74 Amendments of Burkhard BALZ related to 2012/0242(CNS)

Draft legislative resolution
Citation 2 a (new)

– having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Draft legislative resolution
Citation 3 a (new)

– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of ...,

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Citation 1

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 1~~27(6)~~14 thereof,

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Citation 4

~~Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,~~deleted

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Citation 4

Having regard to the opinion of the European ~~Parliament~~Economic and Social Committee,

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 a (new)

(10 a) Shifting the supervision of banks to the European level is a key to place the banking sector on a more sound footing and restore confidence in the euro. The single supervisory mechanism is based on the transfer to the European level of specific, key supervisory tasks for banks established in the euro area. With respect to the supervision of insurers, reinsurers and occupational pensions such changes are not yet foreseen. Close and constructive cooperation within the ESFS is essential for efficient supervision throughout Europe. It is only pragmatic to opt for a step by step approach within the ESFS to enhance consistency and convergence for supervisory practices. However, European supervisors irrespective of the financial area in question should have adequate resources and powers at hands in order to properly fulfil their tasks. Installing a single supervisory mechanism for banks therefore also calls for some alignments in the EIOPA Regulation, concerning the collection of information, the establishment and scope of action and the decision-making.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11

(11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB is well placed to carry out certain clear defined supervisory tasks with a focus on protecting the stability of Europe's financial system. Indeed in many Member States Central Banks are already responsible for banking supervision. ~~The ECB should therefore be conferred specific tasks concerning policies relating to the supervision of credit institutions within the Euro area.~~

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

(12) The ECB should be conferred those specific supervisory tasks which are crucial to ensure a coherent and effective implementation of the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, while other tasks should remain with EBA and national authorities. The ECB's tasks should include measures taken in pursuance of macro-prudential stability.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

(13) Safety and soundness of large banks is essential to ensure the stability of the financial system. However, recent experience shows that smaller banks can also pose a threat to financial stability. Therefore, the ECB should be able to exercise s~~upervisory tasks in relation to all banks of participating Member States~~pecific and clearly defined supervisory tasks requested by EBA in relation to all banks of European systemic importance as defined in this Regulation. The ECB should also be responsible for the supervision of banks which have received or which have requested public financial assistance.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 a (new)

(13 a) National competent authorities should continue to supervise the credit institutions that fall outside the scope of supervision on European level. EBA should establish a supervisory framework for the supervision by national competent authorities of credit institutions falling outside the scope of supervision on European level. As part of their duties under the supervisory framework, national competent authorities should submit a report to EBA on a quarterly basis. EBA should monitor national competent authorities on an ongoing basis.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

(14) Prior authorisation for taking up the business of credit institutions is a key prudential technique to ensure that only operators with a sound economic basis, an organisation capable of dealing with the specific risks inherent to deposit taking and credit provision, and suitable directors carry out those activities. The ECB should therefore have at request from EBA the task to authorise credit institutions and ~~should be responsible~~ for the withdrawal of authorisations.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

(15) In addition to the conditions set out in Union legislative acts for authorisation of credit institutions and the cases for withdrawal of such authorisations, Member States may currently provide for further conditions for authorisation and cases for withdrawal of authorisation. The ECB should therefore carry out ~~its~~the task to authorise credit institutions and to withdraw the authorisation in case of non- compliance with national law upon a proposal by the relevant national or European competent authority, which assesses compliance with the relevant conditions set out by national law. The ECB should grant authorisation within six weeks of receiving the proposal by the relevant national competent authority, where the conditions provided for in Union law are met.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

(16) An assessment of the suitability of any new owner prior to the purchase of a significant stake in a credit institution is an indispensable tool to ensure the continuous suitability and financial soundness of credit institutions' owners. The ECB as a Union institution is well-placed to carry out such an assessment without imposing undue restrictions to the internal market. The ECB should at the request of EBA have the task to assess the acquisition and disposal of significant holdings in credit institutions.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17

(17) Compliance with Union rules requiring credit institutions to hold certain levels of capital against risks inherent to the business of credit institutions, to limit the size of exposures to individual counterparties, to publicly disclose information on a credit institutions' financial situation, to dispose of sufficient liquid assets to withstand situations of market stress, and to limit leverage is a prerequisite for credit institutions' prudential soundness. The ECB should ~~have the task to~~on behalf of EBA ensure compliance with those rules and to set higher prudential requirements and apply additional measures to credit institutions in the cases specifically set out in Union acts.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18

(18) Additional capital buffers, including a capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical capital buffer to ensure that credit institutions accumulate during periods of economic growth a sufficient capital base to absorb losses in stressed periods, are key prudential tools to ensure the availability of adequate loss absorbency. The ECB should at request of EBA have the task to impose such buffers and to ensure credit institutions comply with them.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

(19) The safety and soundness of a credit institution depend also on the allocation of adequate internal capital, having regard to the risks to which it may be exposed, and on the availability of appropriate internal organisation structures and corporate governance arrangements. The ECB should therefore have on behalf of EBA the task to apply requirements ensuring that credit institutions have in place robust governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms, including strategies and processes for assessing and maintaining the adequacy of their internal capital. In case of deficiencies it should also have the task on request by EBA to impose appropriate measures including specific additional own funds requirements, specific publication requirements, and specific liquidity requirements.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20

(20) Risks for the safety and soundness of a credit institution can arise both at the level of an individual credit institution and at the level of a banking group ~~or of a financial conglomerate~~. Specific supervisory arrangements to mitigate these risks are important to ensure the safety and soundness of credit institutions. In addition to the exercise of supervision of individual credit institutions, the ECB's tasks should include the exercise of supervision at the consolidated level, supplementary supervision, supervision of financial holding companies and supervision of mixed financial holding companies.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21

(21) In order to preserve financial stability, the deterioration of an institution's financial and economic situation must be remedied before that institution reaches a point at which authorities have no other alternative than to resolve it. The ECB should have the task to carry out early intervention actions on behalf of EBA as defined in relevant Union law. It should however coordinate its early intervention action with the relevant resolution authorities. Pending the conferral of resolution powers on a European body, the ECB should moreover coordinate appropriately with the national authorities concerned to ensure a common understanding about respective responsibilities in case of crises, in particular in the context of the cross border crisis management groups and the future resolution colleges established for these purposes.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22

(22) Supervisory tasks not conferred on the ECBuropean level should remain with national authorities. Those tasks should include the power to receive notifications from credit institutions in relation to the right of establishment and the free provision of services, to supervise bodies which are not covered by the definition of credit institutions under Union law but which are supervised as credit institutions under national law, to supervise credit institutions from third countries establishing a branch or providing cross- border services in the Union, to supervise payments services, to carry out day-to-day verifications of credit institutions, to carry out the function of competent authorities over credit institutions in relation to markets in financial instruments and the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

(23) The ~~ECB~~competent authorities should carry out the tasks conferred on it with a view to ensuring the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system of the Union and the unity and integrity of the Internal Market, thereby ensuring also the protection of depositors and improving the functioning of the Internal Market, in accordance with the single rulebook for financial services in the Union.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24

(24) The conferral of supervisory tasks on the ~~ECB~~competent European authorities for some of the Member States should be consistent with the framework of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) set up in 2010 and its underlying objective to develop the single rulebook and enhance convergence of supervisory practices across the whole Union. Cooperation between the banking supervisors and the supervisors of insurance and securities markets is important to deal with issues of joint interest and to ensure proper supervision of credit institutions operating also in the insurance and securities sectors. The ECB should therefore be required to cooperate closely with the EBA, the European Securities and Markets Authority and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, within the framework of the EFSF.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27

