21 Amendments of Liem HOANG NGOC related to 2010/0277(NLE)
Amendment 67 #
Recital 2
2. Member State governments and government sub-sectors maintain public accounting systems which include elements such as bookkeeping, internal control, financial reporting, and audit. These should be distinguished from statistical data which relate to the outcomes of government finances and the policies funded by them based on statistical methodologies, and from forecasts or budgeting actions which relate to future government finances.
Amendment 70 #
Recital 4
4. The availability of fiscal data is crucial to the proper functioning of the budgetary surveillance framework of the Union. Regular availability of timely and reliable fiscal data is the key to proper and well- timed monitoring, which in turn allows prompt action in the event of adverse budgetary developments or adverse developments affecting the general economic situation. A crucial element in ensuring the quality of fiscal data is transparency, which must entail regular public availability of such data.
Amendment 72 #
Recital 7
7. Biased and unrealExcessive pessimistic or optimistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts may considerably hamper the effectiveness of fiscal planning and consequently impair commitment to budgetary discipline, while transparency and validation of forecasting methodologies may significantly increase the quality of macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts for fiscal planning;
Amendment 77 #
Recital 10
10. Commission forecasts and information regarding the models on which they are based provide Member States with a useful benchmark for their central scenario, enhancabling the validity ofm to evaluate the forecasts used for budgetary planning, although the extent to which Member States can be expected to take the Commission forecasts into consideration will vary according to the timing of forecast preparation and the comparability of the forecast methodologies and assumptions.
Amendment 82 #
Recital 11
11. The quality of official macroeconomic and budgetary forecast is criticallys would be enhanced by auditing them at the planning stage, this being done by an independent public body. Thorough auditing includes scrutiny of the economic assumptions comparison with forecasts prepared by other institutions and the evaluation of past forecast performance.
Amendment 84 #
Recital 12
12. Considering the documented effectiveness of rules based on budgetary frameworks of thewhich has been noted in certain Member States in promoting budgetary discipline, strong national fiscal rules that are consistentmpatible with the budgetary objectives at the level of the Union must be the cornerstone of the strengthening budgetary surveillance framework of the Union. Strong fiscal rules should be equipped with well specified target definitions together with mechanisms for effective and timely monitoring. In addition policy experience has shown that for numerical rules to work effectively consequences must be attached to non-compliance where the costs involved may be simply reputational.
Amendment 96 #
Recital 13
13. Member States should avoid pro- cyclical fiscal policies and fiscal consolidation efforts should be greater in good times. Well-specified numerical fiscal rules taking account of the stage reached by the economy within the cycle are conducive to these objectives.
Amendment 97 #
Recital 13
13. Member States should avoid pro-implement counter cyclical fiscal policies and fiscal consolidation efforts should be greconcentraterd in good times. Well- specified numerical fiscal rules are conducive to these objectives.
Amendment 104 #
Recital 15
15. Although approval of annual budget legislation is the key step in the budget process in which important budgetary decisions are adopted in the Member States, most fiscal measures have budgetary implications that go well beyond the yearly budgetary cycle. A single year perspective therefore provides a poorn insufficient basis for sound budgetary policies. In order to incorporate the multi-annual budgetary perspective of the budgetary surveillance framework of the Union, planning of annual budget legislation should be based on multiannual fiscal planning stemming from the medium-term budgetary framework, subject to constraints on the timetable to whcih our national parlimanets are able to commit themselves.
Amendment 109 #
Recital 17
Amendment 111 #
Recital 18
18. To be effective in promoting budgetary discipline and the sustainability of public finance, budgetary frameworks should comprehensively cover psublic finance-naitonal governments. For this reason operations of extra budgetary funds and bodies that have an immediate or medium term impact on member States budgetary positions should be given particular consideration.
Amendment 118 #
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) numerical fiscal rules, which establish a permanent constraint on the conduct of fiscal policy expressed in terms of a summary indicator of budgetary performance and the anticyclical effectiveness of budget-related policies, such as the government budget deficit, borrowing, debt, or a major component thereof, as well as their impact on investment levels or unemployment rates;
Amendment 126 #
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) cash based fiscal data at a monthquarterly frequency covering government with each sub-sector thereof separately identified before the end of the following monthquarter,
Amendment 129 #
Article 4 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that fiscal planning is based on realistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts using the most up-to-date information, includign natioanl forecasts where they are more up to date than Commission forecasts. Budgetary planning shall be based on the most likely macro-fiscal scenario or on a more prudent scenario that highlights in detail deviations from the most likely macro-fiscal scenario. The macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts shall be prepared taking into account the Commission forecasts as appropriate. Differences between the chosen macro- fiscal scenario and the Commission forecast shall be explained.
Amendment 139 #
Article 4 – paragraph 4
4. Member States shall have the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts for fiscal planning regularly audited by an independent public body, including ex post evaluation. The result of this auditing shall be made public.
Amendment 148 #
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Member States shall have in place numerical fiscal rules that effectively promote compliance with their respective obligations deriving from the Treaty in the area of budgetary policy, in accordance with its countercyclical role. Such rules shall include in particular:
Amendment 156 #
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) Eescape clauses setting out a limited number ofthe specific circumstances, particularly those reflected by macroeconomic and social indicators, in which temporary non-compliance with the rule is permitted.
Amendment 164 #
Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) comprehensive and transparent multi- annual budgetary objectives in terms of the general government deficit, debt, and any other summary fiscal indicator, and objectives envisaged in respect of the policies being funded ensuring that these are consistent with any fiscal rules as provided for in Chapter IV in force,;
Amendment 167 #
Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) detailed projections of each major expenditure and revenue item, by general government sub-sector, for the budget year and beyond, based on unchanged policies, and the anticipated effects of the policiies being funded;
Amendment 170 #
Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) a statement of the government’s medium-term priorities broken down by major revenue and expenditure item and by general government sub-sector, showing how the adjustment towards the medium- term budgetary objective is achieved compared to projections under unchanged policies or in view of the failure of policies being funded.
Amendment 177 #
Article 13 – paragraph 3