BETA

Activities of Jürgen KLUTE related to 2012/0242(CNS)

Shadow reports (1)

2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2012/0242(CNS)
Documents: PDF(524 KB) DOC(551 KB)

Amendments (36)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1

(1) Over the past decades, the Union has ~~made considerable progress in creating an internal market for banking service~~contributed significantly to the deregulation of financial markets. Consequently, in many Member States, banking groups with their headquarters established in other Member States hold a significant market share, and credit institutions have geographically diversified their business, especially within the Euro area.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 a (new)

(1 a) As a consequence of the deregulation of financial markets unsustainable profit-maximisation has taken place. Market actors have fuelled excessive speculation with different kinds of financial products, which often had only limited positive added value from a macro-economic perspective. This behaviour can be seen as one of the main reasons for the current financial and sovereign debt crisis. In a number of EU Member States supervisors have either failed to detect these problems or have not reacted appropriately.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2

(2) ~~Maintaining and deepening the internal market for banking services is~~Sound financial systems that serve the needs of the real economy are essential ~~in order~~ to foster economic recovery in the Union. However this proves increasingly challenging. ~~Evidence shows that the integration of banking markets in the Union is coming to a halt.~~

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3

(3) At the same time supervisors must step up their supervisory scrutiny to take account of the lessons of the financial crisis in recent years, and be able to oversee highly complex and potentially dangerous inter-connected markets and institutions.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

(4) Competence for supervision of individual banks in the Union remains mostly at national level. This limits the effectiveness of supervision and the ability of supervisors to reach a common understanding of the soundness of the banking sector throughout the Union. In order to ~~preserve and increase the positive effects of market integration on growth and welfare, integration of supervisory responsibilities should therefore be enhanced~~achieve the objectives of sustainable economic growth, increasing welfare and social justice integration of supervisory responsibilities should therefore be enhanced. The overall objective of this legislation is to improve supervision of the European financial markets.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5

(5) The solidity of credit institutions is in many instances still closely linked to the Member State in which they are established. Doubts about the sustainability of public debt, economic growth prospects, and the viability of credit institutions have been creating negative, mutually reinforcing market trends. This may lead to risks for the viability of some credit institutions as well as for the stability of the financial system, and ~~may~~ imposes a heavy burden for already strained public finances of the Member States concerned. The problem poses specific risks within the euro area where the single currency increases the likelihood that negative developments in one Member State can create risks for economic development and the stability of the Euro area as a whole.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9

(9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a true single rulebook for financial services for the Single Market as a whole and composed of a single supervisory mechanism, and a common deposit insurance and resolution frameworkTherefore a single rulebook for financial services for the Single Market as a whole should be established. In view of the close links and interactions between Member States participating in the common currency, the ~~banking union~~single supervisory mechanism should apply at least to all Euro area Member States. WHowever, with a view to ~~maintaining and deepening the internal market, and to the extent that this is institutionally possible, the banking union should also be open to the participation of other Member States~~reducing possible threats of financial markets for the European integration process, and to the extent that this is institutionally possible, a single supervisory mechanism needs to be established for the whole European Union in the near future.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

(10) As a first step ~~towards the banking union,~~ a single supervisory mechanism should ensure that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions is implemented in a coherent and effective way, that the single rulebook for financial services is applied equally to credit institutions in all Member States concerned, and that those credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations. A single supervisory mechanism iscould be the basis for the next steps towards the banking union. This reflects the principle that any introduction of common intervention mechanisms in case of crises should be preceded by common controls to reduce the likelihood that intervention mechanisms will have to be used.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11

(11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB ~~is well placed~~could be one option to carry out supervisory tasks with a focus on protecting the stability of Europe's financial system. ~~Indeed in many Member States Central Banks are already responsible for banking supervision. T~~For a transitional phase and until all legal aspects have been thoroughly examined, the ECB should therefore be conferred specific tasks concerning policies relating to the supervision of certain credit institutions within the Euro area.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

(13) S~~afety and soundness of large banks is essential to ensure the stability of the financial system. However, recent experience shows that smaller banks can also pos~~ystemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) pose particular threats to Europe's economies. The ECB shall in cooperation with national supervisory authorities ensure that these institutions apply business models which serve the people and the rea~~t to financial stability. Therefore, the ECB should be able to exercise supervisory tasks in relation to all banks of participating Member Stat~~l economy rather than their shareholders. For this reason the ECB should supervise these institutions in close cooperation with national supervisory authorities.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18

(18) Additional capital buffers, including a capital conservation buffer ~~and~~, a countercyclical capital buffer and a SIFI buffer as agreed in CRD IV to ensure that credit institutions accumulate during periods of economic growth a sufficient capital base to absorb losses in stressed periods, are key prudential tools to ensure the availability of adequate loss absorbency. The ECB should have the task to impose such buffers and ensure credit institutions comply with them.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28

(28) National supervisors have important and long-established expertise in the supervision of credit institutions within their territory and their economic, organisational and cultural specificities. They have established a large body of dedicated and highly qualified staff for these purposes. In the past, however, some national supervisors have failed to detect risks in their financial systems. Therefore, in order to ensure high quality European supervision national supervisors should assist the ECB in the preparation and implementation of any acts ~~relating to the exercise of the ECB supervisory tasks. This should include in particular the ongoing day-to- day assessment of a bank's situation and related on site verifications.~~ until after a thorough legal analysis has been undertaken these tasks are transferred to an independent dedicated European body that is responsible for supervising all institutions in Europe.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36

(36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should therefore be chaired by a Chair and a Vice-Chair elected by the ECB Governing Council and composed, in addition, of representatives from the ECB ~~and~~ from national authorities, EBA and Members of the European Parliament. In order to allow for an appropriate rotation while ensuring the full independence of the Chair and the Vice-Chair, their term should not exceed five years and should not be renewable. It also should respect the gender balance. In order to ensure full coordination with the ~~activities of the EBA and with the~~ prudential policies of the Union, ~~the EBA and~~ the European Commission should be observers in the supervisory board. The performance of the supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB requires the adoption of a large number of technically complex acts and decisions, including decisions on individual credit institutions. In order to effectively carry out those tasks in accordance with the principle of separation from tasks relating to monetary policy, the ECB Governing Council of the ECB should be able to delegate certain clearly defined supervisory tasks and related decisions to the supervisory board, subject to the oversight and responsibility of the Governing Council, which can give instructions and directions to that body. The supervisory board may be supported by a steering committee with a more limited composition.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 39

(39) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should dispose of adequate resources. Those resources should be obtained in a way that ensures the ECB's independence from undue influences by national competent authorities and market participants, and separation between monetary policy and supervisory tasks. The costs of supervision should be primarily borne by the entities subject to it. Therefore, the exercise of supervisory tasks by the ECB should be financed ~~at least part~~solely by fees charged to credit institutions. In view of the transfer of significant supervisory tasks from national authorities to the ECB it is expected that any supervisory fees due at national level can be reduced as appropriate.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 44

(44) In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments concerns banks and Member States is addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECB should start carrying out specific supervisory tasks as soon as possible. However, the transfer of supervisory tasks from national supervisors to the ECB requires a certain amount of preparation. Therefore, an appropriate phasing-in period should be provided for. ~~The number of banks subject to the supervision of the ECB should increase progressively, taking into account the relevance of the supervision of those banks to ensure financial stability.~~ As a first step the ECB should be able to apply its supervisory tasks to ~~any banks, in particular to~~ banks which have received or requested public financial assistance. As a second step, banks of European systemic importance as reflected in their total exposures and their cross- jurisdictional activities should be covered. Total exposures should be calculated in light of the methodologies defined in the Basel III accord of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervisors on the calculation of the leverage ratio and on the definition of common equity tier 1 capital. The phasing- in process should be completed within one year from the entry into force of this Regulation at the latest.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)

(3a) "Systemically important financial institution (SIFIs)" means institutions as defined in CRD IV/CRR;

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)

(ca) To assess business models of SIFIs and to ensure that they do not pose a systemic threat to the functioning of European economies;

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. The ECB shall carry out the tasks under paragraph 1 for credit institutions, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies and financial conglomerates which: (a) have received public funds under a re- capitalisation programme or (b) are of systemic importance as defined in CRD IV.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1

1. The ECB shall carry out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism composed of the ECB ~~and~~, national competent authorities and EBA.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. National competent authorities shall continue to be responsible for supervision of institutions that fall outside the scope of Article 4(1a) until a single supervisory body has been set-up for the whole European Union.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 4 b (new)

4b. The competent national authorities shall notify the ECB without delay where (a) there are well-founded concerns about the safety and/or creditworthiness of any credit institution falling outside the scope of Article 4(1a) (b) the stability of the financial system is endangered by the situation of any credit institution, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, falling outside the scope of Article 4(1a) or (c) a credit institution ceases to fall within the scope of Article 4(1a).

