Activities of Krzysztof LISEK related to 2013/2170(INI)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on an anti-missile shield for Europe and its political and strategic implications PDF (141 KB) DOC (64 KB)
Amendments (15)
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the issue of anti-missile defence (AMD) was already raised in the past but has become more topical in recent years in view of the multiplication of threats stemming from nuclear proliferation and other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological and radiological weapons, as well as the potential threat posed by conventional weapons, such as short-range ballistic missiles, to which the EU and its allies must be able to respond effectively;
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas AMD is not only a leading symbol of the USA’s commitment to the EU and to its Eastern European Member StatesNATO, but also of allied solidarity, even if: the system is not specifically intended to shield the particular country in which it is basedprotect countries in which facilities for the interception and destruction of ballistic missiles are located (e.g. Romania and Poland), although such facilities are also capable of protecting neighbouring countries;
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Stresses that nuclear proliferation poses a grave danger to the survival of humankind. Even a nuclear strike confined to a to specific area would be constitute a global catastrophe, resulting in a major system shock at global level. The cost of such an event, both human and financial, would be extremely high; stresses, at the same time, that threats of a different nature should not be ignored, such as those posed by arming warheads with other types of weapons of mass destruction, for instance, radiological materials or conventional loads, especially in the case of short-range ballistic missiles;
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Stresses that the NATO ballistic missile defence system (NATO BMD), in accordance with the decisions taken at NATO's Lisbon and Chicago summits concerning ensuring that all NATO territory in Europe has anti-missile protection, is currently being established on the basis of American anti-missile defence installations in Europe (EPAA) and on national resources of NATO member states allocated to the ALTBMD programme and to the NATO BMD joint command system; notes that the announcement of interim NATO BMD capability at the May 2012 NATO summit in Chicago is the first meaningful step taken by NATO towards building this system in Europe and towards achieving complementarity between US and NATO anti-missile defence systems; stresses that the NATO BMD is defensive, forms part of the deterrence mechanism, and supplements the strategic offensive arsenal;
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Highlights the latest phase in the deployment of NATO’s anti-missile shield (AMSNATO BMD), which aims to annihilate ballistic missiles before they reach their targets in the final stage of their trajectory upon re- entry into the atmosphere, will face greater restrictions than was previously anticipated. It will provide protection to key NATO assets, but contrary to previous plans, it will not and should, in its current form, provide sufficient coveragepartial protection for the whole European population from the limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in existence. This unforeseen development has raised support for a European AMS which would supplement NATO’s systemattacks using short-, medium- and intermediate-range missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles;
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Argues that the legitimate grounds for an anti-missile shield originate inthe NATO BMD are to prevent attacks using short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), which may also encompass the threat of a nuclear attack potentially orchestrated by actors who do not subscribe to traditional understandings of rationality. In real terms, certain ‘rogue’ states or state-like actors could be prepared to attack, even in cases where doing so would ultimately result in their inevitable self-destruction;
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Highlights that it is extremely difficult to evaluate the current and future risks of such developments, and that even if some of these countries have the capacity to develop a nuclear bomb, this does not necessarily mean that they are capable of developing ICBMs in the near future; stresses the need, however, to consider the possibility of these countries using short-, medium- and intermediate-range missiles;
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that there is some evidence that Pakistan might be transferring technological expertise to Iran and North Korea; highlights, furthermore, the worrying fact t-{}-hat thousands of unemployed ex-Soviet nuclear scientists provide a continuing threat as regards the transfer of dangerous information; welcomes, at the same time, the signing in Geneva of the P5+1 agreement with Iran concerning the Iranian nuclear programme, which is a step towards increasing stability in the Middle East and improving relations between Iran and the Euro-Atlantic Community; notes, however, that this interim agreement does not deal with methods for delivering weapons of mass destruction – particularly missile technology – and therefore may not constitute a basis for any limitations on the development of the NATO BMD, including the EPAA, especially since the threats posed to Europe by missiles and WMDs is much more complex and is not restricted to Iran;
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Calls therefore for a thorough and transparent cost-benefit analysis to be carried out regarding AMS – investigations should be carried out into which EU mechanisms can be used to deepen political, military and industrial cooperation between Member States in the field of BMD, for example as regards capabilities in terms of carrying out BMD-related EU research and development projects, and as regards identifying EU Member States’ missile defence capabilities against the backdrop of their defence priorities and the continued discussions over the future development of the Common Security and Defence Policy; points out that this analysis should be conducted by an independent panel and should evaluate the cost of the AMS in relation to the potential risk of a ‘rogue’ state orchestrating an attack using short-, medium- and intermediate-range missiles or ICBMs;
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Stresses that ICBMs are by no means the only delivery system used in nuclear devices; points out that the AMS might provide a false sense of security, nonetheless, that the AMS is one of Europe’s key defence and deterrence capabilities and an important factor ensuring peace in Europe; points out that having an effective missile defence system on the European continent has strengthened the EU’s international position and reduced the risk associated with the use or threat of use of missile technology against the EU; points out that the main BMD-related task should be to ensure that the European continent is capable of defending itself from a wide spectrum of missile threats and to provide protection to armed forces deployed outside Europe;
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Stresses that efforts at EU level in the field of missile defence should be complementary to the actions of NATO, which is and should remain the main forum for the integration of national BMD systems in Europe;
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 b (new)
Paragraph 12 b (new)
12b. Stresses that EU initiatives, such as Pooling & Sharing, may prove helpful in strengthening cooperation between Member States in the areas of BMD and carrying out joint research and development work; notes that, in the long term, such cooperation could also lead to the further consolidation of the European defence industry;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Points out that anti-missile technology is developing rapidly; believes that prospective countermeasures, if developed,the AMS would provide partial, but credible defence against short-, medium- and intermediate-range missiles, as well as a limited number of ICBMs;
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Argues that Russia’s involvement in the AMS is desirableStresses that NATO is prepared to cooperate with Russia based on the assumption of cooperation between two independent missile defence systems – NATO’s and Russia’s; points out that NATO made an offer to Russia at the Chicago summit to develop a transparency regime that preserves reciprocity, and therefore urges Russia to adopt a constructive approach; accepts, at the same time, Russia’s involvement in the AMS, given that potential interceptions would most likely take place in Russian airspace; argues, furthermore, that Russia’s involvement in the development of the AMS wcould be beneficial in economic terms, if the system-related costs were to be shared by the actors involved; stresses, once more, that although effective cooperation with Russia could bring measurable benefits, it must be pursued in accordance with political realities and on the basis of full reciprocity and transparency, as increasing mutual trust is vital for the gradual development of such cooperation; notes, therefore, that moving Russian missiles closer to NATO and EU borders is incomprehensible and poses a threat;