECB on financial stability;
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Is deeply alarmed about the persistence of the renewed financial turmoil in the EU and the persistence of substantial macro financial imbalances between the euro area economies as well as deflationary pressures in many euro- area Member States;
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Observes that, despite unitary monetary policy, monetary conditions and the impact of monetary policy diverge considerably in the euro area; in countries experiencing turbulence, banks are tightening the availability of credit, with the opposite happening in other countries with a current account surplus; this asymmetry is likely to become even more pronounced if the ECB keeps increasing rates, given the prevalence of loans indexed to short-term interest rates in the former group of countries;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Is concerned with global monetary developments and the external value of the euro as non conventional liquidity injections in most OECD countries have significant spillover effects; believes that a much stronger international coordination is required for a more stable global monetary system;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Welcomes the determination and proactive stance of the ECB throughout the crisis since 2007; believes however that monetary policy has a part of responsibility in the creation of asset bubbles given the unsustainable developments of credit growth during the years before the crisis,
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Welcomes the intervention of the ECB to stabilize sovereign bonds markets, criticizes its persistent lack of account of social objectives of the Union in its recommendations and conditions attached to its stabilization policies;
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Recallstakes note of the proposals on crisis management made by the ECB both in terms of economic governance and the banking resolution mechanism;
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Deplores the fact that hesitation in the management of the crisis by the Commission and the Member States, particularly in those llack of an adequate EU economic policy framework for crisis management and the hesitation in the management of the crisis by the Member States and the Commission; urges the Council and the Commission to rapidly put forward comprehensive and far reackhing reforms, has triggered the ECB's position against restructuring of Greece's debt; measures required for the survival of the euro such as Eurobonds combined with a stronger fiscal discipline, as well as enhanced capacity and scope of the EFSF/ESM,
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Is alarmed about continuous strains on the euro area sovereign bonds markets reflected on widening spreads over the last two years; deems that flight to safety provoked by waves of panic experienced during the current financial crisis have had massive distorting effects and have created costly negative externalities, commends efforts made by the ECB by means of its Securities Markets Programs to bring down spreads of vulnerable Member States;
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)
Paragraph 8 b (new)
8b. is deeply concerned with the current macro financial global context, the sharp slow down of the recovery and the threat of a global shortfall in aggregate demand in the face of a capacity glut; believes that in such a simultaneous fiscal consolidation process in all Member States achieved by means of far reaching austerity measures will worsen the situation and ultimately fail,
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 c (new)
Paragraph 8 c (new)
8c. Notes that the financial crisis in the euro-area is a solvency crisis that initially manifested itself as a liquidity crisis; deems that such a situation cannot be resolved in the long term by simply pouring new debt and liquidity into highly indebted economies in combination with accelerated plans for fiscal consolidation,
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 d (new)
Paragraph 8 d (new)
8d. Takes note of the restructuring of Greek debt by means of a EU coordinated voluntary exchange offer; deems that the Greek debt burden reduction agreed at the 21st July summit do not restore public debt sustainability
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Reminds that the huge increase of public debt since 2008 in several member States has been triggered by the fact these countries had to face excesses previously caused by an unsustainable growth of private debt and financial bubbles; believes therefore that the current crisis made it evident that the fiscal position is unsustainable if the financing of the private sector is unsustainable,
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Recalls that before the outbreak of the financial crisis, the ratio of public debt to GDP of the euro-area declined in between 1999 and 2007 from 72% of GDP to 67% of GDP and that in contrast, debt levels of households, firms and the leverage of the financial sector experienced a significant increase over the same period; reminds in particular that the household debt in the euro area increased from 52% to 70% of GDP during the same period and that financial institutions debt increased their debt from less than 200% of GDP to more than 250% acknowledges that some Member States such as Greece and Italy were important exceptions to these general trend;
Amendment 107 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Notes the rapid evolution of the leverage ratio of the ECB, measured by its capital and reserves in relation to assets; notes that this leverage ratio by far exceeds that of other comparable cere has been also a substantial evolution in balance sheet sizes of other Central bBanks, with the exception of those having implemented having implemented emergency and non conventional liquidity provision facilities, including quantitative easing programmes, such as the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England;
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Points out that the ECB balance sheet expansion has not led to inflation, due toighlights its increasing role as a central counterparty between euro area banks, which effectively amounts to a monetisation of bank bailouts;
