BETA

16 Amendments of Eva MAYDELL related to 2018/2100(INI)

Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas participation in the Banking Union is open to Member States that have not yet adopted the euro; whereas no EU Member State has so far decided to participate on that basis; whereas several Member States are discussing the possibility of joining the Banking Union; whereas different financial institutions see advantages in being situated within the Banking Union;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Takes note ofWelcomes the achievements of the Banking Union in fostering a truly single market, a level playing field and predictability for market actors; considers that a fully completed Banking Union will further strengthen financial stability and growth prospects in the EU;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Stresses the importance of completing the capital markets union, which will help to channel credit into the real economy, further enable private risk sharing and complement funding through banks; considers, however, that efforts towards creating a Capital Markets Union should not reduce the emphasis put on the completion of the work on the Banking Union, which is still a prerequisite for financial stability in the bank-reliant landscape of the European Union;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Recalls that the Banking Union is open to all Member States; encourages all other non-euro area Member States to take the necessary steps to join the Banking Union, which would progressively align the Banking Union with the entire internal market; takes note that there are some apparently unattractive features of the Banking Union "close cooperation" which is the mechanism for Member States, whose currency is not the euro, to join the Single Supervisory Mechanism. A "close cooperation" country will face extremely asymmetrical treatment: It will not have access to liquidity support from the ECB; it will remain excluded from the final decision-making on supervisory matters in the Governing Council of the ECB; the ECB supervision decisions that are not legally binding outside of the euro area will need to be reproduced by acts of the local supervisor, which will be legally liable in any disputes; different treatment of euro area and non-euro area Member States is further strengthened upon entry into the Single Resolution Mechanism in which the country joining the Banking Union under "close cooperation" is automatically included because the country does not have access to the Single Resolution Fund. The above considerations explain why the inclusion in the Banking Union remains somehow unattractive for non-euro area Member States; calls for urgent legislative changes in this regard (Banking Union "close cooperation" legal framework);
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Takes note of the ECB’s recent ‘failing or likely to fail’ assessments, carried out in 2018; is deeply concerned that some of these cases raised issues concerning the enforcement of anti-money laundering rules in the Banking Union; underlines the urgent need for a common EU approach in this regard with clearly assigned powers; notes that issues concerning the enforcement of anti- money laundering legislation have also been revealed outside the Banking Union; considers that, as membership of the Banking Union brings about increased effectiveness of banking supervision, joining the Banking Union could benefit non euro area Member States experiencing issues with the application of anti-money laundering legislation;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #
7a. Considers that the options and national discretions set out in Union law concerning banking supervision hinder the creation of a genuine Banking Union and reduce the effectiveness of the Banking Union; considers that existing options and national discretions should be phased-out and that legislators should refrain from introducing new ones, unless they are accompanied by a sound justification and are temporary in nature;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Considers that the options and national discretions set out in Union law concerning banking supervision hinder the creation of a genuine Banking Union and reduce the effectiveness of the Banking Union; considers that existing options and national discretions should be phased-out and that legislators should refrain from introducing new ones, unless they are accompanied by a sound justification and are temporary in nature;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Highlights that sovereign debt is not risk-free; takes note of the on-going work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on sovereign risk; is concerned by the fact that some financial institutions are heavily invested inis also concerned by the fact that some financial institutions have excessively large exposures invested in sovereign debt issued by their own sgovereign debt; calls on the Commissionnments; takes note of the solutions explored to assddress whether to introduce risk weighting on sovereign bonds or exposure limits in the EUthose issues and in particular of the on-going work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on sovereign risk; believes that potential changes made to the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures should be coordinated internationally;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Welcomes the Commission proposal to reinforce the role of the EBA in anti-money laundering supervision in the financial sector; calls on the co-legislators adopt the proposal without undue delay within the framework of the review of the European System for Financial Supervision;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the NPL package; welcomes the ECB addendum on NPLs and the work of the EBA on guidelines on management of non-performing and forborne exposures; welcomes the reduction in volume of NPLs over the past years; stresses that the risk to financial stability posed by NPLs is still significant; agrees with the Commission that the primary responsibility for reducing NPLs lies with the Member States, notably through efficient insolvency laws, and banks themselvesexpects the efforts made to bring results soon, which would enable further progress towards the completion of the Banking Union and of the Economic and Monetary Union;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 136 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Considers that further harmonisation of practices concerning the assessment of whether a bank is failing or likely to fail as well as a clearer distinction between supervisory powers and early intervention powers would help to make crisis management by competent authorities, prior to resolution, more effective;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Recalls that normal insolvency proceedings are the procedure applying when resolution action is not deemed to be in the public interest and, as such, likely to be even more frequently resorted to than resolution; believes, however, that insolvency legislation, and at the very least insolvency legislation applying to banks, urgently needs further harmonisation across the Banking Union and across the Union as a whole, in the light of its importance and of its interplay with the resolution regime;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Welcomes the work done by the SRB on resolution planning and resolution preparedness; considers that the fact that none of the cases of bank failures witnessed in 2017 and 2018 gave raise to lasting spillover effects or negative repercussions has illustrated the success of the resolution regime in the Banking Union;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 163 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Stresses the importance of access to liquidity for banks in resolution, during and immediately after resolution proceedings; follows with interest ongoing debates on a possible tool for the provision of liquidity in resolution;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 164 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 b (new)
19b. Stresses the issues resulting from the asymmetry between the burden- sharing rules applying in, respectively, insolvency and resolution; believes that this asymmetry should be corrected once legacy issues are solved, in order to ensure common rules and a level playing field for all banks, investors and creditors in the Banking Union;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 175 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Takes note of the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 concerning the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); underlines the necessity of EDIS as the third pillar of the Banking Union; believes it in order to ensure equal protection for all depositors across the Banking Union, strengthen confidence, foster cross-border financial integration and make recourse to insolvency less problematic when it is needed; believes EDIS should be fully implemented oncein parallel with significant risk reduction has taken place;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON