64 Amendments of Michèle RIVASI related to 2013/0340(NLE)
Amendment 34 #
Proposal for a directive
Title 1
Title 1
Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations
Amendment 36 #
Proposal for a directive
Citation 1
Citation 1
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,on the Functioning of the European Union and in particular Article 3s 153, 191 and 3192 thereof,
Amendment 38 #
Proposal for a directive
Citation 2
Citation 2
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, drawn up after obtaining the opinion of a group of persons appointed by the Scientific and Technical Committee from among scientific experts in the Member States,
Amendment 39 #
Proposal for a directive
Citation 3
Citation 3
Amendment 40 #
Proposal for a directive
Citation 4 a (new)
Citation 4 a (new)
Having regard to the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, which was signed by the European Community and all the EU Member States in 1998,
Amendment 41 #
Proposal for a directive
Citation 4 b (new)
Citation 4 b (new)
Having regard to the implementation of the Aarhus Convention in the context of nuclear safety, as brought about by the ‘Aarhus Convention and Nuclear’ initiative, which requires Member States to publish key information concerning nuclear safety and to involve the public in the decision-making process,
Amendment 42 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
Recital 1
(1) Article 2(b191(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community ('Euratom Treaty') provides for the establishment of uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general publicon the Functioning of the European Union, which stipulates that Union policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the following objectives: preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, and protecting human health.
Amendment 44 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) Article 1530 of the Euratom Treaty provides for the establishment of basic standards within the European Atomic Energy Community ('Community') for theTreaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) allows for the establishment of uniform safety standards to protection of the health of workers and of the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiations.
Amendment 49 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
Recital 9
(9) The Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan in 2011 renewed attention worldwide on the measures needed to minimiseliminate risk and ensure the most robustmaximum levels of nuclear safety. Based on a mandate from the European Council in March 201110, the Commission, together with the European Nuclear Safety Regulator Group ('ENSREG'), carried out Union wide comprehensive risk and safety assessments of nuclear power plants ('stress tests'). The results identified a number of improvements which couldneeded to be implemented in nuclear safety approaches and industry practices in the participating countries11. __________________ 10 European Council, EUCO 10/1/11. European Council, EUCO 10/1/11. 11 ENSREG Peer review Report – Stress Tests performed on European nuclear power plants, 25 April 2012.
Amendment 53 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 15
Recital 15
(15) A strong and independent competent regulatory authority is a fundamental condition of the European nuclear safety regulatory framework. Its political, legal, administrative and financial independence and the exercise of its powers impartially and transparently are crucial factors to ensure a high level of nuclear safety. Objective regulatory decisions and enforcement actions should be established without any undue external influence that might compromise safety, such as pressures associated with changing political, economic or societal conditions, or pressures from government departments or any other public or private entities. The negative consequences of the lack of independence were evident in the Fukushima accident. The provisions of Directive 2009/71/Euratom on functional separation of competent regulatory authorities should be strengthened to ensure the regulatory authorities' effective independence and to guarantee that they are provided with the appropriate means and competencies to properly carry out the responsibilities assigned to them. In particular, the regulatory authority should have sufficient legal powers, including the power to impose penalties, sufficient staffing and sufficient financial resources for the proper discharge of its assigned responsibilities. The strengthened requirements aiming at ensuring independence in carrying out the regulatory tasks should be however without prejudice to close cooperation, as appropriate, with other relevant national authorities or to general policy guidelines issued by the government not related to the regulatory powers and duties.
Amendment 58 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 23
Recital 23
(23) Another key lesson learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident is the importance of enhancing transparency on nuclear safety matters. Transparency is also an important means to promote and guarantee independence in regulatory decision making. Therefore, the current provisions of Directive 2009/71/Euratom on the information to be provided to the public should be more specific as to which type of information should be provided, as a minimum by the competent regulatory authority and by the licence holder, and within which time frames. To this purpose, for example, the type of information that should be provided, as a minimum by the competent regulatory authority and by the licence holder as part of their wider transparency strategies, should be identified. Information should be released in areal timely manner, particularly in case of abnormal events, incidents and accidents. Results of periodic safety reviews and international peer reviews and operators’ responses to recommendations issued by national regulatory authorities should also be made public.
Amendment 60 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 24
Recital 24
(24) The requirements of this Directive on transparency are complementary to those of the existing Euratom legislation. Council Decision 87/600/Euratom of 14 December 1987 on Community arrangements for the early exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency16 imposes obligations on Member States to notify and provide information to the Commission and to other Member States in case of a radiological emergency on its territory, whilst Council Directive 89/618 Euratom of 27 November 198917 includes requirements on Member States to inform the public about health protection measures to be applied and steps to be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, and to provide advance and continuing information to the population likely to be affected in the event of a such an emergency. However, in addition to the information to be provided in such an event, Member States should under this Directive arrange for appropriate transparency provisions, with prompt and regularly updated release of information updated in real time to ensure that workers and the general public are kept informed about all nuclear safety related events, including abnormal events, incidents or accident conditions. Moreover, the public should be given opportunities to participate effectively in the licencing and alteration process of nuclear installations and the competent regulatory authority should provide any safety-related information independently, without need for prior consent from any other public or private entity. The European Commission and the Member States shall ensure that civil society representatives are involved in the consultation and decision-making process. __________________ 16 OJ L 371, 30.12.1987, p. 76. 17 OJ L 357, 7.12.1989, p. 31.
Amendment 62 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 26
Recital 26
(26) Risk-informed methods examine the probability of each event in an event sequence likely to lead or contribute to an accident as well as its possible consequences. In the light of the causes of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, assessments must study and take account of combined, and not just isolated, risk factors. The answers can be used to provide insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the design and operation of a nuclear installation and can thus guide requirements and regulatory attention to the issues where the largest benefit for the safety of a nuclear installation can be obtained. Having invested over the last decades considerable resources in developing Probabilistic Safety Assessments for nuclear installations, particularly for nuclear power plants and research reactors, licence holders and competent regulatory authorities worldwide are now in a position to use the insights derived to enhance the safety of nuclear installationowever, levels of reliability required for a complex interactive and tightly coupled nuclear power plant are very great, with the range of operating reactors having differing sets of designs and configurations. Because of their complexity and the physical conditions during reactor operation, the understanding of the reactor design and operation is always partial. Additionally, as system components and external events can interact in unanticipated ways, it is not possible to predict all possible failure modes. It follows that numerical estimates of probabilities of significant accidents remain deeply uncertain. With its failure to plan for the cascade of unexpected beyond design-base accidents (such as Fukushima and all other major accidents before), the regulatory emphasis on a risk-informed basis while operating them in the most efficient manner based probabilistic assessment has proven very limited. An urgent re-appraisal of this approach, and its real-life application is overdue.
Amendment 65 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 27
Recital 27
(27) Ageing of the safety related structures, systems and components of a nuclear installation, and especially embrittlement of components which are difficult to replace in practice, such as reactor pressure vessels, puts a natural limit to its acceptable continued operation. From both a safety and an economical point of view, the limit of operational lifetime is typically between 25 and 40 years after the start of commercial operation t. As nuclear power plants age, reactor shutdowns become more frequent, weakening certain components, such as reactor pressure vessels. Therefore Member States should ensure that possible lifetime extension of existing nuclear power plants does not expose the workers and the public to additional risks. To this end, Directive 2009/71/Euratom should be amended to include new Community wide safety objectives to be complied with by the regulatory authorities and the licence holders in case of a lifetime extension of existing nuclear power plants.
Amendment 67 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 28
Recital 28
(28) For new reactor design, there is a clear expectation to address in the original design what was beyond design for previous generations of reactors. Design extension conditions are accident conditions that are not considered for design basis accidents, but are considered in the design process of the installation in accordance with best estimate methodology, and for which releases of radioactive material are kept within acceptable limits. Design extension conditions couldmust include severe accident conditions.
Amendment 71 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 30
Recital 30
(30) After the nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, the Fukushima nuclear accident highlighted once again the critical importance of the containment function, which is the last barrier to protect people and the environment against radioactive releases resulting from an accident. Therefore the applicant for a licence for the construction of a new power or research reactor should demonstrate that the design practically limits the effects of a reactor core damage to within the containment, i.e. he has to prove that a radioactive release outside the containment is physically impossible or can be considered extremely unlikely with a high degree of confidence for such release to occur.
Amendment 72 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 31
Recital 31
(31) Directive 2009/71/Euratom does not include measures regarding on-site emergency preparedness and response, which, as the Fukushima nuclear accident highlighted, are crucial to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear accident. Council Directive 96/29/Euratom foresees that, in case of radiological emergencies, it is necessary to organise appropriate intervention to stop or reduce the emission of radionuclides, and to assess and record the consequences of the emergency and the effectiveness of the intervention. Since a nuclear accident can affect several countries, a European emergency response force must be set up. Measures should also be in place for the protection and monitoring of the environment and population. However, more specific provisions regarding on-site emergency preparedness and response are needed in order to assess situations that might require on-site protective measures, to have an organisational structure and coordination among response bodies, and to ensure that sufficient resources are available to apply those appropriate protective measures even in extreme cases.
Amendment 73 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 32
Recital 32
(32) The stress tests demonstrated the key role of enhanced cooperation and coordination mechanisms between all parties having responsibilities for nuclear safety. The peer-reviews have proved to be a good means of building confidence, with the aim of developing and exchanging experience and ensuring the common application of high nuclear safety standards. The scope of the provisions of Directive 2009/71/Euratom is however limited only to self-assessments and international peer-reviews of Member States' legislative, regulatory and organisational infrastructure and therefore the Directive should be widened to include peer reviews of nuclear installations. Peer reviews of this kind must involve experts drawn from civil society and other experts independent of the regulatory authorities.
Amendment 76 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 33
Recital 33
(33) This Directive introduces new provisions on self-assessments and peer- reviews of nuclear installations based on selected nuclear safety topics covering their entire lifecycle. At an international level, there is already confirmed experience with conducting such peer- reviews on nuclear power plants. At the EU level, the experience from the stress tests process shows the value of a coordinated exercise to assess and review the safety of EU nuclear power plants. A similar mechanism, based on cooperation between the Member States' regulatory authorities and the Commission, should be permanently applied here. Therefore, competent regulatory authorities coordinating in the context of expert groups such as ENSREG, could contribute with their expertise to identifying the relevant safety topics and in carrying out these peer reviews. If Member States fail to jointly select at least one topic the Commission should select one or more topics to be subject to the peer reviews. Participation of other stakeholders, such as Technical Support Organisations, international observers or non- governmental Organisations could brings added value to the peer reviews and is therefore essential.
Amendment 81 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 36
Recital 36
(36) In case the Commission identifies substantial deviations or delays in the implementation of the technical recommendations from the peer review process, the Commission shouldall invite the competent regulatory authorities of Member States not concerned to organise and carry out a verification mission with the aim of getting a full picture of the situation and informing the Member State concerned about possible measuresmeasures required to remedy any identified shortcomings.
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 39
Recital 39
(39) In line with the principle of proportionality, the applicability of the provisions of Chapter 2, Section 2 "Specific Obligations" of this Directive depends on the type of nuclear installations on the territory of a Member State. Therefore, when implementing these provisions in national law, Member States should take account of the risks posed by the specific types of nuclear installations they plan or operate. In particular, the proportionality principle will concern those Member States that keep only a small inventory of nuclear and radioactive materials, e.g. linked to the operation of smaller research reactor facilities, which in case of a severe accident would not engender consequences comparable to those generated by nuclear power plants.
Amendment 83 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 40
Recital 40
(40) The provisions of this Directive which are intrinsically linked to the existence of nuclear installations, namely those concerning the licence holder's obligations, the new specific requirements for nuclear installations and the provisions concerning the on-site emergency preparedness and response are not applicable to Member States without nuclear installations as defined by this Directive. These Member States need not transpose and implement the requirement to impose penalties on those who do not comply with this Directive. The other provisions of this Directive should be transposed and implemented in a proportionate manner in accordance with national circumstances and taking into account the fact that these Member States do not have nuclear installations, whilst ensuring that nuclear safety receives appropriate attention by the government or by the competent authorities. Member States which do not have nuclear power plants on their territory shall have the right to be involved in the assessments carried out by neighbouring Member States.
Amendment 84 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 41
Recital 41
(41) According to Directive 2009/71/Euratom, the Member States have to establish and maintain a national legislative, regulatory and organisational framework ('national framework') for nuclear safety of nuclear installations. The determination on how the provisions of the national framework are adopted and through which instrument they are applied rests with the competence of the Member States, and the Commission shall ensure that these provisions are properly transposed.
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point -2 (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point -2 (new)
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 1– point b
Article 1– point b
(-2) Article 1(b) is amended as follows: "b) to ensure that Member States shall provide for appropriate nationalll necessary arrangements for athe highest level of nuclear safety to protect workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiations from nuclear installations.
Amendment 87 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 1 – point c
Article 1 – point c
" c) to ensure that Member States shall provide for appropriate nationalll necessary arrangements so that nuclear installations are designed, sited, constructed, commissioned, operated, monitored, improved or decommissioned so as to avoid unauthorised radioactive releases."
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point -4 (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point -4 (new)
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 3 – paragraph 2
Article 3 – paragraph 2
(-4) In Article 3, paragraph 2 is amended as follows: "2) "“nuclear safety"” means: the achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents andor mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers and, the general public from dangers arising from ionizing radiationsand the environment from radiation hazards stemming from nuclear installations;"
Amendment 90 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 3 – paragraph 7
Article 3 – paragraph 7
7. ‘abnormal event’ means any unintended occurrence the consequences, or potential consequences of which are not negligible from the point of view ofmay jeopardise protection or nuclear safety;
Amendment 91 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 3 – paragraph 8
Article 3 – paragraph 8
8. 'accident' means any unplanned event, including operating errors, equipment failures and other mishaps, the consequences or potential consequences of which are not negligible from the point of view ofmay jeopardise protection or nuclear safety;
Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 3 – paragraph 11
Article 3 – paragraph 11
11. '‘practically eliminating' means that it is physically impossible or it can be considered extremely unlikely with a high degree of confidence for a condition to occur;
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 3 – paragraph 12
Article 3 – paragraph 12
12. 'reasonably achievable' means that, in addition to meeting the requirements of good practice in engineering, further safety or risk reduction measures for the design, commissioning, operation or decommissioning of a nuclear installation should be sought and that these measures should be implemented unless it can be demonstrated that they are grossly disproportionate with regard to the safety benefit they would conferwherever they make a contribution to safety;
Amendment 97 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 3 – paragraph 13
Article 3 – paragraph 13
13. 'design basis' means the range and cumulative effect of conditions and events taken explicitly into account in the design of an installation, according to established criteria, so that the installation can withstand them without exceeding authorised limits by the planned operation of safety systems;
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 3 – paragraph 15
Article 3 – paragraph 15
Amendment 108 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point d a (new)
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point d a (new)
da) employs staff with the necessary qualifications, experience and expertise in senior administrative posts (directorates-general and sub-directorates-general), without their having occupied, for at least the previous ten years, a position of high responsibility in any other public or private entity concerned with the promotion, production or utilisation of nuclear energy;
Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point e
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point e
(e) employs an appropriate number of staff with the necessary qualifications, experience and expertise, provides them with continuous training and can guarantee their independence should any conflict of interest arise;
Amendment 118 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 – point a
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 6 – paragraph 1
Article 6 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that the prime responsibility for the nuclear safety of a nuclear installation rests entirely with its designer and with the licence holder. This responsibility cannot be delegated.
Amendment 121 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 – point b
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 6 – paragraph 2
Article 6 – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires licence holders, under the supervision of the competent regulatory authority, to regularly assess and verify, and continuously improve, as far as reasonably achievable, the nuclear safety of their nuclear installations in a systematic and verifiable manner.
Amendment 123 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 – point f
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 – point f
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 6 – paragraph 5
Article 6 – paragraph 5
5. Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires licence holders to provide for and maintain adequate financial and human resources, with appropriate qualifications, expertise and skills, to fulfil their obligations with respect to nuclear safety of a nuclear installation, laid down in paragraphs 1 to 4a of this Article and Articles 8a to 8d of this Directive, including during and after its decommissioning. These obligations also extend to subcontracted workers.
Amendment 125 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 7
Article 7
Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires all parties to make arrangements for education, training and exercise for their staff and sub-contractors having responsibilities relating to the nuclear safety of nuclear installations and to on-site emergency preparedness and response arrangements, in order to build up, maintain and to further develop up-to-date and mutually recognised expertise and skills in nuclear safety.
Amendment 127 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Member States shall ensure that up to date and timely information in relation to nuclear safety of nuclear installations and related risks is made available to workers, civil society and the general public in real time, with specific consideration to those living in the vicinity of a nuclear installation.
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
3. Member States shall ensure that the public shall be given early and effective opportunities to participate in the licensing process of nuclear installations, in accordance with relevant Union and national legislation and international obligationsprocesses of licensing and improving the operational safety of nuclear installations, in accordance with the Aarhus Convention.
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 a – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 8 a – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that nuclear installations are designed, sited, constructed, commissioned, operated and decommissioned with the objective of avoiding potential radioactive releases by:
Amendment 138 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 a – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 8 a – paragraph 1 – point a
a) practically eliminating the occurrence of all accident sequences which would lead to early or large releases;
Amendment 139 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 a – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 8 a – paragraph 1 – point b
b) for accidents that have not been practically eliminated, implementing design measures so that only limited protective measures in area and time are needed for the public and that sufficient time is available to implement these measures, and that the frequency of such accidents is minimised.
Amendment 140 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 a – paragraph 2
Article 8 a – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that the objective set out in paragraph 1 applies to existing nuclear installations to the extent reasonably achievable.
