8 Amendments of Gabriel MATO related to 2023/2072(INI)
Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Notes that Chinese investments in Europe continued to decline in 2022, reaching a 10-year low of EUR 7.9 billion; recalls a shift in Chinese FDI from mergers and acquisitions (M&A) towards greenfield investments, primarily in battery technology, which is a key sector of the Green Transition1a; _________________ 1a https://rhg.com/research/chinese-fdi-in- europe-2022-update/
Amendment 16 #
3. Is nevertheless convinced that the trade and investment relationship between the EU and China is of strategic importance and should be rules-based, with the multilateral trading system and the principle of reciprocity at its core; welcomes a strategy built on the concept of ‘de-risking’, alongside higher degrees of awareness as regard vulnerabilities linked to the possible weaponisation of economic dependencies and the foreign control or influence on critical infrastructure;
Amendment 21 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Emphasises that trade and investment are key drivers of sustainable growth, job creation and innovation and that the EU should therefore maintain its economic openness1 ; stresses however that a strategic balance must be found between the open character of the EU Single Market and the related security vulnerabilities, especially concerning economic coercion or threats to the integrity of European critical infrastructure; _________________ 1 Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066).
Amendment 41 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Welcomes the Commission’s proposed European economic security strategy2 , which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU’s economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic interdependencies; approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies; is convinced that the protection of critical infrastructure should be a key element in the implementation of the strategy; _________________ 2 Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’ (JOIN(2023)0020).
Amendment 42 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Underlines that EU responses must be built around an augmented understanding of the relevant strategic picture centred on cross-policy and cross- national threat assessments and vulnerability studies on critical infrastructure; is of the opinion that a decentralised or lacunar perception, lacking clear visibility and scrutiny over projects with strategic significance for Europe’s defence and security can greatly harm the Union’s geopolitical interests1a; recalls vulnerabilities linked to foreign interference, specifically in the information space, and the interplay between FDI projects and information manipulation operations by malign foreign actors; _________________ 1a Security implications of China-owned critical infrastructure in the European Union - DG EXPO in-depth analysis
Amendment 54 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Recalls that the Regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments3 addresses risks to security and public order resulting from investments from outside the EU; notes that critical infrastructure is among the factors that may be taken into consideration by the Member States or the Commission in determining whether an investment is likely to affect security or public order.; reiterates the key added value of the screening mechanism as a pertinent tool giving the Union and its Member States a better strategic overview and situational awareness regarding trends, targets, means and methods deployed by foreign actors to increase their economic and political influence; _________________ 3 Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (OJ L 79I, 21.3.2019, p. 1).
Amendment 56 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Highlights the role of the EU as a promotor of quality infrastructure projects abroad, through initiatives such as the Global Gateway or through the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment; underlines the EU’s need to deliver on its value-based and sustainability-driven rhetoric of international infrastructure projects, acknowledging the vital geostrategic role such programs can have at the level of diversification, supply chain resilience, standard setting and regulatory alignment;
Amendment 60 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 b (new)
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7b. Argues that a key area of EU critical infrastructure is also its network of research institutes and R&D facilities, which play a pertinent role in the Union’s ability to deliver on its green and digital transitions, alongside key arenas such as space of defence; reminds of security vulnerabilities linked to forced technology transfers, IP-theft and knowledge leaks, both at home and abroad, and calls for increased vigilance in accounting for such threats to the EU’s ability to innovate and foster growth.