Activities of Eva JOLY related to 2013/2076(INI)
Plenary speeches (1)
European Central Bank annual report for 2012 (debate)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the European Central Bank Annual report for 2012 PDF (170 KB) DOC (83 KB)
Amendments (36)
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas the consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem reached EUR 3 trillion at the end of 2012, representing an increase of approximately 12 % over the course of 2012;
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas non-marketable assets represented the largest component of assets put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the course of 2012, amounting to around 25% of the total; whereas non-marketable securities, together with asset-backed securities, represent more than 40 % of total assets put forward as collateral;
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)
Recital E b (new)
Eb. whereas Emergency Liquidity Assistance lines provided by National Central Banks as represented under the item 'other claims on euro area credit institutions denominated in euro' of the Eurosystem consolidated financial statement reached unprecedented levels over 2012 and amounted to EUR 206 billion at the end of 2012;
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E c (new)
Recital E c (new)
Ec. whereas the ECB's long-term refinancing operations of February 2012 provided EUR 529.5 billion to the Euro area based financial institutions in loans with a maturity of 3 years and an initial 1% interest rate;
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas Article 282 TFEU states that the primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability and that the ECB should support general economic policies of the Union without prejudice to price stability; whereas the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) works under the auspices of the ECB in the area ofCB is conferred specific tasks regarding the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in the area of macro-prudential policy and financial stability;
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Is deeply concerned about the fact that persistently weak economic conditions are becoming the norm in Europe,experienced across the EU which creatinge overwhelming discontent among European citizens and therefore jeopardising the whole European project;
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Welcomes the readiness of the ECB to do whatever it takes to save the Euro; underlines and welcomes the fact that the ECB Governing Council considers that its mandate allows it to fight excessive borrowing costs for Euro area Member States;
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Notes that the recourse to the main refinancing operations, the medium and long-term refinancing operations with full allotment at fixed rates, the recourse to the marginal lending facility, the ELAs and the deposit facility remained all at significantly high levels throughout 2012 signalling a severe impairment of the monetary transmission mechanism and the Eurozone interbank lending market, albeit a significant improvement in the situation signalled by the stabilization of spreads and TARGET II imbalances was observed over the second half of the year;
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Underlines that the overall price stability objective in the Euro area is not undermined by non conventional policies implemented by the ECB given that an expansion of reserves in excess of compulsory requirement does not give banks more resources to expand lending nor represent idle resources but merely changes the composition of liquid assets of the banking system;
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Considers that the three-year LTRO settled on March 2012 contributed to stabilising the banking system, but that this ishould be a temporary measure; notes that, despite the liquidity injected inunprecedented level of support and implicit subsidies provided by the Eurosystem to the banking system by the LTRO, the credit available to the real economy is still well below pre-crisis levels; suggests that it would bunderlines the fact that ECB Governing Council has expressed its readiness to use, where appropriate, for the ECB to reduce its deposit faciliturther measures to restore the monetary trate to negative values in order to encourage banking lending to the real economynsmission mechanism such as a further reduction of interest rates, including a reduction of its deposit facility rate to negative values;
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses that the availability of the ECB to provide further support to the financial and banking system must be properly subject to conditionality, in particularUnderlines that institutions which have benefited from extraordinary central bank liquidity support should be subject to conditionality, in particular by establishing, in the same vein as the 'funding for lending' scheme implemented in the UK, loan targets to the real economy and requiring the commitment by institutions benefiting from such support to increase levels of credit to small and medium-sized enterprises and to householdsthe real economy, without which such efforts would prove to be ineffective;
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Recalls its position on the CRD IV negotiation process to impose additional conditions to institutions having benefited from ECB liquidity support; underlines that such conditionality should be directly linked to the economic benefits provided to banks by means of the non- conventional monetary policy measures, among which the three and one years maturity funding (LTRO), the decrease in the levels of compulsory reserves, the full allotment at fixed rates for its refinancing operations and the enlargement of the spectrum of eligible collateral;