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 4 c (new)

4c. Following a decision by the supervisory board the ECB may take on the task of supervising credit institutions which fall outside the scope of Article 4(1a) where (a) the competent national authorities are not carrying out their duties or are not doing so adequately, (b) there is evidence that credit institutions, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, are jeopardising the proper operation and integrity of the European financial market and/or the stability of the financial system or are exacerbating an existing situation of this kind, or (c) a credit institution falls within the scope of Article 4(1a) or threatens to do so.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 4 d (new)

4d. In the cases covered by Article 4(1a) and by Article 5(2), (3), (4b) and (4c) a conciliation committee shall be set up between the ECB and the competent national authority under the auspices of the EBA to settle disputes. Procedural rules shall be drawn up to determine the details of the committee’s operation.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1

1. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, where credit institutions, financial holding companies, or mixed financial holding companies, intentionally or negligibly, breach a requirement under directly applicable Union acts in relation to which administrative pecuniary sanctions shall be available to competent authorities under Union law, the ECB may impose administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach where those can be determined, or up to 120% of the total annual turnover of a legal person in the preceding business year.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1

1. The planning and execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECB, shall be undertaken by an internal body composed of four representatives of the ECB appointed by the Executive Board of the ECB and one representative of the national authority competent for the supervision of credit institutions in each participating Member State, two representatives of EBA and six members of the European Parliament (hereinafter ‘"supervisory board’"). The four ECB representatives shall neither be part of the Governing Council nor of the Executive Board of the ECB.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 2

2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair elected by the members of the Governing Council from the members, with the exception of the President, of the Executive Board, and a Vice-Chair elected by and from the members of the Governing Council of the ECB. Both positions shall be approved by the European Parliament after a hearing in the responsible committee.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 6

6. T~~he Chair of the European Banking Authority and a~~wo members of the European Commission may participate as observers in the meetings of the supervisory board.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. The supervisory board shall agree a set of minutes for every meeting. A comprehensive set of non-attributable minutes, together with a record of votes taken, shall be published on the ECB website within eight weeks of the meeting date.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1

1. The ECB shall submit each ~~year~~month to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Eurogroup and upon request a report on the execution of the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 3

3. The ~~Chair of the supervisory board may, at the request of the European Parliament, be heard on the execution of its~~European Parliament shall set up a standing Committee on Banking Supervision. That committee may hear the Chair of the supervisory board, his or her deputy and any other ECB staff member responsible for carrying out supervisory tasks and representatives of national supervisory authorities and financial institutions which are subject to supervision. In addition, when considering issues connected with the performance of supervisory tasks by the ~~competent committees of the European Parliament~~standing committee shall have monitoring and investigative rights and the right to inspect documents. The standing committee shall have budgetary control rights in respect of the supervisory fees collected.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 4

4. The ECB shall reply orally or in writing to questions put to it by the European Parliament or, by the Eurogroup or by national parliaments of a participating Member State.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 a (new)

Article 25a Conflict of interest 1. The ECB shall create a standing ethics committee to assess possible conflicts of interest resulting from post-office employment of ECB staff members engaged in supervisory duties. The committee shall be responsible for elaborating comprehensive and formal procedures for assessment. The results of such assessments shall be publicly disclosed. 2. Former ECB staff members who have been engaged in supervisory duties, and who intend to engage in an occupation during the two years after they have ceased to hold office, shall inform the ethics committee in good time. The committee shall make a decision on the compatibility of the employment offer with the need to ensure the integrity and independence of staff. 3. Members of the supervisory board shall be prohibited from taking paid work in private sector institutions for which the ECB has supervisory responsibility during the two years after they have ceased to hold office.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

By 31 December 20153, the Commission shall publish a report on the application of this Regulation. That report shall ~~evaluat~~comprise, inter alia:

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point -a a (new)

(-aa) a detailed legal analysis how a single supervisory mechanism can be implemented for the EU as a whole;

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point -a b (new)

(-ab) if for this single supervisory mechanism a new body needs to be created or if existing institutions or agencies can fulfil the tasks currently assigned to the ECB under Article 4;

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 2

The report shall be forwarded to the European Parliament and to the Council. ~~The Commission shall make accompanying proposals, as appropriat~~On the basis of this analysis the Commission shall make until 1 July 2014 a legislative proposal on a single supervisory mechanism for the EU as a whole.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON