Activities of Marta ANDREASEN related to 2009/0064(COD)
Plenary speeches (2)
Explanations of vote
Alternative investment fund managers (debate)
Amendments (12)
Amendment 192 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) In order to avoid imposing excessive or disproportionate requirements, this Directive provides for an exemption for AIFM where the cumulative AIF under management fall below a threshold of EUR 1200 million. The activities of the AIFM concerned are unlikely to have significant consequences for financial stability or market efficiency. For AIFM which only manage unleveraged AIF and do not grant investors redemption rights during a period of five years a specific threshold of EUR 500 m1 billion applies. This specific threshold is justified by the fact that managers of unleveraged funds, specialised in long term investments, are even less likely to cause systemic risks. Furthermore, the five years lock-up of investors eliminates liquidity risks. AIFM which are exempt from this Directive should continue to be subject to any relevant national legislation. They should however be allowed to be treated as AIFM subject to the opt-in procedure foreseen by this Directive.
Amendment 232 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) Reliable and objective asset valuation is crucial for the protection of investor interests. Different AIFM employ different methodologies and systems for valuing assets, depending on the assets and markets in which they predominantly invest. It is appropriate to recognise these differences but to, nevertheless, require the valuation of assets to be undertaken by an entity which is independent of the AIFM. The AIFM should be able to delegate the process for valuation of assets and the calculation of the net asset value (NAV) to a third party.
Amendment 302 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 27
Recital 27
(27) In particular the Commission should be empowered to adopt the measuresdelegated necessary for the implementation of this Directive. In this respect, the Commission should be able to adopt measures acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty determining the procedures under which AIFM managing portfolios of AIF whose assets under management do not exceed the threshold set out in this Directive may exercise their right to be treated as AIFM covered by this Directive. Theose measures areacts should also be designed to specify the criteria to be used by competent authorities to assess whether AIFM comply with their obligations as regards their conduct of business, the type of conflicts of interests AIFM have to identify, as well as the reasonable steps AIFM are expected to take in terms of internal and organizsational procedures in order to identify, prevent, manage and disclose conflicts of interest. They arshould also be designed to specify the risk management requirements to be employed by AIFM as a function of the risks which the AIFM incurs on behalf of the AIF that it manages as well as any arrangements needed to enable AIFM to manage the particular risks associated with short selling transactions, including any relevant restrictions that might be needed to protect the AIF from undue risk exposures. They arshould also be designed to specify the liquidity management requirements of this Directive and in particular the minimum liquidity requirements for AIF. They arshould also be designed to specify the requirements that originators of securitisation instruments have to meet in order for an AIFM to be allowed to invest in such instruments issued after 1 January 2011. They arshould also be as well designed to specify the requirements that AIFM have to comply with when investing in such securitisation instruments. They are designed to specify the criteria under which a valuator can be considered independent in the meaning of this Directive. They are designed to specify the conditions under which the delegation of AIFM functions should be approved andshould also be designed to specify the conditions under which the manager could no longer be considered to be the manager of the AIF in case of excessive delegation. They arshould also be designed to specify the content and format of the annual report that AIFM have to make available for each AIF they manage and to specify the disclosure obligations of AIFM to investors and reporting requirements to competent authorities as well as their frequency. They arshould also be designed to specify the disclosure requirements imposed on AIFM as regards leverage and the frequency of reporting to competent authorities and of disclosure to investors. They arshould also be designed to setting limits to the level of leverage AIFM can employ when managing AIF. They arshould also be designed to determine the detailed content and the way AIFM acquiring controlling influence in issuers and non-listed companies should fulfil their information obligation towards issuers and non-listed companies and their respective shareholders and representatives of employees, including the information to be provided in the annual reports of the AIF they manage. They arshould also be designed to specify the types of restrictions or conditions that can be imposed on the marketing of AIF to professional investor in the home Member State of the AIFM. They arshould also be designed to specify general criteria for assessing equivalence of valuation standards of third countries where the valuator is established in a third country, the equivalence of legislation of third countries regarding depositaries and, for the purpose of the authorisation of AIFM established in third countries, the equivalence of prudential regulation and ongoing supervision. They arshould also be designed to specify general criteria for assessing whether third countries grant CommunityUnion AIFM effective market access comparable to that granted by the CommunityUnion to AIFM from third countries. They arshould also be designed to specify the modalities, content and frequency of exchange of information regarding AIFM between the competent authorities of the home Member State of the AIFM and other competent authorities where the AIFM individually or collectively with other AIFM may have an impact on the stability of systemically relevant financial institutions and the orderly functioning of markets. They arshould also be designed to specify the procedures for on-the-spot verifications and investigations.
Amendment 351 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) AIFM which either directly or indirectly through a company with which the AIFM is linked by common management or control, or by a substantive direct or indirect holding, manage portfolios of AIF whose assets under management, including any assets acquired through use of leverage, in total do not exceed a threshold of 1EUR 200 million Euro or 500 millions eurosor EUR 1 billion when the portfolio of AIF consists of AIF that are not leveraged and with no redemption rights exercisable during a period of 5 years following the date of constitution of each AIF;
Amendment 386 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point gl (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point gl (new)
(gl) publicly listed closed-end investment trusts.
Amendment 706 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 16 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
1. AIFM shall ensure that, for each AIF that it manages, a valuator is appointed which is independent of the AIFM to establish the value of assets acquired by the AIF and the value of the shares and units of the AIF.
Amendment 769 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 4
Article 16 – paragraph 4
Amendment 893 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 3
Article 17 – paragraph 3
3. The depositary shall be a credit institution having its registered office in the CommunityUnion and be authorised in accordance with Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast)r registered in other jurisdictions with equivalent regulation.
Amendment 920 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 4
Article 17 – paragraph 4
4. Depositaries may delegate their tasks to other depositaries authorised in the Union or elsewhere.
Amendment 941 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
Article 17 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
In case of any loss of financial instruments which the depositary safe-keeps, the depositary can only discharge itself of its liabilitybe held liable if it canis proven that it couldid not have avoided the loss which has occurreexercise due diligence and reasonable care or obligation of means over assets held.
Amendment 1022 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 18 – paragraph 3
Article 18 – paragraph 3
3. The third party may not sub-delegate any of the functions delegated to it except monitoring and oversight.
Amendment 1498 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 35
Article 35