55 Amendments of Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS related to 2015/2344(INI)
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 9
Citation 9
– having regard to Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area, Regulation (EU) no 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, Regulation (EU) no 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, Regulation (EU) no 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure;
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro; whereas the European Monetary Union referred to in TEU article 3.4 currently consists of 19 members, two of whom having the Euro, two members haveing opt-out clauses, and the remaining seven EU Member States having yetbound to join; whereas no financial liability will be incurred by the two countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas economic convergence is a condition for forming a stable common currency, and cohesion policy has not been sufficient in its aim to decrease the divergence between Member States;
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Recital B b (new)
Bb. whereas rapid technological development risk benefitting different parts of the Eurozone to different degrees leading to further cementing divergence between Member States in the Eurozone;
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas contrary to the budgetary arrangements in all other federations, the EU budget is largely dependent on contributions from Member State level to EU level, which is different to fully fledged federations;
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas it became apparent during the sovereign debt crisis that the European Treaties do not provide the euro area with the instruments to deal effectively with shocks in the absence of Member States’ compliance with fiscal surveillance frameworks and structural reforms to increase competitiveness and resilience of their economies, and full labour and capital market integration, both of which play an important shock absorbing function in a monetary union;
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas it became apparent during the sovereign debt crisis that the European Treaties do not provide the euro area with the instruments to deal effectively with shocks; whereas the rules-based system, with loose adherence to the rules by the Member States, and mere coordination of national economic policies failed to provide the required resilience during the crisis;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas, following nominal and increased real convergence in the run-up to the introduction of the common currency, the euro area witnessed structural divergence between 1999 and 2009 with the economies at the centre relying more on exports and tradable activities and the economies in the periphery on non- tradable activities and construction, which made the euro area as a whole less resilient to shocks; whereas regulatory adjustments and structural reforms aimed at reducing risks and improving convergence have been introduced since 2009 at both European and national level, but some euro area Member States still require solidarity and sustainablefar reaching structural reforms in their catching- up process;
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas the Euro acted as a shield during the financial crisis and whereas many Member States would have experienced a worse situation without it; whereas improvements are however required for the Euro to really meet its promises and potential;
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)
Recital F b (new)
Fb. whereas any budgetary capacity for the euro area should not be seen independently from the other necessary evolutions required for the euro area to be an optimal currency area, nor from other tools that already exist (inter alia EIB/EIF), nor from existing rules;
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the Community method was abandoned in favour of intergovernmental agreementsintergovernmental agreements instead of the Community method have been used in order to allow for rapid responses in the crisis; whereas this has made the European Council the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Commission, the European Parliament and its national counterparts have been sidelined;
Amendment 171 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate devaluation; acknowledges that the Euro in itself is a shield against exchange rate fluctuations; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix;
Amendment 175 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuationrequired the carrying out of structural reforms to compensate for the loss of monetary policy as a stabilisation tool; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix;
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member Statein the light of excessive public and private debt levels, unsustainable imbalances, triggered by a lack of structural reforms to foster competitiveness, aggravated and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mereand the lack of consolidation of public finances, partly due to non-adherence to agreed budgetary rules, the very existence of the euro area;
Amendment 203 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms, as well as loose adherence by Member States to the common fiscal framework, has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Believes that the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure has not been used to its full potential to prevent imbalances and to foster greater convergence;
Amendment 218 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Observes that in the absence of the willingness of euro area Member States’ governments to take action to rapidly consolidate their public finances and modernise their economies the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policyfiscal surveillance framework on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reform;
Amendment 262 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Makes it clear that rapid action is needed to ensure the sustainabila well-defined roadmap is needed to realise the full benefitys of the eurocommon currency; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets;
Amendment 268 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vitalpossible element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteriamoral hazard is prevented and responsibility and solidarity are closely linked, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of adherence to the fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance framework, the CSRs and to commitments that are being made under specific programmes;
Amendment 269 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria; considers that it should go hand in hand with completion of the internal market, with an EU budget funding European and future oriented investments;
Amendment 281 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Argues that convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro-area and national level are key, notably to preventing permanent transfers and moral hazard; states that responsibilities must be assigned at the level where decisions are taken or implemented, with national parliaments scrutinising national governments and the European Parliament scrutinising the European executives; believes that this is the only way to ensure the required increased accountability of decision-making;
Amendment 302 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocksto prevent shocks and in order to enable daily political management;
Amendment 311 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Stresses that a sufficient degree of wage and price flexibility, and labour mobility need to be guaranteed to ensure that a fiscal capacity is sustainable and does not lead to permanent transfers between Member States;
Amendment 317 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Stresses that, while seeking complementarities and avoiding overlaps, a fiscal capacity must be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, within its legal framework, in order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro Member States; considers however that the option of an ad-hoc Euro area Treaty should not be disregarded, as this has been the tool chosen for the UK settlement;
Amendment 330 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resourcesadequate own resources, drawing lessons from one of the main failures of the EU budget coming from the expectation of a "fair return", calculated only in numerical terms; recalls the creation of the interinstitutional group on own resources (the Monti group), whose creation in itself reveals an awareness of this problem;
Amendment 342 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3
Subheading 3
Amendment 344 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Considers that, in opposition to the ESM, EFSF, EFSM which were conceived as emergency tools, the budgetary capacity of the euro area should be seen as a permanent governance tool and fund the stability of the Euro area, labour mobility, investment to bring prosperity, in order to make it an optimal currency area;
Amendment 350 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Considers that three different functions have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in ordera sound management of the Euro area must include notably the following elements: to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so asto address asymmetric shocks, to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole;
Amendment 394 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Demands that the ESM be integrated into the Union’s legal framework and evolve towards a Community mechanism, as provided for in the ESM Treaty and as constantly requested by the European Parliament and foreseen in the Five Presidents’ report; underlines that the ECJ Pringle case-law and jurisprudence open up the possibility of bringing the ESM within the Union’s framework, within the existing Treaties, on the basis of Article 352 TFEU; calls, therefore, on the Commission to bring forward as a matter of urgency a legislative proposal to that end; demands that the ESM be made fully accountable to the Members of European Parliament elected in the contributing Member States;
Amendment 412 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the Members of the European Parliament elected in the contributing Member States; emphasises that national parliaments would be adequately involved in the process, given thatif their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources couldwere to be affected;
Amendment 415 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected;
Amendment 420 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Believes that any EMF financial assistance program with a Member State should be based on strict reform conditionality as well as a sustainable debt path.
Amendment 427 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Insists that once it is integrated into Community law, the fiscal capacity for the euro area should be integrated into the EU budget, provided control and accountability is the responsibility of those contributing to it, but over and above the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF);
Amendment 433 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Insists that once it is integrated into Community law, the fiscal capacity for the euro areaEMF should be integrated into the EU budget, but over and above the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF);
Amendment 458 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Believes that compliance with a convergence code based on the country- specific-recommendations should be the condition for access to funding from the ESM/EMF; reiterates its call on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to this end;
Amendment 461 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Believes that compliance with a convergence code should be the condition for access to fundborrowing from the ESM/EMF; reiterates its call on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to this end;
Amendment 464 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4
Subheading 4
Amendment 513 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – introductory part
Paragraph 26 – introductory part
26. Suggests that the convergence code define criteria to be reached within five years, building on the merits of the Maastricht criteria and focusing for the first period on convergence requirements regarding:
Amendment 518 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1
Paragraph 26 – indent 1
Amendment 524 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1
Paragraph 26 – indent 1
– taxation: base and rate of corporate taximplementation of a CCCTB and modification of fiscal rules detrimental to the optimal allocation of capital as underlined in the Werner report,
Amendment 531 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2
Paragraph 26 – indent 2
Amendment 536 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2
Paragraph 26 – indent 2
– labour market, including minimum wages within sectors (within the Member State), and pension systems,
Amendment 546 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3
Paragraph 26 – indent 3
Amendment 549 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1
Amendment 564 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2
Amendment 589 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5
Subheading 5
Amendment 602 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Is convinced that increased convergence within the euro area will significantly increase the capacity of its Member States to absorb asymmetric shocks; believes, however, that no matter how great the efforts regarding convergence and sustainable structural reforms, asymmetric shocks with an impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member States; stresses, therefore, the need to have an instrument available for this emergency which provides an immediate stabilisation effectrecalls the ESM in this respect, which is the instrument available for this emergency;
Amendment 610 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
Amendment 675 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 6
Subheading 6
Amendment 701 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Considers that in the case of symmetric shocks brought about by a lack of internal demand, monetary policy alone cannot reignite the economy, particularly in a context of zero lower bounds; is therefore convinced that public and private investment must be increased, the administrative burden reduced and a proper, simpler regulatory framework developed and implemented, with a view to stimulating potential growth;
Amendment 751 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
Amendment 768 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Calls urgently for the European Parliament and national parliaments to be given a strengthened role in the renewed economic governance framework in order to reinforce democratic accountability; calls for increased national ownership in the European Semester in order to improve compliance with the CSRs;
Amendment 790 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Considers that in order to provide for a genuine EMU, a euro area treasury should be created for collective decision- making, supervision and management of the budgetary capacity for the euro area; calls for the inclusion of this treasury within the European Commission with full macroeconomic, fiscal and financial competences; calls for a vice-president of the European Commission to head the treasury and simultaneously to act as president of the Eurogroup; urges full accountability of this treasury to the European Parliament with appropriate accountability;
Amendment 808 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Considers that those non-euro countries that do not have an opt-out will eventually become part of the EMU and therefore may join the governance framework on a voluntary basis with a special status; considers it essential to differentiate between discussion concerning policies for the euro area and related decision making; modalities must be found to allow all Member States who are committed to joining the euro area to participate in discussions concerning the euro area, if they so wish, however only Member States who are members of the euro area should be able to vote on these decisions;
Amendment 822 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Acknowledges that the current political climate characterised by deep inequality, mistrust and uncertainty is not conducive to proper reforms to achieve and complete EMU; believes, therefore,Believes that a comprehensive roadmap, including clear milestones and convergence criteria within an agreed timetable and taking into account the political situation, should be urgently adopted with a clear commitment by euro area Heads of State and Government to achieving a genu; considers that the roadmap should also address the issue of sovereign debt stock ine and complete EMU appropriate manner;