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Stresses that the Eurosystem has refused to disclose the method used to determine the 'theoretical price' of impaired assets eligible for its liquidity operations in the framework of the Enhanced Credit Support; underlines that it is therefore impossible to verify whether the ECB has played a quasi-fiscal role; demands in this perspective to the ECB to disclose its valuation methods used all along the crisis,
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 b (new)
Paragraph 12 b (new)
12b. Underlines that given the lack of a proper euro area crisis framework the ECB was pushed to take risks it was not foreseen to;
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 c (new)
Paragraph 12 c (new)
12c. Asks the ECB for enhanced transparency of the quality and quantity of securities, included asset backed securities accepted as collateral as well as other marketable and not marketable securities held for monetary purposes and securities not held for monetary purposes;
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Acknowledges the necessity of non- standard monetary policy measures, but calls for a phasing-out of those programmes as soon as possible; provided that a Community framework is established to properly deal with financial instability as well as cross- border banking recovery and resolution framework ;
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Calls on the ECB to put in place in the Security Markets Program a discount rate mechanism that can be adjusEmphasizes that conditions attached to banks benefiting from outstanding modalities related, taking into account whether a certain security is further downgraded by most credit rating agencies and ensuring that the ECB does not end up with too many risky assets; in addition, believes that the ECB should use at least two credit rating qualifications before accepting a security as collateral;o TARGET-2 settlement system and more generally ECB liquidity provision facilities are a matter of concern in terms of credit risks for the ECB itself as well as in terms of scope and transparency,
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Asks the ECB for more public and regular information on flows between euro area central banks measured in the Target- 2 programme so that these flows are not interpreted as permanently moving from current account surplus countries to deficit countries in order to avoid their financial collapse;settlement system in order to have a proper view of its recent developments,
Amendment 143 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Is concerned about the high levels of maturity and currency mismatch of several systemically and non systemically relevant euro area banking institutions,
Amendment 144 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)
Paragraph 15 b (new)
15b. Deems that in the current emergency context it is urgent to define and disclose additional strict conditions attached to ECB liquidity provisions, including prudential conditions going beyond internal and non disclosed rules and haircuts related to the collateral accepted for its refinancing operations,
Amendment 145 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 c (new)
Paragraph 15 c (new)
15c. Asks the ECB to explore whether compulsory reserves requirements could be an additional instrument to the interest rate in order to preserve financial stability without hampering the recovery,
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 d (new)
Paragraph 15 d (new)
15d. Notes that in the US and the EU one of the consequences of monetary policies before and during the crisis has been the engineering of a steep yield curve which helps the banking system to be more rapidly recapitalized with the help of depositors and short term lenders;
Amendment 154 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for a more integrated macro- prudential policy framework within the monetary policy context, if necessary including differentiated macro-prudential tools in the Union to account for differences between the euro area and non- euro area countries; calls for an analysis of the effectiveness of significant enhancement of the resources available for the new financial supervisory architecture and for an evaluation of the option establishing a single European financial supervisory authority, unifying under its umbrella the current European Supervisory Authorities and the European Systemic Risk Board;
Amendment 167 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses the need for a single European minister of Finance in order to coordinate a basic common fiscal policy that could enhance the effectiveness of the euro; believes that the democratic legitimacy of such a proposal must adequately be addressed; notes in this sense that in a monetary union, fiscal policy does not only concern the Member States and that the present crisis has shown the limits of 100% decentralised fiscal policies; believes single European minister of Finance should be democratically accountable before the European Parliament; stresses that a step further towards a Fiscal union within the Community method requires enhanced democratic ownership and a Treaty revision,
Amendment 178 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Stresses the need for a single European Treasury to relieve the ECB off its quasi- fiscal role; until that is the case, suggests confining more tasks to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); regrets that, as it stands, the ESM will not operate under Community rules and did not acquire the right to purchase government bonds on the secondary market as this would have meant a relief for the ECB in the current circumstances;
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Asks the euro area Member States to consider allowing the EFSF-ESM to apply for a banking licence in order to allow it to access ECB liquidity and enhance its intervention capacities;
Amendment 188 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Underlines the absolute necessity to quickly implement and apply the provisions of thea balanced economic governance package once the negotiations have been concluded;
Amendment 203 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Believes that the introduction of eurosecurities maycombined with enhanced fiscal discipline is urgently required for the survival of the euro and would constitute the necessary fiscal quantum- leap forward that the Union needs at this juncture; welcomes the rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXX;