Activities of Jan Philipp ALBRECHT related to 2013/2188(INI)
Plenary speeches (3)
US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and impact on EU citizens' fundamental rights (debate)
US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and impact on EU citizens' fundamental rights (debate)
US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and impact on EU citizens' fundamental rights (debate)
Amendments (93)
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
Citation 8 a (new)
- having regard to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, notably its Articles 24, 27 and 40,
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 36 a (new)
Citation 36 a (new)
– having regard to US Presidential Policy Directive PPD-28 on Signals Intelligence Activities of 17 January 2014,
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the ties between Europe and the United States of America are based on the spirit and principles of democracy and rule of law, liberty, justice and solidarity;
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas, given that the EU's core aim is to promote freedom of the individual, security measures, including counterterrorism measures, must be pursued through the rule of law and must be subject to fundamental rights obligations, including those relating to privacy and data protection;
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas in September 2001 the world entered a new phase which resulted in the fight against terrorism being listed among the top priorities of most governments; whereas the revelations based on leaked documents from whistleblower Edward Snowden, former NSA contractor, put democratically -elected leaders under anthe obligation to address the challenges of the increasing capabilities ofoverseeing and controlling intelligence agencies in surveillance activities and their implications forcting outside the rule of law in a democratic society;
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D – point 2
Recital D – point 2
· the high risk of violation of EU legal standards, fundamental rights and data protection standards;
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D – point 5
Recital D – point 5
· the degreelack of control and effective oversight by the US political authorities and certain EU Member States over their intelligence communities;
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D – point 6
Recital D – point 6
· the possibilityfact of these mass surveillance operations being used for reasons other than national security and the strict fight against terrorism, for example economic and industrial espionage or profiling on political grounds;
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D – point 8
Recital D – point 8
· the increasingly blurred boundaries between law enforcement and intelligence activities, leading to every citizen being treated as a suspect and being surveilled;
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D – point 9 a (new)
Recital D – point 9 a (new)
the undermining of the communications with members of a profession with a confidentiality privilege such as lawyers, journalists, physicians or priests;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the US authorities have denied some of the information revealed but not contested the vast majority of it; whereas the public debate has developed on a large scale in the US and in a limited number of EU Member States; whereas EU governments too often remain silent and fail to launch adequate investigations;
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital K a (new)
Recital K a (new)
Ka. whereas US President Barrack Obama in his speech on 17 January has announced some policy changes to the mass surveillance programmes, he has not called for changes in legislation, particularly the prohibition of mass surveillance activities and bulk processing of personal data and the introduction of legal redress for non-US persons;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital M a (new)
Recital M a (new)
Ma. whereas in all Member States the law protects from disclosure information communicated in confidence between lawyer and client, a principle which has been recognised by the European Court of Justice26a; __________________ 26a Judgement of 18 May 1982 in case C- 155/79, AM & S Europe Limited v Commission of the European Communities
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital N
Recital N
N. whereas according to Article 67(3) TFEU the EU ‘"shall endeavour to ensure a high level of security’"; whereas the provisions of the Treaty (in particular Article 4(2) TEU, Article 72 TFEU and Article 73 TFEU) imply that the EU disposes of certain competences on matters relating to the collective external security of the Union; whereas the EU has exercised competence in matters of internal security (Article 4(j) TFEU) and has exercised this competence by deciding on a number of legislative instruments and concluding international agreements (PNR, TFTP) aimed at fighting serious crime and terrorism and by setting -up an internal security strategy and agencies working in this field;
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital P
Recital P
P. whereas, underin accordance with Article 6 TEU, covering the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the ECHR, Member States’' agencies and even private parties acting in the field of national security also have to respect the rights enshrined therein, be they of their own citizens or of citizens of other States; whereas this also goes forgoes also as far as cooperation with other States’' authorities in the field of national security is concerned;
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Q
Recital Q
Q. whereas the extra-territorial application by a third country of its laws, regulations and other legislative or executive instruments in situations falling under the jurisdiction of the EU or its Member States may impact on the established legal order and the rule of law, or even violate international or EU law, including the rights of natural and legal persons, taking into account the extent and the declared or actual aim of such an application; whereas, in these exceptional circumstances, it is necessary to take action at the EU level to ensure that the rule of law, and the rights of natural and legal persons are respected within the EU, in particular by removing, neutralising, blocking or otherwise countering the effects of the foreign legislation concerned;