(27) In order to ensure that supervisory rules and decisions are applied by credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies, effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions should be imposed in case of breaches. In accordance with Article 132(3) TFEU and Council Regulation (EC) No. 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions, the ECB ison behalf of EBA entitled to impose fines or periodic penalty payments on undertakings for failure to comply with obligations under its regulations and decisions. Moreover, in order to enable the ECB to effectively carry out its tasks relating to the enforcement of supervisory rules set out in directly applicable Union law, the ECB should be empowered to impose on behalf of EBA pecuniary sanctions on credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies for breaches of such rules. National authorities should remain able to apply sanctions in case of failure to comply with obligations stemming from national law transposing Union Directives. Where the ~~ECB~~competent European authorities considers it appropriate for the fulfilment of its tasks that a sanction is applied for such breaches, it should be able to refer the matter to national authorities for those purposes.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28

(28) National supervisors have important and long-established expertise in the supervision of credit institutions within their territory and their economic, organisational and cultural specificities. They have established a large body of dedicated and highly qualified staff for these purposes. Therefore, in order to ensure high quality European supervision national supervisors should assist the ~~ECB~~competent European authorities in the preparation and implementation of any acts relating to the exercise of the ECB supervisory tasks. This should include in particular the ongoing day-to-day assessment of a bank's situation and related on site verifications.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29

(29) As regards the supervision of cross- border banks active both inside and outside the Euro area the ECBuropean competent authorities should cooperate closely with the competent authorities of non participating Member States. As a competent authority the ECB should be subject to the related obligations to cooperate and exchange information under Union law and should participate fully in the colleges of supervisors. In addition, since the exercise of supervisory tasks by a European institution brings about clear benefits in terms of financial stability and sustainable market integration, Member States not participating in the common currency should therefore also have the possibility to participate in the new mechanism. However, it is a necessary pre- condition for an effective exercise of supervisory tasks, that supervisory decisions are implemented fully and without delay. Member States wishing to participate in the new mechanism should therefore undertake to ensure that their national competent authorities will abide by and adopt any measure in relation to credit institutions requested by the ECBuropean competent authorities. The ~~ECB~~y should be able to establish a close cooperation with the competent authorities of a Member State not participating in the common currency. It should be obliged to establish the cooperation where the conditions set out in this regulation are met. The conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the Member States which established a close co-operation take part to the activities of the Supervisory Board should allow the greatest possible involvement of those representatives taking into account the limits following from the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB, in particular as regards the integrity of its decision making processensure fair treatment and representation.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30

(30) In order to carry out its tasks, the ECB should have appropriate supervisory powers. Union law on the prudential supervision of credit institutions provides for certain powers to be conferred on competent authorities designated by the Member States for those purposes. To the extent that these powers fall within the scope of the supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB, for participating Member States the ECB should be considered the competent authority and should have the powers conferred on competent authorities by Union law. This includes powers conferred by those acts on the competent authorities of the home and the host Member States and the powers conferred on designated authorities.deleted

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31

(31) In order to carry out ~~its~~their tasks effectively, the ECBuropean competent authorities should be able to require all necessary information, and to conduct investigations and on-site inspections. These powers should apply to supervised entities, persons involved in the activities of those entities and related third parties, third parties to whom those entities have outsourced operational functions or activities and persons otherwise closely and substantially related or connected to the activities of those entities, including the staff of a supervised entity who are not directly involved in its activities but who, due to their function within the entity, may hold important information on a specific matter and firms which have provided services to those entities. The ECBuropean competent authorities should be able to require information by simple request under which the addressee is not obliged to provide the information but, in the event that it does so voluntarily, the information provided should not be incorrect or misleading and should be made available without delay. The ECBuropean competent authorities should also be able to require information by decision.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32

(32) Where credit institutions exercise their right of establishment or to provide services in another Member State, or where several entities in a group are established in different Member States, Union law provides for specific procedures and for attribution of competences between the Member States concerned. To the extent that the E~~CB takes~~uropean competent authorities take over certain supervisory tasks for all participating Member States, those procedures and attributions should not apply to the exercise of the right of establishment or to provide services in another participating Member State.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 34

