15 Amendments of Marta ANDREASEN related to 2010/2303(INI)
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes the shortcomings of the prescriptive US Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which failed to protect US institutions during the financial crisis, whilst at the same time increasing compliance costs for all listed companies, in particular SMEs, reducing competitiveness and hampering the creation of new listed companies;
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Calls for the establishment of mandatory risk committees at board level for all economically significant financial institutions;
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Stresses that ultimate responsibility for riskcorporate governance lies with the board;
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Calls on national supervisors to develop objective criteria for a ‘fit and proper person’ test to assess the suitability of individuals to be added to an ‘approved persons’ list forcontrol procedures to be observed by those exercising supervisedory functions; supervisors must, including but not limited to performing their assessments and approvals procedure in a timely and efficient manner;
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for regular, formal external assessments to be carried out of the board and its performance, on the basis of objective criteria to be approved by the relevant national supervisthe establishment by national supervisors of key indicators that allow investor,s and for summaries of these assessmentshareholders to be includupdated ion annual reports for the benefit of investors, shareholderrisk evolution and its mand national supervisorsagement efficiency;
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Believes that there should be a basic assumption that the roles of CEO and chairman should be separate; notes that there are circumstances in which a combined role could be beneficialRecalls that sound internal control procedures require that the incumbent to the roles of CEO and chairman of the Board to be different;
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Believes that all non-executive members of unitary or supervisory boards should be of high calibre, that every board should have non-executive members who possess recent and relevant financial industry expertise, whose role should be complemented by other non-executives with other areas of expertise and experience relevant to the work of the board, that every financial institution should have a board with a diversity of experience, expertise and character and that appointments should be made on merit;
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Believes that there shsoulnd be a basic assumptioninternal control rules would require that no person should serve on more than three boards of directors of financial institutions;
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Believes that an enhanced three-way dialogue between supervisors, auditors (both internal and external) and institutions would makit is the Internal Auditor´s responsibility to ensure that the necessary internal controls are itn possibllace to detect substantial or systemic risk at an early stage; encourages supervisors, auditors and institutions to engage in open discussions and to increase the frequency of meetings in order to facilitate prudential supervision and to establish the procedure to follow – including but not limited to that of informing supervisors and hierarchy – in order to avoid negative consequences;
Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Stresses that an auditor's primary role should not be compromised by the burden of extra duties, such as an examine need for the Board of Administration to give adequate attention to the External Auditor´s opinion on the entities´ accounts, their observations and assessment of non-audit information, which falls outside his or recommendations, notably in relation to risk areas, which they will have assessed as part of their area of expertisework in relation to contingencies affecting the financial statements;
Amendment 130 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Believes that significant transactions above a set size, with the benchmark to be decided by ESMA, should requirecertain amount, to be established by national supecific sharervisors, shoulder approval or be subject to a requirement to inform shareholders require an extra level of approval before the transaction can take effect;
Amendment 136 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Recognises that transparency is necessary with regard to related party transactions and that, on the basis of a benchmark to be set by ESMA, transactions which involve a related party should be notified to the listing authority and be accompanied by a letter from an independent adviser confirming that the transaction is fair and reasonable, or should be subject to a vote by shareholders from which the related party is excluded;