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Underlines the important, albeit, limited role played by the SMP in addressing the malfunctioning of certain eurozone sovereign debt securities market segments;
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Welcomes the setting-up of the OMTs, with no ex ante quantitative limits, in order to safeguard monetary policy transmission, but deplorestakes note of the decision to link the activation of the OMT to strict conditionalities attached to an EFSF/ESM programme; calls on the ECB to activate OMTs independently from strict conditionalitytakes note of the ECB President's commitment that the OMT legal documentation will be disclosed whenever there is an application to the programme; underlines that new mechanisms should be created so as to increase the democratic accountability of ESM programmes; stresses the need to avoid designing assistance programmes under overoptimistic assumptions and scenarios which may result in self- defeating and pro-cyclical effects;
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Considers unnecessary theNotes that the planned full sterilisation of the liquidity injected by the OMTs, asthat might be injected by any future activation of the OMT programme, aims at reducing the levels of excess reserves; point out that inflation expectations remain extremely low in a context of weak economic activity;
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Considers that the monetary policy tools that the ECB has used since the beginning of the crisis, while providing a welcome relief in distressed financial markets, have revealed their limits as regards stimulating growth and improving the situation on the labour marketing the real economy; considers, therefore, that the ECB could investigate the possibilities of implementing new unconventional measures aimed at participating in a large, EU-wide pro-growth programme, including the use of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance facility totargeting inter alia better funding conditions for SMEs; understake an ‘overt money financing’ of government debt in order to finance tax cuts targeted on low-income households and/or new spending programmes focused on the Europe 2020 objectivends that the ECB is currently working with the EIB so as to create such a framework in the form of joint risk sharing arrangements; calls on the ECB and the EIB to speed up such process;
Amendment 139 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Remains worried by the significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset- backed securities put forward as collateral to the eurosystem in the framework of its refinancing operations; asks the ECB to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities as well as to disclose valuation methods regarding such assets; underlines that such disclosure would be beneficial for the purpose of parliamentary scrutiny of supervisory tasks conferred to the ECB;
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)
Paragraph 10 b (new)
10b. Underlines that ELA lines are reported under the category 'other claims on Euro area credit institutions denominated in Euro' in the Eurosystem consolidated balance sheets without providing further disclosure and more granular information on such lines as well as on the underlying operations and conditions attached to them; asks the ECB to improve the reporting provided on ELAs developments on a country-by- country basis on its website;
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 c (new)
Paragraph 10 c (new)
10c. Is encouraged by the stabilization of the levels of TARGET II imbalances over the second half of 2012; underlines that the TARGET II settlement system has played a crucial role for safeguarding the integrity of the euro area financial system; remains, nevertheless, concerned by the ongoing fragmentation of financial markets within the Euro area;
Amendment 143 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 d (new)
Paragraph 10 d (new)
10d. Stresses that stable inflation rates, in line with the medium term rate objective defined by the ECB, may be associated with unsustainable debt dynamics, underlying the importance to manage asset bubbles and the growth of credit even when price stability is guaranteed;
Amendment 144 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 e (new)
Paragraph 10 e (new)
10e. Is concerned by the persistent inflation and yield curve differentials within the Euro area; recommends that the ECB follow a proactive macroprudential approach associated with its monetary policy instruments so as to deal with regional asset bubbles and imbalances; asks the ECB to explore whether regional fine-tuning regarding collateral, haircut and reserve requirements may be appropriate for coping with asymmetric shocks, thereby enhancing financial stability within the monetary union while preserving price stability;
Amendment 145 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 f (new)
Paragraph 10 f (new)
10f. Looks forward to the announced ECB assessment of the 'Irish Promissory Notes' deal and its consistency with the Treaty provisions regarding monetary financing;
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 g (new)
Paragraph 10 g (new)
10g. Asks the ECB to disclose to the European Parliament the secret 'Agreements on Net Financial Assets' between the National central banks and the ECB regarding inter alia the amounts of different classes of assets, including government bonds that an Euro area central bank can hold in its balance sheet;
Amendment 154 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Argues that the conduct of monetary policy should be democratic and should result from deliberation between different viewpoints and approaches; believes that the ongoing crisis has highlighted the need to increase theoretical diversity within central banks; requests the ECB to report in its next annual report on how it intends to proceed in order to diversify the analytical background of its staff;