(34) The conferral of supervisory tasks implies a significant responsibility for the ECB to safeguard financial stability in the Union, and to use its supervisory powers in the most effective and proportionate way. TAny shift of supervisory powers from Member States to the Union level should be balanced by appropriate transparency and accountability requirements. Consequently, the ECB should therefore be accountable for the exercise of these tasks towards the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers respectively the Eurogroup as democratically legitimised institutions representing the European people and the Member States. That should include regular reporting and responding to questions. Where national supervisors take action under this Regulation, accountability arrangements provided under national law should continue to apply.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 34 a (new)

(34 a) At the request of the parliaments of the participating Member States and of the European Parliament, a representative of the supervisory board of the ECB, together with the national and European competent authority, may be heard in the competent committees of the parliaments concerned, on the execution of its supervisory tasks. This further strengthening of democratic accountability is appropriate given the impact that supervisory measures may have on public finances, credit institutions, their customers and employees, and the markets in the participating Member States.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 35

(35) The ECB is responsible for carrying out monetary policy functions with a view to maintaining price stability in accordance with Article 127(1) TFEU. The exercise of supervisory tasks on behalf of EBA has the objective to protect the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. In order to avoid conflicts of interests and to ensure that each function is exercised in accordance with the applicable objectives, the ECB should ensure they are carried out in full separation. Staff involved in carrying out the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation should be organisationally separated from other ECB staff and should be subject to separate reporting lines.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36

(36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should ~~therefore~~be composed of representatives from the ECB and from national authorities from participating Member States. The board should be chaired by a Chair a~~nd a Vice-Chair elec~~ppointed by the ~~ECB G~~governing Ccouncil ~~and composed,~~ of the ECB. The Chair should be selected following a~~ddition, of representatives from the ECB and from national authorities. In order to allow for an appropriate rotation while ensuring the full independence of the Chair and the Vice-Chair, their term~~n open selection procedure and after approval by the European Parliament and should have considerable expertise and experience with financial institutions and financial supervision. The Vice-Chair of the supervisory board should be directly elected by the ECB Governing Council. The term of office of the Chair should not exceed five years and should be renewable once. The term of office of the Vice-Chair should not exceed five years and should not be renewable. In order to ensure full coordination with the activities of the EBA and with the prudential policies of the Union, the EBA and the European Commission should be observers in the supervisory board. ~~The performance of~~In order to effectively carry out the supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB ~~requires the adoption of a large number of technically complex acts and decisions, including decisions on individual credit institutions. In order to effectively carry out those tasks~~ in accordance with the principle of separation from tasks relating to monetary policy, the ECB Governing Council of the ECB should be able to delegate certain clearly defined supervisory tasks and related decisions to the supervisory board, subject to the oversight and responsibility of the Governing Council, which can give instructions and directions to that body. The supervisory board ~~may be supported by a steering committee with a more limited composition.~~ should take account of all relevant facts and circumstances in the participating Member States and should perform its duties in the interest of the Union as a whole. The national competent authorities of the participating Member States represented in the supervisory board should have equal voting rights.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 37

(37) The supervisory board, the steering committee and staff of the ECB carrying out supervisory duties on behalf of EBA should be subject to appropriate professional secrecy requirements. Similar requirements should apply to the exchange of information with the staff of the ECB not involved in supervisory activities. This should not prevent the ECB from exchanging information within the limits and under the conditions set out in the relevant Union legislation, including with the European Commission for the purposes of its tasks under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU and under Union law on enhanced economic and budgetary surveillance.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 39

(39) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should dispose of adequate resources. Those resources should be obtained in a way that ensures the ECB's independence from undue influences by national competent authorities and market participants, and separation between monetary policy and supervisory tasks. The costs of supervision should be primarily borne by the entities subject to it. Therefore, the exercise of supervisory tasks by the ECB should be financed at least partly by fees charged to credit institutions. In view of the transfer of significant supervisory tasks from national authorities to the ECBuropean competent authorities it is expected that any supervisory fees due at national level can be reduced as appropriate.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 41

(41) Given the globalisation of banking services and the increased importance of international standards, the ECBuropean competent authorities should carry out ~~its~~their tasks in respect of international standards and in dialogue and close cooperation with supervisors outside the Union, without duplicating the international role of the EBA. It should be empowered to develop contacts and enter into administrative arrangements with the supervisory authorities and administrations of third countries and with international organisations, subject to coordination with the EBAin close coordination and while fully respecting the existing roles and respective competences of the Member States and the Union institutions.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 44

(44) In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments concerns banks and Member States is addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECBuropean competent authorities should start carrying out specific supervisory tasks as soon as possible. However, the transfer of supervisory tasks from national supervisors to the ECB requires a certain amount of preparation. Therefore, an appropriate phasing-in period should be provided for. The number of banks subject to the supervision of the ECB should increase progressively, taking into account the relevance of the supervision of those banks to ensure financial stability. As a first step the ECB should be able to apply its supervisory tasks to any banks, in particular to banks which have receiveThe timetable for the implementation of the single supervisory mechanism should take into account the necessity of ensuring the highest quality of supervision, the need to establish a reasonable period for requested public financial assistance. As a second step, banks of European systemic importance as reflected in their total exposures and their cross-jurisdictional activities should be covered. Total exposures should be calculated in light of the methodologies defined in the Basel III accord of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervisors on the calculation of the leverage ratio and on the definition of common equity tier 1 capital. The phasing-in process should be completed within one year from the entry into force of this Regulation at the latestthe preparation of the new European supervisor to assume supervisory tasks under this Regulation, as well as the existence of the appropriate regulatory framework that encompasses and supports the performance of those supervisory tasks.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 45

(45) The current framework of prudential requirements for credit institutions ~~and the supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates~~ is formed by Directives providing for a significant number of options and discretions for Member States when circumscribing the powers of competent authorities. Pending the adoption of new Union legislative acts which spell out the powers which competent authorities shall have directly and without reference to Member States' options or discretions, the ECB can therefore not take any decisions directly applicable to credit institutions, financial holding companies or mixed financial holding companies. In this transitional phase, the ECB should therefore exercise its tasks only by instructing national competent authorities to act.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1

This Regulation confers on the ECB specific and clearly defined tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions on behalf of EBA, with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system, with due regard for the unity and integrity of the internal market.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 5

(5) ‘mixed financial holding company’ means a mixed financial holding company as defined in Article ~~2(15)~~3 2 b of Directive 200211/879/E~~C of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate15~~ U;

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6

~~(6) ‘financial conglomerate’ means a financial conglomerate as defined in Article 2(14) of Directive 2002/87/EC.~~deleted

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1

The ECB shall ~~cooperate closely with~~act at requests and on behalf of the European Banking Authority, and in close cooperation with the European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Systemic Risk Board, which form part of the European System of Financial Supervision established by Article 2 of Regulations (EU) No. 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010, and (EU) No 1095/2010.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law, ~~be exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes,~~for prudential supervisory purposes and at the request of EBA, carry out the following tasks in relation to ~~all~~the credit institutions ~~established in the participating Member States~~referred to in paragraph 1a:

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point j

(j) To participate in supplementary supervision of a financial conglomerate in relation to the credit institutions included in it and assume the tasks of a coordinator where the ECB is appointed as the coordinator for a financial conglomerate in accordance with the criteria set out relevant Union law;deleted

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. The ECB shall at request of EBA exercise the tasks set out in paragraph 1 in relation to credit institutions established in the participating Member States and which fall in one of the following categories: (a) credit institutions, financial holding companies or mixed financial holding companies which have received or requested public financial assistance; (b) the most significant credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies of European systemic importance at the highest level of consolidation, based on: (i) their size as reflected in the sum of exposure values of all assets and off- balance sheet liabilities not deducted when determining the common equity tier 1 capital for regulatory purposes; (ii) the systemic risk for the domestic economy concerned, expressed as the percentage of assets of a bank divided by GDP of its home country; and (iii) their cross-border activity as reflected in cross-jurisdictional claims such as deposits and other assets in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country and cross- jurisdictional liabilities such as loans and notes in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country, and which together cover at least half of the banking sector in the euro area as a whole and in each Member State.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2