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AC
Recital AC
AC. whereas according to the information revealed and to the findings of the inquiry conducted by the LIBE Committee, the national security agencies of New Zealand and Canada have beenare involved on ain large scale in mass surveillance of electronic communications and have actively cooperated with the US, the UK and Australia, under the so called ‘"Five eyes’" programme, and may have exchanged with each other personal data of EU citizens transferred from the EU to each other;
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AI
Recital AI
AI. whereas national data protection authorities have developed binding corporate rules (BCRs) in order to facilitate international transfers within a multinational corporation with adequate safeguards with respect to the protection of the privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and as regards the exercise of the corresponding rights; whereas before being used, BCRs need to be authorised by the Member States’ competent authorities after the latter have assessed compliance with Union data protection law; whereas BCRs for data processors have been rejected in the LIBE Committee report on the General Data Protection Regulation, as they would leave the data controller and the data subject without any control over the jurisdiction in which their data is processed;
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BA a (new)
Recital BA a (new)
BAa. whereas US intelligence agencies have a policy of systematically undermining cryptographic protocols and products in order to be able to intercept even encrypted communication; whereas the US National Security Agency has collected vast numbers of so called "zero- day exploits" – IT security vulnerabilities that are not yet known to the public or the product vendor; whereas such activities massively undermine global efforts to improve IT security;
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BA b (new)
Recital BA b (new)
BAb. whereas IT vendors often deliver products that have not been properly tested for IT security or that even sometimes have back-doors implanted purposefully by the vendor; whereas the lack of liability rules for software vendors has led to such a situation which is in turn exploited by intelligence agencies, but also leaves the risk of attacks by other entities;
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BB
Recital BB
BB. whereas intelligence services perform an important functioncan provide help in protecting the democratic society against internal and external threats subject to democratic accountability and judicial oversight; whereas they are given special powers and capabilities to this end; whereas these powers are to be limited to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate and used within the rule of law, as otherwise they risk losing legitimacy and erodinge the democratic nature of society;
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BD
Recital BD
BD. whereas technological developments have led tobeen used for increased international intelligence cooperation, also involving the exchange of personal data, and often blurring the line between intelligence and law enforcement activities;
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BE
Recital BE
BE. whereas most of existing national oversight mechanisms and bodies were set up or revamped in the 1990s and have not necessarily been adapted to the rapid political and technological developments over the last decade;
Amendment 126 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Points out specifically to US NSA intelligence programmes allowing for the mass surveillance of EU citizens through direct access to the central servers of leading US internet companies (PRISM programme), the analysis of content and metadata (Xkeyscore programme), the circumvention of online encryption (BULLRUN), access to computer and telephone networks, and access to location data, as well as to systems of the UK intelligence agency GCHQ such as itsthe upstream surveillance activity (Tempora programme) and the decryption programme (Edgehill); believethe targeted man- in-the-middle attacks on information systems (Quantumtheory and Foxacid programmes); the collection and retention of 200 million SMS text messages per day (Dishfire programme); considers that the existence of programmes of a similar nature, even if on a more limited scaledimension, is likely in other EU countries such as France (DGSE), Germany (BND) and Sweden (FRA);
Amendment 130 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes the allegations of ‘hacking’ or tapping into the Belgacom systems by the UK intelligence agency GCHQ; reiteranotes the indication by Belgacom that it could not confirm that EU institutions were targeted or affected, and that the malware used was extremely complex and required the use of extensive financial and staffing resources for its development and use that would not be available to private entities or hackers;
Amendment 138 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that several governments claim that these mass surveillance programmes are necessary to combat terrorism; wholeheartedly supports the fight against terrorism, but strongly believes that it can never in itself never be a justification for untargeted, secret, and sometimes even illegal mass surveillance programmes; expresses concerns, therefore, regarding the legality, necessity and proportionality of these programmesdeems such programmes disproportionate and incompatible with the concept of a democratic society based on the rule of law;
Amendment 145 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Considers it very doubtful that data collection of such magnitude isbe not only guided by the fight against terrorism, as it involves the collection of all possible data of all citizens; points therefore to the possible existence of other power motives such as political and economic espionage;
Amendment 154 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the vast, systemic, blanket collection of the personal data of innocent people, often comprising intimate personal information; emphasises that the systems of mass, indiscriminate surveillance by intelligence services constitute a serious interference with the fundamental rights of citizens; stresses that privacy is not a luxury right, but that it is the foundation stone of a free and democratic society; points out, furthermore, that mass surveillance has potentially severe effects on the freedom of the press, thought and speech and on freedom of assembly and of association, as well as a significant potential for abuse of the information gathered against political adversaries; emphasises that these mass surveillance activities appear also tlso entail illegal actions by intelligence services and raise questions regarding the extra-territoriality of national laws;
Amendment 160 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Is adamant that secret laws, treaties and courts violate the rule of law; points outinsists that any judgment of a court or tribunal and any decision of an administrative authority of a non-EU sState authorising, directly or indirectly, surveillance activities such as those examined by this inquiry may not be automaticallythe transfer of personal data, may not be recogniszed or enforced, but must be submitted individually to the appropria in any manner, without prejudice to a mutual legal assistance treaty or an inte rnational procedures on mutual recognition and legal assistance, including rules imposed by bilateral agreementsagreement in force between the requesting third country and the Union or a Member State and a prior authorisation by the competent supervisory authority;
Amendment 163 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Points out that the abovementioned concerns are exacerbated by rapid technological and societal developments; considers that, since internet and mobile devices are everywhere in modern daily life (‘ubiquitous computing’) and the business model of most internet companies is based on the processing of personal data of all kinds that puts at risk the integrity of the person, the scale of this problem is unprecedented; underlines that this may create a "turnkey tyranny" situation that can severely be misused in case of changes in political leadership;
Amendment 169 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Strongly rejects the notion that these issues are purely a matter of national security and therefore the sole competence of Member States; recalls a recent ruling of the Court of Justice according to which ‘although it is for Member States to take the appropriate measures to ensure their internal and external security, the mere fact that a decision concerns State security cannot result in European Union law being inapplicable’38 ; recalls further that the protection of the privacy of all EU citizens is at stake, as are the security and reliability of all EU communication networks; believes therefore that discussion and action at EU level is not only legitimate, but also a matter of EU autonomy and sovereignty; __________________ 38 No 1 BvR 518/02 of 4 April 2006. Judgement in case C-300/11, ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 4 June 2013
Amendment 173 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Commends the current discussions, inquiries and reviews concerning the subject of this iInquiry in several parts of the world; points to the Global Government Surveillance Reform signed up to by the world’'s leading technology companies, which callsing for sweeping changes to national surveillance laws, including an international ban on bulk collection of data to help preserve the public’'s trust in the internet; points to the call by hundreds of leading academics for ending mass surveillance38a; points to the calls by many civil society organisations for ending mass surveillance38b and for the strict adherence of necessity and proportionality into surveillance measures38c; points to the call by a large group of authors, including a number of Nobel prize winners, along similar lines38d, notes with great interest the recommendations published recently by the US President’'s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies; strongly urges governments to take these calls and recommendations fully into account and to overhaul their national frameworks for the intelligence services in order to implement appropriate safeguards and oversight; __________________ 38a www.academicsagainstsurveillance.net 38b www.stopspyingonus.com 38c www.en.necessaryandproportionate.org 38d www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/buecher/ themen/autoren-gegen- ueberwachung/demokratie-im-digitalen- zeitalter-der-aufruf-der-schriftsteller- 12702040.html
Amendment 182 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new) after heading «Recommendations»
Paragraph 18 a (new) after heading «Recommendations»
18a. Calls on EU Member States to drop criminal charges, if any, against Edward Snowden and to offer him protection from prosecution, extradition or rendition by third parties, in recognition of his status as whistleblower and international human rights defender;
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)
Paragraph 18 b (new)
18b. Calls on the US to drop any criminal charges Edward Snowden in recognition of his status as whistleblower and international human rights defender;
Amendment 186 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 c (new)
Paragraph 18 c (new)
18c. Draws attention to the plight of other whistleblowers and their supporters, including any journalists involved, who find themselves under pressure from government authorities;
Amendment 192 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Calls on the US as well as EU and Member States' legislators to revise legislation on electronic communications and signals intelligence and the processing and transfer of such intelligence information to fully respect the principles of legality, legitimate aim and purpose limitation, necessity, adequacy, proportionality, authorisation by a competent judicial authority, due process, user notification, transparency, public and parliamentary oversight, protection of the integrity of communications and systems, including safeguards for international cooperation and against illegitimate access;
Amendment 201 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Calls on certainall EU Member States, including the UK, Germany, France, Sweden and the Netherlands, toand in particular those participating in the so- called "9-eyes" and "14-eyes" programmes, to comprehensively evaluate and revise where necessary their national legislation and practices governing the activities of intelligence services – including their (strategic) surveillance powers, authorisation procedures and oversight mechanisms - so as to ensure that they are in line with the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights and comply with their fundamental rights obligations as regards data protection, privacy and, presumption of innocence; in particular, given the extensive media reports referring to mass surveillance in the UK, would emphasise that the current legal framework which is made up of a ‘complex interaction’ between three separate pieces of legislation – the Human Rights Act 1998, the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 – should be revised;, the necessity and proportionality of surveillance activities, as well as parliamentary and judicial oversight, the UN compilations of good practices38g and the recommendations of the Venice Commission38h; __________________ 38g United Nations General Assembly, A/HRC/14/46, 17 May 2010. 38h European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission): Report on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, CDL-AD(2010)022, adopted 4 June 2010; Report on the Democratic Oversight of the Security Services, CDL- AD(2007)016, adopted 2 June 2007.
Amendment 207 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Calls on UK to revise their national legislation and practices governing the activities of intelligence services so as to ensure that they are in line with the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights and comply with their fundamental rights obligations as regards data protection, privacy and presumption of innocence; in particular, given the extensive media reports referring to mass surveillance in the UK, would emphasise that the current legal framework which is made up of a 'complex interaction' between three separate pieces of legislation – the Human Rights Act 1998, the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 – should be revised;
Amendment 208 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 b (new)
Paragraph 20 b (new)
20b. Calls on France to revise its legal framework in the field of intelligence activities in order to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights' requirements, to strengthen its general oversight mechanisms, both as regards the ex ante authorisation procedures, the involvement of the Parliament in the monitoring of intelligence activities and the reinforcement of technical capabilities and investigative powers of the latter. Moreover, existing independent administrative authorities should be entitled to monitor more closely and effectively the processing of data collected by the various intelligence agencies. Urges French government to clarify its relations and potential agreements with telecommunication companies as regards access to and exchange of personal data and access to communication facilities including Transatlantic cables;
Amendment 209 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 c (new)
Paragraph 20 c (new)
20c. Calls on Germany to revise the law on the German foreign intelligence service (BND) and the G-10 Law by making them more specific and ending the mass surveillance of cross-border telecommunications by the BND, reinforcing the rights of all persons whose communications are intercepted, providing for more public information in particular as to the activities of the G10 Commission, reinforcing the technical capabilities and investigative powers of the parliamentary oversight bodies; underlines in this context that under the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights governments have to respect and protect fundamental rights, including the secrecy of communications, of all persons, not only of their own citizens and residents;
Amendment 210 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 d (new)
Paragraph 20 d (new)
Amendment 211 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 e (new)
Paragraph 20 e (new)
20e. Takes note of the review of the Dutch Intelligence and Security Act 2002 (report by the "Dessens Commission" of 2 December 2013); supports those recommendations of the review commission which aim to strengthen the transparency of and the control and oversight on the Dutch intelligence services; calls on the Netherlands to refrain from extending the powers of the intelligence services so that untargeted and large-scale surveillance could also be performed on cable-bound communications of innocent citizens, especially given the fact that one of the biggest Internet Exchange Points in the world is located in Amsterdam (AMS-IX); calls for caution in defining the mandate and capabilities of the new Joint Sigint Cyber Unit, as well as for the presence and operation by US intelligence personnel on Dutch territory;
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 f (new)
Paragraph 20 f (new)
20f. Calls on Poland to revise police and secret services' powers (in particular as far as their access to citizens' personal data from various sources is concerned) and introduce an independent supervisory mechanism over their activity, notably in the area of intelligence and general crime prevention; strongly recommends that Poland properly applies freedom of information laws with respect to national security issues in accordance with the Global Principles on the National Security and Access to Information, recently endorsed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in its Resolution 1954 (2013) on National security and access to information; recommends further that any freedom of information requests shall be duly and adequately treated, notably when relevant for explaining government involvement in programs of mass surveillance and for thereby holding decision-makers accountable;
Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Notes that the companies identified by media revelations as being involved in the large- scale mass surveillance of EU data subjects by US NSA are companies that have self-certified their adherence to the Safe Harbour, and that the Safe Harbour is the legal instrument used for the transfer of EU personal data to the US (Google, Microsoft, Yahoo!, Facebook, Apple, LinkedIn); expresses its concerns onis alarmed by the fact that these organisations admitted that they do not encrypt information and communications flowing between their data centres, thereby enabling intelligence services to intercept information39 ; __________________ 39 The Washington Post, 31 October 2013. The Washington Post, 31 October 2013.
