2 Amendments of Bernard MONOT related to 2017/0138(CNS)
Amendment 22 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) Most Member States find it increasingly difficult to protect their national tax bases from erosion as taxlegal tax avoidance planning structures have evolved to be particularly sophisticated and often take advantage of the increasedoverall mobility of both capital and persons within the internal market. These structures commonly consist of arrangements which are developed across variousA small number of Member States are with impunity taking outrageous advantage of this opportunity offered to multinationals, especially American multinationals, to artificially channel their taxable profits earned in various EU Member States into jurisdictions andoffering movre taxable profits towards more beneficial tax regimes or have the effect of reducing the taxpayer´s overall tax billfavourable conditions, such as Ireland and Luxembourg, whose tax regimes are deliberately designed and tailored to ensure that the overall tax bill payable by these multinationals is kept to a minimum. As a result, Member States often experience considerable reductions in their tax revenues which hinder them from applying growth-friendly taxbudgetary policies. It is therefore critical that Member States' tax authorities obtain comprehensive and relevant information about potentially aggressive tax arrangements. This information would enable those authorities to be able to promptly react against harmful tax practices and to close loopholes through enacting legislation or by undertaking adequate risk assessments and carrying out tax audits.
Amendment 40 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) The disclosure of potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements of a cross-border dimension can contribute effectively to the efforts for creating an environment of fair taxation in the internal market and strengthen the collective pressure on those Member States that abuse freedom of movement of capital and EU company law provisions in a bid to attract the tax base of other Member States. In this light, an obligation on intermediaries to inform tax authorities on certain cross-border arrangements that could potentially be used for tax avoidance purposes would constitute a step in the right direction. In order to develop a more comprehensive policy, it would also be significant that as a second step, following disclosure, the tax authorities share information with their peers in other Member States. Such arrangements should also enhance the effectiveness of the CRS. In addition, it would be crucial to grant the Commission access to a sufficient amount of information so that it can monitor the proper functioning of this Directive. Such access to information by the Commission does not discharge a Member State from its obligations to notify any state aid to the Commission.