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 b – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 8 b – paragraph 1 – point a
a) sited so that due consideration is provided to avoid, where possible, external natural and man-made hazards and minimiseforestall their impact;
Amendment 146 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 b – paragraph 1 – point b – point i
Article 8 b – paragraph 1 – point b – point i
i) radiation doses to workers and the general public do not exceed prescribed limits and are kept as low as reasonably achievable;
Amendment 147 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 b – point b – Point ii
Article 8 b – point b – Point ii
ii) the occurrence of abnormal events is minimiseliminated;
Amendment 148 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
iii) the potential for escalation to accident situations is reduceliminated by enhancing the nuclear installations’ capability to effectively manage and control abnormal eventsny events which may nonetheless occur;
Amendment 149 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 b – point b – Point iv
Article 8 b – point b – Point iv
iv) harmful consequences of abnormal events and design basis accidents, should they occur nonetheless, are mitigated to ensure that they induce no off-site radiological impact, or only minor radiological impact;
Amendment 150 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 b – point b – point v
Article 8 b – point b – point v
v) external natural and man-made hazards are avoided, where possible, and their impact is minimised.;
Amendment 153 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 c – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 8 c – paragraph 1 – point a
a) regularly evaluates, and at least once every five years, the radiological impact of a nuclear installation on workers, the general public and air, water and soil, in both normal operating and in both operating and accident conditions;
Amendment 154 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 c – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 8 c – paragraph 1 – point b
b) defines, documents and re-assesses regularly, and at least every tenfive years, the design basis of nuclear installations through a periodic safety review, failing which the nuclear installation concerned shall be shut down, and supplements it bythis with a design extension analysis, to ensure that all reasonably practicable improvement measures are implemented;
Amendment 158 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 c– paragraph 1 – point f
Article 8 c– paragraph 1 – point f
f) carries out a specific safety review for nuclear installations which the competent regulatory authority considers to be close to the limit of their operating lifetime as originally foreseen, and for which an extension of the lifetime is requested. Where an extension of the lifetime is granted, the time periods established in subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b) shall be reduced to two years.
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 d – point a – introductory part
Article 8 d – point a – introductory part
a) prepares and regularly updates, at least once every five years, an on-site emergency plan which shall:
Amendment 161 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 d – point a – point ii
Article 8 d – point a – point ii
ii) be co-ordinated with all other bodies involved and shall draw on lessons learned from the feedback of experience from severe events, should they occur, including as regards evacuating local populations;
Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 d – point a – point iii a (new)
Article 8 d – point a – point iii a (new)
iiia) takes into consideration cumulative risks associated with the presence nearby of other hazardous (Seveso III-type )industrial installations;
Amendment 163 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
f) arranges for an on-site emergency response centre, sufficiently protected against natural hazards and radioactivity to ensure its habitability throughout a crisis management period;
Amendment 164 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 d – point f a (new)
Article 8 d – point f a (new)
fa) authorises, enables and promotes public participation and the involvement of non-governmental organisations active in the field of nuclear safety;
Amendment 166 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 d – point g
Article 8 d – point g
g) takes protective measures in case of an emergency in order to mitigateforestall any consequences for human health and for air, water and soil.
Amendment 171 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8 e – paragraph 1
Article 8 e – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall, at least every tenfive years, arrange for periodic self-assessments of their national framework and competent regulatory authorities and invite an international peer review of relevant segments of their national framework and competent regulatory authorities with the aim of continuously improving nuclear safety. Outcomes of any peer review shall be reported to the Member States and the Commission, when available.
Amendment 181 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8e– paragraph 2 – point a
Article 8e– paragraph 2 – point a
a) jointly and, in close coordination with the non-governmental organisations concerned and with the approval of the Commission, select one or more specific topics related to the nuclear safety of nuclear installations. Should Member States fail to jointly selecubmit at least aone topic approved by the Commission within the time frame specified in this paragraph, the Commission shall selectdecide the topics which are to be the subject of the peer reviews;
Amendment 188 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8e – paragraph 2 – point c
Article 8e – paragraph 2 – point c
c) jointly define a methodology, arrange and carry out a peer review (including by independent experts drawn from civil society) of the results of the national assessments referred to in point (b), toin which the Commission is invited toshall participate;
Amendment 193 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 8e – paragraph 2 – point d
Article 8e – paragraph 2 – point d
d) publish immediately the results of the peer reviews referred to in point (c).
Amendment 215 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14
Directive 2009/71/Euratom
Article 9 a
Article 9 a
The Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, and may consist of a ‘per day’ fine or the suspension of operations at the nuclear installation concerned by way of a national regulatory authority injunction. The Member States shall notify those provisions to the Commission by [insert date – this date must correspond to the deadline for transposition set out in Article 2 of this proposal] at the latest and shall notify it without delay of any subsequent amendment affecting them.