Amendment 224 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Considers that large-scale access by US intelligence agencies to EU personal data processed by Safe Harbour does not per se meet the criteria for derogation under ‘national security’;
Amendment 233 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Calls on the Commission to present by June 2014 a comprehensive assessment of the US privacy framework covering commercial, law enforcement and intelligence activities in response to the fact that the EU and the US legal systems for protecting personal data are drifting apartand concrete recommendations and consequences based on the absence of a general data protection law in the US;
Amendment 237 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to assess without delay whether the adequate level of protection of the New Zealand and of the Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, as declared by Commission Decisions 2013/6540 and 2/2002 of 20 December 2001, have been affected by the involvement of their national intelligence agencies in the mass surveillance of EU citizens and, if necessary, to take appropriate measures to suspend or revers the adequacy decisions; also calls on the Commission to assess the situation for other countries that have received an adequacy rating; expects the Commission to report to the European Parliament on its findings on the abovementioned countries by December 2014 at the latest; __________________ 40 OJ L 28, 30.1.2013, p. 12.
Amendment 238 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Calls on the Member States to prohibit or suspend data flows to third countries based on the standard contractual clauses, contractual clauses or BCRs authorised by the national competent authorities where it is established that the law to which the data importerrecipient is subject imposes upon him requirements which go beyond the restrictions necessarystrictly necessary, adequate and proportionate in a democratic society and which are likely to have a substantialn adverse effect on the guarantees provided by the applicable data protection law and the standard contractual clauses, or because continuing transfer would create an imminent risk of grave harm to the data subjects risk of mass surveillance of the data subjects without suspicion;
Amendment 241 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Calls on the Commission to examine without delay the standard contractual clauses it has established in order to assess whether they provide the necessary protection as regards access to personal data transferred under the clauses for intelligence purposes and, if appropriate, to review them;
Amendment 250 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45
Paragraph 45
45. Reiterates its resolution of 23 October 2013 and asks the Commission for the suspenstermination of the TFTP Agreement;
Amendment 255 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 46
Paragraph 46
46. Calls on the European Commission to react to concerns that three of the four major computerised reservation systems used by airlines worldwide are based in the US and that PNR data are saved in cloud systems operating on US soil under US law, which lacks data protection adequacy; states that this undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of the PNR agreement; calls for termination of the EU US PNR agreement;
Amendment 269 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52
Paragraph 52
52. Stresses that both the Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Directive are necessary to protect the fundamental rights of individuals and therefore must be treated as a package to be adopted simultaneously, in order to ensure that all data-processing activities in the EU provide a high level of protection in all circumstances; stresses that it will only adopt further law enforcement cooperation measures once Council has entered into negotiations with Parliament and Commission on the Data Protection Package;
Amendment 274 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 53
Paragraph 53
53. Notes that trust in US cloud computing and cloud providers has been negatively affected by the abovementioned practices; emphasises, therefore, the development of European clouds and IT solutions as an essential element for growth and employment and trust in cloud computing services and providers and for ensuring a high level of personal data protection;
Amendment 279 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55
Paragraph 55
55. RegDeplorets the fact that such access is usually attained by means of direct enforcement by third-country authorities of their own legal rules, without recourse to international instruments established for legal cooperation such as mutual legal assistance (MLA) agreements or other forms of judicial cooperation;
Amendment 280 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56
Paragraph 56
56. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to speed up the work of establishing a European Cloud Partnership while fully including civil society and the technical community, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and incorporating data protection aspects;
Amendment 289 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58
Paragraph 58
58. Recognises that the EU and the US are pursuing negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which is of major strategic importance for creating further economic growth and for the ability of both the EU and the US to set future global regulatory standards;
Amendment 292 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59
Paragraph 59
59. Strongly emphasises, given the importance of the digital economy in the relationship and in the cause of rebuilding EU-US trust, that the European Parliament will only consent tosee to it that the final TTIP agreement provided the agreement, among other criteria, fully respects fundamental rights recognised by the EU Charter, and that the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data must continue to be governed by Article XIV of the GATSshall remain governed by Article XIV of the GATS before consenting to it; stresses that EU data protection legislation cannot be deemed an "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" in the application of Article XIV of the GATS; stresses furthermore that the European Parliament shall not consent to any final TTIP agreement as long as the blanket mass surveillance activities and bulk processing of personal data as well as the interception of communications in EU institutions and diplomatic representations are not fully stopped;
Amendment 311 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62
Paragraph 62
62. Calls forDecides the setting up of a hHigh-l Level gGroup in order to strengthen cooperationparliamentary oversight in the field of intelligence at EU level, combined with a proper oversight mechanism ensuring both democratic legitimacy and adequate technical capacity; stresses that the high- level group should cooperate closely with national parliaments in order to propose further steps to be taken for increased oversight collaboration in the EU;
Amendment 319 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 64
Paragraph 64
64. Calls on the high-level group to set strict limits on the duration and scope of any surveillance ordered unless its continuation is duly justified by the authorising/oversight authority;
Amendment 322 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 66
Paragraph 66
66. Intends to organise a conference with national oversight bodies, whether parliamentary or independent, byefore the end of 2014;
Amendment 326 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 68
Paragraph 68
68. Calls on the Member States to develop cooperation among oversight bodies, in particular within the European Network of National Intelligence Reviewers (ENNIR); calls particularly on the oversight bodies of those Member States whose governments have refused to cooperate with the EP inquiry - UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden – to further coordinate their activities;
Amendment 329 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 69
Paragraph 69
69. Urges the Commission to present, by September 2014, a proposal for a legal basis for the activities of the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (IntCen), as well as a proper oversight mechanism adapted to its activities, including regular reporting to the European Parliament; decides not to allocate funding to IntCen until its activities are covered by a proper legal basis;
Amendment 335 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 72
Paragraph 72
72. Calls on the Europol Joint Supervisory Body, together with national data protection authorities, to conduct a joint inspection before the end of 2014 in order to ascertain whether information and personal data shared with Europol has been lawfully acquired by national authorities, particularly if the information or data was initially acquired by intelligence services in the EU or a third country, and whether appropriate measures are in place to prevent the use and further dissemination of such information or data; considers that Europol should not process any information or data which was obtained in violation of fundamental rights which would be protected under the Charter of Fundamental Rights;
Amendment 348 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 75
Paragraph 75
75. Considers that the detention of Mr Miranda and the seizure of the material in his possession under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (and also the request to The Guardian to destroy or hand over the material) by UK authorities constitutes an interference with the right of freedom of expression as recognised by Article 10 of the ECHR and Article 11 of the EU Charter;
Amendment 353 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 76 a (new)
Paragraph 76 a (new)
Professional Secrecy and Confidentiality Privilege 76a. Considers that it is of the essence of professional secrecy privilege for lawyers, journalists, priests and other regulated professions that their members are told by their clients, patients or sources about matters which they would not tell to others and that without the certainty of confidentiality, there can be no trust; stresses that if the right of EU citizens to be protected against any divulging of communications with their lawyers is denied, they may be denied access to legal advice and to justice; stresses that if the right of journalists to protect their sources against any divulging of communications is denied, the critical role of investigative journalism for democracy is undermined;
Amendment 365 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 78
Paragraph 78
78. Takes the view that the mass surveillance revelations that have initiated this crisis can be used as an opportunity for Europe to take the initiative and build up an autonomous IT key-resource capability for the mid term; underlines that in order to gain trust, such a European IT capability must be based on open standards and free and open software and if possible hardware, making the whole stack from processor design to the application layer reviewable by every interested party; points out that in order to re-gain competitiveness in the strategic sector of IT services, a digital new deal is needed with joint and large-scale efforts by EU institutions, member state governments, research institutions, industry and civil society; calls on the Commission and the Member States to use public procurement as leverage to support such resource capability in the EU by making EU security and privacy standards a key requirement in the public procurement of IT goods and services;
Amendment 367 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 79
Paragraph 79
79. Is highly concerned by indications that foreignStrongly condemns that that intelligence services sought to lower IT security standards and to install backdoors in a broad range of IT systems; asks the Commission to present draft legislation to ban the use of backdoors by law enforcement agencies;
Amendment 373 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 81
Paragraph 81
81. Calls on the Commission, standardisation bodies and ENISA to develop, by September 2014, minimum security and privacy standards and guidelines for IT systems, networks and services, including cloud computing services, in order to better protect EU citizens’' personal data; believes that such standards should be set in an open and democratic process, not driven by a single country, entity or multinational company; takes the view that, while legitimate law enforcement and intelligence concerns need to be taken into account in order to support the fight against terrorism, they should not lead to a general undermining of the dependability of all IT systemsexpresses support for the recent decisions by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to include governments in the threat model for internet security;
Amendment 376 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82
Paragraph 82
82. Points out that both telecom companies and the EU and national telecom regulators have clearly neglected the IT security of their users and clients; calls on the Commission to make full use of its existing powers under the ePrivacy and Telecommunication Framework Directive to strengthen the protection of confidentiality of communication by adopting measures to ensure that terminal equipment is compatible with the right of users to control and protect their personal data, and to ensure a high level of security of telecommunication networks and services, including by way of requiring state-of-the-art end-to-end encryption of communications;
Amendment 380 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 83
Paragraph 83
83. Supports the EU cyber strategy but considers that it does not cover all possible threats and should be extended to cover malicious state behaviours; underlines the need for more robust IT security and resilience of IT systems;
Amendment 387 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 85
Paragraph 85
85. Calls on the Commission, in the framework of the next Work Programme of the Horizon 2020 Programme, to assess whether more resources should be directed towards boosting European research, development, innovation and training in the field of IT technologies, in particular privacy-enhancing technologies and infrastructures, cryptology, secure computing, open-source security solutions and the Information Society; stresses that no EU funding should be spent for the sole purpose of breaking into IT systems or developing tools for this;
Amendment 401 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 87
Paragraph 87
87. Deems it necessary for the EU to be supported byAsks the Commission to also consider the possible additional need for an EU IT Academy that brings together the best European experts in all related fields, tasked with providing all relevant EU Institutions and bodies with scientific advice on IT technologies, including security-related strategies; as a first step asks the Commission to set up an independent scientific expert panel;
Amendment 414 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 88 – point 5
Paragraph 88 – point 5
· the use of more free and open-source systems and fewer off-the-shelf commercial systems;
Amendment 418 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 88 – point 10
Paragraph 88 – point 10
· the use of cloud storage by the EP, including what kind of data is stored on the cloud, how the content and access to it is protected and where the cloud is located, clarifying the applicable data protection and intelligence legal regimes;
Amendment 420 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 88 – point 13
Paragraph 88 – point 13
· an analysis of the benefits of plan for using the GNU Privacy Guard as a default encryption standard for emails which would at the same time allow for the use of digital signatures;
Amendment 428 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 93
Paragraph 93
93. Calls on standards bodies such as the IETF for the overall architecture of the internet in terms of data flows and storage to be reconsidered, striving for more data minimisation and transparency and less centralised mass storage of raw data, as well as avoiding unnecessaryfull end-to-end encryption of all internet traffic so that the routing of traffic through the territory of countries that do not meet basic standards on fundamental rights, data protection and privacy does not create a risk;
Amendment 430 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 94
Paragraph 94
94. Calls on the Member States, in cooperation with ENISA, Europol’'s CyberCrime Centre, CERTs and national data protection authorities and cybercrime units, to start an education and awareness- raising campaign in order to enable citizens to make a more informed choice regarding what personal data to put on line and how better to protect them, including through ‘digital hygiene’, encryption and safe cloud computing, making full use of the public interest information platform provided for in the Universal Service Directive;
Amendment 436 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 95
Paragraph 95
95. Calls on the Commission, by September 2014, to evaluate the possibilities ofpropose draft legislation encouraging software and hardware manufacturers to introduce more security and privacy throughby design and by default features in their products, including the possibilit by of introducing legal liability on the part of manufacturers for unpatched known vulnerabilities, faulty or insecure software, or the installation of secret backdoors, and disincentives for the undue and disproportionate collection of mass personal data, and if appropriate to come forward with legislative proposals;
Amendment 438 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 96
Paragraph 96
96. Believes, beyond the need for legislative change, that the inquiry has shown the need for the US to restore trust with its partners, as US intelligence agencies’' activities are primarily at stake;
Amendment 444 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 101
Paragraph 101
101. Is ready actively to engage in a dialogue with US counterparts so that, in the ongoing American public and congressional debate on reforming surveillance and reviewing intelligence oversight, the privacy rights of EU citizens are addressed, equal information rights and privacy protection in US courts guaranteed and the current discrimination not perpetuated; urges the US to enact a general data protection law and amend the Privacy Act to create legal redress options for non-US persons;
Amendment 447 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 102
Paragraph 102
102. Insists that necessary reforms be undertaken and effective guarantees given to Europeans to ensure that the use of surveillance and data processing for foreign intelligence purposes is limited by clearly specified conditions and related to reasonable suspicion or probable cause of terrorist or criminal activity; stresses that this purpose must be subject to transparent judicial oversight;
Amendment 451 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 103
Paragraph 103
103. Considers that clear political signals are needed from our American partners to demonstrate that the US distinguishes between allies and adversaries; considers the actions taken and announcements by the US government so far as insufficient;
Amendment 456 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 107
Paragraph 107
107. Also believes that that the involvement and activities of EU Members States has led to a loss of trust; is of the opinion that only full clarity as to purposes and means of surveillance, public debate and, ultimately, revision of legislation, including a and practices to end mass surveillance activities and strengthening of the system of judicial and parliamentary oversight, will be able to re-establish the trust lost;
Amendment 461 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 108
Paragraph 108
108. Is aware that some EU Member States are pursuing bilateral communication with the US authorities on spying allegations, and that some of them have concluded (United Kingdom) or envisage concluding (Germany, France) so-called ‘'anti-spying’' arrangements; underlines that these Member States need to observe fully the interests of the EU as a whole; doubts the relevance of such agreements in the light of revelations that even members of the "Five Eyes" spy on each other;
Amendment 465 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 108 a (new)
Paragraph 108 a (new)
108a. Asks the Council to inform Parliament about discussions by Member States on an EU-wide mutual no-spy arrangement;
Amendment 466 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 109
Paragraph 109
109. Considers that such arrangements should not breach European Treaties, especially the principle of sincere cooperation (under Article 4 paragraph 3 TEU), or undermine EU policies in general and, more specifically, the internal market, fair competition and economic, industrial and social development; decides to review any such arrangements for their compatibility with European law and reserves its right to activate Treaty procedures in the event of such arrangements being proved to contradict the Union’'s cohesion or the fundamental principles on which it is based;
Amendment 481 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 36
Subheading 36
Priority Plan: A European Digital Habeas CorpusDeclaration of Independence
Amendment 485 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 114 – introductory part
Paragraph 114 – introductory part
114. Decides to launch A European Digital Habeas CorpusDeclaration of Independence for protecting privacy based on the following 7 actions with a European Parliament watchdog:
Amendment 505 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 114 – point 6
Paragraph 114 – point 6
Action 6: Develop a European strategy for IT independence (a "digital new deal" including the allocation of adequate resources at national and EU level);
Amendment 510 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 115
Paragraph 115
115. Calls on the EU Institutions and the Member States to support and promote the European Digital Habeas CorpusDeclaration of Independence; undertakes to act as the EU citizens’' rights watchdog, with the following timetable to monitor implementation:
Amendment 517 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 115 – point 3
Paragraph 115 – point 3
· Spring 2014: a formal call on the European Council to include the European Digital Habeas CorpusDeclaration of Independence in the guidelines to be adopted under Article 68 TFEU;
Amendment 519 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 115 – point 4
Paragraph 115 – point 4
Autumn 2014: a commitment that the European Digital Habeas CorpusDeclaration of Independence and related recommendations will serve as key criteria for the approval of the next Commission;
Amendment 521 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 115 – point 7
Paragraph 115 – point 7
20154: a conference bringing together high- level European experts in the various fields conducive to IT security (including mathematics, cryptography and privacy- enhancing technologies) to help foster an EU IT strategy for the next legislature;