Amendment 162 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Invites the ECBTroika to pay more attention to the contractionary effects on GDP, employment and social welfare created by austerity policies carried out by national governments in the framework of Economic Assistance Programmes involving the ECB; calls for a thorough assessment of the Troika modus operandi and the ECB involvement in such framework with a view to clarifying and redefining the scope of responsibilities and increasing the democratic accountability of the adoption and implementation of assistance programmes;
Amendment 171 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Underlines that the ECB's independence should not justify lack of democratic accountability should be ready to comply with the highest standards of accountability when performing its monetary policy tasks and its supervisory tasks vis-à-vis the European Parliament;
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Notes that the European Banking Ssystem is still fragile and needs to be reformed in structural terms and consolidated through the development of a true banking union; is deeply concerned by the delays in setting up the building blocks of the banking union; is of the opinion that it is crucial to complement a genuine supervision of systemic and cross-border institutions at the supranational level with a meaningful supranational backstop and burden- sharing capacity commensurate with the requirements of a functional and effective monetary union;
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Welcomes the progress achieved on the negotiations on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) regulation conferring on the ECB the power of supervision over eurozone credit institutions; believes the setting-up of the SSM will contribute to severing the link between banks and sovereigns and will help develop a common European approach to crisis managementthis will represent a key step towards a genuine European Banking Union;
Amendment 199 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Welcomes the fact that the ECB President has repeatedly emphasised that the SSM should be complemented by a single resolution mechanism (SRM); also welcomes the call by the ECB and the Commission to include in such a framework a common resolution fund for institutions under a future single resolution authority as an integral part of the SRM;
Amendment 205 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Notes that the strengthening of the ECB resulting from the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism needs to be balanced by greater democratic accountability vis-à-vis national parliaments and the European Parliament; insists that the highest standards regarding accountability of supervisors in National Parliaments should be applied in the case of the SSM accountability to the European Parliament;
Amendment 211 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Looks forward to the adoption of an interinstitutional arrangement with the ECB formalizing EP scrutiny of the ECB Supervisory Board; is of the opinion that such arrangement should include scrutiny powers on ELAs, LTRO and other monetary tools presenting a potential of conflict of interest between the ECB's role in determining the solvency of an institution and its obligation to lend only to solvent institutions; stresses the need to set up an appropriate mechanism for identifying and resolving potential conflicts of interest between monetary policy and supervisory powers;
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21b. Points out that the concept of 'insolvency' underpinning the provision of central bank liquidity to institutions in the Euro area lacks a sufficient level of clarity as the concept refers both to a situation arising in a bank after a judicial determination of insolvency or alternatively as the situation where competent supervisory authorities determine that an institution does not comply with minimum requirements defined in the CRD/CRR framework; underlines that such a lack of clarity needs to be addressed so as to guarantee legal certainty and foster financial stability;
Amendment 220 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Considers it urgent to approve the establishment of a European Resolution System in order toMechanism as well as to enhance the EU standards on deposit guarantee schemes in order to reduce taxpayers involvement to the maximum extent possible, protect depositors and prevent further banking crises;
Amendment 227 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Notes that in order to strengthen the stability of the banking system and avoid the development of the ‘'too big to fail’' syndrome, consideration should be given to introducing a full separation between deposit and investment banks, on the lines of the ‘Volcker Rule’ in the USa mandatory separation of banks' essential services to the real economy and other activities by means of a transparent and credible 'ring fence';
Amendment 238 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Is deeply concerned at the contempt shown by the Council towards Parliament's resolution of 25 October 20123 on the appointment of a new Member of the executive board of the ECB, and notes that dueis consideration should be given to both the expertise and the gender of members in the appointment of ECB top managementtrary to the Commission's and Parliament's recommendations for improving gender parity in high-level decision boards in the economic sector;
Amendment 242 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)
Paragraph 27 a (new)
27a. Asks the ECB to provide a detailed reaction to the annual European Parliament's report on the ECB in its subsequent annual reports;