2. For credit institutions established in a non-participating Member State, which establish a branch or provide cross-border services in a participating Member State, the ECB shall at the request of EBA carry out the tasks referred to in paragraph 1 for which the national competent authorities of the participating Member State are competent.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1

1. The ECB shall carry out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism composed of the ECBA and national competent authorities.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2

2. ~~National competent authorities shall assist the ECB on its request~~As regards credit institutions that fall within the scope of Article 4(1a), national competent authorities shall assist the European competent authorities to the extent possible with the preparation and implementation of any acts relating to the tasks referred to in Article 4.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 3

3. The ECBuropean competent authorities shall organise the practical modalities of implementation of paragraph 2 by the national supervisory authorities in discharging ~~its~~their tasks. ItEBA shall clearly define the framework and conditions under which national competent authorities shall carry out those activities, whereby the national competent authorities of all participating Member States shall be treated on an equal footing.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 4

4. National competent authorities shall follow the instructions given by the ECBuropean competent authorities. They shall continue to supervise the credit institutions that fall outside the scope of Article 4(1a).

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

1. Within the limits set out in this Article, the ECB shall carry out the tasks on behalf of EBA in the areas referred to in Article 4 (1) and (2) in relation to credit institutions established in a Member State whose currency is not the euro, where a close cooperation has been established between the ECB and the national competent authority of such Member State in accordance with this Article.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 5

5. Where the ECB considers that a measure relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1 should be adopted by the competent authority of a concerned Member State in relation to a credit institution, financial holding company or mixed-financial holding company, it shall consult with EBA and make a request to that authority, specifying a relevant timeframe. That timeframe shall be no less than 48 hours unless earlier adoption is indispensable to prevent irreparable damage. The competent authority of the concerned Member State shall take all the necessary measures in accordance with the obligation referred to in paragraph (2)(c).

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 5a* – subparagraph 1

5a. Where the conditions set out in paragraph 2(a) to (c) are no longer met by a Member State concerned, or where its competent authority does not act in accordance with the obligation referred to in paragraph 2(c), the ECB may decide to ~~terminate the close cooperation with that Member State. * NB: wrongly numbered as a second paragraph ‘5’ in the Commission proposal~~issue a warning to the Member State concerned that the cooperation will be terminated if no decisive corrective action is undertaken. If no such action has been undertaken 10 days after notification of such a warning, the ECB may after consultation with EBA terminate the close cooperation with that Member State on a date to be determined by the ECB.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1

Without prejudice to the respective competences of the Member States and the other Union institutions, in relation to the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation, the ECB may on behalf of EBA develop contacts and enter into administrative arrangements with supervisory authorities, international organisations and the administrations of third countries~~, subject to appropriate coordination with the EBA~~. Those arrangements shall not create legal obligations in respect of the Union and its Member States.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

1. For the purposes of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by Article 4(1) and (2), ~~the ECB~~EBA shall be considered the competent authority in the participating Member States in accordance with the relevant acts of Union law and have the powers and obligations which competent authorities shall have under those acts. ECB may act on behalf of EBA.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

For the purpose of carrying out the task referred to in Article 4(1) and (2), the ECB shall be considered as the designated authority in accordance with the relevant acts of Union law and have the powers and obligations which designated authorities shall have under those acts.deleted

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 2

~~2. For the purposes of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by Article 4(1) and (2), the ECB shall have the investigatory powers set out in Section I.~~deleted

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. The ECB may on behalf of EBA by simple request or by decision require the following legal or natural persons to provide all information that is necessary in order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, including information to be provided at recurring intervals and in specified formats for supervisory and related statistical purposes:

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Insurance undertakings do not fall within the scope of paragraph 1.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. In order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB may at the request of EBA conduct all necessary investigations of persons referred to in Article 9 (1) (a) to (g). To that end, the ECB shall have the right to:

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 1

1. In order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB may on behalf of EBA conduct all necessary on-site inspections at the business premises of the legal persons referred to in Article 9(1) (a) to (g), in accordance with Article 12. Where the proper conduct and efficiency of the inspection so require, the ECB may carry out the on-site inspection without prior announcement.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

If the credit institution which falls in the scope of Article 4(1a) complies with all conditions of authorisation set out in national law of that Member State, the national competent authority shall take a decision to propose to ~~the ECB~~EBA to grant the authorisation. The decision shall be notified to the ECBA and to the credit institution concerned. EBA may confer the task to authorise a credit institution and for the withdrawal of authorisations to the ECB.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3

When the ECBA receives the proposal from the national competent authority referred to in the second subparagraph, it shall grant the authorisation for institutions which fall in the scope of Article 4(1a) within six weeks of receiving that proposal where the conditions set out in Union law are met. The decision shall be notified to the credit institution concerned.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

~~The ECB~~EBA may withdraw the authorisation in the cases set out in Union acts on its own initiative or on a proposal from the national competent authority of the Member State where the credit institution is established.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Where the national competent authority which has proposed the authorisation in accordance with paragraph 1 considers that the authorisation must be withdrawn in accordance with the national law, it shall submit a proposal to ~~the ECB~~EBA to that end. In that case, ~~the ECB~~EBA may withdraw the authorisation.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1

1. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, where credit institutions, financial holding companies, or mixed financial holding companies, intentionally or negligibly, breach a requirement under directly applicable Union acts in relation to which administrative pecuniary sanctions shall be available to competent authorities under Union law, the ECB may on behalf of EBA impose administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach where those can be determined, or up to 10% of the total annual turnover of a legal person in the preceding business year.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 4

4. ~~The ECB~~EBA shall apply this Article in accordance with Articles 3 to 5 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

5. In the cases not covered by paragraph 1, where necessary for the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, ~~the ECB~~EBA may require national competent authorities to take action in order to ensure that appropriate sanctions are imposed. The sanctions applied by national competent authorities will be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 6

6. ~~The ECB~~EBA shall publish any sanction referred to paragraph 1 without undue delay including information on the type and nature of the breach and the identity of persons responsible for it, unless such publication would seriously jeopardise the stability of the financial markets. Where publication would cause a disproportionate damage to the parties involved, the ECB shall publish the sanction on an anonymous basis.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 7

7. Without prejudice to paragraphs 1 to 6, for the purposes of carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, in case of breaches of ECBA regulations or decisions the ECBA may impose sanctions in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1

1. The planning and execution of the supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB under this Regulation, shall be undertaken by an internal body composed of four representatives of the ECB appointed by the Executive Board of the ECB and one representative of the national authority competent for the supervision of credit institutions in each participating Member State (hereinafter ‘supervisory board’).

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 1

1. From the 1st of July 2013, the ECB shall carry out the supervisory tasks conferred on it also in relation to the most significant credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies of European systemic importance at the highest level of consolidation, based on their size as reflected in, the sum of exposure values of all assets and off-balance sheet liabilities not deducted when determining the common equity tier 1 capital for regulatory purposes, and their cross- border activity as reflected in cross- jurisdictional claims such as deposits and other assets in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country and cross-jurisdictional liabilities such as loans and notes in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country, which together cover at least half of the banking sector in the Euro area as a whole, on 1 January 2013. The ECB shall adopt and make public the list of those institutions before 1 March 2013uropean competent authorities shall carry out the supervisory tasks conferred on it.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 2

~~2. The ECB shall assume in full the tasks conferred on it by this regulation on the 1 January 2014 at latest.~~deleted

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 3

3. Before 1 J~~anuar~~uly 20143 the ECB may, by a decision addressed to the credit institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company and the national competent authority of the participating Member States concerned, start carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, in ~~particular~~ where a credit institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company has received or requested public financial assistance.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON